Tompson v. Lancelot Court Condominium Association

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Judith Tompson
v. Civil No. 16-cv-488-JL
Lancelot Court Condominium Association
Board of Directors
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff, Judith Tompson, has filed a complaint
(Doc. No. 1) and a self-styled “Notice of Appeal” (Doc. No. 1-2)
from a state court decision. The pleadings are before this
court for preliminary review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR
4.3(d)(2).
Preliminary Review Standard
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of
complaints filed in forma pauperis. The magistrate judge may
recommend to the district judge that one or more claims be
dismissed if, among other things, the court lacks jurisdiction,
a defendant is immune from the relief sought, or the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d)(2). In conducting its
preliminary review, the court construes pro se complaints
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief.’” See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Background
This is the second of two actions filed in 2016 by
plaintiff raising similar claims and naming essentially the same
party as a defendant. The first such case, Tompson v. Lancelot
Court Condo. Ass’n, No. 16-cv-251-JD (“Tompson I”), was
dismissed in July 2016, on grounds of res judicata and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Tompson I, No. 16-cv-215-JD, 2016
WL 3660313, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86795, at *2-*6 (D.N.H.
June 9, 2016) (ECF No. 3), R&R adopted, 2016 WL 3661217, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87564 (D.N.H. July 5, 2016) (ECF No. 5).
The same underlying facts alleged in the complaint in
Tompson I are also alleged in this case. Tompson resides at
Lancelot Court Condominiums (“Lancelot”) in Salem, New
Hampshire. Tompson alleges that Lancelot is a New Hampshire
corporation. Lancelot sued Tompson in the New Hampshire
Superior Court in Rockingham County (“Rockingham County case”),
to enforce a lien for unpaid assessments, pursuant to N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 356-B:56. In that action, summary judgment was
granted to Lancelot on the issue of liability. Lancelot
obtained a jury award of $17,000.00 in damages. Lancelot’s
motion for costs and attorneys’ fees totaling almost $22,750.00
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above the jury award, was also granted. Tompson appealed, and
the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”) affirmed the Superior
Court decisions and verdict in the Rockingham County case. See
Lancelot Court Condo. Ass’n v. Tompson, No. 2015-0252, 2016 WL
3475739, 2016 N.H. LEXIS 142 (Apr. 29, 2016); see also Letter to
Maureen O’Neil, Rockingham Cnty. Super. Ct. Clerk (Aug. 23,
2016) (describing state proceedings and requesting issuance of
writ of execution) (Doc. No. 1-1, at 110).
After the NHSC issued its decision in that state
proceeding, plaintiff filed Tompson I in federal court. See
Tompson I (ECF Nos. 1, 1-2). The district judge dismissed that
case, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata. See
Tompson I, July 5, 2016 Order (ECF No. 5) (approving June 9,
2016 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 3)). Plaintiff
appealed the dismissal of Tompson I to the First Circuit, and
that appeal remains pending. See Tompson v. Lancelot Court
Condo. Ass’n, No. 16-1999 (1st Cir., appeal docketed, Aug. 2,
2016).
Before the NHSC issued its decision affirming the judgment
in the Rockingham County case, Lancelot filed a new action
against Tompson in state court in Salem, New Hampshire, to
collect additional unpaid condominium assessments and reasonable
attorney fees. See Lancelot Court Condo. Ass’n v. Tompson, No.
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473-2015-cv-00131 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 10th Cir., Dist. Div., Salem,
filed Dec. 1, 2015) (“Small Claims Case”). The state court in
that case granted Lancelot’s motion for summary judgment on
liability. See Small Claims Case (N.H. Cir. Ct., 10th Cir.,
Dist. Div., Salem, Apr. 7, 2016) (Doc. No. 1-1, at 17). Tompson
filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling, which led the
state court to postpone a damages hearing. See Small Claims
Case (N.H. Cir. Ct., 10th Cir., Dist. Div., Salem, Sept. 8,
2016) (Doc. No. 1-1, at 93). Although the NHSC declined to
accept Tompson’s interlocutory appeal, see Lancelot Court Condo.
Ass’n v. Tompson, No. 2016-0512 (N.H. Oct. 13, 2016) (Doc. No.
1, at 15), the state court docket does not indicate that a
damages hearing has been rescheduled. The Small Claims Case
remains pending at this time.
In this case, as in Tompson I, plaintiff cites a series of
federal laws, federal procedural rules, state laws, treatises,
the Restatement, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Takings
Clause in the complaint (Doc. No. 1) as the bases for her
assertion that this court has federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has characterized this case as both a civil action and
as an “appeal” from NHSC orders declining to accept an
interlocutory appeal in the Small Claims Case. See Doc. No. 1-
2. Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief,
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and review and reversal of the state courts’ decisions in the
Small Claims Case.
Discussion
I. No Appellate Jurisdiction
Plaintiff characterizes this action as an “appeal” of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision to decline to accept an
interlocutory appeal of issues in the Small Claims Case, and the
underlying order granting Lancelot’s motion for summary judgment
on liability in that case.
Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United
States other than [the U.S. Supreme Court] could entertain
a proceeding to reverse or modify the [state court]
judgment for errors of that character. To do so would be
an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction
possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); see also
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284-88 (2005) (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine). See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This court is not an appellate
court with jurisdiction to review and reverse state court
decisions such as those cited by plaintiff.
II. No Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s complaint states that Lancelot is incorporated
in New Hampshire, has a principal place of business in New
Hampshire, and has a fiscal agent that resides in Massachusetts.
The facts alleged in the complaint indicate that defendant, like
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plaintiff, is a citizen of New Hampshire. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c). Cf. Francesco v. Beacon Ct. Condo., No. 07 CIV.
2766(LMM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3826, at *8, 2009 WL 174184, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2009) (unincorporated condominium
association in New York is deemed to be citizen of state where
unit owners reside). As there is no diversity of citizenship
between the parties in this matter, this court lacks diversity
jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
III. Federal Jurisdiction and Claim Preclusion
Arguably, this court may have federal question jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s claims, as she lists a set of federal statutes
and Constitutional provisions in the Complaint. She
specifically alleges, among other things, that the liens filed
by defendant before it proceeded in the Rockingham County case
violated state law, violated her rights to due process, and
effected a taking of her property without just compensation, in
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Tompson
asserts that she has also raised that claim as a defense to the
underlying validity of the lien at issue in the Rockingham
County case.
The Takings Clause protects citizens from exercises of
government power that take private property for public use
without just compensation. In general, only takings effected by
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state action, not purely private conduct, give rise to liability
under the Taking Clause. Defendant is a private party, and its
own conduct in recording a lien and obtaining a judgment is
private action. For that reason, the Takings Clause claim and
due process claims set forth in this case should be dismissed.
Moreover, plaintiff is barred from litigating claims in
this case that challenge the validity of the liens at issue in
the Rockingham County case, and the validity of the final
judgments in the Rockingham County case, for the same reasons
such claims were dismissed in Tompson I. Those reasons are
summarized in the June 6, 2016 R&R (Doc. No. 3) in Tompson I,
which the district judge accepted when it approved that R&R on
July 5, 2016, see Order (ECF No. 5)1:
[R]es judicata, and the [New Hampshire] rules precluding
new claims that should have been raised as defenses or
compulsory counterclaims previously, provides an
independent basis for dismissing this later-filed
action. . . .
It does not matter, for the purposes of preclusion with
respect to the sequential cases at issue here, that the
federal claims here could only have been presented as
defenses or as compulsory counterclaims, in the state
courts. . . .
To the extent plaintiff asserts a right to relief under
federal law here, arising from Lancelot’s action to enforce
1Tompson’s appeal of the order of dismissal in Tompson I
remains pending in the First Circuit at this time. In the
absence of any indication that the First Circuit will not affirm
Tompson I, this court’s application of similar reasoning to
dismiss similar claims in this case is appropriate.
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its lien and collect unpaid assessments, costs, and fees,
her claims here were either compulsory counterclaims in
that state case, or the type of defenses that should now,
when styled as claims, be deemed barred by res judicata.
Accordingly, res judicata bars plaintiff from raising her
claims here.
Tompson I, 2016 WL 3660313, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86795,
at *4-*6 (citations omitted) (ECF No. 3, at 4-6).
Similarly, in this case, the facts alleged in the Complaint
(Doc. No. 1) fail to state any federal claim upon which relief
can be granted, which are not otherwise barred here by res
judicata. To the extent there are any viable state law claims
in this case, the district judge should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over such claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and
should dismiss them without prejudice, upon dismissing the
federal claims for failure to state a claim.
IV. Vexatious Filings
Plaintiff should be aware that the federal court may
sanction a party for filing vexatious litigation. See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). The court will not wait to be inundated
with frivolous actions, arising from the same, previously
litigated matters, before issuing sanctions as necessary to
prevent abuses. If future filings relating to the same or
closely-related matters in the future are deemed to be
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vexatious, this court may issue an injunction restricting
plaintiff’s ability to file new cases in this court.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss the federal claims in this action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over, and dismiss without
prejudice, all state law claims asserted by plaintiff.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen day period may be extended
upon motion. Failure to file objections within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
March 16, 2017
cc: Judith Tompson, pro se
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