USA v. Paladin

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. 	Case No. 09-cr-186-PB-1
Opinion No. 2024 DNH 100
Patricio Paladin
ORDER
Patricio Paladin was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, three counts of
distribution of cocaine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. Doc. 81 at 2. Because Paladin had two qualifying felony drug
convictions, he was initially sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Doc. 87 at 16.
Congress amended § 841(b)(1)(A) in 2018 as a part of the First Step Act
to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence for defendants with two
qualifying convictions from life to twenty-five years. See Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 401(a)(2), 132 St. 5194, 5220 (2018). At the same time, it changed the
trigger for the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence from two
“felony drug convictions” to two “serious drug felony” convictions. See United
States v. Fields, 53 F.4th 1027, 1031 (6th Cir. 2022) (describing changes).
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Paladin filed a compassionate release motion based on this change in the
law, Doc. 113, which I granted. As a result, I reduced Paladin’s sentence
from life to twenty-five years, which is the sentence he is currently serving.
Doc. 124.
Paladin recently filed a second motion for compassionate release citing
another change in the law as a basis for a further sentence reduction. See
Doc. 139. For the reasons explained below, I deny Paladin’s motion.
I. ANALYSIS
A court may grant a request for a sentence reduction brought by a
defendant who has exhausted administrative remedies if:
(1) there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a
sentence 	reduction; 	(2) such 	a 	reduction 	is 	consistent 	with
applicable 	policy 	statements 	issued 	by 	the 	Sentencing
Commission; and (3) after considering the factors set forth in [18
U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, the court finds,
in its discretion, that the particular circumstances of the case
justify reducing the defendant’s sentence.
United States v. D’Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2024) (cleaned up);
United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 96 F.4th 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2024); United
States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2022). I determine whether
these requirements have been met by bearing in mind “the holistic context”
of the defendant’s case. D’Angelo, 110 F.4th at 48.
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A change in the law can be considered in determining whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under certain circumstances:
If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served
at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, [. . .] but only where
such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence
being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the
motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s
individualized circumstances.
U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b)(6).
Paladin bases his current motion on the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Erlinger held that
prior convictions cannot be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence pursuant
to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), unless a jury has
found beyond a reasonable doubt that, as the statute requires, the
convictions were committed on occasions different from one another. 602 U.S.
at 835. Paladin contends that Erlinger also applies to sentencing
enhancements based on § 841(b)(1)(A). He then claims that this change in
the law qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for an additional
sentence reduction because it results in a gross sentencing disparity when
his sentence is compared to the sentence that a comparable defendant would
receive for the same conduct today.
This argument is hopelessly flawed even if I assume that Erlinger
applies to sentencing enhancements imposed pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A).
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First, Erlinger is a procedural rule dealing with the process required to
warrant a sentencing enhancement. Paladin cannot use a compassionate
release motion to collaterally challenge the lawfulness of his sentence. See
United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022) (noting the
distinction between federal habeas relief and compassionate release). Thus,
the appropriate comparator when determining whether Erlinger would
result in a gross sentencing disparity is a comparable defendant who today
has the same qualifying convictions as Paladin. Because that comparable
defendant would be subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence that
Paladin received, his gross disparity argument is a nonstarter.
More fundamentally, Paladin has failed to recognize that when I
reduced his sentence from life to twenty-five years, I determined that I would
have given him the same sentence even if he had not been subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence. See Doc. 143 (imposing a twenty-five year
sentence after “pay[ing] attention to and respect to what the guidelines
would suggest is the appropriate sentence here”). Accordingly, because my
sentencing judgment was not affected by the mandatory minimum sentence
alone, Erlinger could not cause a defendant with the same “individualized
circumstances” as Paladin to receive a lower sentence today than the
sentence Paladin is now serving.
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For the reasons set forth in this order, Paladin’s motion for
compassionate release, Doc. 139, is denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
November 21, 2024
cc: 	Patricio Paladin, pro se
U.S. Probation
U.S. Marshal
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