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Case 1:26-cv-12061-KMW Document9_ Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 4 PagelD: <pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

YOEL PEGUERO,

Petitioner, Civil Action No. 26-cv-12061

¥ MEMORANDUM ORDER

October 15, 2026
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,

Respondents,

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Yoel Peguero (“Petitioner”) (ECF
No. 1), the Court’s September 16, 2026 Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 4), Respondents’ Response
(ECF No. 7), and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 8). The Court has considered the parties’
submissions; and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition (ECF No, 1} is GRANTED.

Petitioner challenges his continued detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (‘ICE’) and seeks immediate release. (ECF No. i.) Respondents assert that
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Dominican Republic, entered the United States without
inspection, admission, or parole by an immigration officer on or about October 28, 2000. (ECF
No. 7 at 1, Ex. A.} Respondents allege that on August 20, 2001, Petitioner failed to appear for his
removal proceeding and the immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed in absentia. (id. Ex.
B.) Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner has filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings
with the Immigration Court, and as a result, Petitioner’s removal is automatically stayed under 8

C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)0i). Ud. at 1-2.) The issue before the Court is whether Petitioner’s

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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continued detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, given the pending motion to reopen his
removal proceedings and the resulting stay of removal.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because
he is subject to a final order of removal. CECF No. 7.) According to Respondents, Petitioner’s
removal period commenced when ICE arrested him on September 12, 2026, and therefore he had
been detained for only twelve days when Respondents filed their response. (Ud, at 3, Ex. D.)
Respondents rely principally on the mandatory-detention provision applicable during the 90-day
removal period, See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).

Petitioner argues that his pending motion to reopen before the Buffalo Immigration Court
automatically stays his removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)4)Gp, and that his continued
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is unlawful because Respondents cannot presently effectuate
his removal. (ECF No. 8.)

Respondents’ reliance on § 1231(a)(2) requires the Court to distinguish between the
commencement of the statutory removal period and the authority for detention after that period.
Section 1231(a)(1)(B) provides that the removal period begins on the latest of the dates specified
therein, including the date the removal order becomes administratively final. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(B), Respondents identify August 20, 2001, as the date on which the Immigration Judge
entered Petitioner’s in absentia removal order, (ECF No, 7 at 1-2, Ex. B.) Under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(B), the removal period begins on the latest of the dates specified by statute, including
the date the removal order becomes administratively final. Assuming the order became
administratively final in 2001, the 90-day removal period expired that year, absent a statutory basis
for postponing or extending it. Respondents identify no provision of § 1231(a)(1)(B) that would

make Petitioner’s September 12, 2026 arrest restart that period, nor do they assert that the removal

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period was extended under § 1231{a)(1)(C).

Respondents, however, acknowledge that Petitioner has filed a motion to reopen his
removal proceedings before the Buffalo Immigration Court. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) Under 8 C.B.R. §
1003.23(b)(4) Gn), the filing of a qualifying motion to reopen automatically stays removal pending
the Immigration Judge’s disposition of the motion. That stay prevents execution of the removal
order while it remains in effect, but does not, without further analysis, establish that the order is
no longer administratively final or that the statutory removal period has recommenced. The Court
therefore considers the effect of the pending motion to reopen in assessing whether Respondents
have demonstrated lawful authority for Petitioner’s present detention,

Section 1231(a)(6) permits detention beyond the removal period in specified
circumstances, subject to the limitation recognized in Zadvydas v, Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689, 699
(2001). Under Zadvydas, detention may continue only for the period reasonably necessary to
accomplish removal. The Supreme Court identified six months as a presumptively reasonable
period of post-removal-order detention and explained that, after that period, a noncitizen who
provides good reason to believe that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future may require the Government to rebut that showing. Jd. at 701.

Petitioner had been detained for approximately twelve days when Respondents filed thei
response. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) The Court therefore does not rely solely on the duration of Petitioner’ s
detention or Respondents’ failure to identify a specific removal date. Rather, the Court considers
whether the statutory basis asserted by Respondents authorizes Petitioner’s present detention in
light of the pending motion to reopen and the resulting stay of removal. Respondents rely on §
1231(a), but have not established that Petitioner’s September 12, 2026 arrest commenced a new

removal period under § 1231(a)(1)(B). (See ECF No. 7.) Nor have they adequately explained the

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statutory basis for continued detention while execution of the removal order is stayed. (See id.)

The Government must have statutory authority to continue Petitioner’s detention, and §
1231{a)(6), as construed by Zadvydas, does not authorize detention where removal is not
reasonably foreseeable. 533 U.S. at 699. On the present record, Respondents have not supplied a
sufficient factual basis for concluding that Petitioner’s removal is reasonably foreseeable.

Thus, the Court concludes that continued detention under § 1231(a) Is not presently
authorized, and Petitioner is therefore entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly,

IT IS on this 15" day of October 2026,

ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 1), is GRANTED;
and it is further

ORDERED that Respondents shall RELEASE Petitioner forthwith from immigration
custody within twenty-four (24) hours of the filing of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this matter,

fo

Hon. Karen M. Williams
United States District Judge