USA v. Snyder

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
United States of America, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	ORDER DENYING MOTION
) 	TO ALLOW UNRESTRICTED
v. 	) 	TELEPHONE ACCESS
)
Sean David Snyder, 	) 	Case No.: 1:25-cr-00255
)
Defendant. 	)
On November 19, 2025, Defendant was charged by Indictment with three counts of travel
with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, three counts of engaging in illicit sexual conduct in
foreign places, and one count of possession of materials containing child pornography. (Doc. No.
2).
On April 2, 2026, Defendant was charged by Superseding Indictment with an additional
count, attempted tampering with a witness. (Doc. No. 65). Based on this charge, on April 17, 2026,
the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) directed the detention facility to restrict Defendant’s
telephone access to calls with his attorney only. (See Doc. No. 73 at 1-2).
On April 28, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion to Allow Unrestricted Telephone Access. (Doc.
No. 71). Therein, Defendant requests the court allow him unrestricted access to the telephone. He
specially asserted that if he is unable to communicate with his family, his businesses in Thailand
and North Dakota will suffer, and the telephone calls are important to his mental health, the mental
health of his family, and to his businesses. Next, Defendant alleges that neither he nor anyone else
in his family have access to his minor children, the alleged victims, as they are currently in the
custody of a Non-Government Organization in Thailand. Finally, Defendant contends that the
Case 1:25-cr-00255-DLH Document 74 Filed 05/04/26 Page 1 of 5

2
phone calls upon which the attempted witness tampering charge is based, were ordinary family
phone calls, not attempts to improperly influence or intimidate the alleged minor victims.
On April 29, 2026, the United States filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion.
(Doc. No. 73). The United States disputes several of the factual assertions made in Defendant’s
motion and argues that the USMS had a legitimate interest in restricting the Defendant’s jail calls
and appropriately imposed those restrictions.
The court is inclined to agree with the United States that the telephone restriction is
warranted and appropriate in this circumstance. Pursuant to the Due Process Clause, federal
detainees are protected from punishment prior to conviction. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979). Courts consider the following when determining whether particular restrictions and
conditions of pretrial detention amount to punishment:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment
or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility
officials, that determination generally will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose
to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’
Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount
to ‘punishment.’ Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related
to a legitimate goal – if it is arbitrary or purposeless – a court permissibly may infer
that 	the 	purpose 	of 	the 	governmental 	action 	is 	punishment 	that 	may 	not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Id. at 538-39 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Restrictions on telephone access have been permitted when reasonably related to a
government objective. See Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that
while prisoners may have the right to use the telephone, there is no right to unlimited telephone
use). Similarly, both the Eighth Circuit and other district courts in this circuit have concluded that
restrictions on telephonic communication may be implemented to address legitimate concerns. Id.
Case 1:25-cr-00255-DLH Document 74 Filed 05/04/26 Page 2 of 5

3
at 1109 (“In the present case, internal security and rehabilitation concerns justify the telephone
policy in HU #5. The policy at issue only limits inmates’ right to communicate by telephone, not
their mail or visiting privileges. Furthermore, the policy seems the best way of addressing the
legitimate concerns of prison authorities.”); see also Kemp v. Petray, No. 07-5056, 2009 WL
2709921, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 26, 2009) (determining a plaintiff’s rights were not violated when
his telephone access was restricted for a number of days and he had previously placed hundreds of
phone calls).
Here, the USMS restricted Defendant’s access to the telephone to attorney-calls only based
on the witness tampering charge. “Preventing witness tampering is a legitimate government
purpose and limiting a pretrial detainee’s communication with people not his lawyer is a response
rationally related to preventing witness tampering.” United States v. Howell, No. 22-CR-107
(KMM/JFD), 2022 WL 4735912, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 3, 2022); see United States v. Hunter, No.
12-185(3) ADM/FLN, 2013 WL 593413, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2013), aff’d, 770 F.3d 740 (8th
Cir. 2014) (“The January 15th Order correctly determined that the United States Marshal’s decision
to place Defendant in administrative segregation is rationally related to a legitimate government
objective – to prevent witness tampering by Defendant.”).
The United States argues the USMS had a legitimate interest in restricting Defendant’s jail
calls. Defendant contends that the alleged jail calls do not constitute attempted witness tampering
but instead were misconstrued conversations pertaining to family and business matters and such a
broad ban impacts his relationships with his family and businesses. Whether these conversations
constituted attempted witness tampering is a question for the jury, however, preventing witness
tampering is a legitimate government purpose. While the court is aware that limiting Defendant’s
calls to attorney-only may place some discomfort on him, his family or businesses, such a
Case 1:25-cr-00255-DLH Document 74 Filed 05/04/26 Page 3 of 5

4
restriction is rationally related to the prevention of witness tampering. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 540 (1979) (finding that restraints reasonably related to a governmental purpose do not,
without more, constitute punishment even when they are discomforting).
Even though Defendant may argue such a restriction is overly broad or unreasonable given
the circumstances, such a ban is necessary to ensure that Defendant does not communicate with
the potential witnesses or use others to communicate with potential witnesses on his behalf.
Moreover, the court is not convinced the restriction is overbroad. See Shaw v. Shell, No. 2:15-CV-
102, 2016 WL 818496, at *3 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No.
2:15-CV-102, 2016 WL 845306 (D.N.D. Mar. 2, 2016) (“Unconstitutional practices include those
that are intended as punitive, those that are not rationally related to a legitimate purpose – such as
safety, security, and efficiency – and those that are rationally related but nonetheless excessive
with regard to their purpose.”). There is no indication that the restriction imposed is excessive as
although Defendant has been restricted to attorney-only calls, the record does not show that
Defendant was also restricted in his ability to engage in written communication or in having visits.
Insofar as Defendant mentions the insufficiency of the United States mail, whether due to
mail delays or otherwise, delays are an inevitable and common occurrence that does not justify
lifting the restriction.1 Finally, Defendant argues there are less restrictive alternatives available,
such as call monitoring, contact lists, or specific prohibitions that would serve the United States’
interests without imposing a “near-total” communication ban. The court first notes that call
monitoring would be insufficient here. The phone calls cited by the United States occurred on
1 In terms of mail, Defendant argues, “[m]ail delays hinder timely communication necessary for business operations
and the coordination of defense-related efforts.” (Doc. No. 71 at 6). The court questions how mail communications
may hinder coordination of defense-related efforts. Defendant has not been restricted from contacting his attorney by
telephone, and pursuant to the Stipulated Discovery and Protective Order, any discovery materials are to remain in the
sole custody of Defendant’s counsel, subject to slim exceptions. (See Doc. No. 13).
Case 1:25-cr-00255-DLH Document 74 Filed 05/04/26 Page 4 of 5

5
recorded lines, which Defendant knew, or should have known, were being recorded. It is also not
reasonable for Defendant to have a call list, as Defendant engaged in the subject calls with his
child and wife, whom he would likely request be included on such a list.
Based on the information provided to the court and in finding the USMS had a legitimate
interest in restricting Defendant’s jail calls to attorney-only based on the witness tampering charge
and to prevent witness tampering, the court DENIES Defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 71).
Defendant’s telephone calls shall remain restricted to attorney-only unless and until further
directed by the USMS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 4th day of May, 2026.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
Case 1:25-cr-00255-DLH Document 74 Filed 05/04/26 Page 5 of 5