WARCHESUNSAPE et al v. HILL WALLACK LLP et al

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DONNELL BRANCH WARCHESUNSAPE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HILL WALLACK LLP, et al.
Defendants.
Case No. 2:26-cv-11609 (BRM) (JRA)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Donnell Branch Warchesunsape’s (“Plaintiff”) second
amended complaint (“Second Amended Complaint”), filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the
Indian Non-Intercourse Act, the Federal False Claims Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
the Preemption Clause, and the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (ECF No. 9.) Previously, this Court denied Plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma
pauperis without prejudice due to several filing deficiencies and provided leave to amend. (ECF
Nos. 1 and 4.) The Court later granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and dismissed Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a). (ECF Nos.
5, 7–8.)
On September 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9.)
Therefore, at this time, the Court must review the operative Second Amended Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous
or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
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Additionally, Plaintiff filed a request for summons1 to be issued as to several enumerated
Defendants (ECF No. 10) as well as a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to
enjoin the Essex County Sherrif sale and auction of 54 Hobson Street scheduled for October 27,
2026 (ECF No. 11).
For the reasons set forth below, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and the emergency application is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
Plaintiff is seeking an order dismissing a foreclosure action filed on January 9, 2024 against
BB Real Estate Investments LLC with respect to a commercial mortgage encumbering 54 Hobson
Street, Newark, New Jersey. (ECF No. 9 at 83.) On June 4, 2026, Plaintiff moved for identical
relief in Essex County Superior Court, which was denied on July 8, 2026 on procedural grounds.
(Id.) Plaintiff refiled his application in Essex County Superior Court. (Id.) On September 15, 2026,
the court again denied Plaintiff’s application for lack of standing and for failure to satisfy the
requirements of New Jersey Rule of Court 4:50-1 (describing the requirements to secure relief
from judgement or order.) (Id. at 84.)
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as indigent. According to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim,
1 In light of the Second Amended Complaint’s dismissal, this request is denied as moot.
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the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv.
Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover,
while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in
their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted).
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, is a doctrine which bars parties from
re-litigating an issue determined by a “final and valid” judgment in any future lawsuit. United
States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 217 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts assess five factors to determine if issue
preclusion bars a claim in a new litigation:
(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) the
issue was actually litigated; (3) there was a final judgment on the
merits; (4) the determination was essential to the earlier judgment;
and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party
or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
Fitzgerald v. Shore Mem’l Hosp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 214, 225–26 (D.N.J. 2015). When
determining whether an issue is identical between litigations, the issues must be “in substance the
same.” Pasqua v. Cnty. of Hunterdon, Civ. A. No. 15-3501, 2017 WL 5667999, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov.
27, 2017). In assessing similarity, courts consider “whether there is substantial overlap of evidence
or argument in the second proceeding; whether the evidence involves application of the same rule
of law; whether discovery in the first proceeding could have encompassed discovery in the second;
and whether the claims asserted in the two actions are closely related.” Strassman v. Essential
Images, Civ. A. No. 17-4227, 2018 WL 1251636, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2018) (quoting First
Union Nat’l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 921 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 2007)).
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Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in
limited circumstances.” Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290
F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002)). The primary purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is “maintenance
of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.” Acierno v. New Castle Cnty.,
40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994).
In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, the moving party must show:
(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and
(2) that it will be irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted . . .
[In addition,] the district court, in considering whether to grant a
preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are
relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from
the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.
Reilly v. Cnty. of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Del. River Auth. v.
Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919–20 (3d Cir. 1974)).
The movant bears the burden of establishing “the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’
factors . . . . If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and
determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting
the requested preliminary relief.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179. A court may issue an injunction to a
plaintiff “only if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to convince the district court that all
four factors favor preliminary relief.” AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1427
(3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
III. 	DECISION
A. Screening The Second Amended Complaint
Although Plaintiff’s claims are being presented slightly differently here, it is based on the
same operative facts that were already fully litigated in Essex County Superior Court and
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dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 9 at 86.) Plaintiff’s motion in the state court action alleged
that public records and “notice metrics from Hill Wallack LLP show[s] an illegal $19,565 price
inflation over the certified writ baseline” as well as “fraud using the machinery of the Court” in
executing the foreclosure. (Id. at 79.) Plaintiff further alleged Defendants “failed to show a clean
ledger under corporate veil-piercing standards” and engaged in “extrajudicial contempt outside the
electronic [] portal framework.” (Id.) Plaintiff also made allegations concerning the August 7, 2026
foreclosure sheriff’s sale notice packet and numerous Fourth Amendment violations. (Id.) The state
court 	squarely 	addressed 	these 	allegations 	and 	held 	the 	facts 	did 	not 	“establish 	fraud,
misrepresentation, or a basis to vacate final judgment.” (Id. at 85.) The state court also denied
Plaintiff’s application because it found Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action on behalf of
BB Real Estate Investments LLC or in his individual capacity. (Id.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Office of the Essex County Sheriff, acting via its
Foreclosure Unit, implemented an unconstitutional, non-audited custom” causing a seizure of
Plaintiff’s property, and that Essex County Sheriff “accepted a baseline execution writ of
$228,138.99, yet actively authorized Hill Wallack LLP to enforce an upset price of $247,704.56 –
and an unauthorized $19,565.57 inflation . . . overcharge on the ledger.”2 (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff also
alleges numerous Constitutional violations, namely, that the foreclosure constituted an “[a]rbtirary
property liquidation . . . driven by an unauthorized 13.7 overcharge sale.” (Id. at 2.)
2 Plaintiff also lists a slew of other artificial intelligence generated allegations concerning “an
unconstitutional property extraction against lot coordinates 54 Hobson Street (Block 3060, Lot 8)”
and how Defendants “deployed a ‘double-ledger’ portal glitch via Edmunds GovTech to leave
contractually satisfied escrow credits open on secondary screens while siphoning a foreign
monthly water delinquency from 214 Roseville Avenue onto 54 Hobson Street.” (ECF No. 9 at
22.) All the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint stem from the same foreclosure action
that Plaintiff challenged in the original state court action.
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The issues to be litigated here concerning the writ of execution on 54 Hobson Street are
“in substance the same” between the state and federal court action. Pasqua, 2017 WL 5667999, at
*15. Not only is there “substantial overlap of evidence or argument” between the two proceedings,
but the two requests for relief invoke similar statutes and Constitutional provisions. See Strassman,
2018 WL 1251636, at *5–6. Therefore, the Court finds the requirements of collateral estoppel are
satisfied3: (1) identical issues were decided in a prior adjudication; (2) the issues were actually
litigated4; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination was essential to
the earlier judgment. See Fitzgerald, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 225–26.
Additionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars consideration of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on ‘the well-settled understanding
that the Supreme Court of the United States, and not the lower federal courts, has jurisdiction to
review a state court decision.’” Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2000)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from adjudicating actions where the
plaintiff requests relief that requires finding that the state court’s decision was wrong or voidable,
3 The Court also agrees with the Essex County Superior Court judgement on the merits that
Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge government action targeting property owning to BB Real
Estate Investment LLC. (ECF No. 9 at 83–84.) Plaintiff was advised by this Court that the
corporate plaintiff, BB Real Estate Investments, LLC, may only appear in federal court through a
licensed attorney. (ECF No. 4.) Rather than procure counsel, Plaintiff chose to drop corporate
Plaintiff from its Second Amended Complaint but maintain causes of action only BB Real Estate
Investment LLC can pursue.
4 The Court also notes although the state claims have been reframed somewhat as federal questions,
they could and should have been brought in plaintiff’s state law submissions. See Sutton v. Sutton,
71 F. Supp. 2d 383, 390 (D.N.J. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted) (barring a plaintiff’s federal
claims regarding an estate, because although reframed as federal questions, they could and should
have been brought in the state proceedings, which dealt with plaintiff’s initial complaint against
the settlement and accounting of the same estate).
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just as the Plaintiff requests of this Court. Because the state court entered a judgment denying
Plaintiff’s application on September 15, 2026, only three weeks ago, Plaintiff’s requested relief
would require the Court to find that the state judgment was flawed in some respect. This Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to do so. Plaintiff’s proper remedy is appealing through the state
court system, rather than seeking relief through the federal courts.
B. TRO
Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO fails for the same reasons the Second Amended Complaint
fails. Plaintiff is unable to establish “the threshold for the first . . . ‘most critical’ factor[]” Reilly,
858 F.3d at 179. Namely, Plaintiff will not be able to establish “a reasonable probability of eventual
success in the litigation[.]” Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE5 and the Motion for TRO (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. An
appropriate order follows.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 9, 2026
5 “Reasons a court could deny leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive,
prejudice, and futility.” Fonti v. Health Pros. & Allied Emps., Civ. A. No. 13-4231, 2015 WL
1523834, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2015). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would
not survive a motion to dismiss.” Cnty. of Hudson v. Janiszewski, 351 F. App’x 662, 666 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Court declines to grant
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend, because any amendment of the Second Amended Complaint
would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)
(recognizing long tradition of denying leave to amend under Rule 15(a) when amendment is futile,
and this standard applies to IFP plaintiffs).
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