Bryan v. Anderson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
NASEEF BRYAN
v. Civ. No. 26-cv-052-LM-TSM
DAVID ANDERSON, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT ANNA DRONZEK’S MOTION TO DISMISS
In this action removed from state court, self-represented Plaintiff Naseef Bryan, appearing
in forma pauperis, sued several individuals apparently involved in his prior unsuccessful litigation.
One of those Defendants, Assistant United States Attorney Anna Dronzek, moves to dismiss (Doc.
No. 3), asserting that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Mr. Bryan
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). Mr.
Bryan timely objected (Doc. No. 6). Attorney Dronzek’s motion has been referred to the
undersigned magistrate judge for a recommended disposition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For
the reasons that follow, the motion should be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss that challenges the sufficiency of the undisputed facts
offered to establish jurisdiction, such as this one, the undisputed facts must plausibly demonstrate
that the plaintiff’s claim is justiciable. See Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730-31
(1st Cir. 2016) (applying the plausibility standard to jurisdictional challenges prior to taking of
discovery); Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363 (explaining that the court may consider, on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), undisputed facts submitted by either party in addition to facts alleged
in the complaint).
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Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true, construe reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and “determine whether
the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which relief may
be granted.” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (quotation
omitted). The court is not bound, however, to accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true
— it may disregard facts which are “conclusively contradicted” by other sources of fact the court
is entitled to consider on the motion. Lister v. Bank of Am., 790 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting
Soto-Negrón v. Taber Partners I, 339 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2003)).
A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Analyzing plausibility is “a context-specific task” in which the
court relies on its “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
BACKGROUND
In addition to Attorney Dronzek, the Defendants in Mr. Bryan’s complaint are three New
Hampshire Superior Court justices, two New Hampshire Department of Justice investigators, the
New Hampshire Attorney General, a Superior Court Clerk and the Manchester Police
Department’s assistant chief. Doc. No. 1-1. Although Mr. Bryan alleges that his civil rights were
violated, the complaint contains few facts. Id. Based on a review of documents appended to his
complaint, it appears that Mr. Bryan was arrested for voter fraud in 2025 and was subject to
prosecution in state court by state prosecutors. See Doc. No. 4-11 at pg. 8; Doc. No. 4-12.
As to Attorney Dronzek, Mr. Bryan alleges the following:
Anna Dronzek, ha[s] committed the offense of Conspiracy when she acted with a
purpose that a crime defined by statute be committed, she agrees with one or more
persons to cause the commission of such crime which an overt act is committed by
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one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracies mentioned under an
Unconstitutional Law.
Doc. No. 1-1 at pg. 12.
Attorney Dronzek removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which,
as relevant here, provides that a civil action against a federal officer “may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
pending[.]”1 Id. § 1442(a). Shortly after removing the case to this court, Attorney Dronzek moved
to dismiss Mr. Bryan’s lawsuit against her. Doc. No. 3.
DISCUSSION
I. Derivative Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Attorney Dronzek moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1), based on the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. Doc. No. 3 at pgs. 3-4. That doctrine
provides that when a case is removed to federal court from state court under section 1442 and the
state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court also lacks jurisdiction. See Arizona
v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981) (holding that “it is well settled that if the state court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court acquires none upon removal,
even though the federal court would have had jurisdiction if the suit had originated there”); Patriot
Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 210 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that “a federal
district court does not have removal jurisdiction over a claim that the state court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to decide in the first place”). As explained more fully below, the court agrees
1 Mr. Bryan filed an Objection after the case was removed to this court. Doc. No. 2. However, the
arguments Mr. Bryan raised in his Objection are moot in light of this court’s recommendation that
the district judge dismiss Attorney Dronzek and remand the remaining claims to the state court.
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that the derivative jurisdiction doctrine deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over Mr.
Bryan’s claims against Attorney Dronzek.
Mr. Bryan claims that Attorney Dronzek conspired with others against him.2 See generally
Doc. No. 1-1. “The [Federal Tort Claims Act] is the exclusive remedy for negligent or wrongful
acts committed by any federal employee while acting within the scope of his or her office or
employment. Schomaker v. United States, No. 07-CV-164-PB, 2008 WL 2065918, at *7 (D.N.H.
May 13, 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)), aff’d, 334 F. App’x 336 (1st Cir. 2009). And federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over “claims against the United States, for money
damages . . . for . . . personal injury . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of [her] office or employment . . .”
William Spencer & Spencer Bros. LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 740 F. Supp. 3d 101, 107
(D.N.H. 2024). “Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating
to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is precluded without
regard to when the act or omission occurred.” Id.
Given the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court over Mr. Bryan’s tort claim against
Attorney Dronzek, the state court in which this case was filed, never had subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim. Accordingly, this court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the
district judge should dismiss Attorney Dronzek from this lawsuit.
II. Failure to State a Claim
Should the district judge conclude this court has subject matter jurisdiction over Mr.
Bryan’s claim that Attorney Dronzek is liable for conspiracy, dismissal is still warranted because
2 Given that the other Defendants are judges, attorneys, police and investigators, the court
concludes that the claim against Attorney Dronzek, threadbare though it may be, is based on
actions she took in her capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney.
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the claim fails as a matter of law. “To state a viable claim for civil conspiracy under New
Hampshire law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that ‘two or more persons’ conspired to achieve
an unlawful objective.” Traudt v. Lebanon Police Dep’t, 749 F. Supp. 3d 251, 259 (D.N.H. 2024)
(quoting Carney v. Town of Weare, Civ. No. 15-cv-291-LM, 2017 WL 680384, at *15 (D.N.H.
Feb. 21, 2017)). Mr. Bryan’s complaint contains no facts from which the court can discern a viable
cause of action for conspiracy. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up) (“A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement.”). Therefore, the district judge should grant Attorney Dronzek’s motion to dismiss
for this additional independent reason.
III. Effect of Dismissal of Federal Defendant
When, as here, a case removed under Section 1442(a) also includes state law claims
against nonfederal defendants, the statute effectively allows a district court to exercise “a species
of statutorily-mandated supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction” over those other claims. Lewis
v. United States, No. CV DKC 22-2566, 2023 WL 3304890, at *4 (D. Md. May 8, 2023) (quoting
14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3726 (Rev. 4th ed.
Apr. 2023) (“Wright & Miller”)). Even “after the claim against the federal defendant is resolved
and that defendant “drops out of the case,” the district court may still exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Id. (citing Wright & Miller § 3726).
Here, if the district judge dismisses Attorney Dronzek from this lawsuit, there will be no
basis for federal jurisdiction because Mr. Bryan’s complaint does not name any other federal
officer as a defendant, and because his claims arise under state law and there is no diversity of
citizenship, as all parties appear to be citizens of New Hampshire. The district judge should decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Bryan’s remaining claims and instead remand them
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because: 1) they assert only state-law causes of action; 2) the litigation is in its initial stages; and
3) Mr. Bryan originally filed the action in his forum of choice. See Wright & Miller § 3726
(“Whether the supplemental claims should be remanded if the federal officer’s ‘anchor’ claim is
dismissed or settled, or if the supplemental claims have been asserted against non-federal parties,
depends on considerations of comity, federalism, judicial economy, and fairness to litigants.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant Attorney Dronzek’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. No. 3). If the district judge adopts this recommendation, this case should be
remanded to the Merrimack County Superior Court. The pending motion to dismiss filed by the
remaining Defendants (Doc. No. 7) should be terminated as moot, without prejudice to those
Defendants’ ability to re-file the motion in state court.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Failure to file any objection within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district
court's Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016). Only those
issues raised in the objection(s) to this Report and Recommendation “are subject to review in the
district court.” Id. (cleaned up). Additionally, any issues “not preserved by such objection are
precluded on appeal.” Id.
________________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
April 14, 2026
cc: Naseef Bryan, pro se
Counsel of Record
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