Doe 1 et al v. United States Department of Labor et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JOHN DOE 1,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, OSHA, JULIE A. SU, Acting
Secretary of Labor (official capacity;
LPP, and SIGNAL SECURITY,
Defendants.
8:25CV590
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Doe 1 filed a complaint, motion for temporary restraining
order, and petition for writ of mandamus. Filing No. 1. Plaintiff’ is a non-
prisoner, is not represented by counsel, and proceeds in forma pauperis. The
Court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The 	Court 	is 	required 	to 	review 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	and 	prisoner
complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must dismiss a complaint or
any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’”
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Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs
must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are
held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at
849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that “if the
essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal
nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that
permits 	the 	layperson’s 	claim 	to 	be 	considered 	within 	the 	proper 	legal
framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for
relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.
1980).
II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff John Doe 1 sues LPP and Signal Security for alleged dangerous
and toxic workplace 	conditions. He further moves for a writ of mandamus
requiring OSHA to investigate his complaints and concerns.
Based on the complaint, it appears LPP was the location of Plaintiff’s
workplace. 	It is unclear what relationship 	exists, if any between LPP and
Signal 	Security, and 	what 	Plaintiff’s 	relationship 	is with 	either 	of 	these
defendants. 	However, 	it 	appears 	Plaintiff 	was 	employed 	by 	LPP, Signal
Security, or both.
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Plaintiff 	alleges that in August of 2025, he began reporting 	unsafe
practices 	implemented 	by LPP 	to 	cut 	costs, 	including 	exposing 	multiple
employees 	to 	highly 	toxic 	chemicals 	resulting 	in 	actual 	or 	potential
hospitalizations; 	orders to 	illegally reuse 	contaminated 	PAA filters; 	black
specks 	of 	contaminants 	shedding 	onto 	meat 	products 	meant 	for 	human
consumption; dangerously slippery and soapy floors with ladders and sharp
bladed equipment; and LOTO (lockout/tagout) 	failures; exposed wiring; and
lack of required Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as face masks and
shields.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 17, 2025, management advised
him to reuse a PAA filter that was visibly contaminated, beyond its service life,
and not legally permitted for reuse. When he attempted to escalate his safety
concerns, 	he 	was 	accused 	of 	defamation. 	Plaintiff 	also 	reported 	theft 	of
personal 	and 	company 	property 	by members 	of 	management 	and/or 	HR.
Rather than disciplining the wrongdoers, LPP retaliated against the reporting
employees, effectively punishing those who spoke up.
Plaintiff’s 	employment 	was 	suspended 	on 	August 	23, 	2025, 	and
terminated 	on August 27, 2025. Plaintiff sent an email to LPP stating he
believed he was the victim of retaliation for voicing his safety concerns and he
intended to report those concerns to the authorities. He demanded retention of
records. In response, on September 6, 2025, LPP sent him a $0.00 check with
a mocking message.
As to Signal Security, on September 4, 2025, Plaintiff contacted Signal
Security and asked it to preserve evidence and documentation. Signal Security
did not properly respond. As currently written, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no
misconduct by Signal Security other than this alleged failure to respond to
Plaintiff’s document retention demand.
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff requests: (1) a Writ of Mandamus directing OSHA to investigate
his safety and whistleblower complaints; (2) a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against LPP and Signal Security to prevent further
harassment, retaliation, intimidation, discharge, concealment of hazards, and
fabrication 	of 	statements 	against 	the 	employees; 	(3) 	civil 	damages 	and
equitable relief for wrongful termination under the public policy exception to
employment-at-will; 	(4) 	conversion 	of 	property; 	and 	(5) 	racketeering 	in
violation of the civil RICO statute.
A. Writ of Mandamus
The district courts have original jurisdiction of any action requesting a
writ of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
federal agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A writ
of mandamus is extraordinary relief and sparingly granted. The party seeking
the writ must show he has no other adequate means to attain the relief desired.
The petitioner must have a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought,
and the respondent must have a non-discretionary duty to honor that right. In
addition, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the
writ is appropriate under the circumstances. In re Brazile, 993 F.3d 593, 594
(8th Cir. 2021); In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff 	is 	requesting 	a 	writ 	requiring 	OSHA 	to 	investigate 	his
complaints. “[E]mployees who believe that a violation of a safety or health
standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger
exists, may request an inspection” by giving written notice to the Secretary or
his authorized representative of the violation or danger. 29 U.S.C.A. § 657
(f)(1). Upon receipt, the Secretary will determine whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists. If so, an inspection must
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be performed as soon as practicable; if not, the employee must be notified in
writing of the Secretary’s response. Id.
The court must dismiss mandamus claims where the complaint fails to
allege that a federal government officer or employee violated a duty owed to
the plaintiff. 	Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976). Here,
OSHA’s decision to investigate is discretionary, and Plaintiff does not have a
clear 	right 	to 	an 	OSHA 	investigation. 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	a 	Writ 	of
Mandamus to compel an OSHA investigation of his complaints must be denied.
B. Injunction against LPP and Signal Security
Plaintiff 	requests an order 	enjoining LPP and Signal Security 	from
harassing, 	intimidating, 	discharging, 	and 	falsely 	accusing 	employees,
retaliating against them, and concealing hazards from them.
Plaintiff 	appears 	to be asserting 	claims 	on behalf of 	all employees.
Plaintiff is not an attorney. He can file a lawsuit on his own behalf, but a non-
attorney litigant may not represent someone else in federal court. Chatman v.
Omaha 	Housing 	Authority, 2025 WL 1827309, at 	*1 (D. 	Neb. 2025). So,
Plaintiff cannot pursue this case on behalf of his co-employees.
As 	to 	claims 	asserted 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	behalf, 	he 	has 	failed 	to
sufficiently explain what happened, when it happened, who did it, or even the
identity of his employer when it occurred. And since Plaintiff no longer works
for the employer who committed the misconduct, he has failed to allege how an
injunction would benefit him in the future.
Finally, Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief is impermissibly 	vague.
“Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must: (A) state
the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in
reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document--
the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d). “Broad language
in an injunction that essentially requires a party to obey the law in the future
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is not encouraged and may be struck” because Rule 65(d) is intended to provide
“fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits.”
Calvin Klein Cosms. Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 (8th
Cir. 1987) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415
U.S. 423, 444 (1974).
The meaning of harassment, retaliation, discharge, intimidation, etc. in
the workplace is subject to interpretation and dependent on the people and
circumstances involved. The court cannot draft a sufficiently specific injunction
for application to every nuance of the employer-employee relationship, and as
to 	Plaintiff’s 	claims, 	it 	is 	ill-equipped 	and 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	ongoing
workplace oversight. Laws have been enacted to afford employees protection if
they report unlawful workplace 	conditions. Plaintiff’s injunction effectively
asks for a court order requiring Plaintiff’s employer to follow those laws. The
court will not do so.
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
injunctive relief.
C. Damages for Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Plaintiff 	alleges he was terminated 	in violation by public policy for
reporting OSHA, Food Safety Modernization Act (FMSA), and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) violations and reporting theft of property. He claims
these federal statutes enact public policy, and a violation of these statutes
supports 	a 	public 	policy 	exception 	Nebraska’s 	employment-at-will
jurisprudence. Each of the federal laws recited by Plaintiff provides protections
and remedies for employees who report violations. See False Claim Act (FCA),
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730; FMSA and FDA, 21 U.S.C.A. § 399d; OSHA violations, 29
U.S.C.A. § 660 (c)(2). Where employee protection is already included in the
statutory scheme evidencing the public policy, Nebraska will not duplicate
those statutory protections by recognizing parallel public policy exceptions to
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employment-at-will. Dibbern v. York Surgical Assocs., P.C., 20 N.W.3d 90 (Neb.
2025). 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	damages 	caused 	by 	his
employment 	termination 	in 	violation 	of 	a 	public 	policy 	exception 	to
employment-at-will.
D. Conversion of Property
Plaintiff 	seeks 	recovery 	for 	property 	conversion. 	Conversion 	is
wrongfully possessing property in denial of another person’s right to possess
it. The plaintiff must show a right to immediate possession of the property
when it was converted. If the property was not taken intentionally, the plaintiff
must also show he demanded its return, but the defendant refused to do so.
Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, N.A., 585 N.W.2d 445, 451–52 (Neb. 1998).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state what was taken, who took it,
when and where that happened, how it came into the possession of another,
whether demands for its return were denied or ignored, or any information as
to 	why the 	property 	was taken. 	Plaintiff 	has failed 	to 	state 	a claim 	for
conversion under Nebraska law.
E. Civil RICO
Plaintiff alleges Signal Security and LPP committed theft, fraud, and
obstruction in a manner and pattern sufficient to establish liability under the
civil 	enforcement 	provisions 	of 	the 	Racketeer 	Influenced 	and 	Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). A violation of § 1962(c) requires the
plaintiff to allege, with specificity, (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through
a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. A civil RICO plaintiff must show a factual
and concrete loss proximately caused by the alleged RICO violation. UMB
Bank, N.A. v. Guerin, 89 F.4th 1047, 1053 (8th Cir. 2024).
The broad, conclusory 	statements 	of theft, fraud 	and obstruction 	in
Plaintiff’s complaint must be disregarded. Plaintiff must allege facts. He has
failed to allege, with specificity, any of the elements of a civil RICO claim. He
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has not alleged facts showing an enterprise existed, what conduct it committed,
or 	what 	action 	and 	inactions 	it 	committed 	that 	indicate 	a 	pattern 	of
racketeering 	activity. Plaintiff 	has failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	civil RICO
recovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court is required to dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that
states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
any of the defendants. But rather than dismiss the case, the Court will allow
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED
1. Plaintiff shall have until December 	24, 2025, to file an amended
complaint. Plaintiff must state facts supporting his claim, including what each
defendant did to him, when it was done, how it was done, and how that specific
defendant’s actions or inactions harmed him. The amended complaint replaces
rather than supplements the original complaint. The amended complaint must
therefore include all the facts Plaintiff asks the court to consider. Failure to
file an amended complaint within the time specified by the Court will result in
the Court dismissing this case without further notice to Plaintiff.
2. The Court reserves the right to conduct further review of Plaintiff's
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) in the event he files an amended
complaint.
3. The Clerk of Court is directed 	to set 	a pro se 	case management
deadline using the following text: “December 	24, 2025:” check for amended
complaint.”
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4. The parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by
the Local Rules of this Court. Plaintiff shall keep the Court informed of his
current address at all times while this case is pending. Failure to do so may
result in dismissal.
Dated this 24th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Cheryl R. Zwart
United States Magistrate Judge
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