Maciaszek v. Northern NH Correctional Facility et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
JACOB LEE MACIASZEK
v. Civil No. 24-cv-387-SE-TSM
WARDEN, NORTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff, Jacob Maciaszek, who is incarcerated at the Northern New
Hampshire Correctional Facility (“NCF”), claims that Defendants1 violated his rights under the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when they conducted a strip search and moved him
to administrative segregation pending administrative review. Doc. No. 1. The Complaint, naming
Defendants in their individual and official capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is before this
court for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and LR 4.3(d)(1). For the reasons
that follow, the district judge should dismiss Maciaszek’s Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
In conducting a preliminary review of a prisoner’s claims seeking relief from state
government officials, this court considers whether those claims should be dismissed because there
is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief sought, the plaintiff
1 Defendants named in the Complaint are the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility
(“NCF”), the NCF Warden, NCF Major Joey Backman, NCF Captain John Nadeau, and NCF
Corporal Prescott.
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has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or the action is frivolous or malicious.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); LR 4.3(d)(1). To determine whether to dismiss one or more claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court takes as true the factual content
asserted by the plaintiff and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, and, after stripping
away legal conclusions, considers whether the plaintiff has stated a claim that is plausible on its
face. Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Because Plaintiff in this case proceeds without counsel, the court
construes his pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
BACKGROUND
On October 15, 2024, Corporal Prescott and another officer entered and searched
Maciaszek’s cell at NCF, where they found a marshmallow fluff container that was half full, which
Corporal Prescott emptied. Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 2. A few minutes later, the officers handcuffed
Maciaszek and took him from his housing unit. Id. at ¶ 3. They brought Maciaszek to a reception
cell where he was strip searched and told to spread his legs for visual inspection in the presence of
at least three other officers. Id. at ¶ 4. Maciaszek stayed in that cell alone for nearly four hours,
without access to water, a bathroom, or furniture. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6. Eventually, officers moved
Maciaszek to another reception cell and provided formal notice that he was in administrative
segregation pending administrative review (“PAR”) because of the “homebrewed alcoholic
beverage” found in his cell. Id. at ¶ 4.
Maciaszek submitted an appeal of his PAR status to the NCF Warden on October 17, 2024.
Id. at ¶ 14. In that appeal, Maciaszek asserted that he was not in possession of alcoholic beverages;
was put on PAR status even though he did not pose a danger to himself or others as required by
prison policy; and that the disciplinary charges against him for “manufacturing components for
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alcohol and usage of” were overly broad and vague. Id. On October 21, 2024, Major Backman
responded that the PAR status would remain in effect as written because Maciaszek was “found in
possession of components to produce a homebrew alcoholic beverage.” Id. at ¶ 15.
Maciaszek remained in PAR status for fifteen days. Id. at ¶ 18. He claims he should have
received two reviews during that time but was never afforded any such review and waited eight
days before receiving a disciplinary hearing. Id.
Claims
Liberally construed, the Complaint asserts the following claims for relief:
1. Defendants subjected Maciaszek to an unreasonable strip search, in violation of
Maciaszek’s Fourth Amendment rights, rendering them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
2. Defendants subjected Maciaszek to an unreasonable strip search, in violation of
Maciaszek’s Eighth Amendment rights, rendering them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
3. Defendants denied Maciaszek his right to due process of law, in violation of Maciaszek’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights, rendering them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that:
a. Defendants moved Maciaszek to PAR status for at least three (3) hours, absent any
evidence or disciplinary hearing showing that Maciaszek presented a clear danger
to himself or others, in violation of N.H. Code Admin. R. Cor. 410.03(b)–(c);
b. Defendants moved Maciaszek to PAR status without an immediate referral and
evaluation by the prison’s behavioral health department, in violation of N.H. Code
Admin. R. Cor. 410.09(g);
c. Defendants did not review Maciaszek’s status every seven days while he was in
PAR status, in violation of N.H. Code Admin. R. Cor. 410.03(f)–(g);
d. Defendants deprived Maciaszek of an opportunity to challenge his PAR status
every seven days, in violation of N.H. Code Admin. R. Cor. 410.03(f)–(g); and
e. Defendants used vague, arbitrary, or unduly broad language with respect to the
disciplinary charge that led to his PAR status.
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DISCUSSION
I. Fourth Amendment (Claim 1)
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” County of Los
Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427 (2017). Prison inmates retain Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but “[t]he fact of confinement as well as the legitimate
goals and policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights.” Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “Strip searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner
that is justified by sufficient legitimate penological interests to outweigh the significant privacy
interests of the inmate.” Therriault v. NCF, No. 23-CV-449-SE-TSM, 2024 WL 5500151, at *4,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241951, at *9 (D.N.H. Dec. 12, 2024) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559–60),
R&R approved, 2025 WL 986145, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62851 (D.N.H. Apr. 2, 2025). “The
test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. “Courts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in
which it is conducted.” Id.
Visual inspections of prisoners, without “allegations that [it] was undertaken as a pretext
for retaliatory conduct, as punishment, or for sexual humiliation,” do not amount to a Fourth
Amendment violation. Morales v. Foster, No. 17-CV-234-SM, 2019 WL 441967, at *3, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17431, at *8 (D.N.H. Jan. 3, 2019) (citing Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
1997)), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 440564, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17125 (D.N.H. Feb. 1, 2019).
Maciaszek alleged he was visually inspected and that several officers observed the search. See
Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 4. Without more, those allegations do not state a claim for relief for a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. See McKinney v. Piazza, No. CV 20-6963 (FLW), 2022 WL 17668049,
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at *9, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225053, at *24 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2022) (no Fourth Amendment
violation where prisoner “was asked to squat and cough four times for three different officers and
felt uncomfortable”); cf. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 333–34, 339 (2012)
(rejecting claim that subjecting pretrial detainees to visual body-cavity searches without
individualized suspicion violated Fourth Amendment). Accordingly, Maciaszek has not stated an
unreasonable search claim under the Fourth Amendment and the district judge should dismiss
Claim 1.
II. Eighth Amendment (Claim 2)
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from depriving inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 565 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “An Eighth Amendment claim
challenging the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement has an objective and subjective
component.” Morales, 2019 WL 441967, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17431, at *12 (citing
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). To satisfy the objective component, the deprivations
alleged must be “extreme.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). To satisfy the subjective
component, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
“A prisoner states a claim under the Eighth Amendment when he plausibly alleges that the
strip-search in question was motivated by a desire to harass or humiliate rather than by a legitimate
justification, such as the need for order and security in prisons.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889,
897 (7th Cir. 2015). “Even where prison authorities are able to identify a valid correctional
justification for the search, it may still violate the Eighth Amendment if [it was] conducted in a
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harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Maciaszek alleges that he underwent a visual inspection when he was moved out of the
general population and into PAR status. Although Maciaszek alleges that he was strip searched in
the presence of three officers, that, alone, does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
Baptiste v. Foster, No. 16-CV-439-JD, 2017 WL 1207878, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49498,
at *4 (D.N.H. Mar. 13, 2017) (no Eighth Amendment claim where plaintiff was subject to a strip
search in front of other inmates and alleged that the search created a substantial risk that he would
be subject to inmate-on-inmate sexual violence), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 1207505, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49496 (D.N.H. Mar. 30, 2017). Therefore, Maciaszek has not stated an Eighth
Amendment claim, and the district judge should dismiss Count 2.
III. Due Process (Claims 3(a)-(e))
In the allegations summarized above as Claim 3 and its subparts, Maciaszek claims that
the lack of precision in the disciplinary charge that gave rise to his PAR status, along with
Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with prison regulations relating to his disciplinary
proceedings violated his right to due process. In particular, Maciaszek alleges that he remained in
PAR status for fifteen days, including a three-hour period when he was deprived of water and
furniture, and that he was reclassified to a higher security level.
A. Protected Liberty Interest (Claims 3(a)–(e))
In general, the “failure of prison officials to grant [plaintiff] any process that he believes
he was entitled to under prison regulations . . . does not amount to a violation of his due process
rights, unless he can show that such failure deprived him of a liberty interest[.]” Cole v. Thyng,
No. 11-CV-018-JL, 2011 WL 6020804, at *12, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139159, at *34 (D.N.H.
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Nov. 8, 2011), R&R adopted, 2011 WL 6018272, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139099 (D.N.H. Dec. 2,
2011). Prisoners challenging the imposition of sanctions through disciplinary proceedings
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995). “Discipline by prison officials in response to . . .
misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id. at
485.
The restrictions Maciaszek describes are not so severe as to constitute “atypical and
significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life[.]” See Perry v. Spencer,
94 F.4th 136, 154 (1st Cir. 2024) (en banc) (one instance where confinement implicates a
constitutionally protected liberty interest is when solitary confinement exceeds thirty days and is
“[ir]rational,” “[in]essential,” or “excessive” in duration (quoting Skinner v. Cunningham, 430
F.3d 483, 487 (1st Cir. 2005)); see, e.g., Wright v. DeMoura, No. 21-CV-11428-AK, 2025 WL
928784, at *9, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57252, at *27–28 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2025) (no protected
liberty interest implicated where plaintiff spent 12 days in limited privileges unit); Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484–86 (30 days in punitive segregation did not implicate liberty interest sufficient to
invoke due process protections). Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that he
was subjected to any deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, upon
which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Claim 3, including
each of its subparts, as identified in this Report and Recommendation.
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B. Vagueness Challenge (Claim 3(e))
Even if Maciaszek was deprived of a liberty interest, his claim that the charges against him
were unconstitutionally vague would fail. “[I]t is ‘a violation of due process to punish inmates for
acts which they could not have known were prohibited.’” Yoda v. Warden, FCI Berlin, No. 21-
CV-556-JL, 2023 WL 11886872, at *3, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240658, at *6 (D.N.H. Mar. 31,
2023) (quoting Pettaway v. Fox, No. CV 15-0545 CAS (AFM), 2016 WL 922437, at *3, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31861, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2016), R&R adopted, 2016 WL 927131, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31817 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016)). Accordingly, the prison’s disciplinary code
must be “set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can
sufficiently understand and comply with.” Lane v. Salazar, 911 F.3d 942, (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578–79
(1973)). “[I]mprecision in penal legislation should be tolerated if the language can be said
nevertheless to give fair notice to those who might violate it.” Id. (internal quotations and brackets
omitted) (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Maciaszek claims that the disciplinary charge against him for possessing, distributing
manufacturing, or introducing any “drug, drug-paraphernalia, alcoholic beverages, etc.” is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it uses the term “etc.” See Doc. No. 1 at pg. 14;
Doc. No. 1-1 at pg. 2. Maciaszek’s claim is unavailing. He failed to show how the use of the term
“etc.” renders the prison’s prohibition on manufacturing of alcohol or drugs unclear. See Lane,
911 F.3d 942, (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Maciaszek has not stated a due process claim under
a theory that his disciplinary charge was unconstitutionally vague, and the district judge can
dismiss Claim 3(e) on that alternate basis.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss Maciaszek’s Complaint (Doc.
No. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the clerk of court should
then close this case. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may
be extended upon motion. Failure to file specific written objections to the Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
January 13, 2026
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Jacob L. Maciaszek, pro se
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