Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Rasul Choupanzadeh, Madineh
Sheikh, and I.C., minor,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 26-cv-0277-SM-TSM
v. 	Opinion No. 2026 DNH 073
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
Joseph B. Edlow, Director, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services;
Terri Robinson, Director, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services
National Benefits Center; and
Marjolaine Geraghty, Acting Field
Office Director, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Bedford,
New Hampshire Field Office,
Defendants
O R D E R
Plaintiffs filed suit on April 9, 2026, challenging the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS)
apparently indefinite (meaning effectively permanent) “pause” in
the adjudication of plaintiffs’ long-pending applications for
work authorization and an adjustment of status. 	Plaintiffs are
citizens of Iran who have lawfully resided in the United States
since 2021. 	Their routine applications for employment
authorization documents (EAD) are being intentionally ignored
under two USCIS policy memoranda issued in December, 2025, and
January, 2026. 	Those memoranda direct USCIS personnel to place
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an indefinite hold on pending benefit applications submitted by
nationals from 39 countries disfavored by the Executive,
including Iran.
Plaintiffs have moved for emergency preliminary injunctive
relief because adjudication of their EAD applications is
essential to their continued employment in the United States,
and, in the case of Sheikh, the viability of her medical
residency program. 	They ask the court to order defendants to
promptly adjudicate their pending applications, and to issue
Choupanzadeh and Sheikh an EAD within five days from the date of
the Court’s order.
Both plaintiffs and respondents agree that an evidentiary
hearing is not required, and that resolution on the papers is
appropriate. 	Because plaintiffs have established that they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims; that they are
likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief; and
that the balance of the equities weighs in their favor, their
motion for a preliminary injunction is granted, in part.
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BACKGROUND
The material facts, as described in plaintiffs’ complaint
and the affidavits accompanying their motion for injunctive
relief, are not seriously disputed.
Rasul Choupanzadeh and Madineh Sheikh are married and have
a small child. 	They are citizens of Iran, but the family has
lawfully resided in the United States since August 4, 2021,
under the authority of federal law and F-1 and F-2 student visas
issued by the United States government. 	Rasul Choupanzadeh
attended the University of Idaho, graduating with a doctorate in
Electrical Engineering in December, 2024. 	Choupanzadeh properly
maintained his F-1 visa status while attending university, and
his wife and their minor child maintained their F-2 visa status.
In April, 2024, while still enrolled at the University of
Idaho as a doctoral student, Choupanzadeh filed an employment-
based visa petition on Form I-140. 	Choupanzadeh’s Form I-140
was approved by USCIS on November 5, 2024.
After obtaining his Ph.D., Choupanzadeh applied to USCIS
for authorization of temporary employment for Post Graduation
Optional Practical Training (“OPT”). 	USCIS granted his
application for OPT from January 20, 2025, through January 19,
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2026. 	Because Choupanzadeh’s degree falls within what is
commonly known as a STEM program (a program in science,
technology, engineering, or math), so long as Choupanzadeh filed
a request to renew his EAD card before it expired, he was
automatically eligible for a 180-day extension.
On October 22, 2025, Choupanzadeh timely filed Form I-765
to extend his EAD, paying for USCIS’s premium processing
services to ensure it was renewed before expiration of the OPT
automatic extension on July 19, 2026. 	About a month later, on
November 21, 2025, both plaintiffs applied to USCIS for
adjustment of their status from “immigrant” to “lawful permanent
resident” based on Choupanzadeh’s approved Form I-140. 	At that
same time, Choupanzadeh and Sheikh also applied for EAD cards on
Form I-765. 	Those applications are pending but unaddressed,
subject to the indefinite hold. 	Choupanzadeh is employed by
Amphenol, a technology company specializing in high-speed
connector systems.
Plaintiff Madineh Sheikh is an international medical
graduate – a physician still in training. 	She has passed all
required licensing exams, and recently “matched” into an
Internal Medicine residency program at Berkshire Medical Center
in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. 	Her residency begins on July 1,
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2026, with mandatory orientation scheduled to begin in mid-June.
Without an EAD card, Sheikh may become ineligible for her
residency (which includes “employment”), that, of course, would
derail her medical training and professional development.
On December 2, 2025, while the plaintiffs’ applications
were pending, USCIS issued PM-602-0192, a Policy Memorandum
entitled “Hold and Review of all Pending Asylum Applications and
all USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by Aliens from High-Risk
Countries.” 	That memorandum, inter alia, placed an adjudicative
“hold” on all pending benefit requests from nationals of 19
different countries, including Iran. 	It declared that the hold
“will remain in effect until lifted by the USCIS Director
through a subsequent memorandum.”1 	A month later, on January 1,
2026, USCIS issued PM-602-0194, a second Policy Memorandum,
entitled “Hold and Review of USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by
Aliens from Additional High-Risk Countries.” 	That memo
confirmed that USCIS’s December 2 Policy Memorandum guidance
1 	PM-602-0192 references Executive Order 14161 issued on
January 20, 2025, entitled “Protecting the United States from
Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety
Threats.” 	That order “underscores the importance of vigilance
during the visa issuance process to ensure that individuals
approved for admission into the United States do not intend to
harm Americans or compromise U.S. national interests.”
Varniab v. Edlow, No. 25-CV-10602-SVK, 2026 WL 485490, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026).
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remained in place, and expanded the list of countries whose
nationals would be subject to the indefinite adjudication hold.
Adhering to the guidance provided in the December, 2025,
and January, 2026, Policy Memoranda, USCIS ignored its statutory
and regulatory obligations to adjudicate plaintiffs’
applications. 	Plaintiffs allege that USCIS’s refusal to
adjudicate their applications to adjust status and for EADs
imposes irreparable harm on them. 	Neither plaintiff can
lawfully continue to work or commence work, or train as a
resident physician without an EAD, and both will lose their jobs
as well as suffer an unreasonable disruption of their
professional development. 	Without jobs, they will be unable to
provide for their small child, or afford basic living costs.
Plaintiffs seek relief on an emergency basis under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Mandamus Act, and the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and challenge the USCIS’s processing
“pause” on adjudication of their applications. 	They ask the
court to declare that USCIS’s newly minted policies as described
in the policy memoranda are arbitrary and capricious, contrary
to law, and exceed defendants’ statutory authority, and to grant
appropriate relief.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable
remedy that is never awarded as of right.” 	Starbucks Corp. v.
McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345–46 (2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate
entitlement to injunctive relief. 	See We The People PAC v.
Bellows, 40 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2022).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must
demonstrate that: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities is in their
favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. 	US
Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC, 121 F.4th
339, 347 (1st Cir. 2024). 	The “most important” factors are
likelihood of success and irreparable harm. 	District 4 Lodge of
the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge
207, 40 F.4th 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2022). 	When, as here, the
“government is the opposing party,” the balance of equities and
public interest factors merge. 	Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20,
37 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted) (cleaned up).
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DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, the government asserts that the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because
plaintiffs challenge discretionary agency decisions that
Congress has expressly insulated from judicial review.
According to the government, plaintiffs’ challenge to USCIS’s
adjudication of their applications is barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (ii), which reads, “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in
the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security ...” 	28 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 	Because
plaintiffs seek to compel the Secretary’s discretionary action,
the government says, the court lacks jurisdiction.
But, of course, the government’s position misapprehends the
plaintiffs’ argument. 	Plaintiffs “do not contest the
adjudication of their applications to adjust status or for
employment authorization; instead, they seek review of the
failure to adjudicate the application.” 	Bowser v. Noem, No. 26-
CV-10382-AK, 2026 WL 555624, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2026)
(addressing identical argument). 	If a noncitizen’s home country
falls within the list of enumerated countries, any application
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for benefits filed by that noncitizen is automatically subject
to the indefinite processing hold. 	There is no discretion
involved.
The government made the same argument in Varniab v. Edlow,
No. 25-CV-10602-SVK, 2026 WL 485490, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20,
2026), a similar case pending in the Northern District of
California where plaintiffs, married medical doctors from Iran,
sought a preliminary injunction directing the government to
complete adjudication of their pending applications for
permanent residency and work authorization. 	As here,
plaintiffs’ applications were indefinitely “on hold” pursuant to
USCIS’s policy withholding “final adjudication of applications
for immigration benefits filed by persons from certain countries
including Iran.” 	Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *1. 	The court was
not persuaded by the government’s argument concerning Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), writing:
an overarching problem with Defendants’ argument is
that numerous courts have concluded that subsection
(B)(ii) only precludes judicial review of decisions
denying discretionary relief on individual
applications and does not preclude judicial review of
the Government's decision to categorically act or
withhold action. 	See, e.g., Miot v. Trump, -- F.
Supp. 3d --, 2026 WL 266413, at * 17 (D.D.C. Feb. 2,
2026) (holding that “Subsection (a)(2)(B)(ii) poses no
barrier to the Court's review” of decision of DHS
Secretary to terminate Temporary Protected Status
designation for Haiti); Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d
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311, 332 (D. Mass. 2025), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025) (holding
that “categorical actions challenged here,” which were
decisions to terminate parole program for aliens from
certain countries, were not precluded from judicial
review by subsection (B)(ii)).
Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *7. 	See also Doe, et al. v. Trump,
et al., No. 25-13946-JEK, 2026 WL at *15 (D. Mass. April 30,
2026) (“Like the adjustment of status regulations, these
regulations contain an implicit requirement that work
authorization applications be decided. 	The adjudicative hold
policy – which prohibits decisions on such applications – is
fundamentally inconsistent with that regulatory command. 	In
addition, it is incompatible with the [Administrative Procedure
Act’s] requirement that agency action, including USCIS’s
consideration of adjustment of status applications and work
authorization applications, ‘conclude’ ‘within a reasonable
time.’”).
So too, here. 	The government’s argument is utterly
unpersuasive because, as noted in Bowser v. Noem, 2026 WL
555624, at *4, “while it is undisputed that the substance of the
Attorney General's decision is discretionary, he does not have
discretion to decide not to adjudicate at all.” (quoting Tang v.
Chertoff, 493 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (D. Mass. June 26, 2007)).
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Jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims is, then, properly
exercised.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
For the same reasons supporting the exercise of
jurisdiction described above, plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits – the agency does not have discretion to
indefinitely, or even for an unreasonable period of time, refuse
to adjudicate benefit applications.
Indeed, it can probably be said with some confidence that
plaintiffs have already succeeded. 	Three days ago, on June 12,
2026, USCIS filed an affidavit in a nearly identical court
challenge in the district of Rhode Island, in which the Agency
described its compliance with that court’s order declaring the
same policies at issue here to be unlawful as violative of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and (C), and
therefore vacated. 	Dorcas Intl. Inst. of Rhode Island v. United
States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 26-CV-132-JJM-PAS, 2026
WL 1622708, (D.R.I. June 5, 2026). 	The Agency has apparently
determined to “treat the vacated policies as if they are no
longer in effect.” 	Dorcas, No. 26-cv-132-JJM-PAS, Document No.
41-1 (filed June 12, 2026). 	But, while that development
portends well for a forthcoming adjudication, there is no reason
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to expect that these plaintiffs will not continue to suffer
irreparable harm directly caused by the unlawful delay to this
point. 	They are at the brink of suffering irreparable injury,
particularly with respect to Sheikh’s potential loss of her
medical residency.
Irreparable Injury
To be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiffs
must also show that they will be irreparably injured absent a
preliminary injunction. 	While the government contends that the
harm alleged by plaintiffs is merely financial, the harm they
allege actually goes well beyond financial harm.
Plaintiffs point out that neither can legally work in the
United States until USCIS processes their applications. 	Sheikh
is slated to begin her medical residency in July, 2026. 	If
Sheikh does not obtain either an EAD card or her lawful
permanent residence status, she will likely lose her residency.
She says that this loss would “cause irreparable harm to my
medical career and eliminate a critical opportunity to
contribute to the U.S. healthcare system, particularly providing
healthcare services to underserved areas of Berkshire County.”
Document No. 6-2. 	She further explains that the “medical
resident position I have been matched for is strictly time-
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sensitive and cannot be deferred. 	If I am unable to begin my
residency as scheduled, I will lose this opportunity entirely,
resulting in immediate professional, financial, and emotional
harm.” 	Id.
Plaintiffs further allege that, without jobs, they will be
unable to meet their ongoing financial obligations, and may be
forced to sell their car. 	They also face “significant emotional
distress caused by the loss of income and uncertainty regarding
[their] family’s future.” 	Document No. 6-1.
Plaintiffs have adequately established irreparable harm, as
the “harm here extends beyond ordinary economic injury.” 	Bowser
v. Noem, 2026 WL 555624, at *9 (quoting Miot v. Trump, 2026 WL
266413, at *36). 	Both plaintiffs will not merely lose their
jobs, but would also be “categorically barred from lawful
employment.” 	Id. 	And, most concerning, loss of Sheikh’s
residency training has the potential to completely alter the
trajectory of her medical career, and her chosen profession.
The “loss of that hard-earned opportunity will delay [Sheikh’s]
career in . . . medicine by at least a [full] year, causing
significant and long-lasting damage to her professional
development.” 	Pouri v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al.,
No. 26-CV-1339, 2026 WL 1508425, at *9 (D.D.C. May 30, 2026).
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In Pouri v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al., 2026
WL 1508425, at *9, the plaintiff similarly faced the loss of her
residency if USCIS failed to adjudicate her EAD application. 	As
here, the plaintiff either had to “start orientation on time or
forgo the position altogether.” 	The court found irreparable
harm, noting that “the loss of that hard-earned opportunity will
delay Plaintiff's career in American medicine by at least a
year, causing significant and long-lasting damage to her
professional development.” 	Id. at *9. 	Given plaintiff’s
“residency timeline and planned career path,” the court
concluded that plaintiff’s “imminent loss of work authorization
constitutes irreparable harm.” 	Id.
Along with several other courts that have considered the
issue, this court concludes that the “loss of work authorization
. . . constitutes irreparable harm.” 	Miot v. Trump, 2026 WL
266413, at *36. 	See also Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *22;
Bowser v. Noem, 2026 WL 555624, at *9; Behdin v. Edlow, No. 26-
CV-00566-SVK, 2026 WL 1031079, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026);
Saghafi v. Edlow, No. CV GLR-26-100, 2026 WL 1127468, at *12 (D.
Md. Apr. 24, 2026) (noting “multiple courts have found that the
loss of opportunity to pursue one’s chosen profession, including
by limiting their professional opportunities, constitutes
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irreparable harm.”) (internal quotations omitted) (cleaned up).
That factor therefore weighs in favor of a preliminary
injunction.
Balance of Equities and Public Interest
Plaintiffs contend that the balance of equities favors them
because their requested injunction is limited in scope, and the
defendants “will suffer no damage by acting on and approving an
EAD for each Plaintiff which the USCIS is obligated to do.”
Document No. 7 at 14. 	The government responds that USCIS has a
strong public interest in promoting the statutes and regulations
immigrants and nonimmigrants must abide by when entering the
United States. 	According to the government, granting plaintiffs
injunctive relief would thwart those interests.
As the plaintiffs point out, however, defendants fail to
identify any national security concerns relating to them, or
explain why American citizens need protection from the
plaintiffs, who have lawfully been in the United States since
2021 and have complied in all respects with the terms of their
non-immigrant status. 	See Bowser v. Noem, 2026 WL 555624, at *9
(“Defendants’ invocation of national security concerns is even
less salient in the context of [the] Plaintiff[ ] in this case,
who ha[s] been living and [studying/]working in the United
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States since [2013] and about whom Defendants have identified no
specific national security concerns.” (quoting Varniab, 2026 WL
485490, at *14)). 	The government also fails to explain how
withholding employment opportunities to noncitizens who have
lawfully been admitted into and entered the United States is in
the public interest.
The equities weigh decidedly in favor of injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
There is no need to add “ruffles and flourishes” to the
comprehensive legal analyses already provided by Judge
McConnell, Dorcas, 2026 WL 1622708, and the other courts cited
above. 	The policies at issue here have been ordered vacated,
and USCIS seems to have declared its intent to abandon
implementation of those policies going forward, and treat the
policies as if they do not exist.
In this case, unlike Dorcas, however, injunctive relief
sufficient to protect the plaintiffs is necessary – there is no
basis in this record to suppose that USCIS will swiftly address
plaintiffs’ pending application for EADs absent an order, which
failure will precipitate the very harm the agency has put at
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risk by its extended unlawful refusal to comply with the law as
Congress has enacted it, with respect to plaintiffs.
No doubt, given the likely backlog of unadjudicated
applications USCIS has caused by its unlawful actions, another
extended period of time will be required before all long-pending
applications before the Agency can be fully resolved and
decisions administratively communicated – unfortunate, but a
reality that cannot be ignored.
Accordingly, while the relief granted needs to be
effective, it need not be unduly burdensome on the government if
the burden can be tempered. 	Therefore, the court enters the
following preliminary injunctive relief:
Defendant(s) (USCIS) shall, within ten (10) days of the
date of this order, fully adjudicate the long-pending
applications for immigrant benefits filed by plaintiffs, if
USCIS can do so without undue administrative effort that
adversely affects consideration of benefit applications from
others that have been pending for a longer time, or from those
in more precarious situations with respect to imminent harm
caused by the government’s unlawful delay.
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Should Defendant(s) (USCIS) not be able to fairly
adjudicate the plaintiffs’ applications within ten (10) days,
the defendants are enjoined from enforcing any requirement
respecting EADs or statutes or regulation that in any way
interfere with or burden plaintiffs’ abilities to be employed or
live lawfully, or, with respect to plaintiff Sheikh, to fully
participate in all aspects of her matched medical residency.
And, if necessary, notice of this order shall be provided to the
relevant hospital or program administrators and/or employers,
freeing them of any legal obligation to comply with such
enjoined requirements, and enjoining them from requiring any EAD
or other indicia of authority from USCIS as a condition of
employment or participation in a residency program, or any other
aspect of lawful presence in the United States, until such time
as USCIS adjudicates plaintiffs’ applications, and provides
formal notice of that adjudication to plaintiffs, and any
administrative appeals taken are resolved.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
June 15, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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