PLATT v. LEAFFILTER NORTH LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GEORGE PLATT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:25-CV-332
)
LEAFFILTER NORTH, LLC, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge.
The plaintiff, George Platt, sued defendant LeafFilter North, LLC, alleging that he
“performed sales services” for LeafFilter for several years and that LeafFilter terminated
the arrangement in April 2024. He asserts a number of claims arising out of these and
surrounding events. LeafFilter moves for judgment on the pleadings. The motion will be
granted in part as to those causes of action where Mr. Platt has not stated a plausible
claim for relief and will otherwise be denied.
I. 	Brief Overview of Facts as Alleged in the Complaint
Mr. Platt alleges that LeafFilter misclassified him and other persons who provided
sales services on LeafFilter’s behalf as independent contractors instead of as employees.
See, e.g., Doc. 1 ¶ 34. He alleges that his agreement with LeafFilter, referred to in his
complaint and elsewhere as a “Direct Seller Agreement” or a “DSA,” explicitly stated
that “Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 3508, Direct Seller will not be treated as an
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 9

2
employee,” id. at ¶ 30, that § 3508 of the Code does not authorize such a categorization
as an independent contractor, and that this statement is false and misleading.
Other allegations will be noted in the context of specific claims asserted.
II. 	Discussion
A. False Claims Act Retaliation Claim
To sufficiently plead retaliation under the False Claims Act, a plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that: (1) he engaged in protected
activity in furtherance of a qui tam suit, (2) his employer knew about the protected
activity, and (3) his employer took adverse action against him as a result. Glynn v. EDO
Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2013); accord Smith v. Clark/Smoot/Russell, 796 F.3d
424, 433 (4th Cir. 2015). An employee is engaged in protected activity “in furtherance
of” an FCA action when “litigation is a distinct possibility, when the conduct reasonably
could lead to a viable FCA action, or when litigation is a reasonable possibility.” United
States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc., 912 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned
up).
Mr. Platt alleges that after he told LeafFilter he believed its practice of
characterizing direct sellers like him as independent contractors was “materially
misleading” and resulted in LeafFilter filing false 1099s and evading payroll tax
obligations, LeafFilter retaliated against him by terminating him. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57–60.
This is insufficient to state a plausible claim. Among other problems, nothing in Mr.
Platt’s complaint gives rise to an inference that his complaints were in furtherance of
False Claims Act litigation.
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 9

3
Given this fatal defect in the complaint, the Court need not go into the several
other reasons the complaint fails to state a False Claims Act retaliation claim.
B. Declaratory Judgment
A request for a declaratory judgment is not technically a separate cause of action
but rather is a remedy or form of relief. Mr. Platt asks for a declaratory judgment that his
contract language declaring him to be an independent contractor and imposing penalties
for challenging that language is void because it violates the FLSA. Id. at ¶¶ 62–65. This
is linked to his FLSA claim, which, as discussed infra, may proceed.
But according to the complaint, Mr. Platt no longer works for LeafFilter. Thus, he
cannot show future injury or that future litigation as to him is likely to happen. See Wells
v. Johnson, 150 F.4th 289, 302 (4th Cir. 2025) (“To have standing a plaintiff must show
both that future litigation is likely to happen (at least absent the declaration sought) and
that the declaration’s preclusive effect will likely help him in that litigation.”). Thus, Mr.
Platt lacks standing to pursue a declaratory judgment remedy. And to the extent he
requests a declaratory judgment that the language in his agreement with LeafFilter is void
whenever it appears in any contract LeafFilter or any other person or entity has with
another person, that request for relief will be dismissed because he has made no claim on
behalf of a class or collective.
C. Breach of Contract
Mr. Platt alleges that his agreement with LeafFilter required 30 days’ notice for
termination, that LeafFilter did not give him 30 days’ notice, and that this failure was a
breach of contract. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 67–68. LeafFilter contends that it terminated Mr. Platt
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 9

4
for cause so that the 30-day notice provision did not apply. But Mr. Platt disputes the
reasons given by LeafFilter for his termination and denies, for example, that he failed to
show up for work. LeafFilter’s arguments are better addressed on a more developed
factual record. As to this cause of action, the motion to dismiss will be denied.
D. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
Mr. Platt alleges that after he complained to LeafFilter that he was misclassified as
an independent contractor, reported data security violations, and raised workplace
discrimination, he was terminated, and that his termination violates North Carolina public
policy. Id. at ¶¶ 71–72. While no North Carolina court has expressly identified the
essential elements for this cause of action, the elements of a claim alleging wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, generally, are described as:
(1) the plaintiff was an at-will employee of the defendant; (2) the defendant
terminated the plaintiff; (3) there was a public policy applicable to the
circumstances of the termination; (4) the plaintiff was protected by this
public policy; and (5) the defendant’s motivation in terminating the plaintiff
violated this public policy.
Crespo v. Delta Apparel, Inc., No. 07-CV-65, 2008 WL 2986279, at *5 (W.D.N.C. July
31, 2008); accord Malik v. Amazon.com Prices, LLC, No. 21-CV-627, 2024 WL 150763,
at *8 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2024). Ordinary discussions or complaints with employers
about wages, salary, or job classification are not, without more, protected by the public
policy of the state. Nor does public policy automatically protect an employee merely
because the employee characterizes an employer’s practice as illegal or malfeasant.
Here, Mr. Platt believes LeafFilter improperly classified him as an independent
contractor instead of as an employee and believes that was illegal. But using the word
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 9

5
“malfeasance” does not make expression of that opinion protected by law. He points to
no North Carolina law supporting his assertion that there is such a public policy.
While complaints of racial and religious discrimination may be so protected, Mr.
Platt’s allegations about these complaints are conclusory and insufficient to raise a
plausible claim. Likewise, his conclusory assertions that his reports of “data security
violations” under the contract without any support for the proposition that this violates
public policy are insufficient to state a plausible claim.
E. Fair Labor Standards Act
While his complaint is inartful, Mr. Platt adequately alleges that he was
misclassified as an independent contractor instead of an employee and that he is entitled
to approximately $10,000 in unpaid wages and overtime. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 75–78. The Court
agrees with LeafFilter that the complaint is long on hyperbole and short on factual
details, but the amount of the unpaid wage is set forth with specificity, and details can be
provided in discovery.
A scheduling order was entered on September 19, 2024, Doc. 26, and it required
the parties to provide initial pretrial disclosures by October 24, 2025. Doc. 26 at ¶ 1(d).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires a party to disclose to its opposing party “a
computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must
also make available . . . the documents or other evidentiary material . . . on which each
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). “[A] party’s Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) disclosure
must state the types of damages that the party seeks, must contain a specific computation
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 9

6
of each category, and must include documents to support the computations.” Silicon
Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 07-CV-275, 2012 WL 1596722, at *1 (E.D.N.C.
May 7, 2012). Providing a lump sum is not sufficient. Intercollegiate Women’s Lacrosse
Coaches Ass’n v. Corrigan Sports Enter., 698 F. Supp. 3d 814, 819 (M.D.N.C. 2023);
accord Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). If Mr. Platt has
not done this, he should do so immediately.
F. Unfair Trade Practices Claim
Mr. Platt alleges that LeafFilter committed an unfair trade practice by
“misrepresenting” the Internal Revenue Code in the contract with direct sellers and by
imposing coercive penalties. Doc. 1 at ¶ 80(a). North Carolina’s UDTPA does not
extend to basic employment disputes, which is what Mr. Platt alleges happened here; to
be applicable to an employment relationship, plaintiffs must allege special circumstances.
Bonham v. Wolf Creek Acad., 767 F. Supp. 2d 558, 574 (W.D.N.C. 2011); see HAJMM
Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 593, 403 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1991)
(observing UDTPA “does not cover employer-employee relations”); Durling v. King, 146
N.C. App. 483, 488–89, 554 S.E.2d 1, 4–5 (2001) (concluding UDTPA did not apply in
employees’ suit to recover unpaid commissions). Mr. Platt has alleged no such special
circumstances here.
Mr. Platt also alleges that LeafFilter engaged in deceptive and misleading practices
against consumers by “deceiving consumers” by outfitting misclassified workers with
LeafFilter uniforms and credentials, Doc. 1 at ¶ 80(b), by directing workers to collect
sensitive consumer information of consumers, id. at ¶ 80(c), and by failing to respond to
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 9

7
his report of a live consumer data breach. Id. at ¶ 80(d). But he does not allege any facts
tending to indicate that he was harmed by these practices. It is an element of an unfair
trade practices claim that such unfair or misleading practice have caused injury to the
plaintiff. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 et. seq; Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C.
61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2000). Alleging that other persons were harmed does not
state a claim.
The motion to dismiss the Chapter 75 claim will be granted.
G. Title VII
Mr. Platt alleges that LeafFilter discriminated against him by mandating weekly
Christian prayer sessions, Doc. 1 at ¶ 85, and by terminating his employment after he
complained about racial discrimination against a coworker. Id. at ¶¶ 86–87. He alleges
that he timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in September 2024, citing
to “Exhibit C.” Id. at ¶ 89. LeafFilter moves to dismiss this cause of action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Before a plaintiff may file a suit under Title VII alleging discrimination or
retaliation, he must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and exhaust his
administrative remedies. See, e.g., Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th
Cir. 2002); accord Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383–84 (4th Cir. 2022)
(cleaned up). Failure to do so is not a jurisdictional defect, but it is a mandatory claims
processing rule. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019). In the absence
of such a charge, dismissal is the appropriate remedy when raised by the defendant. See,
e.g., Stevens v. Elior Inc., No. 22-CV-576, 2023 WL 3061857, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 24,
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 9

8
2023) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where plaintiff filed suit before administrative
remedies were exhausted).
Here, LeafFilter has not directly asserted that Mr. Platt did not file a charge with
the EEOC, but it accurately points out that “Exhibit C” cited by the plaintiff is not an
EEOC charge of discrimination, nor does it in any way show that Mr. Platt filed such a
charge. Mr. Platt acknowledges that he has not received a right to sue letter from the
EEOC. Doc. 46 at 18 (noting that the right to sue letter is “pending”).
Mr. Platt contends that at this stage, the Court must accept as true his allegation
that he filed a charge with the EEOC. If he has in fact filed such a charge, it is difficult to
understand why he did not provide a copy with his brief in opposition. Without the
charge, LeafFilter is precluded from evaluating whether the claims in the lawsuit are
broader than the claims in the EEOC charge, for example.
The motion to dismiss this cause of action will be granted, but if Mr. Platt has filed
a charge of discrimination and all other conditions for filing an individual claim have
now been met, he may file a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint setting
forth such facts with specificity and attaching both a proposed amended complaint and a
copy of the EEOC charge and other necessary documents showing exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
It is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Doc.
33, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1. 	The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of
contract and violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 9

9
2. 	The motion to dismiss is otherwise GRANTED and the plaintiff’s remaining
claims are DISMISSED. The Title VII claim dismissal is without prejudice
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as are claims dismissed for lack
of standing.
3. 	If the plaintiff has filed an EEOC charge and has received a right to sue letter,
the plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint including
a Title VII claim within ten days. Any such motion SHALL comply with LR
15.1.
This the 29th day of January, 2026.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00332-CCE-JEP Document 50 Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 9