Griffin v. Summit Properties

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John R. Griffin, Jr.
v. Case No. 23-cv-493-JL-TSM
Summit Properties
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff, John Griffin, Jr., filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) against defendant, Summit
Properties, challenging defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. His complaint is before the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for preliminary review. See LR 4.3(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the District Judge dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Preliminary Review Standard
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of pleadings filed in forma pauperis.
See LR 4.3(d). The magistrate judge may recommend to the district judge that one or more claims
be dismissed if, among other things, the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the
relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d). In conducting its preliminary review, the court construes pro se
complaints liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The court treats as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and construes reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
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Background
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges he applied for a position as a community manager with
Summit Properties on December 15, 2022. He alleges that the application inquired about the
applicant’s COVID-19 vaccine status and contained a statement that applicants “should be fully
vaccinated against COVID-19 unless you have a valid religious or medical exemption.” (Doc. 1,
at 2). Plaintiff alleges that “within an hour of submitting the job application, [Summit Properties]
emailed [plaintiff] back since [he] told them asking for vaccine status is a violation of federal
HIPPA statutes.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s application was subsequently rejected. Notably, plaintiff
does not allege that he requested a medical or religious exemption.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered harm as a result of Summit Property’s decision not to hire
him on account of his position regarding the COVID-19 vaccine. He states that he now works in
a factory setting, which exacerbated several of his pre-existing conditions and injuries, and which
is otherwise detrimental to his health. Accordingly, plaintiff requests reconsideration for
employment, a year’s salary, and $20,000.00 for pain and suffering.
Discussion
I. Claims Alleging Violations of Criminal Law
As an initial matter, plaintiff alleges defendant violated criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2331
(“The Patriot Act”). That statute, however, does not empower private citizens to institute criminal
proceedings. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[o]nly the United States as
prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (the criminal analogue of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983)).” Similarly, plaintiff cites federal regulations applying “to all clinical investigations
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) under sections 505(i) and 520(g) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as well as clinical investigations that support applications
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for research or marketing permits for products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.”
21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (detailing the scope of Part 50 “Protection of Human Subjects” pertaining to the
Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services). Neither
regulation, however, provides plaintiff with a private right of action against defendant.
Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss Mr. Griffin’s claims to the extent they assert
violations of criminal law or FDA regulations.1
II. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Summit Properties failed to hire him on account of his position
regarding the COVID-19 vaccine. Construing the complaint liberally, the Court interprets
plaintiff’s complaint as asserting a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Title VII provides “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This prohibition encompasses “disparate treatment” discrimination,
“where an employer has ‘treated [a] particular person less favorably than others because of’ a
protected trait.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)).
To ultimately succeed on the claim, “[a] disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that
the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’ for taking a job-related action.” Ricci, 557
1 Plaintiff also asserts that defendant violated the Nuremberg Code by implementing mandatory COVID-19
precautions. “[A]s other courts have held, Covid-19 vaccine mandates are simply not equivalent to the forced
experimentation on concentration camp victims that led to the writing of the Nuremberg Code.” Anderson v. United
Airlines, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1334-35 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (citations omitted); see also Bridges v. Houston
Methodist Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 3d 525, 528 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“Equating the injection requirement to medical
experimentation in concentration camps is reprehensible.”).
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U.S. at 577. However, courts “have explicitly held that plaintiffs need not plead facts in the
complaint that establish a prima facie case under Title VII.” Garayalde-Rijos v. Mun. of Carolina,
747 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014). Rather, the complaint simply must contain facts that “plausibly
allege” that the plaintiff experienced a discriminatory employment action. Morales-Cruz v. Univ.
of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). “If a reasonable court can draw the necessary inference
[of discrimination] from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has
been satisfied.” Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932 (6th Cir. 2024). “After all, ‘plausibility’
occupies that wide space between ‘possibility’ and ‘probability.’” Id.
Here, plaintiff alleges that Summit Properties requires applicants “be fully vaccination
against COVID-19 unless you have a valid religious or medical exemption.” (Doc. No. 1, at 2).
Plaintiff contends this requirement perpetuates “coer[c]ion” on behalf of the World Health
Organization (WHO) “to get as many people as possible to take the mRNA COVID-19 gene
therapy that is known to cause myocarditis, unnatural clotting of blood vessels, stroke, heart attacks
… and a host of other serious illnesses and death which involves acts dangerous to human life.”
Id. He further alleges that defendant’s vaccination policies “are precisely the same as the Jim
Jones cult in Guyana: ‘The Koolaid [sic] only works if everyone drinks it.’” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff
alleges that “[t]his policy of Summit Property Management is a crime against humanity in the
name of mass formation hysteria, mental illness, to coerce others to engage in their fear based
delusions.” Id. Thus, in an effort to liberally construe plaintiff’s complaint, the court construes
plaintiff’s claim as alleging religious discrimination.
Title VII defines “religion” as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
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the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Plaintiff’s claim, however,
fundamentally fails absent any reference to any sincerely held religious beliefs.
Title VII does not protect social, political, or economic views or personal
preferences. Thus, objections to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement that are
purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or any
other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible effects of the vaccine),
do not qualify as religious beliefs, practices, or observances under Title VII.
U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, § L at L.2, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-
you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws#L
(https://perma.cc/4Z6E-7XDK). Plaintiff’s objections to the vaccine raise questions of long-term
effects akin to those the EEOC stated do not qualify as religious beliefs. See also Mason v. Brown
Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1988) (chiropractic “view of the human body ...
which rejects various types of drug and surgical intervention[s] in favor of a belief that ‘health
comes from within’” held not to be a religious belief for purposes of Title VII protection). Absent
identification of a religious belief, or other protected class, “[v]accination status is not a class to
which Title VII protections apply.” Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., No. 22-CV-2154, 2023 WL
4490395, at *8 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2023), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 96 F.4th 932
(6th Cir. 2024). As such, the District Judge should dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims.2
2 In addition, Title VII requires that before a plaintiff can bring a lawsuit in court to allege unlawful discrimination,
they must first file a timely charge with the EEOC or a state or local agency with authority to seek relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). Congress has established an
elaborate administrative procedure through the EEOC that is designed “to assist in the investigation of claims of ...
discrimination in the workplace and to work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than
litigation.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Plaintiffs must file a charge with the EEOC within
one hundred and eighty days after “the alleged unlawful employment practice” occurred, or within 300 days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice if they initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1). To the extent plaintiff intended to claim that defendant's vaccination policy violated his rights under
Title VII based on religion, the claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)-(f).
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Judge should dismiss the claims asserted in the
complaint. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); LR 7.2(d). The fourteen-day period
may be extended upon motion. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168
(1st Cir. 2016).
SO ORDERED.
_________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
April 17, 2024
cc: John R. Griffin, pro se
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