Manchon v. Charlestown, NH Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Marc Manchon
v. No. 24-cv-347-LM-AJ
David Tucker, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented plaintiff Marc Manchon brought this civil
rights action against the Charlestown, New Hampshire Police
Department (“CPD”), CPD Chief Patrick Connors, CPD dispatcher
Sirena Relihan, and Bail Commissioner David Tucker, claiming
violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights after he was
arrested while livestreaming his visit to the CPD to retrieve
records.1
Presently before the court for a recommended decision is
CPD’s, Connors’s and Relihan’s motion for summary judgment, in
which they seek dismissal of the arrest-related claims against
them (Doc. No. 31). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B); LR 72.1. As explained more fully below, the
defendants’ motion should be granted.
1 The complaint also contained a claim that he was subject
to excessive bail conditions. The court dismissed the claim
against Bail Commissioner Tucker on October 3, 2025 (Doc. No.
36).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A movant is entitled to summary judgment where he “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
[that he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In reviewing the record, the court construes all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant. Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs. Inc., 707 F.3d 108,
115 (1st Cir. 2013).
As to summary judgment, a grant “is appropriate when there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Viscito v. Nat’l Plan.
Corp., 34 F.4th 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “A genuine
dispute is one that would permit a rational factfinder to
resolve the issue in favor of either party, and a material fact
is one that has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit
under the applicable law.” Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 63 F.4th
71, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2023) (citations and quotations omitted). In
considering the motion, the “construe[s] the record in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Miller v. Sunapee
Difference, LLC, 918 F.3d 172, 176 (1st Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise
indicated. The court draws this narrative from the parties’
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affidavits2 and its own review of the approximately twenty-one
minute recording of Mr. Manchon’s livestream.3 The court first
recounts the events as shown on the recording.
On October 27, 2021, Plaintiff visited the CPD to retrieve
records he had previously requested. He livestreamed his visit
on his YouTube channel, “Press NH Now.” The video is captioned
with the title “Tyrant Chief Violates Public Records Law.”
Livestream viewers could, in real time, react to it, comment on
it, or share it. Mr. Manchon spoke to viewers directly, often
thanking them for positive comments, throughout the recording,
often referring to them by their screen names. He specifically
explained the purpose of his visit.
Roughly two minutes into the recording, prior to entering
the CPD building, Mr. Manchon said, “I am going to probably need
your help here . . . with what I am doing. Um, the police chief,
is uh, playing hard to get with these records and it is really
pissing me off.” He specifically expressed his frustration to
the viewers that the records he requested were not sent to him
2 Mr. Manchon’s affidavit (Doc. No. 33-1) contains only the
following relevant factual assertions: 1) that he entered the
CPD on October 27, 2021 and was livestreaming his visit; 2) that
livestream viewers began calling the CPD are 4:04 p.m.; 3)
defendant Relihan reacted to the calls and summoned Chief
Connors; 4) he was arrested at approximately 4:06 p.m.
3 See
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15Hr3Yes6oE&list=PLEqSybSG3PxlON
IYrkZaeb2e59sHzErM0&index=24 (last accessed Jan. 20, 2026).
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via email, requiring him to drive two hours to retrieve them. As
the livestream continued, two viewers in the livestream chat
asked for the CPD phone number. In the chat section of the
video, a moderator wrote “CHIEF CONNORS CHARLESTOWN NH 1-603-
826-5747 DONT CALL.” (capitalization in the original).
After Mr. Manchon entered the CPD (approximately eight
minutes into the recording) he walked toward a small window in
the lobby. There is a sign on the window that indicates the
premises are being “audio and video recorded.” He aimed the
camera through the window, showing Dispatcher Relihan, who can
be seen working at a computer adjacent to the window. She asked
Mr. Manchon if he needed help. Mr. Manchon stated that he was
there “to pick up some records,” Dispatcher Relihan responded
“okay” and asked Plaintiff for his name. Mr. Manchon said, “I
did not give that” before indicating that something was “right
there.”
After speaking with Dispatcher Relihan, Mr. Manchon
continued to engage with livestream commenters. At one point, he
said, “Damn guys, let’s get that up to 200 likes,” and then,
“when they ask you if they can help you, they don’t mean that.
It’s a fluke.” Dispatcher Relihan then told Mr. Manchon, “I am
just making sure everything is there for you to grab. It will be
one second.” Mr. Manchon asked about Chief Connors and Relihan
informed him that the Chief was on patrol.
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After engaging in a brief dialogue with Dispatcher Relihan
regarding Mr. Manchon’s recording, Manchon said that she was
“striking out,” as she approached the window with a folder
containing the requested records. After receiving the records,
Mr. Manchon asked to speak with Chief Connors. Dispatcher
Relihan indicated that she would call Chief Connors to return to
the department. Mr. Manchon then said “damn, strike three,” to
which Dispatcher Relihan replied, “excuse me?” Mr. Manchon
said, “strike three? I’m sorry, my viewers understand.”
Mr. Manchon then asked Relihan her name, to which she
responded, “Dispatcher 400.” They repeated the exchange, after
which Mr. Manchon said, “that is not your name, that’s your ID
number, what’s your name?”. Mr. Manchon responded, “are you
going to refuse to give me your name?”, to which Relihan did not
respond. Mr. Manchon then says, to his viewers, “I don’t know
guys,” . . .“I may need to pull her records, too.”
At approximately the same time, a telephone can be heard
ringing in the dispatch room, on the other side of the glass
from where Mr. Manchon is standing and recording. He then said,
“Uh, I don’t know guys, do you want to figure out her name? You
can ask her if you would like, everything is in the description
for you.” Livestream viewers continued to engage with Mr.
Manchon, including several who say they will call the dispatch
line Relihan is answering.
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Mr. Manchon then opened the folder he was given and said,
in response to a commenter who stated, “Let’s hear the phones
ring,” “Yeah, . . . , I think they need to learn about public
record laws.” Livestream chat moderators and commenters posted
three telephone emojis next to Chief Connors’s name, and wrote
“start calling.” Another commenter wrote “ask her what the
direct # is there,” after which Mr. Manchon called out to
Dispatcher Relihan, asking, “What’s your direct number?” He then
said, “they’re asking, that’s all. They [the viewers] may have
some questions for you guys. If you [the viewers] have any
questions, you can, uh, what is it, 401? 400? You [the viewers]
could ask, uh, dispatch 401, or whatever the hell it is, what
her name is. Maybe she’ll let you know, after the 100th ring,
maybe?”
Not long after these statements to his viewers, Mr. Manchon
said, “You guys do not have to call.” Though, soon after, Mr.
Manchon thanked a livestream moderator for posting the CPD’s
phone number. At roughly the same time the phone could be heard
ringing from the room with Dispatcher Relihan. Mr. Manchon
stated, presumably to Dispatcher Relihan, “The public has some
questions or concern and, I think they may want to ask you.”
Livestream commenters continued to express their intent and
efforts to call in to the dispatch line. Mr. Manchon then said
to the viewers, “Poor girl, it’s only her, too.”
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Meanwhile, Dispatcher Relihan can be seen responding to
calls while additional calls are coming in and a livestream
moderator again posted CPD’s number. Mr. Manchon then said, “I
don’t know, I’m just curious to see what her name is, I’m sure
you guys are, too.” As the livestream chat continues to discuss
the telephone calls coming into the dispatch line, Mr. Manchon
said, “They’re going to learn today, guys, let me tell ya.”
After briefly looking at the documents he received, Mr.
Manchon said, “So, this dispatcher, is not named Lisa, oh, look
at that. They have all my information, but they wouldn’t e-mail
this to me. Huh, violating public records laws, huh. RSA 91-A,
you guys are going to learn today, aren’t you? Making me drive
two hours to get these records when you could have e-mailed
them. Incredible, guys. See, they just want to make it
difficult. They wanted to come see me again.” In the livestream
chat, viewers and moderators continue to comment on their
efforts to call the dispatch line.
Mr. Manchon then re-engaged Dispatcher Relihan, asking her
to provide her name and then saying, “Now, I’m going to pull
your salary too, I’m gonna make that public.” As the telephone
line in the dispatch room continued to ring, Plaintiff stated:
“I hope you enjoy.” He added “I won’t leave here until she
leaves, or she gives me her name. That’s the deal.” Mr. Manchon
then pointed the camera away from the dispatch room window,
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towards the front door, and exited the building. He continued to
express his dissatisfaction regarding CPD’s document production,
continuing to articulate his dissatisfaction with CPD’s document
production, and said: “They’re not busy enough here, anyway, in
Charlestown. I was in town almost 45 minutes and I didn’t even
hear dispatch go off, so. So, you guys, do not call.”
After Mr. Manchon re-entered the building, and while he was
still livestreaming, Chief Connors arrived at CPD. Chief Connors
and Mr. Manchon then began to argue over the records provided to
Mr. Manchon. Chief Connors said: “No, we’re not going back and
forth.” Mr. Manchon responded, “No, we are going back and
forth. You’re going to sit here and listen to what I have to say
and a thousand other people are going to tell you exactly what to
say.” Chief Connors responded, “Listen to me,” to which Mr.
Manchon replied, “No, I’m not going to listen to you, Chief. I
asked you, I asked you for certain records. Okay? You responded
with: ‘what is your name, where do I send it to. I take vid, uh,
I take e-mails very seriously for FOIA requests,’ which is
bullshit . . . Okay?! Because you made me drive out here for two
hours, two hours to drive out here to get public records that you
could e-mail, that says it in the statute that you can and will
e-mail it when I asked.”
After Chief Connors interrupted the argument, he went into
the dispatch room and asked Dispatcher Relihan if she had “a
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bunch of people calling in that this guy incited?” After
hearing of Relihan’s affirmative response, Mr. Manchon said,
“No, I did not. I did not incite it. I told them, ‘do not
call.’” He also said, “Prove it, prove it, prove it” to Chief
Connors.
Based, in part, on his communications with Dispatcher
Relihan, Chief Connors said to Mr. Manchon, “Well, you’re going
to get arrested for –,” but Mr. Manchon interrupted him and said
“Oh really? Yeah, you better do your investigation and watch”
the live stream. Chief Connors tried to speak, but Mr. Manchon
continued, “Connors, you got 700 people . . . .” Chief Connors
eventually told Mr. Manchon he was under arrest. In response to
Mr. Manchon asking why he was being arrested, Chief Connors
responded, “For obstructing governmental – ,” before he was
interrupted, “I am not doing that. I am not making those phone
calls.” He continued to speak to his viewers as Chief Connors
arrested him, saying “I’m under arrest. Do not call the
Charlestown Police Department. I did not incite these phone
calls.” As he was being handcuffed, Mr. Manchon said, “I said,
if you have any questions or grievances you can call dispatch,
on your own, okay?” He also said, “I never told them. You hear
this, guys, do not call,” and, while he is being arrested “I do
not consent to any searches or seizures of my property.” Chief
Connors then informed him, “Okay, well, you’re under arrest, so
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I’m searching you incident to arrest.” As Chief Connors appears
to conduct a search of Mr. Manchon, he again said, “I do not
consent to any searches or seizures of my property. Guys, do not
call the Charlestown Police Department regarding my unlawful
arrest and detainment.” The recording ended a few seconds later.
Mr. Manchon was arrested on charges of disorderly conduct
and obstructing government administration. Bail Commissioner
Tucker imposed conditions which prohibited Mr. Manchon from
“entering any public buildings in Charlestown, NH” unless he was
“reporting a crime or injury.” A week later, Mr. Manchon was
arrested for violating his conditions of bail. Those charges
were dismissed at arraignment, and Mr. Manchon was found not
guilty of the charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing
government administration. Id.
In her affidavit in support of the instant motion,
Dispatcher Relihan states that, while Mr. Manchon was at CPD,
and prior to Chief Connors’s arrival at CPD, she began receiving
numerous non-emergency telephone calls to the dispatch line. The
number of non-emergency calls continued to increase in
frequency, which impacted the operations of dispatch.” Relihan
Aff. (Doc. No. 31-4) ¶ 7. She further stated that during his
interaction with Chief Connors, during which Mr. Manchon was
“hostile and agitated,” she continued to respond to “non-
emergency calls that came into dispatch, which appeared to
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constitute supporters or viewers of Mr. Manchon calling the
dispatch line.” Id. She added that some callers specifically
asked for her name rather than report a need for services. Other
callers were obscene and evasive. Relihan was forced to put
calls on hold in an effort to try to respond to the flood of
illegitimate, non-emergency calls that came in. Id.
Dispatcher Relihan additionally states that when Chief
Connors opened the door to dispatch, he inquired into whether
she was receiving calls that Mr. Manchon incited. Given her
interactions with and observations of Mr. Manchon as well as the
details of the non-emergency calls she was receiving, she
believed that Mr. Manchon was the cause of the increase in non-
emergency calls that she received, which impeded her ability to
respond to any legitimate calls for service. She so informed
Chief Connors, who then placed Mr. Manchon under arrest. Id. ¶ 9
Finally, Dispatcher Relihan notes that she had never interacted
with Mr. Manchon prior to the date in question. Id. ¶ 10.
Chief Connors’ affidavit tells a similar story. He could
hear the dispatch phone “continuously ringing” as he and Mr.
Manchon were talking outside the dispatch office. Connors Aff.
(Doc. No. 31-2) ¶ 11. He could also see that Dispatcher Relihan
was struggling to keep up with the call volume. Id. When he
talked to her, Dispatcher Relihan explained to Connors that she
believed that Mr. Manchon told the people on his livestream to
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call into dispatch. Id. Believing he had probable cause, Chief
Connors then arrested Mr. Manchon. Id.
DISCUSSION
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Manchon has asserted two
claims. First, he alleges that his arrest was an act of
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. Am.
Compl. (Doc. No. 12) at 3. Next he alleges that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested without
probable cause and when his phone was seized after he was placed
under arrest. Id. The court addresses the claims in turn.
A. First Amendment
“It is well established that claims of retaliation for the
exercise of First Amendment rights are cognizable under section
1983.” Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing
Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2004)). In
addition, the First Circuit has observed that “there is an
undoubted right to gather news from any source by means within
the law.” Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (2011).
In a section 1983 claim of retaliatory prosecution for
First Amendment activity, a plaintiff must prove that his
conduct was constitutionally protected and was a “‘substantial’”
or “‘motivating’” factor for the retaliatory decision . . .” id.
(citations omitted), “and that there was no probable cause for
the criminal charge[.]” Id. (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
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250, 265–66 (2006)). Thus, “if there is probable cause to believe
the person has committed a criminal offense there is often no
recourse for the deprivation.” Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U.S.
87, 90 (2018) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153
(2004)). In addition, protected speech can be a “wholly
legitimate consideration” for an arresting officer. Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 401 (2019) (decision to arrest the
plaintiff for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest was based
in part on the combative tone and content of his speech)
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 668 (2012)); see also
United States v. Regeneron Pharms., Inc., No. CV 20-11217-FDS,
2020 WL 7130004, at *17 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2020) (“It is hardly a
novel legal theory that speech may provide evidence of a crime,
or be an integral part of a crime, without running afoul of the
First Amendment.”).
Here, the defendants do not dispute Mr. Manchon’s First
Amendment right to livestream his visit to the CPD to retrieve
records he had previously requested, and to comment on the
proceedings. Instead, they argue that Chief Connors had probable
cause for the arrest, and relatedly, that the record contains no
evidence from which a jury could conclude that he was
retaliating against Mr. Manchon for his protected activities.
The court agrees with both points.
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Mr. Manchon was arrested for violating N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(“RSA”) § 642:1, Obstructing Government Administration. The
statute makes it a misdemeanor to
use[] intimidation, actual or threatened force or
violence, simulated legal process, or engages in any
other unlawful conduct with a purpose to hinder or
interfere with a public servant, as defined in RSA
640:2, II, performing or purporting to perform an
official function or to retaliate for the performance
or purported performance of such a function.
RSA 640:2, II, in turn, defines “public servant” as “any officer
or employee of the state or any political subdivision thereof,
including judges, legislators, consultants, jurors, and persons
otherwise performing a governmental function.” And finally, as
the defendants point out, Mr. Manchon’s activities fit
comfortably within the description of “disorderly conduct,”
which includes “[d]isrupting the orderly conduct of business in
any public or governmental facility . . . .” RSA 644:2, III.
As previously noted, if Chief Connors had probable cause,
then Mr. Manchon’s First Amendment claim fails. “The probable
cause determination turns on ‘whether . . . the facts and
circumstances within [the police officer's] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that’ a
crime was committed or was being committed.” Deaton v. Town of
Barrington, 100 F.4th 348, 356 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “To determine whether an officer
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had probable cause for an arrest, ‘[courts] examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to” probable cause.’” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56–57 (2018) (quoting
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). Probable cause
is a “fluid concept,” Deaton, 100 F.4th at 356 (quoting
Karamanoglu v. Town of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82, 87 (1st Cir.
2021)), requiring “more than ‘bare suspicion’, but less tha[n]
what would be needed to ‘justify . . . conviction.’” Valente v.
Wallace, 332 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2003). Ultimately, “[t]he
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371
(cleaned up).
Given the undisputed factual record, the court finds that
Chief Connors did have probable cause to arrest Mr. Manchon. The
court first notes that Mr. Manchon does not dispute Dispatcher
Relihan’s affidavit that the calls into dispatch disrupted the
orderly business of the police department, as she had to devote
all, or substantially all, of her attention to those calls. And
while Mr. Manchon argues now, as he did at the scene, that he
did not ask his viewers to call the CPD, he provides no facts to
counter Dispatcher Relihan’s affidavit, in which she notes that
Mr. Manchon said that his viewers “understand” what his
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reference to “strike three” meant, and that callers were asking
for her name as Mr. Manchon had. Dispatcher Relihan’s belief
that Mr. Manchon was causing the calls to be made was reasonable
on its face. She related that belief to Chief Connors, who was
able to see the effects of the calls first-hand. Mr. Manchon
provides no basis to suggest that Chief Connors’s reliance on
Dispatcher Relihan’s statements was not reasonable, and provides
no facts that would support an inference that Chief Connors was
retaliating against Mr. Manchon for livestreaming his visit, as
opposed to instigating the disruptive phone calls.
Given the existence of probable cause to arrest Mr.
Manchon, his First Amendment claim against Chief Connors
necessarily fails. And while that is also fatal to his claim
against Dispatcher Relihan, Mr. Manchon’s claim against her
fails for another reason – she did not arrest him. Accordingly,
Chief Connors and Dispatcher Relihan are entitled to summary
judgment on Mr. Manchon’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
B. Fourth Amendment
1. Arrest
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
seizures, including arrests made without probable cause. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; see Karamanoglu, 15 F.4th at 82. It is a “long
settled principle” that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
warrantless arrests not supported by probable cause. Fraser v.
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Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 544 F. Supp. 3d 148, 156-57 (D. Mass.
2021) (quoting Prall v. City of Boston, 985 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122
(D. Mass. 2013)). To survive summary judgment on his arrest
claim, Mr. Manchon must show that a jury could reasonably
conclude that Chief Connors lacked probable cause to arrest him.
See Charron v. Cnty. of York, 49 F.4th 608, 615 (1st Cir. 2022).
As described in connection with his First Amendment claim, Mr.
Manchon cannot meet his summary judgment burden to demonstrate a
lack of probable cause to arrest. Therefore the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2. Seizure of phone
Mr. Manchon’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the seizure
of his phone fares no better. Where, as the court has already
found, the arrest of Mr. Manchon was supported by probable
cause, the seizure of his phone was lawful. See Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (search incident to lawful arrest is an
exception to the warrant requirement that “derives from
interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are
typically implicated in arrest situations”). Given that Mr.
Manchon was using his phone to livestream, and that the
livestream was alleged to be the cause of the phone calls to
CPD, it was undoubtedly evidence that Chief Connors could
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lawfully secure. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on this claim as well.4
C. Claims against CPD
Mr. Manchon names the CPD as a separate defendant. To the
extent he seeks to state a claim against CPD, the claim would be
against the municipality of Charlestown. See Brady v. Whitefield
Police Dep't, No. 19-CV-00147-JL, 2019 WL 2720783, at *2 (D.N.H.
June 13, 2019) “A municipal police department is not an entity
subject to suit under § 1983.”) (citing Henschel v. Worcester
Police Dept., 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir. 1971) (dismissing §
1983 claim against police department because it was not suable
entity apart from the municipality)), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 19-CV-147-JL, 2019 WL 2716320 (D.N.H. June 27,
2019). Moreover, in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court outlined the limited circumstances
under which a municipality may be liable under Section 1983.
Only when the municipality, through the execution of its
policies, actually deprives an individual of his constitutional
rights, is it liable for the injury. Id. at 694. To establish
4 The record does not suggest that either Chief Connors or
Dispatcher Relihan was aware of the full content of the
livestream and comments in real time. It was not unreasonable
for the Chief to assume, however, that the video could be
relevant to Mr. Manchon’s prosecution. The court provides the
details of the livestream only as background. The court’s
probable cause analysis is focused only on the facts known to
Chief Connors and Dispatcher Relihan at the time.
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municipal liability, the policy must actually cause the
violation of constitutional rights; it must be the moving force
behind the violation. Id.
Mr. Manchon’s claim against Charlestown suffers from at
least two dispositive flaws. First, the court has already found
that neither Chief Connors nor Dispatcher Relihan acted
unconstitutionally. Thus there is no constitutional deprivation
to support a Monell claim. Moreover, neither Mr. Manchon’s
operative complaint nor his objection to the defendants’ motion
contain any reference to a municipal custom or policy that might
support a claim. Accordingly, the CPD is entitled to summary
judgment.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 31). The
movants are the only remaining defendants. Therefore, if the
district judge adopts this recommendation, the Clerk’s office
should be directed to enter judgment and close the case.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
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district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to
file any objections within the specified time waives the right
to appeal the district court's order. See Santos-Santos v.
Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
January 27, 2026
cc: Marc Jon Manchon, pro se
Counsel of Record
Case 1:24-cv-00347-LM-AJ Document 39 Filed 01/27/26 Page 20 of 20