Lightfeather v. Officer Blue et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
AUSTIN EDWARD
LIGHTFEATHER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER BLUE, in his individual
capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
8:22-CV-247
ORDER
The plaintiff has filed a "motion to recuse" (filing 72) asking the Court to
disqualify Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart from all of his civil cases.1 The
Court will deny that motion.
The Court notes that Judge Zwart is no longer performing duties on any
of the plaintiff's cases, so his motion is moot. But his allegations would not
support disqualification regardless. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144,
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to
hear such proceeding.
1 I am authorized, by this Court's rules, to assign and reassign magistrate judges for cases in
which I am presiding judge. See NEGenR 1.4(a)(3)(B).
8:22-cv-00247-JMG-PRSE Doc # 73 Filed: 01/14/26 Page 1 of 2 - Page ID #
<pageID>

- 2 -
But—even assuming that the plaintiff's signed motion qualifies as an
"affidavit" within the meaning of § 144—his allegations here are insufficient.
To support judicial disqualification, a legally sufficient affidavit must
allege bias or prejudice, and such bias or prejudice must stem from an
extrajudicial source. United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984).
That is, "bias or prejudice" doesn't include opinions held by judges acquired in
the course of the proceedings, nor does it include opinions held as a result of
what judges learned in earlier proceedings. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 551 (1994). A party isn't entitled to recusal even when a judge is ill-
disposed toward him, where the judge's knowledge and the opinion it produced
were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings. In re
Steward, 828 F.3d at 682; see Rubashkin, 655 F.3d at 858. And judicial rulings
rarely establish a valid basis for recusal. United States v. Melton, 738 F.3d 903,
906 (8th Cir. 2013).
Here, the defendant's accusations are substantiated only by unfavorable
rulings in previous litigation, which are neither extrajudicial nor indicative of
bias. See United States v. Larsen, 427 F.3d 1091, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 2014). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's "motion to recuse" (filing 72)
is denied.
Dated this 14th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
John M. Gerrard
Senior United States District Judge
8:22-cv-00247-JMG-PRSE Doc # 73 Filed: 01/14/26 Page 2 of 2 - Page ID #
<pageID>