Machado v. US Army, Secretary

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jeffrey Machado
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-42-PB-TSM
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 029
Daniel P. Driscoll,
Secretary of the Army1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case arises from the Army Discharge Review Board (“the Board”)’s
refusal to upgrade its characterization of Jeffrey Machado’s service in the
Army from “Other Than Honorable” to “Honorable.”
Since voluntarily separating from service in lieu of court-martial in
2014, Machado has sought to have his discharge upgraded in light of his
service-connected diagnoses with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and
traumatic brain injury (“TBI”). In three applications to the Board, he has
unsuccessfully contended that his misconduct leading to his discharge was
attributable to these mental health conditions, which are increasingly
afforded special weight by federal law and military policy.
1 	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Secretary of the
Army Daniel P. Driscoll is automatically substituted for former Acting
Secretary Mark F. Averill. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 1 of 36

2
Reviewing the Board’s most recent denial, I conclude that it overlooked
key arguments and evidence that Machado marshalled in his favor and failed
to give liberal consideration to Machado’s mental health conditions as
compelled by statute. These errors render the Board’s decision arbitrary and
capricious, requiring me to set it aside and remand it for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 	Policy Framework
The United States military’s practices related to personnel who
separate from service with mental health conditions have significantly
evolved over the last fifteen years. Before delving into the facts of Machado’s
discharge, it is helpful to trace those developments.
When a servicemember separates from the military, he or she receives
a “Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty,” also known as a
Form DD-214. Dep’t of Def., Form DD-214. On the unabbreviated version of
this form, the servicemember is assigned one of five designations
characterizing his or her discharge: “Honorable,” “General Under Honorable
Conditions,” “Other Than Honorable,” “Bad Conduct,” and “Dishonorable.”2
2 	There are other fields on Form DD-214 which correspond with or
elaborate on the servicemember’s discharge characterization, including the
“Separation Code,” “Reentry Code,” and “Narrative Reason for Separation.”
Dep’t of Defense, Form DD-214.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 2 of 36

3
Id. While the precise consequences vary by discharge, any characterization
other than “Honorable” can adversely affect a servicemember’s eligibility for
certain veterans’ benefits. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (“[P]ension,
compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation is payable” for
service “terminated by discharge or release under conditions other than
dishonorable.”).
Within fifteen years of separation, a former servicemember may obtain
review of his or her discharge characterization from a military review board.
See 10 U.S.C. § 1553. For the Army, these reviews are performed by the
Board. See 32 C.F.R. § 581.2. In weighing an application for review,
Department of Defense regulations require the Board to assess the
“[p]ropriety” and “[e]quity” of the servicemember’s discharge, “giv[ing] full,
fair, and impartial considerations to all applicable factors.” Id. § 70.9. A
discharge may be improper, for example, if “[t]here exists an error of fact,
law, procedure, or discretion associated with the discharge at the time of
issuance.” Id. § 70.9(b)(1)(i). A discharge may likewise be inequitable,
meanwhile, if “[t]here is substantial doubt” that the veteran “would have
received the same discharge” if subsequently enacted policies or procedures
“had been available” at the time. Id. § 70.9(c)(1)(ii). To explain its conclusions,
the Board must issue a “decisional document” that, in relevant part, “set[s]
forth” the evidence “contradictory” to its decision and “explain[s] why the
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 3 of 36

4
information relied upon was more persuasive than the information that was
rejected.” Id. § 70.8(e)(3)(ii)(B)(2), (6)(ii)(B)(2).
In September 2014—just as Machado was separating from the Army—
then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued a memorandum (the “Hagel
Memorandum”3) responding to an influx of such applications from Vietnam
War veterans who sought discharge upgrades based on PTSD diagnoses that
were not recognized at the time of their service. The Hagel Memorandum
establishes guiding principles for review boards reviewing these and similar
applications. Principally, it directs that “[l]iberal consideration will be given”
where service records “document one or more symptoms which meet the
diagnostic criteria of [PTSD] or related conditions.” Hagel Memorandum ¶ 1.
The Department of Defense elaborated on this standard in a 2017
memorandum issued by then-Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness A.M. Kurta (the “Kurta Memorandum”4). That
3 	Memorandum from Charles T. Hagel to Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Supplemental Guidance to Military Boards for Correction of
Military/Naval Records Considering Discharge Upgrade Requests by
Veterans Claiming Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Sept. 3, 2014).
4 	Memorandum from Anthony M. Kurta to Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Clarifying Guidance to Military Discharge Review Boards and
Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records Considering Requests by
Veterans for Modification of their Discharge Due to Mental Health
Conditions, Sexual Assault, or Sexual Harassment (Aug. 25, 2017).
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 4 of 36

5
memorandum created a four-step framework (the “Kurta Questions”) for
assessing discharge-upgrade requests “based in whole or in part on matters
relating to mental health conditions, including PTSD [and] TBI.” Kurta
Memorandum ¶¶ 2, 3. Specifically, the Kurta Memorandum requires review
boards to address four questions:
[(1)] Did the veteran have a condition or experience that may
excuse or mitigate the discharge? [(2)] Did that condition exist/
experience occur during military service? [(3)] Does that condition
or experience actually excuse or mitigate the discharge? [(4)] Does
that condition or experience outweigh the discharge?
Id. ¶ 2. Consistent with the Hagel Memorandum, the Kurta Memorandum
emphasizes that in conducting each inquiry, “[l]iberal consideration will be
given” to servicemembers who base their applications on PTSD or TBI
diagnoses. Id. ¶ 3. The memorandum goes on to explain that PTSD and TBI
“impact veterans in many intimate ways” and “inherently affect one’s
behaviors and choices[,] causing veterans to think and behave differently
than might otherwise be expected.” Id. ¶ 26(d), (e). Significantly, the
memorandum states that while “[l]iberal consideration does not mandate an
upgrade” in discharge characterization in every case, “[r]elief may be
appropriate” even for “significant misconduct sufficiently justified or
outweighed by the facts and circumstances.” Id. ¶ 26(k).
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 5 of 36

6
In a third memorandum issued in 2018 (the “Wilkie Memorandum”5),
then-Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Robert L.
Wilkie added a set of guiding principles for review boards to apply when
considering these and other equity-based applications for relief. In relevant
part, the Wilkie Memorandum identifies several kinds of post-service
evidence that review boards should consider. Wilkie Memorandum ¶¶ 6(a),
(7). These include, for example, a servicemember’s “[a]cceptance of
responsibility, remorse, or atonement for misconduct,” “[m]eritorious service
in government or other endeavors,” “evidence of rehabilitation,” and
“[c]haracter references.” Id. ¶ 7(g), (k), (l), (p).
Throughout this period, Congress instituted similar reforms, codifying
the “liberal consideration” standard in the statute governing discharge
reviews in 2016 and amending it in 2017. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000,
2123-24 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)); National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283,
1379 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)(a)(ii)). With these amendments, the
5 	Memorandum from Robert L. Wilkie to Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Guidance to Military Discharge Review Boards and Boards for
Correction of Military/Naval Records Regarding Equity, Injustice, or
Clemency Determinations (July 25, 2018).
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 6 of 36

7
statute provides that, for a former servicemember “whose application for
relief is based in whole or in part on matters relating to [PTSD] or [TBI] as
supporting rationale,” a review board must “review the case with liberal
consideration to the [servicemember] that [PTSD] or [TBI] potentially
contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge or dismissal or to
the original characterization of the member’s discharge or dismissal.” 10
U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii), (B).
Finally, a recent court-ordered development bears mentioning. In 2016,
two Army veterans brought a class action against the Secretary of the Army
on behalf of a class of Army veterans, ultimately asserting that the Board
had disregarded the statutory and administrative authorities above in
arbitrarily denying discharge upgrades to former servicemembers with
diagnoses of PTSD and PTSD-related conditions. See Kennedy v. Whitley,
539 F. Supp. 3d 261, 263-64 (D. Conn. 2021). In 2021, the court approved a
settlement agreement between the parties in that case, which in part
provided for renewed review of applications that had been denied despite
raising issues related to these mental health conditions. See id. at 267.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 7 of 36

8
B. 	Machado’s Service & Discharge
Machado enlisted in the Army as an infantryman in November 2010.
AR 181.6 Following his initial training, Machado was stationed with the 1st
Armored Division at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. Id. at 149.
In December 2012, the 1st Armored Division deployed to Afghanistan
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. AR 603-04. There, Machado
served on his company’s Intelligence Support Team, requiring him to rove
with patrols to collect and verify battlefield intelligence. Id. at 516. His unit
used this information to interdict emplacement of improvised explosive
devices (“IEDs”) and generally inform troop movements and responses. Id. at
291. Machado received multiple awards for his service in this role, id. at
288-91, and in April 2013, he re-enlisted. Id. at 158, 177.
The following summer, two events occurred that laid the foundation for
these proceedings. First, in May 2013, Machado’s company responded to
render emergency aid when its sister company detonated multiple IEDs in a
nearby village, killing several soldiers and making double- and triple-
amputees out of many more. Id. at 518. On an ensuing patrol in the village,
members of Machado’s company detonated yet another IED, injuring four
6 	I cite to the administrative record, which the government filed
conventionally. See Doc. 14; Doc. 18.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 8 of 36

9
more soldiers. Id. Amidst the chaos from the second explosion, Machado and
a fellow soldier remember him running into the blast zone to help rescue the
wounded survivors. Id. at 518, 527. Machado spent the next eight days
collecting soldiers’ remains. Id. at 519.
Then, in June 2013, Machado recalls collapsing from dehydration on
his way to a morning meeting, striking his head on the bumper of a military
vehicle as he fell. Id. at 517. Machado attests that he “was unconscious for
about ten minutes and woke up on a litter, being carried into the aide
station.” Id. For the days that followed, Machado says he “felt fuzzy, couldn’t
concentrate, and was slow to react.” Id.
After these events, Machado’s behavior shifted. As he describes it, over
that summer, he became a “cold, bitter person” with newfound contempt
towards Afghans. Id. at 503. He remembers exhibiting such a short temper
that a senior officer “had to step in and monitor his behavior towards them”
after an incident in which he pulled his knife on an Afghan police officer. Id.
at 520. He also acted more recklessly, sometimes electing to “stand on found
munitions just to get a closer picture of serial numbers, for example.” Id. at
519. Throughout this period, he recalls that “sleep was not an easy thing” for
him. Id. Yet, by all accounts, he did not receive medical treatment for these
symptoms while deployed.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 9 of 36

10
Machado’s unit returned to Fort Bliss in August 2013. Id. at 520. Three
days later, he married his girlfriend, who he had met shortly before he
deployed and carried on a long-distance relationship with from Afghanistan.
Id. Now in her company, Machado’s aberrant behavior persisted. He reported
going into an “internal frenzy” upon hearing gunshots, sometimes “waking up
with a gun in [his] hand,” and intrusively reliving experiences from his tour
of duty. Id. at 503. He felt “depressed and suicidal” around this time,
eventually asking a friend to store his firearms after “a few failed attempts to
take [his] own life.” Id. at 520. But when he reported feeling “jumpy and
paranoid” to an Army doctor upon his return, he was told that his “feelings
were normal and that they would go away in a month.” Id.
In January 2014, Machado was reassigned to the 25th Infantry
Division out of Schofield Barracks in Oahu, Hawaii. Id. at 149. There, he
continued to feel “stressed, anxious, and depressed,” and he gained weight.
Id. at 520. His suicidal ideation worsened, and his wife grappled with her
own mental health challenges. Id. Their young marriage spiraled over the
following months, even as Machado sought treatment and the couple went to
marriage counseling. Id.
The record is ambiguous as to what transpired next. As Machado
recounts, he engaged in three episodes of erratic behavior.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 10 of 36

11
First, he recalls an incident in which he tried to commit suicide by
driving off the side of a highway with his wife in the car. Id. at 521. When she
reached for the steering wheel, Machado says he “grabbed her and pushed
her away.” Id. Later, having “snapped . . . out of” his “trance,” Machado
continued to drive home. Id. When Machado’s wife asked him to let her out of
the car, he refused in favor of completing the trip. Id.
Second, Machado describes an argument with his wife in which she
“began throwing [their] belongings off of their shelves, to the ground and into
trash bags.” Id. Machado states that he “tried to turn her towards facing
[him] by grabbing her arm.” Id. According to Machado, this “caused her to
lose her balance and hit her lip.” Id.
Third, Machado acknowledges that he twice attempted to communicate
with his wife in violation of a military protective order while psychiatrically
hospitalized. Id. In one case, he asked another soldier to “text her to make
sure that she was okay,” a request he characterizes as motivated by worry for
her wellbeing because she had previously threatened to kill herself. Id. In the
other case, he says that his wife had texted him “a picture of her hand with
no wedding ring,” informed him that she had sold it, and threatened to
divorce him if he did not respond, so he did. Id.
Machado proactively reported the first two of these episodes to his
commanding officer. Id. After the third, having violated the Army’s protective
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 11 of 36

12
order, Machado was transferred to the brig at Joint Base Pearl Harbor for
pre-trial confinement. Id. Although first transferred on June 4, 2014, he was
immediately hospitalized again for suicidal ideations. Id. at 999. After he was
discharged on June 10, he was transferred back to the brig, where he claims
that he spent his first month in solitary confinement. Id. at 521. While
incarcerated, Machado underwent two physical examinations and numerous
individual psychotherapy sessions. Id. at 1659-70.
At some point, Machado was charged with violating three provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). Id. at 153-55. Taken at face
value, the charges describe unsettling conduct that is far more extreme than
Machado’s telling. The first charge, under Article 128 of the UCMJ, alleged a
wide array of domestic violence dating back to September 2013, before
Machado transferred to Hawaii. Id. at 153. Across various instances, the
Army asserted that Machado “grab[bed]” his wife and “dragged her”; “sh[ook]
her, pin[ned] her to a couch, and punch[ed] her in the head”; “grab[bed] [her]
by the head and press[ed] his thumbs against her eyes”; “str[uck] [her] in the
side of the face with his arm, grab[bed] the back of her neck with his hand,
and pull[ed] her toward him”; “push[ed] her face into a door”; “str[uck] her in
the throat”; and “shove[d]” her “down onto a mattress with his hands.” Id.
The second charge, under Article 134, alleged that Machado made several
threats to his wife over the same time period, including statements that he
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 12 of 36

13
would “kill her by putting her in a bathtub with a toaster”; “injure her by
hitting her in the head with a hammer”; “kill her if she ever left him”; and
“injure her by shoving a broom handle into her vulva and anus.” Id. at 154.
That charge also alleged that Machado had “confine[d] and h[eld]” his wife
“against her will” and, in one case, “pointed a handgun at his head in [her]
presence,” threatening to kill himself if she left him. Id. The third charge,
under Article 90, concerned Machado’s violations of the protective order. Id.
at 154-55. That charge purported to identify three unauthorized
communications he made to her after the order was issued. Id.
Facing these charges, Machado requested discharge in lieu of trial by
court-martial in September 2014. Id. at 758. In the process, Machado
acknowledged his guilt of “some of the charges and/or specification[s] or a
lesser included offense.”7 Doc. 1 at 15 (alteration in original). His request was
approved, resulting in the charges’ dismissal without specific findings by
court-martial. See AR 153-55. Machado was ultimately discharged from duty
with an “Other Than Honorable” characterization. Id. at 758.
After his discharge, Machado at first returned to Texas with his wife
but soon separated from her, later moving alone to Massachusetts. Id. at 522.
7 	The letter containing this acknowledgment is not in the administrative
record, and neither party has provided it, so it remains unclear to which
specific allegations it pertains, if any.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 13 of 36

14
With the help of a veterans’ outreach program, he eventually obtained mental
health treatment through the Red Sox Foundation’s Home Base Program at
Massachusetts General Hospital, where he was diagnosed with major
depressive disorder, PTSD, and TBI. Id. at 34, 536. In 2016, based on a
review of his treatment records, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”)
found Machado’s discharge “honorable for VA purposes” because he was
“insane at the time” of his misconduct, in turn rendering him eligible for VA
benefits notwithstanding his unfavorable discharge characterization. Id. at
52-53. In 2017, the VA further determined that his PTSD and TBI diagnoses
were service-connected and assigned him a 100-percent disability rating,
enabling him to receive monthly VA benefit payments. Id. at 57-58.
Today, Machado is remarried and lives in New Hampshire, where he
owns a home and lives with his wife. Id. at 34. He receives mental health
treatment multiple times per week, which has allowed him to better manage
his symptoms of PTSD. See id. at 34-35. His wife concurs, attesting that he is
now “a lot calmer” and “triggered less frequently.” Id. at 40. In his free time,
Machado volunteers for multiple veterans’ causes and helps to set up coffee
socials for veterans through the same organization that connected him to the
Home Base Program many years ago. Id. at 36.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 14 of 36

15
C. 	Procedural Background
Machado first applied for review of his discharge in May 2016. Id. at
481-97. In that application, Machado argued that his “Other Than
Honorable” discharge was inequitable in light of his mental health conditions
and record of post-service rehabilitation. Id. at 489-91, 495-96. He also
argued that his discharge was improper due to the Army’s asserted failure to
comply with the procedural requirements for administrative separations
imposed by 10 U.S.C. § 1177. Id. at 492. Attached to his application were
several exhibits, including a medical report prepared by psychologist Dr.
Sandra A. Dixon, Psy.D., diagnosing him with major depressive disorder and
PTSD; correspondence from Mass General confirming the same; copies of
reports from mental status evaluations that the Army performed prior to his
discharge in May and June 2014; a copy of a report describing his admission
to an El Paso hospital for suicidal ideation in October 2014; letters of support
from family, friends, and servicemembers who deployed with him to
Afghanistan; and other Army personnel records. Id. at 502-679. Based on this
evidence, Machado asked the Board to upgrade his discharge characterization
to “Honorable” and make related revisions to his Army records. Id. at 483,
497. The Board denied his application in July 2018. Id. at 463-70.
Machado reapplied for review of the Board’s denial later that year. Id.
at 292. In his second application, he expressly incorporated by reference the
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 15 of 36

16
arguments and exhibits from his 2016 application and supplemented them
with the VA’s favorable intervening eligibility and service-connection
decisions; a sworn affidavit from Dr. Dixon affirming Machado’s earlier PTSD
diagnosis and explaining why “[t]he conduct that led to his discharge was” a
“manifestation of PTSD symptoms”; and a copy of an article examining the
relationship between PTSD diagnoses and intimate-partner violence (“IPV”)
in military families. Id. at 286-315, 431-48. Machado testified in person
before the Board in support of his reapplication. Id. at 286. In a decision
issued in July 2019, the Board again denied his request. Id. at 278-85.
Two years later, pursuant to the Kennedy settlement detailed above,
the Board notified Machado that it would automatically reconsider his
application once more. Id. at 43-45. Machado availed himself of the
opportunity to submit additional evidence, supplying affidavits from him and
his wife discussing his progress with mental health treatment, his volunteer
work with regional veterans’ organizations, and the stability of their
relationship. Id. at 34-41. He also submitted a new letter from a licensed
social worker verifying his “consistent” and “motivated” engagement with
regular psychotherapy. Id. at 76. In a supplemental brief to the Board,
Machado continued to rely heavily on Dr. Dixon’s assessments to argue that
his symptoms of PTSD mitigate his discharge and outweigh his misconduct,
thus satisfying Kurta Questions 3 and 4. Id. at 24-27; see Kurta
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 16 of 36

17
Memorandum ¶ 2. He also again emphasized the evidence of his
rehabilitation, arguing that it merits relief under the Wilkie Memorandum.
AR 28-29. And again, as in 2019, Machado expressly “incorporate[d] [his
prior] submissions by reference,” including the evidentiary record and
arguments in prior briefs prepared by counsel. Id. at 16.
The Board issued its third and final decision in June 2022. Id. at 2-11.
The decision is primarily descriptive, summarizing Machado’s service and
discharge history, the law and policies governing the Board’s review, and
Machado’s arguments. See id. at 2-9. In its two-page “Discussion and
Determination,” the Board sequentially addresses the four Kurta Questions
and responds to some of Machado’s contentions. Id. at 9-10.
In response to Kurta Questions 1 and 2, the Board answers
affirmatively, acknowledging that Machado’s PTSD and TBI diagnoses are
conditions that could mitigate the misconduct leading to his separation and
that those conditions are service-connected. Id. at 9. On Question 3, however,
the Board demurs, stating:
It is the opinion of the Board’s Medical Advisor that there are no
mitigating Behavioral Health conditions for applicant’s basis for
separation. Applicant’s severe physical assaults that were the
basis for applicant’s separation, are not part of the natural history
or sequelae of PTSD, TBI or other behavioral health conditions,
and, as such, are not mitigated under Liberal Consideration.
Id. Likewise, on Question 4, the Board rules against Machado:
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 17 of 36

18
Despite the Board’s application of liberal consideration, the Board
concurred with the opinion of the Board’s Medical Advisor, a voting
member, that the available evidence did not support a conclusion
that 	any 	of 	the 	applicant’s 	medical 	conditions 	of 	TBI/PTSD
outweighed the unmitigated basis for applicant’s separation—
repeated assaults, threats, and disobeying a lawful no-contact
order.
Id. Given its adverse conclusions on Kurta Questions 3 and 4, the Board once
again declined to upgrade Machado’s discharge characterization. Id. at 11.
In January 2025, Machado sued the Secretary of the Army in the
Secretary’s official capacity, asserting that the Board’s decision violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and his constitutional due process
rights. Doc. 1 at 20-24. Machado asks this Court to direct the Board to
upgrade his discharge as requested or, in the alternative, set aside its
decision and remand for further proceedings. Id. at 25. Before me now are the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the administrative law context, “a motion for summary judgment is
simply a vehicle to tee up a case for judicial review.” Bos. Redevelopment
Auth. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 838 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2016). This review is akin
to that of an appellate court; my task is “not to determine whether a dispute
of fact remains,” but instead to assess the lawfulness of an agency’s decision
under the rubric of the APA. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The decisions of
military review boards are agency decisions subject to that familiar standard
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 18 of 36

19
of review. See Mahoney v. Del Toro, 99 F.4th 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2024); see also
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983).
Under the APA, I may only “set aside” an agency’s decision “if that
decision is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,’ or if the decision is ‘unsupported by substantial
evidence.’” Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 34 (quoting Sasen v. Spencer, 879 F.3d 354,
359-60 (1st Cir. 2018)). This standard is “highly deferential,” meaning that I
“must uphold” such a decision so long as it is “free from legal errors and is
supported by any rational review of the record.” Id. (citation modified).
Absent legal error, I cannot “substitute [my] judgment for that of the agency.”
Bos. Redevelopment Auth., 838 F.3d at 47 (quoting Associated Fisheries of
Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)).
III. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the government contends that in reviewing
Machado’s case, I should assume that the Board’s 2022 decision implicitly
incorporated the reasoning of its 2018 and 2019 decisions. However, the
government does not point to any statement to that effect in the 2022
decision itself—nor could it, as that decision makes no reference to the prior
two. See AR 1-11. Rather, the government relies on Machado’s express
incorporation of his prior submissions to the Board when he supplemented
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 19 of 36

20
the record pursuant to the Kennedy settlement, see id. at 16, to argue that I
can infer the same of the Board.
While that approach might evoke a sense of parity, to impute the same
incorporation by reference to the Board’s reasoning as to Machado’s
evidentiary submissions would directly undermine the essential bargain of
the Kennedy settlement and frustrate the Board’s related promises to class
members. The Kennedy settlement requires the Board, for each class
member, to newly “review the discharge applications” and “reconsider the
individual applicant’s case.” 539 F. Supp. 3d at 267. Consistent with that
obligation, the Board made clear in its letter notifying Machado of the
settlement that it would “take a fresh look at” his application and “send [him]
its decision” based on that review. AR 110. This language plainly evinced the
Board’s intent to newly engage with his arguments for relief under the proper
legal standards and write a new decision articulating a freestanding
resolution of those contentions. See 539 F. Supp. 3d at 267.
Moreover, the Board’s letter to Machado nowhere warns of the tradeoff
that the government seems to suggest, whereby Machado would empower the
Board to stake its new decision on its prior reasoning if he relied on his prior
submissions. See AR 109-11. To the contrary, the Board’s letter makes clear
that it would undertake a renewed review of Machado’s application “even if
[he] cho[se] not to contact the Board.” Id. at 110. Depriving Machado of a
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 20 of 36

21
fulsome explanation for the Board’s decision because he did contact the Board
would turn the logic of this promise upside down.8
I therefore proceed to review the Board’s reasoning in its 2022 decision
only. Machado makes four distinct arguments challenging that decision, each
of which I address in turn.
A. 	10 U.S.C. § 1177
Machado first argues that the 2022 decision is arbitrary and capricious
because the Board wholly ignored his contention that his separation failed to
comply with 10 U.S.C. § 1177.
Section 1177 requires that a servicemember “who has been deployed
overseas in support of a contingency operation . . . during the previous 24
months” and is diagnosed with PTSD or TBI must “receive[] a medical
examination to evaluate a diagnosis of [PTSD] or [TBI].” 10 U.S.C.
§ 1177(a)(1). That examination must “assess whether the effects” of PTSD or
TBI “constitute matters in extenuation that relate to the basis for” the
servicemember’s less-than-honorable separation. Id. § 1177(b). To that end,
8 	Even setting the Kennedy settlement aside, the Board’s silence on
whether it incorporated its prior materials by reference, especially given
Machado’s explicit preceding statement to that effect, independently suggests
that it did not take the same approach to drafting its decision as Machado did
to his supplemental submissions. This divergence is all the more likely given
the government’s acknowledgment at oral argument that each of Machado’s
reviews was conducted by an entirely different panel of Board personnel.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 21 of 36

22
the statute provides that such a servicemember “shall not be
administratively separated under conditions other than honorable, including
an administrative separation in lieu of court-martial, until the results of the
medical examination have been reviewed by appropriate authorities
responsible for evaluating, review, and approving the separation case.” Id.
§ 1177(a)(2).
Before all three panels of the Board to review his case, Machado argued
that the Army failed to consider whether his positive screenings for PTSD
and TBI constituted “extenuating circumstances” within the meaning of
section 1177. See AR 31, 287, 492. Now to this Court, he additionally claims
that he was never afforded the precise type of examination required by
subsection 1177(a)(1) in the first place and that the Board neglected to
address that failure in its most recent decision.
Machado’s argument that the Board overlooked the first of these
contentions is plainly correct. Without fail, Machado raised the Army’s duty
to consider his PTSD and TBI diagnoses as extenuating circumstances under
section 1177 at every stage of proceedings before the Board, including in his
supplemental submission in 2021. See id. at 31; see also id. at 287, 492. Yet
there is no mention of the issue anywhere in the Board’s 2022 decision. See
id. 1-11. Not once is section 1177 even cited, much less the merits of
Machado’s related argument addressed. See id.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 22 of 36

23
The government’s only response to this gap in the Board’s reasoning is
to point to two references to section 1177 in the Board’s 2018 decision, but as
explained above, that decision does not bear on the rigor of the Board’s
analysis in 2022. I can therefore only conclude that the Army’s dismissal of
this argument sub silentio was arbitrary. See Poole v. Harvey, 571
F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he [review board] must respond to all
non-frivolous arguments raised by the applicant. If the [board] does not
respond to non-frivolous arguments, the [board]’s decision is arbitrary.”); cf.
Doe v. Emmert, 2025 WL 915700, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2025) (“By failing
to acknowledge or respond to Doe’s arguments,” the review board “failed to
adequately” explain its adverse decision on his discharge-upgrade
application.).
The same cannot be said about Machado’s claim that the Army
neglected to provide him with the medical examination required by section
1177 to begin with, however. Machado never appears to have made this
argument below, instead seemingly raising it for the first time in this Court.
In fact, in his initial application to the Board, he acknowledged that he “did
receive a Mental Status Evaluation in May 2014 in which he screened
positive for TBI and PTSD,” arguing only that the appropriate authorities
failed to consider whether those conditions “constituted matters in
extenuation.” AR 492 (emphasis added). And he continued to stand by that
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 23 of 36

24
characterization of his position before the panel of the Board that reviewed
the initial decision. See id. at 286 (“We incorporate by reference our previous
memorandum and evidence submitted in support of Mr. Machado’s initial
application for records review.”). Only now, in this Court, does Machado
argue that the evaluations he received prior to separation failed to satisfy
section 1177 because they were tailored to the wrong kind of discharge.9 But
the Board cannot be accused of arbitrarily or capriciously resolving an issue
that was never presented to it. See Mount v. DHS, 937 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir.
2019); see also Collins v. Esper, 2018 WL 1399299, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 20,
2018) (“Because [the discharged servicemember] failed to raise this argument
in his . . . application, it does not provide a basis for reversal.”).
That limited waiver aside, however, the Board was unequivocally
informed of Machado’s core contention invoking section 1177—that his PTSD
and TBI diagnoses were never considered as potential “matters in
extenuation” affecting his discharge—and failed to address it. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 1177(b). That shortcoming requires remand.
9 	Machado claims that the Army eschewed section 1177 by medically
examining him pursuant to Army regulations that govern involuntary
separations rather than those pertaining to servicemember-initiated
departures. Given the Board’s other errors, I need not determine whether
this distinction has merit or is merely a clerical “distinction without a
difference,” as the government contends. See Doc. 29 at 5.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 24 of 36

25
B. 	Liberal Consideration
Machado next contends that the Board failed to give his application
liberal consideration as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3) and the Hagel,
Kurta, and Wilkie Memoranda.
“[L]iberal consideration” is a “lenient evidentiary standard,” one “that
is not strict or literal.” See Bussey v. Driscoll, 131 F.4th 756, 762-63 (9th Cir.
2025). If a servicemember shows that a mental health condition like PTSD or
TBI “may reasonably have existed at the time of discharge,” it must be
“liberally considered as excusing or mitigating the discharge.” Kurta
Memorandum ¶ 16. To the extent that evidence in a servicemember’s record
may “reasonably support more than one diagnosis,” it must be “liberally
construed” as evidence of one that “warrant[s]” relief. Id. ¶ 17. At bottom, this
relaxed standard requires review boards to “resolv[e] all . . . doubts and
inferences in favor of” the servicemember. Bussey, 131 F.4th at 762-63.
At minimum, this standard necessarily requires the Board to consider
all the evidence that a servicemember submits pertaining to relevant mental
health conditions. See id. (remanding where the Board “did not consider”
evidence of PTSD’s contribution to servicemember’s misconduct); see also
Jeanpierre v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 11, 18 (2025) (listing examples of
“evidence outside . . . the four corners of the service record” that review
boards “should consider”); cf. Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 36-37 (affirming denial
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 25 of 36

26
where review board “considered” the servicemember’s medical evidence and
“took into account” his evidence supporting other mitigating factors). Indeed,
a failure by the Board to consider the servicemember’s best evidence
altogether would fall short of even an ordinary administrative standard of
review, much less the “liberal consideration” standard. See Bussey, 131 F.4th
at 763 (“The Board here did not consider, let alone under a lenient
evidentiary standard,” the impact of PTSD on the misconduct at issue.
(emphasis added)); cf. Associated Fisheries, 127 F.3d at 109 (“An agency rule
is arbitrary and capricious if the agency . . . failed to consider pertinent
aspects of the problem . . . .”).
Machado trains his attack on the Board’s analysis of Kurta Questions 3
and 4, identifying three aspects of the Board’s answers to these questions
that he claims demonstrate its failure to apply liberal consideration. As
summarized above, the Board answered Kurta Questions 3 and 4 in the
negative. AR 9. In two sentences of reasoning under Question 3, the Board
concludes that Machado’s charged misconduct—in the Board’s words, his
“severe physical assaults”—could not be excused or mitigated by PTSD or
TBI because that conduct is “not part of the natural history sequelae of
PTSD, TBI or other behavioral health conditions.” Id. In its similarly cursory
discussion of Question 4, the Board states only that it “concurred with the
opinion of the Board’s Medical Advisor . . . that the available evidence did not
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 26 of 36

27
support a conclusion that any of the applicant’s medical conditions of
TBI/PTSD outweighed the unmitigated basis for applicant’s separation.” Id.
Taking his examples in turn, Machado first claims that the Board
erroneously applied a blanket assumption that “allegations of physical harm”
can never be excused, mitigated, or outweighed by PTSD or TBI. Doc. 17-1 at
23. True enough, adopting such a categorical rule would be inconsistent with
the Kurta Memorandum, which expressly contemplates a case-by-case
inquiry. Kurta Memorandum ¶ 26(k) (noting that “[r]elief may be
appropriate” even for “significant misconduct” when “sufficiently justified or
outweighed by the facts and circumstances”). But the Board’s explanation
here does not betray such an assumption. The Board did not conclude that
violence could never be excused, mitigated, or outweighed by PTSD or TBI in
any case; rather, it stated that “Applicant’s severe physical assaults that
were the basis for applicant’s separation” were inconsistent with “the
applicant’s medical conditions of TBI/PTSD.” See AR 9 (emphasis added).
This phrasing appears to reflect the Board’s particularized conclusions about
Machado’s conduct and condition, not its application of a categorical rule.10
10 	At oral argument, Machado’s counsel intimated that the quoted
language is boilerplate, ubiquitously found in the Board’s decisions on similar
applications. My reasoning above might differ if the record contained
evidence to support that argument.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 27 of 36

28
Machado’s second example is more availing. Machado contends that the
Board straightforwardly demonstrated its inattention to liberal consideration
by altogether ignoring his medical evidence, including Dr. Dixon’s report and
affidavit as well as the VA’s eligibility and service-connection decisions. This
characterization is hardly an overstatement. The Board’s decision indeed
omits any mention of Dr. Dixon’s medical opinion whatsoever. See id. at 1-11.
And while the decision at least acknowledges the VA’s decisions, it stops
short of addressing their substance, instead merely reiterating the
undisputed fact that the Board is not bound by them. See id. at 10. Nowhere
does the Board explain why, notwithstanding its structural independence, it
did not consider the VA’s medical opinions for their informative value
regarding Machado’s condition. See id. at 1-11.
The government’s only response to this vacuum of engagement is to
gesture at the Board’s review of this evidence in its 2019 decision denying
Machado relief. See id. at 281-84. But again, as discussed, it was incumbent
on the Board to reexamine all of Machado’s evidence anew per the Kennedy
settlement. See 539 F. Supp. 3d at 267. As far as one can tell from the 2022
decision, the Board never substantively revisited Machado’s medical evidence
at all. That failure to even address Machado’s medical evidence, much less
“wrestle with or seek to explain why these medical opinions should not be
followed,” falls far short of “liberal consideration.” LaBonte v. United States,
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 28 of 36

29
2023 WL 3197825, at *9 (Fed. Cl. May 2, 2023); see also Bussey, 131 F.4th at
763; Jeanpierre, 176 Fed. Cl. at 32-33.
Relatedly, for this third example, Machado points to the Board’s
unexplained reliance on its own medical advisor’s opinion of Machado’s
condition over a plethora of contradictory evidence in the record. In fact, as
previewed, the medical advisor’s opinion was the sole authority cited by the
Board in support of its adverse answers to Kurta Questions 3 and 4. See AR 9
(“It is the opinion of the Board’s Medical Advisor that” Machado’s condition
does not excuse or mitigate his discharge, and “the Board concurred with the
opinion of the Board’s Medical Advisor” that the condition does not outweigh
the discharge.). As Machado points out, all the other medical evidence in the
record uniformly disagreed with the medical advisor’s conclusion, including
the medical opinions of Dr. Dixon and the VA as well as the scientific
literature on the nexus between PTSD and IPV. See id. at 286-315, 431-48,
463-70. The Board’s decision lacks any explanation as to why it discounted all
this evidence in favor of the medical advisor’s opinion. See id. at 1-11.
As with his second example, Machado is correct to cry foul. It is the
“antithesis of ‘liberal consideration’” to take the “narrow approach” of “simply
adopt[ing] the Army psychologists’ opinions” without critically engaging the
countervailing evidence in the record. Bussey, 131 F.4th at 763 (quoting 10
U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(b)). While even under this servicemember-friendly
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 29 of 36

30
standard the Board may permissibly weigh unfavorable evidence more
heavily, the Board’s mandate to construe evidence in the servicemember’s
favor where possible at the very least requires it to explain itself when it
nonetheless discounts the servicemember’s best evidence. See 32 C.F.R.
§ 70.8(e)(3)(ii)(B)(2), (6)(ii)(B)(2). The Board failed to do so here.
In sum, Machado has established by way of his latter two examples
that the Board neglected to liberally consider his application in reaching its
2022 decision. While the decision prefaces many of its conclusions with
dependent clauses featuring the phrase “liberal consideration,” see AR 6, 9,
11, the sparse substance of its reasoning demonstrates anything but. See
Thomas v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 47, 69 (2025) (“[W]hile the Board paid
lip service to the requirement that [the servicemember]’s claims be given
liberal consideration, in practice it failed to actually do so.”). On remand, the
Board must carefully consider Machado’s evidence—especially the medical
opinions of Dr. Dixon and the VA—and, to the extent that it remains
unmoved, explain why each piece of his evidence is unpersuasive.
C. 	Post-Service Rehabilitation
Machado also argues that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious because it neglected to address evidence of his rehabilitation
following his separation as required by the Wilkie Memorandum.
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 30 of 36

31
To reiterate, the Wilkie Memorandum sets out “standards” that review
boards should use to “determine[e] whether relief is warranted on the basis of
equity, injustice, or clemency.” Wilkie Memorandum ¶ 1. The memorandum
identifies eighteen kinds of evidence that boards “should” consider “as
applicable.” Id. ¶ 7. Among them are the servicemember’s “[a]cceptance of
responsibility, remorse, or atonement for misconduct,” “[m]eritorious service
in government or other endeavors,” “evidence of rehabilitation,” and
“[c]haracter references.” Id. ¶ 7(g), (k), (l), (p).
As examples of overlooked evidence, Machado specifically cites his
“post-service mental health treatment, lack of a criminal record, stable
marriage, volunteering, and other rehabilitation” as demonstrated by
character reference letters, statements from his mental health providers, Dr.
Dixon’s report and affidavit, and his own testimony. Doc. 17-1 at 23. Machado
contends that the Board’s decision does not engage with any of the above.
The government responds by pointing to one paragraph in the
“Response to Contention(s)” section of the Board’s decision. See AR 10. There,
the Board acknowledges that Machado “contends obtaining employment and
volunteering in the community” and proceeds to restate the principles
guiding its consideration of “post-service factors” in evaluating discharge
upgrade applications. Id. The Board reserves any explanation of how those
factors apply in Machado’s case to the paragraph’s final sentence: “In this
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 31 of 36

32
case, the Board determined that the applicant’s post-service accomplishments
do not warrant any discharge change owing the [sic] serious nature of the
discharging offenses.” Id. Additionally, the Board also provides at the outset
of its decision a brief summary of the post-service evidence that Machado
supplied: “The applicant states obtaining employment and becoming a
valuable member of the community. The applicant is going to mental health
treatment, volunteering with multiple veteran’s organizations, and providing
support to other veterans.” Id. at 5.
The First Circuit confronted a similar challenge in Mahoney, in which a
former Navy servicemember contested a discharge-upgrade denial by the
Navy’s counterpart to the Board. See 99 F.4th at 29. In the original
administrative decision on appeal, the Navy’s board acknowledged the
servicemember’s evidence of post-service rehabilitation, noting the “numerous
advocacy letters submitted on [his] behalf” and that it “considered [his]
post-service achievements, such as being sober since 2006, graduating from
college, as well as [his] involvement as an active church member and
community volunteer.” Admin. Rec. Index ICO Daniel R. Mahoney at 3,
Mahoney v. Del Toro, 2023 WL 3587285 (D. Mass. May 22, 2023) (No.
22-cv-11074), ECF No. 17-1. In weighing those facts in its analysis, however,
the Navy’s board bundled them with the rest, stating only in general terms
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 32 of 36

33
that it “weighed all potentially mitigating factors” and reached its decision
“after consideration of [his] contentions and mitigating factors.” Id. at 2, 4.
On appeal, the district court rebuffed the servicemember’s claim that
he was entitled to “a more detailed explanation as to why those [post-service]
factors were not sufficient to recharacterize his discharge,” concluding that
“the level of explanatory detail in the opinion is sufficient under the
circumstances to withstand review under the APA” because it contained
“sufficient information from which the Court [could] ‘conclude that [the
Board’s decision] was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.’” Mahoney v.
Del Toro, 2023 WL 3587285, at *10 (D. Mass. May 22, 2023) (third alteration
in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)). The First Circuit affirmed,
discerning no error in the Navy board’s account for the servicemember’s
post-service evidence. See Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 37.
Standing alone, this Board’s treatment of Machado’s post-service
evidence is susceptible to the same conclusion. Like in Mahoney, the Board
provided a brief summary of the post-service evidence that Machado
supplied. See AR 5. And arguably, the Board’s analysis of this evidence is
even more transparent than the Navy board’s assessment in Mahoney—
rather than vaguely alluding to an unspecific assemblage of “mitigating
factors,” the Board directly addresses “the applicant’s post-service
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 33 of 36

34
accomplishments” and notes that they “do not warrant any discharge change”
because of “the serious nature of the discharging offenses.” Id. at 10.
Adhering to the low bar that the First Circuit affirmed in Mahoney, this
statement would thus seem to supply “sufficient information” from which I
can conclude that the Board arrived at it through “reasoned decisionmaking.”
See Mahoney, 2023 WL 3587285, at *10.
That said, under the circumstances, the Board’s brevity may
nonetheless be its downfall, as the lynchpin of its explanation for discounting
Machado’s post-service conduct is the outsize weight it places on the “serious
nature” of Machado’s misconduct—precisely the characterization called into
question by the Board’s inadequate engagement with the evidence of
Machado’s mental health conditions above. It follows that this conclusion,
which apparently hinged on the Board’s understanding of those conditions
and how they affected Machado’s conduct, will necessarily require revisiting
once the Board has corrected its underlying errors. Accordingly, the Board
must reevaluate its analysis of Machado’s evidence of post-service
rehabilitation on remand as well.
D. 	Procedural Due Process
Machado finally argues that the Board’s decision violated his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because it failed to
apply the correct legal standards, address all the arguments he presented,
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 34 of 36

35
and discuss the evidence above. See U.S. Const. amend. V; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(B). The threshold for satisfying constitutional due process is far
lower, however. “[A] party’s procedural due process rights are respected so
long as the party is afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Bos. Redevelopment
Auth., 838 F.3d at 50 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)). Machado does not contend that he lacked notice of the Board’s
proceedings (nor could he, having initiated them). Neither does he argue that
the Board failed to abide by its review procedures or that those procedures
somehow impeded his ability to meaningfully and promptly make his case for
relief. Instead, he asks me to infer constitutional deficiency of process from
the Board’s defects of reasoning. But legal error is not always the fault of
deficient process, and Machado offers no reason to suspect that some
inopportunity to be heard by the Board is to blame for its mistakes in this
case. Cf. Doe, 2025 WL 915700, at *12 (determining that a servicemember’s
procedural due process claim failed where he “ha[d] not specified what
additional procedures, in his view, due process requires”). Machado has
accordingly failed to establish a violation of his procedural due process rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Per the foregoing, I set aside the Board’s 2022 decision and remand
Machado’s case for further proceedings consistent with this order. On
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 35 of 36

36
remand, the Board shall substantively address Machado’s arguments under
10 U.S.C. § 1177; carefully consider the medical evidence he has submitted;
explain its reliance on its medical advisor’s contrary view to the extent it
continues to invoke that opinion; and reexamine Machado’s evidence of
post-service rehabilitation in light of its reasoned responses to Kurta
Questions 3 and 4. Consistent with the Department of Defense’s governing
regulations, see 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(e), the Board’s next decision must detail its
reasoning in sufficient depth to discern its proper application of liberal
consideration.
Machado’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. 17, is granted, and the
government’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Doc. 25, is denied. The
clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
March 26, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-00042-PB-TSM Document 30 Filed 03/26/26 Page 36 of 36