Saykaly v. Donovan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Nicholas E. Saykaly
v. Civil No. 23-cv-289-SE
Hon. Patrick E. Donovan
William J. Quinn
Amanda Beth Colburn-Saykaly
REPORT AND RECOMMENDEDATION
Pro se plaintiff Nicholas E. Saykaly, appearing in forma
pauperis, filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) against Amanda Beth
Colburn-Saykaly,1 William J. Quinn (her attorney), and New
Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Patrick E. Donovan. Mr.
Saykaly’s complaint is before the undersigned magistrate Judge
for preliminary review. See LR 4.3(d)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
Standard of Review
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of
pleadings, like Mr. Saykaly’s, that are filed in forma pauperis.
See LR 4.3(d). The magistrate judge may recommend to the
district judge that one or more claims be dismissed if, among
other things, the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is
1 At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff and Ms.
Colburn Saykaly were involved in divorce proceedings. See Compl.
Add. (Doc. No. 1-1) at 8.
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immune from the relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d). In conducting its preliminary review,
the court construes pro se complaints liberally. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citation omitted). The court treats as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations, and construes reasonable
inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Background
In connection with Mr. Saykaly’s divorce proceedings,
Justice Donovan found that certain of Mr. Saykaly’s New
Hampshire Supreme Court filings were frivolous and ultimately
awarded attorney’s fees to Amanda Beth Colburn Saykaly’s
attorney, defendant William Quinn. See Order, Petition of
Nicholas Saykaly, No. 2022-0064 (N.H. Feb. 8, 2023) (Doc. No. 1-
1 at 10). Pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 21(7),2
Justice Donovan was the only Justice to preside over the
attorney’s fee hearing and he entered the fee Order. Mr.
2 As relevant here, N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 21(7) provides that
“[a] single justice may rule on all non-dispositive motions and
may issue any non-dispositive order . . . Any order of a
single justice shall state which justice so ruled.
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Saykaly asserts that such a “single justice order” violates N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 490:7, captioned “Quorum,” which provides in
relevant part that “[s}essions of the court shall be held by at
least 3 supreme court justices. A lesser number, or the clerk,
if no justice attends, may adjourn the sessions from day to day
until 3 justices attend.”
Invoking 42 U.S.C § 1983,3 Mr. Saykaly claims that Justice
Donovan’s alleged violation of New Hampshire law violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. He asserts the
same claim against the other defendants based on their
participation in the single-Justice session. Mr. Saykaly seeks
a declaratory judgment reflecting the illegality of the February
8, 2023 hearing, an injunction preventing enforcement of the
judgment, and an order directing the defendants to return their
“ill-gotten gains.” Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 5.
Discussion
The gist of Mr. Saykaly’s claim is that Justice Donovan
failed to follow New Hampshire law when held the February 8,
2023 hearing and subsequently issued an order on the attorney’s
fees issue. Ultimately, he asks this court to set aside Justice
Donovan’s order due to its “illegality.” This relief is barred
3 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the
deprivation of a federally secured right by a person “acting
under the color of state law.” Doucette v. Georgetown Pub. Sch.,
936 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019).
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by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, pursuant to which “lower federal
courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over
final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463
(2006).4 That doctrine exists to prevent precisely this type of
action: a “case[ ] brought by [a] state-court loser[ ]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). The appropriate forum for Mr. Saykaly to have sought
relief from Justice Donovan’s order would have been a motion to
reconsider, which would have been “referred to the court for
decision,” N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 27(9), and, if necessary, a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. See Efreom v. McKee, No. 21-1382, 2022 WL 3483975, at *5
(1st Cir. Aug. 18, 2022) (noting that “only the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to review the decision of a state court in
civil litigation.” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at
287)).
“When Rooker–Feldman applies, this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to review a state court judgment even if the
4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from two cases: Rooker
v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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judgment is wrong or was entered following patently
unconstitutional proceedings.” Brady v. Howard, No. 21-cv-614-
PB, 2022 WL 88159, at *3 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2022) (citing Feldman,
460 U.S. at 486), aff’d, No. 22-1060 (1st Cir. Sept. 8, 2023).
Accordingly, the district court should dismiss this case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Judicial Immunity
In addition to application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
absolute judicial immunity also bars Mr. Saykaly’s claim against
Justice Donovan. “[I]t is an axiom of black letter law that
when a judge carries out traditional adjudicatory functions, he
or she has absolute immunity for those actions.” Zenon v.
Guzman, 924 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2019). This holds true
“even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” E.g.,
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); accord Zenon, 924
F.3d at 616 (“The breadth of [judicial immunity] is fulsome,
shielding judges even when their actions are malicious, corrupt,
mistaken, or taken in bad faith.”). “[A]bsolute judicial
immunity means not just immunity from damages, but immunity from
suit altogether.” Zenon, 924 F.3d at 617 n.10 (citing Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). Even “grave procedural errors”
are not enough to support a claim against a judge. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, (1978).
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Whether judicial immunity applies to a particular case is
determined by the nature of the act complained of, rather than
the simple fact that the defendant is a judge. Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (observing that “immunity is
justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves,
not by the person to whom it attaches”). Particularly relevant
to this case is the principle that judicial immunity serves,
primarily, “as a device for discouraging collateral attacks and
thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the
standard system for correcting judicial error.” Id. at 225.
Additionally, judicial immunity serves to “protect[ ] judicial
independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions
prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.” Id.
To determine if the judge is entitled to the full
protection of the doctrine, the Supreme Court has assessed
whether the judge's act was one normally performed by a judge,
and whether the parties were dealing with the judge in his or
her judicial capacity. Strahan v. McNamara, No. 22-CV-391-SM-
TSM, 2023 WL 5237915, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 15, 2023). Here, there
can be no reasonable dispute that in conducting the February 8,
2023 hearing, the parties were “dealing with [Justice Donovan]
in his . . . judicial capacity” and that Justice Donovan was
performing an act “normally performed by a judge.” Id.
Accordingly, should the district judge decline to dismiss this
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case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the claim against
Justice Donovan should be dismissed because he is immune from
suit.
C. Defendants Quinn and Colburn-Saykaly
Mr. Saykaly’s claim against the remaining defendants is
that they violated his civil rights by scheduling and
participating in the “illegal” New Hampshire Supreme Court
hearing. Compl. Add. (Doc. No. 1-1) ¶¶ 2,3. The complaint lacks
any factual support for the implied assertion that either
Attorney Quinn or Ms. Colburn-Saykaly played any role in the
scheduling of the attorney’s fee hearing before a single
justice.
Another basis for dismissal of these defendants is that
private actors generally cannot be held liable for violations of
an individual's federal constitutional rights. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312 (1981)); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296-97 (2001)
(collecting cases on various circumstances in which an
ostensibly private actor has been treated as a state actor for
purposes of section 1983). One such exception giving rise to a
private party's liability occurs when that party conspires with
state actors. See McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 77 (1st
Cir. 1984). For this exception to apply, a plaintiff must plead
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“the relationship or nature of cooperation between the state and
a private individual . . . in some detail.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Here, as noted above, the only allegations against
defendants Quinn and Colburn-Saykaly is that they participated
in a hearing scheduled by the State Supreme Court and “[made]
filings.” Compl. Add. (Doc. No. 1-1) ¶ 2. These allegations
insufficient to impart “state actor” status to these defendants.
Accordingly, should the district judge decline to dismiss
this case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it should
dismiss the claim against these defendants for failure to state
a cause of action for which relief can be granted.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, this case should be dismissed.
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the claim against
Justice Donovan should be dismissed as he is immune from suit
and the claim against the other defendants should be dismissed
because the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against
them. If the district court dismisses this case, it should also
deny the following motions as moot: 1) plaintiff’s motion to
participate in electronic filing (Doc. No. 3); 2) plaintiff’s
emergency motion to correct the record (Doc. No. 4); 3)
plaintiff’s motion to bring forward emergency motion (Doc. No.
7); and 4) plaintiff’s motion for clarification (Doc. No. 8).
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Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Failure to file any objection within the specified time
waives the right to appeal the district court's Order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016). Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation “‘are subject to review in the
district court.’” Id. Additionally, any issues “‘not preserved
by such objection are precluded on appeal.’” Id. (citations
omitted).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
October 3, 2023
cc: Nicholas E. Saykaly, pro se
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