Shine v. NH Department of Corrections, Commissioner et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
WILLIAM SHINE
v. Civil No. 25-cv-539-JL-TSM
WILLIAM HART, JR., COMMISSIONER,
NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AND SARA PROVENCHER,
WARDEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PRISON
FOR WOMEN
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff, William Shine, who is incarcerated at the New Hampshire State
Prison for Men (“NHSP-M”) sued Willliam Hart, Jr., Commissioner of the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections, and Sara Provencher, Warden, of the New Hampshire State Prison for
Women. Doc. No. 1. Shine claims that Defendants violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments when they prevented him from receiving or sending mail to his wife, who
is incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Prison for Women (“NHSP-W”). The Complaint,
naming Defendants in their individual and official capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is
before this court for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and LR 4.3(d)(1).
LEGAL STANDARD
In conducting a preliminary review of a prisoner’s claims seeking relief from state
government officials, this court considers whether those claims should be dismissed because there
is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief sought, the plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or the action is frivolous or malicious.
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See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); LR 4.3(d)(1). To determine whether to dismiss one or more claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court takes as true the factual content
asserted by the plaintiff and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, and, after stripping
away legal conclusions, considers whether the plaintiff stated a claim that is plausible on its face.
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Because Plaintiff in this case proceeds without counsel, the court construes
his pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
BACKGROUND
Shine and his wife, Julie, married in 2009. Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5. Shine has been incarcerated
at NHSP-M since 2015, and Julie has been incarcerated at NHSP-W since 2017. Id. In 2017, the
NHSP-M Warden approved Shine’s request to correspond with Julie at NHSP-W. Id. at ¶ 7.
However, Shine experienced periods of time when Julie did not receive his letters, and he did not
receive Julie’s letters. Id. at ¶ 8. Shine sent several Inmate Request Slips (“IRS”) about the missing
letters. Id. At some point, Correctional Officer Applee, who typically worked at NHSP-W, met
with Shine regarding the missing mail and agreed to create a log to track correspondence between
the Shines. Id. at ¶ 9.
On September 23, 2025, Shine’s sister informed him that NHSP-W Warden Sara
Provencher told Julie that Julie can no longer correspond with Shine “due to content.” Id. at ¶ 10.
That same day, Shine sent an IRS to Warden Provencher stating that he and his wife had not
violated prison rules regarding mail, and he never received notice that there was an issue with the
mail. Id. On September 25, 2025, Warden Provencher responded that, “[b]ased on information
available to [Warden Provencher,] permission to correspond ha[s] been revoked . . . . Appropriate
staff and parties have been informed.” Id. at ¶ 11; Doc. No. 1-1 at pg. 5.
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On October 13, 2025, Shine alleges he sent a grievance to New Hampshire Department of
Corrections Commissioner (“NHDOC”), whose office confirmed that Warden Provencher
“revoked” Shine’s correspondence privileges with his wife. Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 13; see Doc. No. 1-1
at pg. 9. On November 19, 2025, Shine sent an IRS to the Commissioner to reconsider the
“decision affirming” that his correspondence privileges were revoked. Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 14. The
Commissioner did not respond to that IRS. Id.
Claims
Liberally construed, Shine asserts the following claims for damages and equitable relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
1. Warden Provencher violated, and continues to violate, Shine’s rights under the First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, in that Warden Provencher prevented
Shine from corresponding with his incarcerated wife, thereby violating:
a. Shine’s constitutionally protected right to intimate association with his wife;
b. Shine’s First Amendment right to receive mail from his wife; and
c. Shine’s First Amendment right to send mail to his wife.
2. Warden Provencher violated, and continues to violate, Shine’s right under the First
Amendment to exercise his religion in the expression of emotional support and
commitment to his marriage, in that Warden Provencher prevented Shine from
corresponding with his wife; and
3. Warden Provencher violated, and continues to violate, Shine’s right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment in that Warden Provencher failed to provide
notice and an opportunity to challenge the decision to prevent Shine from
corresponding with his wife.
4. The Commissioner, in his supervisory capacity, violated Shine’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, in that the Commissioner knew of, condoned, and
continues to condone Warden Provencher’s decision to prevent Shine from
corresponding with Shine’s wife.
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DISCUSSION
I. Eleventh Amendment (Official Capacity Damages Claims)
Construed liberally, Shine’s Complaint asserts claims for damages and injunctive relief
against Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. See Doc. No. 1 at pg. 15. The
Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages asserted against state officials sued in their official
capacities unless the State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Town of Barnstable
v. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2015). Section 1983 does not abrogate the State’s
immunity, and the State has not waived it here. See Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 54
(1st Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities are
thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Shine’s
official-capacity claims seeking damages from Defendants.1
II. First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process:
A. Intimate Association (Claim 1(a))
Although an individual loses many of his constitutional rights upon incarceration, he
“retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
822 (1974). As particularly relevant here, “freedom of association is among the rights least
compatible with incarceration,” and “[s]ome curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the
prison context.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984), the Court identified the right to
1 Shine’s official-capacity claims against Defendants seeking prospective injunctive relief are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 421
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005).
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intimate association as a fundamental personal freedom that receives protection under the Due
Process Clause. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987), the Court recognized that there is
constitutional protection to the marriage relationship in the prison context. Shine’s § 1983 intimate
association claim regarding Warden Provencher’s alleged prohibition on his ability to correspond
with his incarcerated wife is adequately stated to survive this court’s preliminary review.
Accordingly, in the Order issued on this date, the court serves Claim 1(a) on Warden Provencher
and directs her to file an answer to that claim in her individual capacity to the extent damages are
sought and in her official capacity to the extent equitable relief is requested.
B. Incoming Mail (Claim 1(b))
The prison’s censorship of incoming mail is governed by the test developed in Turner,
which asks whether that censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482
U.S. at 89. Shine sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim that Warden Provencher violated his
First Amendment rights by censoring incoming mail from his wife. In the Order issued on this
date, the court serves that claim upon Warden Provencher, who must file an answer to Claim 1(b)
in her individual capacity to the extent damages are sought and in her official capacity to the extent
equitable relief is requested.
C. Outgoing Mail (Claim 1(c))
A prisoner’s outgoing mail receives greater constitutional protection than incoming mail,
and censorship of that mail is governed by Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412–13 (1974),
overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989). The Martinez
test asks two questions: (1) whether the regulation or practice furthers “an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,” including “security, order, and
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rehabilitation;” and (2) whether the challenged action is “no greater than is necessary” to protect
the governmental interest at stake. Id. at 413.
Shine sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim that Warden Provencher violated his rights
under the First Amendment by censoring his outgoing mail to his wife. In the Order issued on this
date, the court serves that claim upon Warden Provencher, who must file an answer to Claim 1(c)
in her individual capacity to the extent damages are sought and in her official capacity to the extent
equitable relief is requested.
III. First Amendment Free Exercise (Claim 2)
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause “requires government respect for, and
noninterference with,” an individual’s “religious beliefs and practices.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 719 (2005). The First Amendment protects the exercise of a prisoner’s sincerely held
religious beliefs to the extent that the exercise does not contravene prison regulations that are
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528
(2006) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
Shine makes no allegation that implicates his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. He
provides no explanation as to what religious belief Warden Provencher denied. Instead, he
references religion only in the context of expressing commitment to his marriage. See Doc. No. 1
at pg. 1. Alone, that allegation is not sufficient to support a First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
claim. Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Claim 2.
IV. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (Claim 3)
“The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter,
grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the
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Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.”
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418. As such, “the decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular
letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards.” Id. at 417.
[T]he Court agreed that (1) notice should be given to inmates if personal letters they
write or are intended to receive are rejected; (2) the person writing the letter should
be given a “reasonable opportunity to protest” the rejection, and (3) complaints
should be heard by a person not involved in the decision to reject the letter.
Starr v. Knierman, 474 F. App’x 785, 786 (1st Cir. 2012).
Shine sufficiently alleges that Warden Provencher denied him the minimal procedural
safeguards required for censoring incoming or outgoing mail when prison officials rejected letters
he mailed to his wife and what he asserts were her letters to him, without notice to him and without
a reason for rejection, or an opportunity to respond. Based on these allegations, Shine has stated
a due process claim against Warden Provencher relating to rejected letters sent to and from his
wife, without notice to him or an opportunity to object. In the Order issued on this date, the court
serves that claim upon Warden Provencher, who must file an answer to Claim 3 in her individual
capacity to the extent damages are sought and in her official capacity to the extent equitable relief
is requested.
V. Supervisory Liability (Claim 4)
“Although Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior, supervisory officials may be liable on the
basis of their own acts or omissions. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dávila, 135 F.3d
182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998)).
In the context of Section 1983 actions, supervisory liability typically arises in one
of two ways: either the supervisor may be a “primary violator or direct participant
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in the rights-violating incident,” or liability may attach “if a responsible official
supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the
possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a
civil rights deprivation.”
Id. (quoting Camilo–Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)). “In either case, the
plaintiff in a Section 1983 action must show an affirmative link, whether through direct
participation or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization, between the
actor and the underlying violation.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
Shine has sufficiently alleged, for purposes of preliminary review, that the Commissioner
knew about and condoned Warden Provencher’s rejection of Shine’s correspondence with his wife
without notice or an opportunity to respond, which violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 54–55. Therefore, Shine stated a claim that the
Commissioner is liable for Warden Provencher’s alleged violations of Shine’s constitutional rights
under the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment as identified in Claims 1(a), 1(b), 1(c),
and 3. Accordingly, in the Order issued on this date, this court serves Claim 4 upon the
Commissioner, who must answer the Complaint as to the constitutional violations alleged in
Claims 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), and 3 in his individual capacity, to the extent damages are sought, and in
his official capacity to the extent equitable relief is requested.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss all of Shine’s official-capacity
claims for damages and also dismiss Claim 2, as identified above.
As stated in an Order issued this date, the court directs the Clerk’s Office to serve
Defendants with electronic copies of the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) and the motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. No. 2). Defendants, in their individual capacities as to the claims for damages,
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and in their official capacities as to the claims for injunctive relief, must file their answer to the
Complaint (Doc. No. 1), in particular with respect to Claims 1(a)–(c), 3, and 4, as identified above.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Failure to file specific written objections to the Report and Recommendation within
the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
_________________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
U.S. Magistrate Judge
January 13, 2026
cc: William Shine, pro se
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