USA v. NEUMAN

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Criminal Action No. 23-638 (MAS)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
JOSEF NEUMAN,

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Josef Neuman’s (“Neuman”)
correspondence, which the Court construes as a Motion for Early Termination of Supervised
Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (the “Motion”), (ECF No. 21.) The United States of
America (the “Government”) opposed the Motion. (ECF No. 22.) The Court has carefully
considered the submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil
Rule 78.1, which applies to criminal cases under Local Criminal Rule 1.1. For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2023, Neuman pled guilty to a one-count Information charging him with
knowing and willful failure to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over payroll taxes to the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (See Information, ECF No. 1;
Plea Agreement, ECF No. 5.)

On April 5, 2024, Neuman was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment followed by
two years of supervised release, with special conditions. (See Apr. 2024 J., ECF No. 19.) In his

Motion, Neuman moves for early termination of supervised release on the basis that “[early

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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termination] would significantly help [him] to start paying off [his] restitution to the IRS more
quickly in a more reasonable way.” (Neuman’s Mot. 1-2, ECF No, 21.) The Government opposed
Neuman’s Motion. (Gov’t’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 22.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to amend or modify the conditions of supervised release are governed by
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which allows the sentencing court to terminate supervised release “at any
time after the expiration of one year of supervised release,” if, after considering the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court “is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct
of the defendant released and the interest of justice[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). When reviewing
the Section 3553(a) factors, the Court need not make specific findings for each factor. United
States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 2020). Rather, the Court need only state that it has
considered them. Jd. at 53.

Although the Third Circuit has held that Section 3583(e)(1) does not require a finding of
new or unforeseen circumstances, it also reasoned that, “/g/enerally, early termination of
supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) will be proper only when the sentencing judge is satisfied
that new or unforeseen circumstances warrant it.” /d. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The Third Circuit reasoned “[t]hat is because, if a sentence was
‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ when first pronounced, [the Court] would expect that
something will have changed in the interim that would justify an early end to a term of supervised
release.” /d. Importantly, “[d]istrict courts possess broad discretionary authority to modify the
terms and conditions of a defendant’s supervised release.” United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d

412,416 (3d Cir. 2013).

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III. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that early termination of supervised release is not warranted here for two
reasons.

First, Neuman filed his motion approximately two months after beginning his term of
supervised release. (See generally Neuman’s Mot.) As noted above, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) allows
the sentencing court to terminate supervised release “at any time after the expiration of one year
of supervised release.” Thus, Neuman’s Motion must be denied because it is premature.

Second, Neuman’s Motion is barred by his plea agreement. (See Plea Agreement Sch. A
4 11 (Neuman will not challenge or seek to reduce by any means any component of the sentence
imposed by the sentencing judge for any reason other than ineffective assistance of counsel.”).)
Indeed, as the Government asserts in its opposition, “Neuman’s [M]otion is also barred by the plea
agreement, which specifically provided that if the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court did
not exceed 57 months—which it did not—Neuman could not bring a motion for early termination
of supervised release.” (Gov’t’s Opp’n Br, 2 (citing Plea Agreement Sch. A { 11).) Accordingly,
Neuman’s Motion is denied.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS on this 14th day of October 2026 ORDERED that:

1, Neuman’s Motion (ECF No. 21) is DENIED.

2, The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Order to Defendant by
regular U.S. mail. “x

MICHAEL A, SHI iy
UNITED STATES DHSTRICT JUDGE