USA v. MATHURIN

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document118 _ Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 7 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 24-432 (MAS)
Vv.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
NIKENSON JEAN MATHURIN,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Nikenson Jean Mathurin’s
(“Defendant”) Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”) (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 99) of this
Court’s August 28, 2026, Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) (ECF Nos. 89, 90). The United States of
America (the “Government”) opposed. (Gov’t’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 106.) The Court has carefully
considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 78.1, which is applicable to criminal cases under Local Criminal Rule 1.1.

Aithough the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize motions for
reconsideration, such motions “may be filed pursuant to Local Civil Rules 1.1{a) and 7.1(i).”
United States v. Patel, No. 22-35, 2024 WL 3937479, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2024). Motions for
reconsideration are used sparingly to “correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence[,]” not to relitigate stale matters or raise new arguments. See Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986);

P, Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt, LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp, 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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A motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lazaridis v. Wehmer,
591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). “[A]n abuse of discretion exists where the district court’s
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper
application of law to fact.” Jn re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 118 (Gd Cir.
2004) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). A judgment may be altered or amended only if
the party seeking reconsideration shows “at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court [decided the motion;] or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.” Blystone vy. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation modified).
Defendant asserts that all three grounds warrant reconsideration. The Court addresses each in turn.

First, Defendant contends that the Third Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Evans,
175 F.4th 443, 450 (3d Cir. 2026), constitutes intervening precedent that “the Court did not have
before it” at the time the Court issued its prior decision. (Def.’s Moving Br. 1.) In Evans, the Third
Circuit held that portions of a detective’s trial testimony “should have been deemed outside the
scope of a lay opinion and inadmissible under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 701” where the
detective’s “experiences not associated with the facts of record” formed the bases of the opinions.
Evans, 175 F.4th at 453. Based on this holding, Defendant argues that the Government’s expert
witness, Special Agent Pohar (“Pohar”), impermissibly: (1) inferred that Government investigators
had “no reason to believe that anyone else other than [Defendant] engaged in [the fraudulent]
transactions utilizing [certain] IP addresses” after admitting he is not a specialist in the relevant
field (Def.’s Moving Br. 6-7); (2) testified regarding similarities between the signature samples
Pohar compiled despite admittedly having “no training in handwriting analysis” (id. at 7); and

(3) opined that Defendant wired money between his accounts “ultimately for his benefit or for the

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purchase of personal expenses” (id. (citing Trial Tr. 248:15-18)). These opinions, according to
Defendant, rested not on Pohar’s perception of the relevant facts, but on his “training and
experience,” Ud. at 1.)

As the Government explains, Evans is neither intervening nor analogous here. (See Gov’t’s
Opp’n Br. 3-4.) Evans was decided three months before the Court denied Defendant’s Motion for
a New Trial—it therefore does not constitute a “change in the intervening law.” See Marracco
y. Kuder, No. 08-713, 2009 WL 235469, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2009) (finding no “change in the
intervening law” where the cited case was decided before the decision underlying the motion for
reconsideration). Even if this Court had reason to find otherwise, Evans would still lend
Defendant’s argument no support because in Evans, the testifying detective offered opinions
“regarding drug traffickers’ general practices, which [were] not tied to his perceptions of the
underlying facts of [the] case.” Evans, 175 F.4th at 453 (emphasis added), While the Third Circuit
found that such generalized opinions exceeded the bounds of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, it also
noted that a witness may offer opinions and make logical inferences based on “personal
perception” so long as those opinions and inferences are based on “the witness’s own exposure to
the facts.” Evans, 175 F.4th at 451. That is precisely the standard reflected in this Court’s August
Opinion, where this Court considered that “Pohar testified that he personally reviewed the
evidence” and concluded that Pohar’s testimony was “rationally based upon his review of the
records and his experience conducting fraud investigations and was helpful to the jury in
understanding the evidence.” (Aug. 28, 2026, Mem. Op. 7-8, ECF No. 89.) Defendant has therefore
failed to show that an intervening change in the law warrants reconsideration of the Court’s

previous decision.

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Next, Defendant points to two forms of so-called new evidence: (1) the “Phase One report”
of Defendant’s retained forensic financial analyst, which allegedly identifies “unlabeled and
inconsistently applied date[s]” in the Government’s summary exhibits (Def.’s Moving Br. 1-2);
and (2) the Government’s handwritten trial preparation notes, which Defendant contends were
produced on “the eve of trial” and are now under review by a forensic document examiner (id. at
2, 10). The Government correctly observes that Defendant “did not advance these particular
arguments in his initial Rule 33 motion,” and this Court cannot consider “matters of fact that were
not presented to the Court upon the original motion.” (Gov’t’s Opp’n Br. 5 (quoting United States
v. Guibilo, No. 04-558, 2007 WL 9717677, at *2 (D.N.J. May 16, 2007)); see also Def.’s Moving
Br. for New Trial, ECF No. 78.) For the avoidance of doubt, however, the Court takes the
opportunity to briefly explain why these arguments~—~if Defendant had properly raised them—
would have nevertheless failed.

The Third Circuit has made clear that “new evidence ... does not refer to evidence that a
patty ... submits to the court after an adverse ruling. Rather, new evidence in this context means
evidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously
available.” Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415-16 (citation modified). The Government’s handwritten notes
were made available to Defendant before trial, and Defendant could have—but did not—challenge
their accuracy before the Court during trial. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 6.) As to the reports generated
by Defendant’s newly retained forensic experts, the Court notes that such reports are based on the

Government’s Exhibit 800, Summary Charts (“Summary Charts”)—evidence that, again, was

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made available to Defendant before trial.! Moreover, the mere fact that, after trial, experts prepared
reports that happen to support Defendant’s arguments does not enable this Court to recast those
reports as new evidence. See United States v. Pelullo, No. 01-124, 2009 WL 689680, at *6 (D.N.J.
Mar. 10, 2009) (“Since the evidence relied upon in seeking reconsideration must be ‘newly
discovered,’ a motion for reconsideration may not be premised on legal theories that could have
been adjudicated or evidence which was available but not presented prior to the earlier ruling.”).
Indeed, Defendant could have retained forensic experts to explore alleged defects in the Summary
Charts at any point before now, but he apparently did so only after receiving an adverse ruling
from this Court. See also Massaro v. United States, No. 97-2971, 1998 WL 241625, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1998) (finding that tests conducted by petitioner’s experts post-conviction
did not constitute new evidence under Rule 33 and “[rJather, the only thing that [was] new about
this evidence [was] the team of experts reviewing it” (citation omitted)). Defendant, accordingly,
has not met the applicable standard for showing “new evidence” on a motion for reconsideration,
nor could he.

Finally, Defendant claims that a “structural manifest injustice” is present because
Defendant has proceeded pro se “without the business records, payroll records, preparer
communications, and devices” that were in the vehicle seized by the New Jersey State Police on
March 10, 2024, and which remain unavailable to Defendant. (See Def.*s Moving Br. 2, 15-16.)
Defendant also argues that the pending completion of forensic financial and handwriting

examinations by his retained experts—for which he requests permission to supplement the record

' This Court previously explained that “Defendant had an opportunity to review the Summary
Charts and underlying evidence in advance of trial, the underlying evidence was admitted by
stipulation, and the Summary Charts were admitted without objection.” (Aug. 28, 2026, Mem.
Op. 5.)

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upon completion—is necessary and “not within his control.” Ud, at 2, 17.) The seizure of these
records and devices, Defendant argues, “bears the mark of bad faith” and warrants inquiry into the
circumstances of the seizure and the whereabouts of the documents. (/d. at 16.)

The Court is not convinced. Defendant’s pro se status—which he specifically requested
(see ECF No, 83}—does not inherently lead to the conclusion that Defendant has faced an injustice
that requires this Court to order a new trial, let alone to do so mere weeks before sentencing.
Rather, “[ajs the exhaustive [docket] history in this case demonstrates, this [C]ourt has been
exceedingly lenient with [Defendant]. Nevertheless, the [C]ourt cannot litigate this case for him.”
Bennett v. Shoemaker, No, 22-0354, 2024 WL 3969682, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2024); see also
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution [does not] require judges to
take over chores for a pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a
matter of course.” (second alteration in original)).

Moreover, the Court notes that Defendant attempts to repackage and relitigate the very
discovery-related arguments that this Court has considered and rejected not once, not twice, but
three times in the last month.” (See generally Sep. 10, 2026, Order, ECF No. 97; Sep. 23, 2026,
Mem. Order, ECF No. 103; Sep. 28, 2026, Mem. Order, ECF No. 105.) Even setting aside the fact
that the Government has represented to both Defendant and this Court that the evidence Defendant
seeks is neither in its possession nor control (see ECF No. 96), Defendant’s repeated requests to
supplement or otherwise reopen the record exemplify precisely the tactic that the Third Circuit has
deemed improper in motions for reconsideration. See Boldrini vy. Wilson, 542 F. App’x

152, 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming order denying motion for reconsideration where defendant

* In fact, in this Motion, Defendant expressly references his Motion for Brady/Giglio Review and
Disclosure (ECF No. 87), which was pending at the time Defendant filed this Motion, but the Court
has since denied (ECF No. 105). (See Def.’s Moving Br. 16.)

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“presented many of the same arguments that the District Court had previously rejected” and thus
“properly refused to allow [defendant] to relitigate issues that it had already decided”). The
Court—yet again—trejects Defendant’s attempts to skirt the limits of discovery in criminal matters.

While Defendant was within his right to seek reconsideration of the Court’s decision to
deny him a new trial, persuading the Court to do so required that he meet a heavy burden,
Considering each of Defendant’s arguments separately and taking them together, the conclusion
is clear: Defendant has not met that burden.

The Court, accordingly, denies the requests set forth in Defendant’s Motion.

IT IS, on this [Oth day of October 2026, ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion (ECF No, 99) is DENIED.

MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE