Bethea v. Equifax Information Services, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00684-KDB-WCM
JOTHAM BETHEA,
Plaintiffs,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA,
ET AL. ,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Goldman Sachs Bank USA’s
(“Goldman”) Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. No. 77). The Court has carefully considered
this motion and the Parties' briefs and exhibits. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will
GRANT the motion, compel arbitration, deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc.
No. 78) as moot, and, finding no non-arbitrable claims remaining, dismiss this action.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) represents “a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements” and applies “to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
[FAA].” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Under
Section 2 of the FAA, a written arbitration provision “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §
2 (2012). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011).
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In the Fourth Circuit, a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if he can demonstrate:
“(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an
arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) a relationship of the transaction,
which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect
or refusal of [a party] to arbitrate the dispute.” Galloway v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 819
F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Chorley Enters., Inc. v. Dickey's Barbecue Rests., Inc., 807
F.3d 553, 563 (4th Cir. 2015). Agreements to arbitrate are construed according to ordinary rules
of contract interpretation, as augmented by a federal policy requiring that all ambiguities be
resolved in favor of arbitration. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d
707, 710 (4th Cir. 2011). Whether a party agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a question of
state law governing contract formation. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th
Cir. 2002). “[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue
are unsuitable for arbitration.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000).
If the Court sends a case to arbitration, it must stay the case if either party requests it,
assuming that there are no other reasons to dismiss unrelated to the fact an issue in the case is
subject to arbitration. See Smith v. Spizzirri, 144 S. Ct. 1173, 1176 (2024). For example, where all
the claims at issue in a lawsuit are arbitrable, but neither party has requested a stay, the court may
dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Wake Cnty.
Bd. of Educ. v. Dow Roofing Sys., LLC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 (E.D.N.C. 2011); see also Choice
Hotels Intern., 252 F.3d at 709-10 (“[D]ismissal is a proper remedy when all of the issues presented
in a lawsuit are arbitrable.”).
Alternatively, where the claims at issue are arbitrable, but neither party has requested a
stay, a court may choose to stay a lawsuit pending the parties' completion of arbitration. See
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Silkworm Screen Printers, Inc. v. Abrams, No. 91-1631, 1992 WL 317187, at *6 (4th Cir. Nov. 4,
1992) (“If the district court finds that [plaintiff] agreed to arbitrate ... it may either dismiss
[plaintiff's] complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or stay its proceedings pending
arbitration and consideration of the award pursuant to Article V of the Convention.”).
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Jotham Bethea obtained two credit cards from Goldman. (See Doc. No. 1). In this
action, Bethea alleges numerous claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et
seq. (“FCRA”) and a violation of the Gramm Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6803, et seq.
(“GLBA”) against the bank in connection with credit reporting related to the cards. (Id.).
The terms of the credit card relationship between Bethea and Goldman are described in
cardholder agreements for each card. One of the agreed terms is an arbitration provision that
provides that either party can elect mandatory binding arbitration of any claim:
arising from or relating to: (i) this Agreement, your Account or your relationship
with us; (ii) any servicing of your Account by our agents or service providers; (iii)
advertisements, promotions or statements related to this Agreement or your
Account; (iv) your application for credit; (v) credit bureau reporting or debt
collection on or related to your Account; and (vi) your access to and use of your
Account from or using any products or services provided by [] and its affiliates.
(Doc. No. 77-1 at 18; Doc. No. 77-2 at 16). To exercise its rights under this provision, Goldman
filed the pending motion to compel arbitration on February 3, 2026. (Doc. No. 77). Three days
later, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 78). The
proposed Amended Complaint asserts similar claims against Goldman arising out of credit
reporting related to Plaintiff’s credit cards. (Doc. No. 78-1).
III. DISCUSSION
Under the well-established law supporting arbitration agreements, the Parties' dispute must
be resolved in arbitration. See Kendall v. Reg'l Enters., LLC, No. 5:24-CV-00180-KDB-SCR, 2024
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WL 4375792, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 2, 2024). Blount v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:25-CV-
00846-KDB-WCM, 2026 WL 660576, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2026). As described above, there
is (and could be) no dispute that Bethea and Goldman entered into agreements to arbitrate the
credit reporting claims at issue here. Therefore, the Court must compel arbitration of the Plaintiff’s
claims against Goldman.
In the exercise of the Court’s discretion and in the absence of any request for a stay, the
Court will dismiss this action upon directing that the Plaintiff’s claims be arbitrated.
IV. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Goldman’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. No. 77 is GRANTED; and
finding no non-arbitrable claims remaining, DISMISS this action;
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 78) is
DENIED as moot; and
3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: March 18, 2026
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