Dublin v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-00178-KDB-SCR
JORDAN DUBLIN,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
Defendant.
In June 2025, Plaintiff Jordan Dublin and Defendant engaged in an arbitration that resulted
in an award in Defendant’s favor. See Doc. No. 1. Approximately four months later, Dublin filed
a Complaint in the Western District of North Carolina and moved to vacate the arbitration award.
See Doc. Nos. 1, 6. The Court denied that motion because Dublin failed to show that the Western
District of North Carolina was the district in which the arbitration award was made,1 and failed to
timely serve notice of the motion to vacate on the adverse party.2 Dublin then sought
reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60, asserting “new evidence”
and that equitable tolling should apply in light of his period of homelessness. See Doc. Nos. 7, 9.
The Court denied the motion, concluding that Dublin had not cured either the jurisdictional defect
1 9 U.S.C. § 10 allows a court in the “district wherein the award was made” to vacate an
award under certain circumstances. Dublin has failed to demonstrate that the arbitration award was
made in the Western District of North Carolina. Indeed, he alleges the arbitration award was made
in Concord, North Carolina, which is located in the Middle District of North Carolina. Doc. No. 6
at 2. 2 9 U.S.C. § 12 provides that “[n]otice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award
must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed
or delivered,” and Dublin filed his motion to vacate on October 24, 2025, more than three months
after the arbitration award date of July 9, 2025. See Doc. No. 1.
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or the untimeliness of his filing, and has not demonstrated the type of extraordinary circumstances
that might warrant consideration of equitable tolling—an exception the Fourth Circuit has
expressed skepticism about in this context. Doc. No. 10. See Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225
(4th Cir. 1986) (“The existence of [due diligence or equitable tolling] exceptions to § 12 is
questionable, for they are not implicit in the language of the statute and cannot be described as
common-law exceptions because there was no common-law analogue to enforcement of an
arbitration award.”).
Now before the Court is Dublin’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. No. 11),
which Defendant Wells Fargo opposes. Dublin again invokes Rule 59(e) and advances the same
arguments previously raised in his Motion to Reconsider. Rule 59(e) permits a party to request that
a court “alter or amend a judgment,” with “judgment” defined by Rule 54(a) to include “a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). The rule
applies only to final judgments, Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d
1462, 1469 (4th Cir. 1991), including orders dismissing an action.
The Fourth Circuit recognizes only three narrow grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): “(1)
to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). “[M]ere disagreement” with a court’s prior ruling
does not suffice. See Matter of Vulcan Constr. Materials, LLC, 433 F. Supp. 3d 816, 819–20 (E.D.
Va. 2019); Hutchinson, 994 F.2d at 1082. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized relief under
Rule 59(e) “is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 402–03 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted).
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Dublin contends that only prong three of Rule 59(e) is at issue. Doc. No. 11 at 3. As in his
previous motion, he asserts that he was homeless from late 2023 through November 2025, with
intermittent access to computing equipment and internet, which, in his view, prevented him from
timely filing this matter. Id. at 3–4. Yet he also acknowledges that he stayed with a friend who
provided transportation and financial support for several months in 2025, and later with an out of
state family member beginning around June 2025. Doc. No. 1-2 at 39. He further asserts that he
“did not elect to delay” filing this matter. Id. He explains that instead, he was “actively responding”
to Defendant about “overlapping proceedings.” Id. However, his demonstrated ability to
participate in proceedings with Defendant and the state court during the relevant period confirms
that, notwithstanding his housing and other instabilities, he remained capable of filing this matter
(and providing notice to Defendant) within the three-month statutory window following entry of
the arbitral award. Dublin likewise identifies no clear error of law that would warrant revisiting
the Court’s prior ruling to avert “manifest injustice.” Hutchinson, 994 F.2d at 1081. Accordingly,
for the reasons set forth above, and in the Court’s prior Order denying Dublin’s Motion to
Reconsider (Doc. No. 10), the Court will deny the Motion with prejudice.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED with
prejudice; and
2. The Clerk is directed retain this matter as closed in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
Signed: January 30, 2026
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