Grimes v. Southern New Hampshire University

1:17-cv-00266NhdAug 31, 2017

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jerome L. Grimes
v. Civil No. 17-cv-266-SM
Southern New Hampshire University
SUPERSEDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This Superseding Report and Recommendation replaces the
August 11, 2017 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 6) (“August
11 R&R”), which this court has withdrawn in an Order issued on
this date.
Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes has filed a Complaint (Doc. No.
1) and an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8), which are before this
court for preliminary review, pursuant to LR 4.3(d) and 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Grimes also filed a “Reply Objection to
Report and Recommendation” (Doc. No. 7) after the court issued
the August 11 R&R (Doc. No. 6) vacated this date. The court has
considered the factual assertions in Document No. 7, along with
those in the complaint (Doc. No. 1) and amended complaint (Doc.
No. 8) in conducting this preliminary review.1 Also before the
1Grimes filed Document Nos. 1, 7, and 8 while in the “trial
competency program” at the Springfield Hospital Center in
Sykesville, Maryland. This court is authorized to screen
Grimes’s pleadings, pursuant to LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C.
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court are Grimes’s requests for a preliminary injunction, set
forth in the complaint (Doc. No. 1) and amended complaint (Doc.
No. 8).
Background
Grimes’s pleadings (Doc. Nos. 1, 7, 8) allege that Grimes
has enrolled in a 30-month online sports management graduate
program at Southern New Hampshire University (“SNHU”). Grimes
applied for and obtained financial aid in the form of a loan,
guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Education, to pay tuition
for courses in that program.
Grimes asserts he enrolled in an online sports management
field methods course at SNHU, which was scheduled to run from
April 2017 through June 2017. SNHU accepted a disbursement of
Grimes’s federally-insured student loan to pay for that course.
§ 1915(e)(2), before inquiring further as to the applicability
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). See Mahoney v. Hearst Corp., No.
13-cv-12994-LTS, 2015 WL 686814, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19253, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 17, 2015) (“‘[i]n the context of
unrepresented litigants proceeding in forma pauperis,” court’s
inquiry as to application of Rule 17 “‘would usually occur after
the preliminary merits screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A or 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)’” (citation omitted)), appeal filed, No. 15-
1518 (1st Cir. May 5, 2015); see also Hartmann v. Carroll, 582
F. App’x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A trial court contemplating
appointment of a representative or counsel in a civil case must
first find ‘that the plaintiff’s claim has arguable merit in
fact and law.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
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Grimes could not complete the course and received a failing
grade in June 2017. Sometime after June 26, 2017, Grimes
received notice that the “F” he received had been withdrawn by
the professor. See Doc. No. 7, at 2.
Grimes asserts that on June 14, 2017, SNHU financial aid
office staff members, agents, student advisors, and co-
conspirators, in Grimes’s view, inspired by a “hidden agenda,”
effectively “blacklisted” or “discriminat[ed]” against Grimes,
by preventing him from accessing federally insured student loan
funds to pay for future courses at SNHU. Grimes alleges that
SNHU’s alleged discriminatory conduct has violated Titles III,
IV, and IX and other federal laws. Grimes seeks preliminary
injunctions granting him access to student loan funds at SNHU,
and an order firing unnamed “state actors” from remaining in the
employ of schools or universities that receive federal funds.
Discussion
I. Preliminary Review
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of
pleadings like Grimes’s, which are filed in forma pauperis. See
LR 4.3(d). The magistrate judge may recommend to the district
judge that one or more claims be dismissed if, among other
things, the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from
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the relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR
4.3(d). In conducting its preliminary review, the court
construes pro se complaints liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted).
Stripped of legal conclusions, Grimes’s bald assertions of
discrimination under Titles III, IV, and IX, and other laws are
not actionable as they fail to assert sufficient facts to state
any claim upon which relief might be granted. Grimes’s claims
of discrimination under Titles III, IV, and IX are conclusory
and do not allege facts to show that Grimes was treated
differently than any similarly-situated individuals on the basis
of sex, race, disability, or any other classification.
Grimes has also failed to state claims based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. SNHU is a
private university. Given the absence of allegations of state
action here, Grimes has not stated actionable claims of
violations of his federal constitutional rights, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not provide Grimes with a remedy. Cf. Murphy v.
Villanova Univ., 547 F. Supp. 512, 517-18 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
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(private university not liable under section 1983 as plaintiff
failed to show university engaged in “state action”), aff’d, 707
F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1983).
II. Preliminary Injunction
“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.’” Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015) (citation omitted). The likelihood
of success and irreparable harm are the factors that weigh most
heavily in the analysis. See Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig–
Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Voice of the
Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32
(1st Cir. 2011).
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff has not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claims. Further, Grimes has not asserted any facts to
demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm if his requests
for dismissal of various individuals from their jobs and for
access to student loan funds, are not granted while this action
remains pending. Accordingly, the district judge should deny
Grimes’s requests for injunctive relief.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss this action, and deny Grimes’s request for a preliminary
injunction, without prejudice to plaintiff’s ability to file a
new motion for a preliminary injunction, showing why such relief
is necessary, if the district judge does not approve the
recommendation of dismissal. Any objections to this Superseding
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The
fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. Failure to
file specific written objections to the Superseding Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
August 31, 2017
cc: Jerome L. Grimes, pro se
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