Coleman v. State of New Hampshire

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Richard Coleman
v. 	Case No. 16-cv-498-LM
State of New Hampshire, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The sole remaining claim in this case is pro se plaintiff
Richard Coleman's malicious-prosecution claim against Natasha
Cormier. 	On June 22, 2017, the clerk of court defaulted Cormier
for failing to appear. 	See doc. no. 34. 	Coleman now moves for
default judgment against Cormier. 	Doc. no. 128.1 	The motion has
been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and
recommendation. 	For the reasons that follow, the court
recommends that the district judge deny Coleman's motion.
Background
A. 	Allegations in the complaint
The court starts by briefly summarizing the allegations in
Coleman's complaint. 	A more comprehensive discussion of those
1 Coleman twice previously moved for default judgment
against Cormier. 	See doc. no. 37; doc. no. 47. 	The court
denied both motions without prejudice, the first time because
Coleman had not adequately supported his damages claim, see doc.
no. 45, and the second time on the basis that Coleman's claims
against the other remaining defendant, Thomas Dronsfield, should
first be resolved on the merits, see doc. no. 60.
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allegations can be found in the undersigned's Report and
Recommendation following preliminary review, which is
incorporated by reference. 	See doc. no. 19 at 2-4. 	In short,
Coleman alleges that Cormier, his neighbor, falsely reported to
law enforcement that Coleman was exposing his genitals to her.
Coleman alleges that Lee Police Officer Thomas Dronsfield
responded to the call and confronted Coleman, then secured a
warrant for Coleman's arrest. 	Coleman alleges that Dronsfield
lied in the affidavit submitted in support of that warrant and
intentionally omitted exculpatory information from the
affidavit. 	Coleman alleges that he was arrested and prosecuted
for indecent exposure, but that the charges were ultimately
dropped in January 2015.
B. 	Procedural history
Following preliminary review, the court concluded that
Coleman had asserted viable state and federal malicious-
prosecution claims against Dronsfield and minimally pleaded a
state-law malicious prosecution claim against Cormier.2 	Though
Cormier defaulted, Dronsfield appeared through counsel and
defended the claims against him.
2 Coleman also asserted a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution claim against Cormier, which the court recommended
be dismissed because Coleman had not alleged that Cormier was a
state actor when she made the allegedly false allegations. 	See
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982). 	Judge McCafferty
approved that recommendation.
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Dronsfield and Coleman each moved for summary judgment.
Those motions were referred to the undersigned for report and
recommendation. 	Concluding that Coleman had not pointed to any
evidence in support of his claims against Dronsfield, and
finding meritless Coleman's arguments as to why he was
nevertheless entitled to summary judgment, the court recommended
that Coleman's motion be denied. 	See doc. no. 115 at 6-12. 	In
contrast, the court concluded that Dronsfield had marshaled
evidence demonstrating that there was probable cause to arrest
Coleman for indecent exposure and that Coleman had not countered
that evidence with any of his own. 	Id. at 12-19. 	Because lack
of probable cause is an element of malicious prosecution under
both federal and state law, see Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723
F.3d 91, 101 (2013); Farrelly v. City of Concord, 168 N.H. 430,
445 (2015), the court recommended that Dronsfield's motion be
granted, see doc. no. 115 at 19-20. 	Judge McCafferty approved
both recommendations over Coleman's objection. 	See doc. no.
120.
The court also briefly addressed Coleman's claim against
Cormier in its Report and Recommendation. 	See id. at 1 n. 1.
The court noted that Coleman had twice previously moved for
default judgment against Cormier, but that both motions had been
denied without prejudice. 	Id. 	The court further noted that
Coleman had suggested that he wished to have Cormier "deleted"
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from the suit but had not formally sought to dismiss her as a
defendant. 	Id. 	The court ultimately took no position with
respect to Coleman's claims against Cormier or her status as a
defendant. 	Id.
On October 23, 2018, Judge McCafferty issued a procedural
order directing Coleman to file a motion for default judgment
against Cormier no later than Friday, November 16, 2018. 	See
doc. no. 124. 	In response, Coleman filed the currently pending
motion. 	See doc. no. 128. 	Coleman's motion comprises a single
paragraph and cites no evidence, record or otherwise. 	See id.
Discussion
When presented with a motion for default judgment, a court
ordinarily "examine[s] a plaintiff's complaint, taking all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, to determine whether it
alleges a cause of action." 	Ramos-Falcón v. Autoridad de
Energía Electríca, 301 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir.
1992)). 	But the court's analysis is not so limited when a
plaintiff brings similar claims against multiple defendants and
at least one defendant appears and defends the claims against it
on the merits. 	Rather, when an answering defendant's defense
equally applies to a plaintiff's claims against a defaulting
defendant, "summary judgment in favor of the answering
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defendant[] will accrue to the benefit of the defaulting
defendant." 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2690 (4th ed. 2018) (and
cases cited therein). 	Put differently, "if [a] plaintiff loses
on the merits [against an answering defendant], the complaint
should then be dismissed against [all defendants]." 	Animal Sci.
Prod., Inc. v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp.,
596 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (D.N.J. 2008) (collecting cases).
The only claims to survive preliminary review in this case
were for malicious prosecution. 	But as discussed, lack of
probable cause is an element of malicious prosecution under both
state and federal law. 	Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d at 101;
Farrelly, 168 N.H. at 445. 	The court previously concluded that
Dronsfield was entitled to summary judgment on Coleman's claims
against him because the record evidence, even when taken in the
light most favorable to Coleman, demonstrated that there was
probable cause for Coleman's arrest under both the federal and
state definitions of the probable-cause standard. 	See doc. no.
115 at 15-20. 	Because Coleman's claim against Cormier is based
on the same theory and arises from the same underlying series of
events, and Coleman cites no additional evidence in support of
that claim, this conclusion equally precludes an entry of
default judgment against Cormier. 	See Wright, Miller & Kane,
supra, § 2690.
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Conclusion
For these reasons, the district judge should deny Coleman's
motion for default judgment (doc. no. 128). 	Any objections to
this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
The fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. 	Failure to
file specific written objections to the Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
December 28, 2018
cc: 	Richard Coleman, pro se
Charles P. Bauer, Esq.
Matthew Vernon Burrows, Esq.
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