Brown v. McConkey et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Steven Brown
v. Case No. 25-cv-077-LM-AJ
Mark McConkey, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented plaintiff Steven Brown filed a complaint
(Doc. No. 1) against several individuals1 he alleges violated his
constitutional rights in connection with a property dispute in
Ossipee, New Hampshire. Presently before the court for a
recommended disposition are non-party Lynne M. Clarke’s motions
to intervene (Doc. Nos. 16 and 21). As explained more fully
below, the motions should be denied.
Legal Standard
“On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction” if the person “is so situated that disposing of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [his]
ability to protect [his] interest, unless existing parties
1 The defendants are Ossipee Police Chief Don Babbin,
Selectman Jonathan Smith, Town Administrator and Zoning Officer
Matt Sawyer, and Mark McConkey, a state senator and property
owner.
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 1 of 6

2
adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
Known as “intervention as of right,” this avenue for
intervention in a lawsuit requires that the moving party satisfy
every requirement of the rule (timeliness, interest, threat of
impairment, and inadequate representation by existing parties).
Victim Rights Law Ctr. v. Rosenfelt, 988 F.3d 556, 560 (1st Cir.
2021); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows
of Harvard Coll., 807 F.3d 472, 474 (1st Cir. 2015). While
intervention by right requires each of the four requirements be
satisfied, the court may “recognize that there is some interplay
between them,” Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics &
Election Pracs., 172 F.3d 104, 113 (1st Cir. 1999), and consider
the motion for intervention “with an eye toward the commonsense
view of the overall litigation,” Ungar v. Arafat, 634 F.3d 46,
51 (1st Cir. 2011).
Alternatively, if the moving party cannot meet the
requirements of intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2),
she can seek “permissive intervention” under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) if
she “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.” Id. When evaluating a request
for permissive intervention, “the district court can consider
almost any factor rationally relevant” when exercising its “very
broad discretion in granting or denying the motion,” Daggett,
172 F.3d at 113, but “[i]n exercising its discretion, the court
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 2 of 6

3
must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v.
Haaland, No. 1:21-CV-11171-IT, 2022 WL 18033002, at *2 (D. Mass.
Jan. 7, 2022), aff'd sub nom. Melone v. Coit, 100 F.4th 21 (1st
Cir. 2024).
Discussion
Turning first to intervention as of right, Ms. Clarke’s
motion should be denied because she does not “claim an interest
relating to the property that is the subject of the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). According to the operative complaint
(Doc. No. 1), the basis of Mr. Brown’s suit is that “a county
employee unlawfully trespassed” onto his property, id. ¶ 6, and,
along with others, subjected him to “unlawful fines and
enforcement actions . . . .” Id. ¶ 7. According to one of Mr.
Brown’s filings, his property is located at 25 Chapel Rd. in
Ossipee, New Hampshire. Pltf. Mot. (Doc. No. 7) at 1. By
contrast, Ms. Clarke’s motion describes a legal dispute with the
New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts over real estate
located at 154 Moultonville Rd. in Center Ossipee, New
Hampshire. See November 20, 2024 Status Report, Ossipee
Revitalization Grp. v. Ossipee Bd. of Selectmen, No. 212-2024-
CV-00066 (Carroll Super. Ct.) (Doc. No. 21-1). As Ms. Clarke
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 3 of 6

4
fails to demonstrate “an interest relating to” Mr. Brown’s
property, she cannot claim intervention as a matter of right.2
Ms. Clarke’s claim for permissive intervention fares no
better, as there is no apparent “common question of law or fact”
that she shares with Mr. Brown’s claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(B). As noted above, Mr. Brown claims that local
officials violated his rights when they trespassed on his
property and commenced legal proceedings against him. Ms.
Clarke’s grievance seems to stem from her involvement in an
organization seeking to stop the Town of Ossipee from
demolishing a historic building and her failed attempt to
intervene in state court proceedings involving the Director of
Charitable Trusts, from whom the Town needs permission for the
proposed demolition. That she shares Mr. Brown’s belief that
Town officials have behaved illegally is not a basis for
intervention where the Town’s actions involve entirely unrelated
proceedings.
Furthermore, Rule 24(b)(2) requires “the court [to]
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”
Allowing Ms. Clarke to intervene would expand the scope of this
2 In addition to lacking an interest in Mr. Brown’s property
dispute, Ms. Clarke fails to demonstrate how the disposition of
this suit would affect her rights if intervention is denied.
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 4 of 6

5
suit to an impermissible extent by forcing the defendants to
address their actions in unrelated situations involving
different properties and legal theories.3 Indeed, Ms. Clarke
acknowledges that, other than “shar[ing] constitutional themes”
with Mr. Brown’s action, her claims arise from “independent
property interests, [New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law]
violations, and charitable trust violations,” Supp. to Mot.
(Doc. No. 33) at 1-2, none of which are present in Mr. Brown’s
suit. Accordingly, the district court should deny Ms. Clarke’s
motion to the extent she seeks permissive intervention.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should deny Ms.
Clarke’s motions to intervene (Doc. Nos. 16 and 21). Any
objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this
Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the district
3 Mr. Brown, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the
defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 2. Ms. Clarke also asserts
that the Constitutional rights of unnamed “affected parties were
violated,” Repl. (Doc. No. 31) at 2, but also claims that that
town officials failed to “follow zoning procedure, uphold
fiduciary and legal duties, [and] disclose conflicts of
interest, . . . .” Id. Litigating these additional matters would
undoubtedly delay the proceedings in this case.
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 5 of 6

6
court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such
objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to file
any objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court's Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
______________________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
November 20, 2025
cc: Steven Brown, pro se
Counsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-00077-LM-AJ Document 42 Filed 11/20/25 Page 6 of 6