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Case 3:25-cv-17997-RK Document9 Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 24 PagelD: <pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

VITO L.,
Plaintiff,
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge

Civil Action No. 25-17997 (RK)

OPINION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Vito L.’s! (“Vito” or “Plaintiff’) appeal from

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant’’)

final decision, which partially denied Vito’s request for Social Security disability insurance

benefits.” (ECF No. 1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

and reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons

below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

In this appeal, the Court must answer the following question: does substantial evidence

support Administrative Law Judge Kenneth Ayers’s (“the ALJ” or “Judge Ayers”) determination

that Vito was not disabled prior to October 16, 2024?

' The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

? As explained hereinbelow, Defendant concluded that Vito was not disabled as of the disability onset date
he alleged (September 1, 2022) but became disabled as of his fifty-fifth birthday (on October 16, 2024),
i.e., upon becoming a “person of advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
A. 	PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On August 8, 2023, Vito L. (“Vito” or “Plaintiff”) filed an application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of September 1, 2022.
(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 100.)3 At the time of the alleged onset date, Vito was an
“individual closely approaching advanced age.” (Id. at 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563).) The
Social Security Administration (the “Administration”) denied the request both initially, (id. at 121–
25), and on reconsideration, (id. at 127–30). Thereafter, Vito requested a hearing before an ALJ.
(Id. at 136–37.) On December 10, 2024, Vito, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational
expert (“VE”) testified at a hearing before Judge Ayers. (Id. at 35–58.) On January 30, 2025, Judge
Ayers issued a written decision finding that Vito was not disabled prior to October 16, 2024, but
became disabled on that date when he turned fifty-five years old. (Id. at 15–27.) After receiving
notice of the partially unfavorable decision, Vito requested review by the Administration’s Appeals
Council. (Id. at 204–05.) On November 21, 2025, the Appeals Council determined that Vito had
“not provide[d] a basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision” and denied Vito’s request. (Id. at 1.)
This appeal followed. (ECF No. 1.) The Administrative Record was filed on January 24, 2026.
(ECF No. 4.) Vito then filed his moving brief, (“Pl. Br.,” ECF No. 5),4 and the Commissioner filed
an opposition (“Def. Opp.,” ECF No. 7).
B. 	JUDGE AYERS ’S DECISION
On January 30, 2025, Judge Ayers issued a decision finding that Vito was not disabled prior
3 The Administrative Record (“Record” or “AR”) is docketed at ECF Nos. 4-1 through 4-14. This Opinion
will reference only page numbers in the record without the corresponding ECF numbers.
4 The Court construes Plaintiff’s filing, styled as a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,” as Plaintiff’s
moving brief, consistent with this District’s local practices, the Supplemental Rules for Social Security
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the timing of the filing. (See ECF No. 8.) Because Plaintiff’s brief
does not contain internal pagination, the Court uses the page numbers in the CM/ECF header.
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to October 16, 2024, but that he became disabled on that date—the date his age category changed—
and continued to be disabled through the date of the decision.5 (See generally AR at 15–27.) In
reaching his determination that Vito was not disabled from the alleged onset date through October
16, 2024, but was disabled from October 16, 2024 onward, Judge Ayers applied the five-step
process for determining whether an individual is disabled as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).
(Id. at 1–27.)
At Step One, Judge Ayers found that Vito had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since September 1, 2022, his alleged onset date. (Id. at 18 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.).)
At Step Two, Judge Ayers found that Vito suffers from four severe impairments: post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”), an anxiety disorder, a depressive disorder, and a cervical and lumbar
spine disorder. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).)6
At Step Three, Judge Ayers determined that, as of September 1, 2022, Vito did not have
“an impairment or combination of impairments” that qualifies under the Administration’s listed
impairments (the “Listings”), set out in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR at 18
(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).) As relevant here, Judge Ayers considered
whether Vito’s mental impairments, either “singly [or] in combination,” met the criteria of Listings
5 The Administration regulations provide that claimants between the ages of 50 and 54 are “[p]erson[s]
closely approaching advanced age” and that claimants 55 years old and older are “[p]ersons of advanced
age.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d)–(e); see id. § 404.1563(e) (“We consider that at advanced age (age 55 or
older), age significantly affects a person’s ability to adjust to other work.”). Vito turned 55 on October 17,
2024. (See AR at 11, 25.)
6 Judge Ayers also discussed Vito’s non-severe impairments and provided adequate explanation as to why
he found such impairments non-severe. (AR at 18 (citing AR at 1368–74) (finding that Vito’s gastritis with
acute complaints of dysphagia, gastroesophageal reflux disease without esophagitis, hyperlipidemia,
hypertension, unspecified bradycardia, and mild mitral valve regurgitation were non-severe because they
were “only acute or mild” and the record evidence “fail[ed] to document any significant limitations related
to these impairments”).) Judge Ayers further found that Vito’s reported headaches and Crohn’s disease
were not medically determinable impairments because Vito treated his headaches with only over-the-
counter Motrin and his Crohn’s disease was noted to be asymptomatic. (Id. (citing AR at 629, 1280, 1282).)
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12.04, 12.06, and 12.15—respectively, “depressive, bipolar and related disorders,” “anxiety and
obsessive-compulsive disorders,” and “trauma- and stressor-related disorders.”7 (Id. at 19.) To
answer that question, Judge Ayers assessed whether Vito’s mental conditions satisfied the criteria
set forth in “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” of each Listing. (Id.); see Listing § 12.00(A)(2)
(explaining that, in order to satisfy Listing 12.04, 12.06, or 12.15, a claimant must satisfy the
requirements of either paragraph B or C, which respectively relate to the functional limitations
caused by the impairment and the seriousness and persistence of the impairment).
Beginning with paragraph B, Judge Ayers evaluated whether Vito’s impairments resulted
in “at least one extreme or two marked limitations” in the following areas of functioning: (1)
understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information; 	(2) 	interacting 	with 	others; 	(3)
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) or adapting or managing oneself. (AR at
19–20.) A marked limitation means a serious limitation in a functioning category, and an extreme
limitation is an inability to function in such category. (Id.) Judge Ayers first found Vito had a mild
limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information. (Id. at 19.) He cited Vito’s
Function Report, in which Vito did not report any limitations with understanding. (Id. (citing AR
at 274–91).) Judge Ayers further noted that, although Vito “did report issues with his memory and
with following instructions,” his psychotherapist stated in treatment notes that Vito’s memory
“was only slightly impaired” and Vito “needed reminders at times and sometimes had difficulty
remembering instructions.” (Id. (citing AR at 274–91, 1154–85).) Regarding interacting with
7 The Court notes that at Step Three, Judge Ayers also discussed Vito’s spinal impairment and considered,
but found inapplicable, Listings 1.15 and 1.16. (AR at 18–19.) The ALJ found no evidence of nerve root
compromise or spinal stenosis with the requisite neurological signs established by imaging, nor any
evidence that Vito medically requires an assistive device involving the use of both hands or is unable to use
his upper extremities for fine and gross movements. (Id. at 19.) Judge Ayers adequately discussed his
determination regarding Listings 1.15 and 1.16, and Vito does not challenge this aspect of Judge Ayers’s
opinion, so the Court focuses its review on how Judge Ayers evaluated Vito’s mental impairments. See
Torres v. Kijakazi, No. 21-18424, 2023 WL 6890851, at *2 n.3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023) (collecting cases).
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others, the ALJ found Vito had a moderate limitation. (Id. at 19.) The ALJ noted, inter alia, that
Vito reported difficulty getting along with others, (id. (citing AR at 274–91)), and his therapist
similarly reported that Vito had “difficulty extending himself socially,” (id. (citing AR at 1154–
85)). Regarding concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the ALJ found Vito had a moderate
limitation. (Id. at 19.) Despite reports of not sleeping well, which impacted Vito’s ability focus,
the record showed Vito was able to shop for groceries, care for himself, remember his medications,
drive when necessary, and manage his checkbook and savings account. (Id. at 19–20 (citing AR at
274–91, 1376).) Lastly, the ALJ found that Vito experienced a moderate limitation in his ability
to adapt or manage himself. (Id. at 20.) Judge Ayers noted that Vito stated that he does not cook
for himself and that “his activities of daily living are limited,” but also reported that he “has no
difficulty with performing personal care,” “keep[s] up with general dusting and laundry,” “can
driv[e] when necessary,” and “is able to pay bills, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook.”
(Id. (citing AR at 274–91).)
Because Vito did not have at least one extreme or two marked limitations, Judge Ayers
found the “paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied. (Id.) Judge Ayers also found that the
“paragraph C” criteria were not satisfied because the record did not show that Vito’s depression
resulted in repeated episodes of decompensation or marginal adjustment, nor that his anxiety
resulted in a complete inability to function independently outside the home, nor that his PTSD had
been “serious and persistent despite treatment.” (Id.)
As a precursor to Step Four, Judge Ayers concluded, based on a review of the evidence in
the record, that Vito has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light” work, see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), but that any job he performs has to be limited in specified ways:
[S]ince September 1, 2022, the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
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except can occasionally reach overhead, bilaterally; can frequently
climb ramps and stairs, occasionally climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds, occasionally stoop; can occasionally work at unprotected
heights and around hazardous, moving mechanical parts; and can
carry out simple instructions, never interact with the public, and
tolerate no more than occasional changes in routine work setting.
(AR at 20.) As part of this determination, Judge Ayers considered Vito’s subjective statements,
the objective medical evidence and other medical evidence, and the medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings (“PAMFs”) in the record. (Id. at 20–25.)
Judge Ayers began his RFC analysis by reviewing Vito’s subjective testimony and function
reports. (Id. at 20–22 (citing AR at 238–48, 274–91).) Vito “allege[d] disability due to severe
anxiety and depression, a panic disorder, PTSD, Bruxism, and lumbar degenerative disc disease
with radiculopathy.”8 (Id. at 21 (citing AR at 238–48).) In his function reports, Vito reported that
he finds it difficult to be around people, gets angry very quickly, experiences road rage while
driving, sleeps poorly due to nightmares, and is always tired and unable to focus. (Id. (citing AR
at 274–91).) He reported spending most of his day lying around the house, leaving only for doctor’s
appointments and grocery shopping, and planning his driving routes to avoid traffic and people.
(Id.) Vito also reported that he had sold his classic cars and lost interest in car shows and other
activities, and that he has no tolerance for his siblings because they do not help him care for their
mother. (Id.) He nonetheless reported no difficulty with personal care, no need for reminders to
groom or take his medication, the ability to do general dusting and laundry (with help from his
girlfriend “when she comes over”), and the ability to pay bills, count change, and handle a checking
and savings account. (Id.) Vito’s girlfriend completed a third-party function report describing
8 The Court notes that Judge Ayers reviewed the evidence regarding Vito’s physical impairments when
determining Vito’s RFC. Because Vito only challenges Judge Ayers’s treatment of his mental impairments,
particularly as it relates to his therapist’s opinion, the Court does not here elaborate on Vito’s physical
impairments. See Torres, 2023 WL 6890851, at *2 n.3.
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similar limitations; she reported, among other things, that she sees Vito “walking around and
confused,” prepares his food on the days she sees him, and usually drives him places due to his
road rage. (Id. at 21–22 (citing AR at 266–73).)
At the hearing, Vito testified that he has a significant history of mental impairments and
has undergone therapy and psychiatric treatment, including years of medication, but that he is
“medication resistant.” (Id. at 22.) He testified that he had recently tried a new form of treatment
using magnetic fields to stimulate nerve cells in the brain, but showed no improvement after more
than 30 sessions, and that his doctor had discussed electric shock therapy with him. (Id.) Vito
testified that he stopped working at his last job because his medication made him drowsy and
unable to concentrate. (Id.) He explained that his depression and anxiety began in 2017, when his
father was in hospice, and progressively worsened, and that his father’s deterioration gave him
nightmares. (Id.) Vito testified that he spends his days lying on the couch, does not go out or talk
to many people, and often receives assistance from others for household chores and cooking. (Id.)
He described trips to Washington, D.C., and Mexico during which he did not leave the house or
hotel room. (Id.) As to his physical impairments, Vito testified that he suffers from degenerative
disc disease in his cervical spine; has had no surgery or injections; takes only Motrin for pain;
experiences migraine headaches from his pain but takes no medication for them; can lift only about
10 pounds; and has trouble sitting in one place. (Id.)
Judge 	Ayers 	determined 	that 	Vito’s 	“medically 	determinable 	impairments 	could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms” but that Vito’s statements “concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully supported” by the record
evidence (Id.) Judge Ayers explained that, although the record reflected severe physical and
psychological impairments, those impairments “only limit [Vito] to the compromise range of light
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exertional work” reflected in the RFC. (Id.) Judge Ayers then reviewed the medical evidence in
the record in detail to explain his conclusion, starting with records from Garden State Heart Care
dating back to 2022. (Id. at 22.) Those records, Judge Ayers explained, documented Vito’s history
of anxiety, PTSD, and depression with associated chest pain and shortness of breath, as well as
traumatic stress arising from his role as caretaker for his father, who had mesothelioma. (Id. (citing
AR at 463).) Vito was maintained on various psychotropic medications and generally denied side
effects, although he reported in October 2022 feeling dizzy at night due to his medication. (Id. at
23 (citing AR at 359, 366, 368, 372, 376).) At that October 2022 visit, Vito was calm and
cooperative and reported being nervous about his mother’s ankle injury and rehabilitation stay, but
also reported that when his mother is away, “he felt like he could breathe.” (Id. (citing AR at 359).)
In December 2022, after returning from Mexico, Vito’s testing results and EKG were normal, and
he was offered but declined a Xanax prescription. (Id. (citing AR at 435–37).) A repeat EKG in
January 2023 was also normal. (Id. (citing AR at 425).)
Vito’s psychotherapy notes throughout 2023 documented that he was upset over his
father’s death and his siblings’ lack of help with his mother, that he continued to have nightmares,
and that his therapist encouraged him to get out and socialize. (Id. (citing AR at 331–489).) In
January 2023, for example, Vito rated his depression at 5/10 but reported worsening anxiety and
anger, although he nonetheless presented with a full affect, no memory or concentration issues,
and fair insight and judgment. (Id. (citing AR at 352–53).) The same complaints and findings were
recorded from February through April 2023. (Id. (citing AR at 343–47).) From late May through
July 2023, Vito reported daily depression and ongoing nightmares, but his thought process
remained linear and goal directed, his memory and concentration were intact, and his insight and
judgment were fair. (Id. (citing AR at 337–41).) Records from Central Jersey Family Medical in
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August 2023 noted that he regularly followed up with psychology and psychiatry, and his
December 2023 therapy records reflected the same complaints alongside largely normal mental
status findings and medication compliance without side effects. (Id. (citing AR at 701, 929-30,
1188-90).)
In January 2024, Vito’s therapist, Mr. Anthony Georges (“Mr. Georges”), wrote a letter on
Vito’s behalf stating that Vito had diagnoses of anxiety, PTSD, and depression; attended weekly
psychotherapy sessions since February 2019; “respond[ed] well to therapeutic interventions and
supportive counseling” and was “maintained on various psychotropic medications”; “ha[d] trouble
extending himself socially at times”; and had “slightly impaired” memory. (Id. (citing AR at 1156–
57).) Throughout 2024, Vito continued psychotherapy and “struggle[d] with witnessing his
mother’s deteriorating state.” (Id.) Judge Ayers noted that, in August 2024, Vito “reported feeling
overwhelmed with anxiety” but also reported plans to travel to Holland in September 2024 “to
take a break from home and take care of himself and remain socially active.” (Id. at 23–24 (citing
AR at 1378).) In October 2024, while his mother was hospitalized, Vito reported ongoing
nightmares and depression but presented as calm and cooperative with a linear and goal-directed
thought process, intact memory and concentration, and fair insight and judgment. (Id. at 24 (citing
AR at 1422–23).) Vito also reported that he was taking his medication at that time and denied any
side effects. (Id.) Judge Ayers noted that, from late June 2024 through late October 2024, Vito
underwent 28 treatments at the TMS Center of New Jersey (i.e., the treatment using magnetic
fields about which Vito testified during the hearing) without any reported change in his symptoms.
(Id. (citing AR at 1425–45); see id. at 40.) Vito’s TMS Center technician told him it was “normal
this early in the process” to not experience improvement. (Id. at 24.)
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Judge Ayers next analyzed the medical opinions and PAMFs in the record and explained
the persuasiveness of each. (Id. at 24–25.) For example, Judge Ayers found unpersuasive the
PAMFs completed by state agency consultants at the initial and reconsideration levels. (Id. at 25
(citing AR at 100–07, 109–14).) He explained that, although the state agency consultants found
that Vito had only non-severe physical and psychological impairments, the “entire record of
evidence,” including Vito’s hearing testimony and medical records submitted after the PAMFs
were completed, were “consistent with a finding that [Vito] has severe physical and psychological
impairments which do limit him to a compromised range of light exertional work.” (Id.) As
relevant here, Judge Ayers also considered the opinion of Vito’s therapist, Mr. Georges, which he
found unpersuasive for the reasons explained hereinbelow. (Id. (citing AR at 564–71)); see infra
Section III.A.
At Step Four, based on his assessment of the record and RFC determination, Judge Ayers
concluded that Vito was unable to perform his past relevant work as an electrician apprentice—a
skilled job that is generally performed as medium exertional work and that Vito performed at the
heavy exertional level. (AR at 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).) Judge Ayers further found that
Vito was “an individual closely approaching advanced age” prior to October 16, 2024, when his
age category changed to “an individual of advanced age.” (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563,
404.1564)); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) (explaining that a claimant’s age is considered “in
combination with [his] residual functional capacity, education, and work experience” as part of the
disability determination process). Judge Ayers concluded that, although “transferability of job
skills [was] not material to the determination of disability” prior to October 16, 2024, beginning
on that date Vito “has not been able to transfer job skills to other occupations.” (AR at 26 (citing
SSR 82-41, 1982 WL 31389 (Jan. 1, 1982); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2)); see 20
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C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4) (providing that, if a claimant is 55 years old or older and limited to light
or sedentary work, the ALJ “will find that [the claimant] cannot make an adjustment to other work”
unless the claimant has “transferable skills” as set out in the relevant Administration regulations).
Finally, at Step Five, Judge Ayers determined Vito’s disability status both before and after
October 16, 2024, when Vito turned 55 years old. (AR at 26–27.) For the period prior to that date,
accounting for Vito’s RFC, age, education,9 and work experience, in conjunction with the VE’s
testimony, Judge Ayers concluded that Vito could perform other jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 26 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a).) Beginning
on October 16, 2024, however, Judge Ayers found that Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06 directed
a finding of “disabled” based on Vito’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. (Id. at 27 (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 404.1566).) Thus, Judge Ayers concluded that Vito was not disabled
prior to October 16, 2024, but became disabled on that date and continued to be disabled through
the date of the decision and beyond. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).)
This appeal concerns Judge Ayers’s determination that Vito was not disabled from
September 1, 2022 through October 15, 2024. Vito argues that Judge Ayers incorrectly evaluated
the opinion of Vito’s therapist, Mr. Anthony Georges, and failed to adequately develop the
administrative record. (See Pl. Br. at 9–11.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	S TANDARD OF REVIEW
The 	Court 	reviews 	the 	Commissioner’s 	final 	decision 	to 	determine 	whether 	the
Commissioner’s findings are “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the
Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, “the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s
9 The highest level of education Vito completed was high school. (AR at 25, 240.)
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final decision.” Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is “more
than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Zirnsak v.
Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552
(3d Cir. 2005)). Put differently, “[i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 633 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)). This evidentiary
threshold “is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019).
The scope of the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “quite limited.” Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 552. On review, the Court may not “re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own factual
determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual
inquiry differently.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001). The court must
“review the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports a factual
finding.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 610 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431
(3d Cir. 1999)). “Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the
wrong reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected
is required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were
improper.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706–07 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
B. 	E STABLISHING E LIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY I NSURANCE B ENEFITS
A claimant may establish disability under the Social Security Act by proving that he is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
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be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The ALJ applies a well-established “five-step sequential evaluation process,” which requires
considering whether the claimant:
(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea 	v. 	Comm’r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	370 	F.3d 	357, 	360 	(3d 	Cir. 	2004) 	(citing 	20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)–(f)). The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps, at which point it shifts
to the Commissioner at Step Five. Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019)
(citing Smith, 631 F.3d at 634).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Vito appeals Judge Ayers’s determination that he was not disabled from his alleged onset
date of September 1, 2022 until October 16, 2024. (See ECF No. 1.) He raises two issues on appeal:
first, that Judge Ayers erred by failing to afford “controlling weight” to the opinion of Vito’s
treating therapist under the so-called “treating physician rule,” (Pl. Br. at 9–10), and second, that
Judge Ayers failed to develop the record regarding Vito’s non-exertional limitations, (id. at 10–
11). The Commissioner responds that the treating physician rule does not apply to Vito’s claim,
that Vito’s therapist would not qualify as a treating source even if it did, and that the record—
which Vito’s counsel represented was complete—was fully developed. (Def. Br. at 6–11.) Because
“all other issues have been [forfeited],” the Court restricts its review to these arguments. Torres v.
Kijakazi, No. 21-18424, 2023 WL 6890851, at *2 n.3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023) (collecting cases).
For the reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ.
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A. 	MR. G EORGES ’ O PINION
Vito first argues that Judge Ayers erred in discounting the opinion of his long-time
therapist, Anthony Georges, LCSW (“Mr. Georges”), who opined that Vito had “marked and
extreme limitations in the ability to follow simple instructions, make simple work related
decisions, sustain an ordinary work routine without special supervision, maintain attention for two
hour segments,” and other areas of mental functioning, and that Vito’s psychological conditions
“met the A, B and C criteria” of the relevant Listings. (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 564–71).)
Invoking the so-called “treating physician rule,” Vito contends that the therapist’s treatment notes
are “extensive,” that Judge Ayers “failed to identify any records that are inconsistent with the
therapist’s opinion, most likely since there are none,” and that Judge Ayers should have given
“controlling weight” to Mr. Georges’ opinion. (Id. at 9–10.)
Vito’s argument fails at the threshold because it rests on a regulatory framework that does
not govern his claim. The Third Circuit once applied the “treating physician rule” in Social
Security appeals. “The rules for weighing physician opinions, however, were radically revised by
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, which not only gives no preferential treatment to the opinions of treating
physicians, but also states that no specific evidentiary weight is given to opinions from any
physician.” R.D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-3591, 2025 WL 2047241, at *1 (D.N.J. July 22,
2025). By its own terms, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527—the regulation that codified the treating physician
rule, and on which Vito relies—applies only to “claims filed . . . before March 27, 2017”; for
“claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the rules in § 404.1520c apply.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
It is undisputed that Vito protectively filed his application on August 8, 2023. (AR at 27.)
Accordingly, the treating physician rule does not govern Vito’s claim. Under the appropriate
regulation, § 404.1520c, the Commissioner “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,
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including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . . . , including those from [the claimant’s]
medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Judge Ayers correctly applied that standard.10 (See
AR at 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c); id. at 24.)11
Even construing Vito as presenting a challenge under the governing regulations, the Court
finds that Judge Ayers adequately considered Mr. Georges’ opinion. Mr. Georges, a licensed
clinical social worker, is a “medical source,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(d), and a statement from a
medical source about what a claimant can still do despite his impairments is a “medical opinion”
that the ALJ must consider, id. § 404.1513(a)(2); see id. § 404.1520c(a)–(b). The relevant question
10 Even if the treating physician rule were to apply, Vito’s argument would still fail. Under those regulations,
only an “acceptable medical source” could qualify as a “treating source” whose opinion was eligible for
controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (defining “treating source” as “your own acceptable
medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with medical treatment or evaluation and who has,
or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you”). Mr. Georges, a licensed clinical social worker
and psychotherapist, (AR at 1157), does not meet the definition of an “acceptable medical source” under
the prior regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (listing acceptable medical sources); Trump v. Colvin,
No. 14-920, 2015 WL 3842427, at *6 n.23 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2015) (“A licensed clinical social worker is
not 	an 	‘acceptable 	medical 	source’ 	under 	[then-applicable] 	regulations 	of 	the 	Social 	Security
Administration.”); Oliva v. Astrue, No. 10-2616, 2011 WL 3862216, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011)
(explaining that psychotherapists were not considered “acceptable medical sources” but rather were “other
sources” under prior regulations). The treating physician rule would thus not apply to Mr. Georges’ opinion,
and it would not have been entitled to controlling weight under any version of the regulations.
11 For similar reasons, Vito’s argument that Judge Ayers was required to “rely on two other opinions that
Plaintiff was not disabled” in order to “reject[] the therapist’s opinion” is without merit. (Pl. Br. at 10.) In
support of that proposition, Vito relies on Burns v. Colvin, 156 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588–89 (M.D. Pa. 2016)—
a Middle District of Pennsylvania case that applied the outdated treating physician rule and collected cases
that did the same. Indeed, Vito specifically states that, “under the treating physician rule, ‘the Third Circuit
has only affirmed an ALJ who rejects a treating source medical opinion when there are two or more medical
opinions that the claimant is not disabled.’” (Pl. Br. at 9–10 (emphasis added) (quoting Burns, 156 F. Supp.
3d at 588–89).) Even under the treating physician rule and in the cases Burns cited, the Third Circuit set
forth no such prescription. See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1991); Plummer v. Apfel,
186 F.3d 422, 430–31 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
Chung v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-1974, 2025 WL 1065241, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (“[Plaintiff’s]
contrary authority concerns the quantum of evidence necessary to overcome a treating doctor’s opinion
under the pre-2017 ‘treating source’ rule.”). Burns is also inapposite: it concerned an ALJ who “reject[ed]
all of the medical opinions in favor of [the ALJ’s own] lay interpretation.” Burns, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 589.
Judge Ayers, by contrast, did not engage in impermissible lay evaluation of the medical evidence; he
properly applied the § 1520c factors to determine the relative persuasiveness of the medical opinions in the
record, as ALJs are required to do, and formulated an appropriate RFC based on the record evidence.
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under § 404.1520c is not whether Judge Ayers should have given Mr. Georges’ opinion
“controlling weight,” (Pl. Br. at 9), but whether Judge Ayers adequately evaluated the opinion’s
persuasiveness. The Court finds he did.
Under § 404.1520c, the ALJ assesses the persuasiveness of each medical opinion in light
of several factors, the “most important” of which are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2); see also Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir.
2024). Supportability concerns how well the objective medical evidence and explanations
presented by the medical source support the opinion; consistency concerns how well the opinion
accords with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2). The ALJ must “discuss the supportability and consistency factors when
articulating [his] consideration of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings in
[his] opinion.” Timothy M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-4592, 2024 WL 4882704, at *4 (D.N.J.
Nov. 25, 2024) (cleaned up) (citing Lee Ann M. v. O’Malley, No. 22-1104, 2024 WL 4184486 at
*7 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2024)).
The RFC determination is the sole province of the ALJ, and that role cannot be assumed
by any of the medical practitioners who evaluate a claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c),
404.1520c; see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361 (“The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians
or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.”). The
ALJ may elect to accept or reject a particular medical opinion as long as that decision is supported
by proper reasons and an adequate explanation. Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704–05; Sutherland v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 785 F. App’x 921, 928 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Morales, 225 F.3d at 317); see also
Nazario v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]lthough the
government may properly accept some parts of the medical evidence and reject other parts, the
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government must provide some explanation for a rejection of probative evidence which would
suggest a contrary disposition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The ALJ need not “use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis,” so long as there is
“sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.”
Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). The Court “examine[s] the ALJ’s conclusions
as to a claimant’s RFC with ‘the deference required of the substantial evidence standard of
review.’” Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 547 F. App’x 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Burns v.
Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002)). That is, as long as the ALJ’s decision supported by
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]
conclusion,” it will be upheld. Smith, 631 F.3d at 633. Substantial evidence does not require highly
detailed explanations; “[t]o the contrary, a reviewing court must ‘uphold’ even ‘a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593
U.S. 357, 369 (2021).
Judge Ayers’s evaluation of Mr. Georges’ opinion satisfies these standards. Judge Ayers
found the opinion unpersuasive for two reasons: first, “there are insufficient notes to document
such overly broad and restrictive limitations in mental functioning”; and second, the “extreme and
marked limitations are not consistent with the treatment records and the evidence in its entirety.”
(AR at 25.) The first reason speaks to supportability; the second, to consistency. Judge Ayers’s
discussion of the opinion is concise, but “the ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive
explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would
probably suffice.” Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482. Judge Ayers’s decision, “read as a whole,” supplies
ample record support for both conclusions. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; see also Diaz v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 577 F. 3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that an ALJ “need not employ particular
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‘magic’ words” or “adhere to a particular format” and need only provide a sufficient discussion of
the evidence and explanation of reasoning to enable “meaningful judicial review”).
Vito first argues that Mr. Georges’ treatment notes are “extensive” and document his
“chronic nightmares, difficulty sleeping, chronic anxiety, repeated panic attacks and difficulty
swallowing due to his attacks.” (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 544–56, 572–610).)12 To the extent this
is an argument addressed to the supportability of Mr. Georges’ opinion, it is unavailing. For
starters, Judge Ayers considered those reported symptoms throughout his decision, (AR at 20–24),
and he considered Mr. Georges’ own opinions that Vito “respond[ed] well to therapeutic
interventions and supportive counseling,” was “maintained on various psychotropic medications,”
had “trouble extending himself socially at times,” and that Vito’s memory was only “slightly
impaired,” (id. at 23 (citing AR at 1156–57); see also id. at 19). Judge Ayers reasonably concluded
that such evidence did not support Mr. Georges’ opinion that Vito was markedly or extremely
limited in every area of mental functioning, including his ability to follow simple instructions. See
Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. As shown above, Judge Ayers’s RFC determination is supported by
medical findings in the record, which document less severe limitations on Vito’s mental
functioning than those stated in Mr. Georges’ opinion. When read as a whole, Judge Ayers’s entire
opinion enables this Court to discern his reasoning and reflects that substantial evidence supports
his RFC determination.
12 The Court notes that, in support of his argument about the contents of Mr. Georges’ treatment records,
Vito cites medical records from unrelated medical appointments with other practitioners, (AR at 544–56),
followed by the entirety of Mr. Georges’ treatment notes, (id. at 572–610). Vito does not point the Court to
anything specific within the latter, which is about forty pages of treatment notes spanning two-and-a-half
years. Nor does he counter Judge Ayers’s finding that “there are insufficient notes to document such overly
broad and restrictive limitations in mental functioning,” (id. at 25), by simply citing treatment records that
purportedly support the existence of certain symptoms, without any argumentation regarding the extent of
limitations allegedly caused by those symptoms.
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Moreover, contrary to Vito’s assertion that Judge Ayers “failed to identify any records that
are inconsistent with the therapist’s opinion,” (Pl. Br. at 10), Judge Ayers’s decision catalogs
numerous treatment records that are inconsistent with the marked and extreme limitations Mr.
Georges assessed, as detailed supra. During an October 2022 appointment, for example, Vito was
noted to be calm and cooperative and reported that, when his ill mother was away, “he felt like he
could breathe.” (AR at 23 (citing AR at 359).) Throughout 2022, Vito was “maintained on various
psychotropic medications” and “denied any side effects.” (AR at 22–23 (citing AR at 359, 366,
368, 372, 376).) In January 2023, Vito rated his depression as a five out of ten, his affect was full,
“he had no issues with his memory or concentration,” and his insight and judgment were fair—
findings that were repeated in February, March, and April 2023. (AR at 23 (citing AR at 343–47,
352–53).) In May through July 2023, although Vito reported continuing nightmares and daily
depression, his thought process was linear and goal directed, his memory and concentration were
intact, and his insight and judgment were fair. (Id. (citing AR at 337–41).) In December 2023, Vito
presented as calm and cooperative, reported that he was taking his medications without side
effects, and again demonstrated linear and goal-directed thinking, no issues with memory or
concentration, and fair insight and judgment. (Id. (citing AR at 929–30, 1188–90).) The same
findings were recorded in October 2024. (Id. at 24 (citing AR at 1422–23).) The record also reflects
that Vito traveled to Mexico in late 2022 and reported plans to travel to Holland in September
2024 to “take a break from home and take care of himself and remain socially active.” (Id. at 23–
24 (citing AR at 435–37, 1378).) Although Vito testified that he largely stayed indoors during his
travels, (id. at 22), it was for Judge Ayers, not this Court, to weigh that testimony against the
remainder of the record. See Garland, 593 U.S. at 368. These are precisely the “treatment records”
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that Judge Ayers found inconsistent with Mr. Georges’ opinion, (AR at 25), and the Court can
readily trace his reasoning. See Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704–05.13
Vito contends that the records of his psychiatrist, Dr. Arkady Ganelin, MD, are “completely
consistent with the notes of [Mr. Georges].” (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 337–406, 929–86).)
However, consistency among treatment notes that document Vito’s reported symptoms is not the
same as consistency with the functional limitations set forth in Mr. Georges’ opinion. See supra
note 12. Vito cites only broad page ranges—seemingly the entirety of Dr. Ganelin’s medical
records—and does not identify any clinical finding that Judge Ayers overlooked or that is
inconsistent with the mental status findings Judge Ayers discussed. At bottom, Vito asks the Court
to re-weigh the evidence, which it may not do. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359.
In sum, an ALJ’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence and must include
enough explanation that a reviewing court can trace the ALJ’s reasoning. See Martin, 547 F. App’x
at 160; Garland, 593 U.S. at 368; Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482. Nothing in § 404.1520c or in Third
Circuit precedent requires an ALJ to give any opinion “controlling weight,” to identify a contrary
medical opinion before discounting one, or to find at least one medical opinion persuasive, so long
13 Furthermore, Judge Ayers did not discount Vito’s mental impairments wholesale. In fact, he found
unpersuasive the PAMFs in which state agency consultants opined that Vito’s psychological impairments
were non-severe, explaining that additional evidence submitted after the stage agency’s review, together
with Vito’s hearing testimony, established that Vito had severe impairments. (AR at 25.) Judge Ayers
further found that Vito had moderate limitations in three of the four “paragraph B” areas of mental
functioning, (id. at 19–20), and incorporated corresponding mental limitations into the RFC, restricting Vito
to carrying out simple instructions, never interacting with the public, and tolerating no more than occasional
changes in a routine work setting, (id. at 20). Judge Ayers charted a middle course—rejecting both the
PAMFs and Mr. Georges’ extreme limitations—which reflects exactly the weighing of evidence that the
regulations contemplate. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361; see also Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6,
11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an
ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”). Moreover, to the extent Mr. Georges opined that Vito’s
conditions satisfied the Listings criteria, Judge Ayers separately explained his conclusions to the contrary
with citations to the record, (AR at 19–20), and Vito does not challenge the ALJ’s Step Three findings.
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as the ALJ adequately explains his reasons. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361–62; R.D., 2025 WL
2047241, at *1; supra note 11. Judge Ayers properly explained why he found both the PAMFs and
Mr. Georges’ opinion unpersuasive, and his reasons are supported by substantial evidence.
B. 	DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECORD
Finally, Vito contends that by rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating therapist “without
the benefit of any alternative opinion,” Judge Ayers “failed to perform his duty to adequately
develop the record [and] seek more evidence regarding Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations.” (Pl.
Br. at 11.) The Court disagrees.
“ALJs have a duty to develop a full and fair record in social security cases.” Ventura v.
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995). However, the burden of proving disability, and of
furnishing the medical evidence necessary to do so, rests with the claimant. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Moreover, “if there are no ‘obvious gaps’ in the
administrative record, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information in advance of
rejecting a benefits claim.” Pearson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-1137, 2020 WL 1248199, at
*11 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4517857, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug.
23, 2013)), aff’d, 839 F. App’x 684 (3d Cir. 2020). Likewise, “[a]n ALJ . . . is not required to hunt
in vain for medical records that a claimant’s attorney represents do not exist.” Fox v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 19-4879, 2020 WL 1888251, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2020) (collecting cases).
The record in this case is comprehensive, including “regarding [Vito’s] psychological
impairments.” (Pl. Br. at 11.) Judge Ayers had before him well over one thousand pages of medical
evidence, including years of psychotherapy and psychiatric treatment records, (see Pl. Br. at 6
(collecting citations to AR at 337–406, 572–610, 929–86, 1156–85, 1187–1246, 1376–88, 1399–
1424)), along with Mr. Georges’ at-issue opinion, the state agency PAMFs, function reports from
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Vito and his girlfriend, and Vito’s hearing testimony, (AR at 21–25). Vito, who has been
represented by counsel since before his initial application for disability benefits, made no
objections to the evidence in the record, made no requests for further development, and affirmed
that the record before the ALJ was complete. (Id. at 38–39, 119, 330.)14
Vito suggests that Judge Ayers created a gap in the record when he discounted Mr.
Georges’ opinion. (See Pl. Br. at 11.) This “misapplies” the concept of an “evidentiary gap.”
Yolanda R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3177, 2024 WL 4025988, at *6 n.8 (D.N.J. Sept. 3,
2024) (citing Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)); see id. (“The evidentiary record
in the instant case includes extensive medical treatment records and objective medical evidence
such that any claims of evidentiary gaps are not persuasive.”); Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 (finding “clear
gaps” that ALJ should have “attempt[ed] to fill” where, inter alia, the record contained “sparse
notes” reflecting nine visits with treating physician, despite claimant’s testimony suggesting
monthly treatment over many years, and where record evidence identified “a number of other
physicians” whose records were not provided to the ALJ).
14 Vito has been represented by counsel since June of 2023, even before his initial application for disability
insurance benefits in August of 2023. (AR at 115–19, 208–09.) During the administrative hearing, when
Judge Ayers asked whether any additional evidence was outstanding, Vito, through counsel, indicated an
intent to submit certain recent medical records, and he was granted an additional week to do so. (Id. at 38–
39.) Those records were timely submitted, and counsel affirmed that the record was thereafter complete.
(Id. at 330, 1446–1923; see also id. at 24 (Judge Ayers citing and discussing portions of the later-submitted
records in his decision).) “When an applicant for social security benefits is represented by counsel, the ALJ
‘is entitled to assume that he is making his strongest case for benefits.’” Keveanos v. Berryhill, No. 18-
3421, 2019 WL 1500624, at *8 n.9 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2019). Further, as the Commissioner points out,
“Plaintiff, with the assistance of counsel, could have asked the ALJ to further develop the record with a
consultative examination, but he did not.” (Def. Br. at 7; see Pl. Br. at 11.) “[T]he ALJ retains the discretion,
but not the duty, to order a consultative examination.” Byers v. Saul, No. 19-12247, 2021 WL 870819, at
*6 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2021) (collecting cases); see Thompson v. Halter, 45 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
Where, as here, the record is “sufficient for the ALJ to make a proper [disability] determination,” the ALJ
“act[s] within his discretion” by declining to order a consultative examination. Haganey v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 17-7944, 2019 WL 192901, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2019).
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Vito’s position that Judge Ayers needed an “alternative opinion” after discounting Mr.
Georges’ is similarly mistaken. There is no requirement that the record contain a medical opinion
that matches the ALJ’s RFC, and “the ALJ is not precluded from reaching RFC determinations
without outside medical expert review of each fact incorporated into the decision.” Chandler, 667
F.3d at 362; see Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no legal
requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
determining an RFC.”); Mays v. Barnhart, 78 F. App’x 808, 813 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
claimant’s argument that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because
the record contained no expert opinion indicating the claimant could perform light work and
reasoning that the ALJ is responsible for determining the RFC and is not required to seek a separate
expert medical opinion); Jennifer R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 25-14242, 2026 WL 1906758, at
*13 & n.13 (D.N.J. July 2, 2026).
Because Judge Ayers had before him an adequately developed record, reviewed well over
one thousand pages of treatment records and other evidence, provided sufficient reasoning for
finding the at-issue medical opinion unpersuasive, and supported his findings, including his RFC
determination, with substantial evidence, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record as a whole, the decision of the Commissioner is

AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

ROBERT KARSCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE>

Dated: October 15, 2026

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