Navia v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00302-MR-WCM
JUAN CARLOS NAVIA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 24].
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 30, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court
of Yancey County, North Carolina, asserting claims for breach of contract,
bad faith, and unfair claim settlement practices against the Defendant
insurance company. [Doc. 1-1]. The Defendant filed timely notice of removal
to this Court on September 5, 2025 and an Answer on September 12, 2025.
[Docs. 1, 6]. On January 20, 2026, the Defendant filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, and the Plaintiff filed a Response on February
19, 2026. [Docs. 15, 19].
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On March 25, 2026, the Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
its Answer solely to include an additional defense. [Doc. 21]. The Court
granted that motion on April 14, 2026, and the Defendant filed its Amended
Answer the same day. [Text-Only Order entered April 14, 2026; Doc. 23].
Because the Defendant filed an Amended Answer, the Court denied the
Defendant’s then-pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as moot,
without prejudice as to the filing of a renewed motion for judgment on the
pleadings. [Text-Only Order entered April 14, 2026]. On April 17, 2026, the
Defendant filed a renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. [Doc. 24].
The Plaintiff has not filed a Response, and the deadline to do so has expired.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion is now ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In
evaluating such a motion, the Court is limited to considering the parties’
pleadings, such as the Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Defendant’s Answer, as
well as any documents attached thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a); see also
Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013).
“The standard of review for Rule 12(c) motions is the same as the
standard used to review a district court's ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
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motion to dismiss.” Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Ladue, No. 21-1680, 2023 WL
5289365, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2023). Therefore, to survive a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To be “plausible on its face,” a
plaintiff must demonstrate more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must “draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” but the court “need not accept
as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.”
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th
Cir. 2009). As a result, “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action,
and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to constitute
well-pled facts.” Id. at 255. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task,” Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at
193, which requires the Court to assess whether the factual allegations of
the complaint are sufficient “to raise the right to relief above the speculative
level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action concerns the Defendant’s denial of the Plaintiff’s claim for
insurance coverage for damages to real property owned by the Plaintiff that
he alleges were caused by Hurricane Helene on September 27, 2024. [Doc.
1-1 at ¶¶ 7-28]. It is undisputed that the Defendant issued an insurance
policy to the Plaintiff that was in full force and effect at the time of the alleged
damages. [Id. at ¶¶ 9-17; Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 9-17]. The Plaintiff timely filed a
claim for coverage under the insurance policy, and he provided the
Defendant with “a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss,” “all photographs
available and in his possession” regarding the damages, and an “estimate
for the Loss.” [Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 21]; see also [Doc. 23 ¶ 21].
On or about November 18, 2024, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff
that only some of the Plaintiff’s claimed damages were covered by the
Plaintiff’s insurance policy, and the Defendant denied payment for those
damages because the estimate for the covered damages did not exceed the
Plaintiff’s deductible. [Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 23; Doc. 23-2; Doc. 23-3]. The Plaintiff
requested reconsideration of his claim, and, on or about April 10, 2025, the
Defendant again denied payment. [Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 24; Doc. 23-4;]. The
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegations regarding whether the Plaintiff
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provided any additional information to the Defendant between the
Defendant’s first and second denials of coverage.1
IV. DISCUSSION
The Defendant has moved for partial judgment on the pleadings
regarding the Plaintiff’s claims for bad faith and unfair claim settlement
practices. [Doc. 23].
Under North Carolina law, to state a plausible claim for an insurer’s
bad faith refusal to settle, the Plaintiff must plead “(1) a refusal to pay after
recognition of a valid claim, (2) bad faith, and (3) aggravating or outrageous
conduct.” Lovell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 416, 420, 424
S.E.2d 181, 184, aff'd, 334 N.C. 682, 435 S.E.2d 71 (1993). To plead bad
faith, the Plaintiff must allege more than mere “honest disagreement or
innocent mistake.” Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 396,
1 In his Response in Opposition to the Defendant’s original motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the Plaintiff asserted that “[a]s stated in Paragraph 21 of the Complaint,
between November 18, 2024 and April 10, 2025, Plaintiff provided an estimate prepared
by a professional with expertise in evaluating and estimating potential expenses
necessary to return the Property to its pre-loss condition, as well as photographs, a Sworn
Proof of Loss, and other information.” [Doc. 19 at 7]. The Complaint does not, however,
allege that the Plaintiff provided that information, or any information, between November
18, 2024 and April 10, 2025. [Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 21]. Moreover, the Defendant has filed a
copy of an email from the Plaintiff’s counsel dated October 30, 2024, in which the
Plaintiff’s counsel provided the Defendant with the estimate. [Doc. 25-1]. The
Defendant’s April 10, 2025 letter to the Plaintiff also states that the Plaintiff’s counsel
“indicated that there was no new information to share regarding [the Plaintiff’s] position
on the claim.” [Doc. 23-4 at 1]. Finally, the Plaintiff has not attempted to raise that issue
in a Response in opposition to the Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
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331 S.E.2d 148, 155 (1985). To plead aggravating or outrageous conduct,
the Plaintiff may allege “fraud, malice, gross negligence, insult, rudeness,
oppression, or wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights.” Lovell,
108 N.C. App. at 422, 424 S.E.2d at 185.
The Plaintiff’s Complaint is problematic. It appears to be a generic
form presenting few particulars in support of the Plaintiff’s claims. In fact,
some of the allegations are so generic as to be erroneous in the present
case. For instance, the Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that the policy in
question is his homeowner’s insurance policy. [Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 9, 13]. The
documents filed with the pleadings, however, clearly show that the property
is a rental unit and that the policy at issue is a landlord’s policy. [Docs. 6-1,
6-2, 6-4]. Such generic pleading causes particular deficiencies regarding the
Plaintiff’s claims of bad faith and outrageous conduct, because they are
general and conclusory.2 See [Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 23-26, 41-43, 45]. Moreover,
the Defendant’s letters denying the Plaintiff’s claim indicate that the
Defendant inspected the Plaintiff’s property, reached a decision based on
that inspection, and reaffirmed that decision after corresponding with the
Plaintiff’s counsel and receiving no new information. [Docs. 23-2, 23-3, 23-
2 When the Defendant amended its Answer and filed its renewed Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, the Plaintiff had two clear opportunities to correct these deficiencies
and errors but chose not to do so.
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4]. As a result, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately
allege any of the three elements required for his bad faith claim.
Similar shortcomings thwart the Plaintiff’s unfair claim settlement
practices claim. “[A] plaintiff's remedy for violation of the unfair claim
settlement practices statute is the filing of a claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 75–1.1, the unfair or deceptive practices statute.” Defeat The Beat, Inc. v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 194 N.C. App. 108, 116, 669 S.E.2d 48, 53
(2008). The unfair claim settlement practices statute enumerates fourteen
unfair business practices, any of which may serve as “examples of conduct
to support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Gray v. N.
Carolina Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683
(2000). Here, however, all the relevant allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint
are either general and conclusory or mere recitals of the relevant statutory
provisions. Compare [Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 48(a)-(f)], with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-
15(11)(a), (c), (d), (f), (g), (n).
At most, the pleadings establish only that the Plaintiff disagrees with
the Defendant’s decision to deny his claim. Such disagreement, without
more, is insufficient as a matter of law to state a plausible claim for bad faith
or unfair claim settlement practices. Accordingly, the Court will grant the
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Defendant’s motion, and the second and third causes of action in the
Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed.
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 24] is GRANTED, and the Second and
Third Causes of Action in the Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1] are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Local 16.1, the parties
are hereby DIRECTED to conduct an Initial Attorney’s Conference within
fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order. At the conference, the parties are
required to discuss the issue of consent to jurisdiction of a magistrate judge
in accordance with Local Rules 16.1(A) and 73.1(C). The Certificate of Initial
Attorney’s Conference and, if applicable, the Joint Stipulation of Consent to
Exercise Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge should be filed
within seven (7) days of the conference. If appropriate, a party may file a
Motion to Stay the Initial Attorney’s Conference.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: May 20, 2026
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