NUNEZ v. SOUTH AMBOY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:26-cv-05456-GC-JBD Document 33 _ Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 15 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

G.N. on behalf of L.N.,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 26-05456 (GC) (JBD)

V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SOUTH AMBOY CITY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff G.N.’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction.| (ECF No. 21.) Defendant South Amboy City Board of Education (the
Board) opposed, (ECF No. 23), and Plaintiff replied, (ECF No. 24). In response to Orders from
the Court, (ECF Nos. 25, 30), the parties also submitted supplemental briefing addressing why the
stay-put provision under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) should apply rather than 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(2)(C)G)(), (ECF Nos. 27, 28), and whether the Court needs to hold an evidentiary
hearing to resolve any factual disputes regarding a July 14, 2026 Individualized Education
Program (IEP) meeting, (ECF Nos. 31, 32). The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’

submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

I While Plaintiff styles the Motion as an “Application for an Order to Show Cause,” the

Court construes it as a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction as Plaintiff seeks an order directing the
Board “to maintain L.N.’s placement [at Rock Brook] during the pendency of this appeal and to
refrain from changing her placement from Rock Brook to an in-district program without Plaintiffs
informed written consent.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 16.)

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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Procedure (Rule) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and
other good cause shown, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND?

This case arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400, ef seg., and specifically under its “stay-put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(). The dispute
centers on where L.N., a disabled minor, should attend school while her mother, G.N.,? challenges
a proposed change in her educational placement. The parties are before this Court on an
interlocutory appeal from the March 27, 2026 placement decision by the New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law.*

The Board is a local educational agency (LEA) that operates the South Amboy School
District (the District) within Middlesex County, New Jersey, and receives federal funds in
connection with its obligations to educate students with disabilities pursuant to the IDEA. L.N. is

a seventeen-year-old with a pervasive development disorder, seizure disorder, and autism spectrum

2 The Court draws upon Plaintiff's Complaint as well as the parties’ briefs and attached
exhibits for these facts. Courts have consistently held that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply at the preliminary injunction stage. Accordingly, a court may rely on hearsay evidence that
would not be admissible at trial. R.B. ex rel. Parent v. Mastery Charter Sch., 762 F. Supp. 2d 745,
747 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd sub nom. R.B. v. Mastery Charter Sch., 532 F. App’x 136 (3d Cir.
2013). The Court agrees with other courts that have adopted the same general standards governing
preliminary injunctions in the stay-put context. See id.

3 G.N. is bringing this appeal on L.N.’s behalf.

4 This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415@)(3)(A). Additionally, courts in the Third Circuit “accept jurisdiction of stay put disputes,
and the Court of Appeals has expressed no concern about the jurisdictional basis.” R.S. v.
Somerville Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 10-4215, 2011 WL 32521, at *7 (D.N-J. Jan. 5, 2011).

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disorder whose family moved to South Amboy and enrolled in the District in spring 2025. (ECF
No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 21-1 at 3-4.)5
L.N. was previously enrolled in the East Windsor Township School District and attended
Rock Brook School, a “State-approved private school for children with disabilities,” pursuant to
an IEP developed in that school district.6 	(ECF No. 21-1 at 4; ECF No. 23 at 2.) 	Upon L.N.’s
move to the District, it is undisputed that the District agreed to continue L.N.’s placement at Rock
Brook for the remainder of the 2024-2025 school year. (ECF No. 27 at 2; ECF No. 28 at 3.) After
L.N. enrolled in the District, the District developed a new IEP for her, dated May 14, 2025, that
provided for L.N.’s transition to South Amboy High School in September 2025 for the 2025-2026
school year. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4; ECF No. 23 at 2.)
G.N. filed a due process petition challenging the District’s May 14, 2025 IEP. (ECF No. 1
at 3; ECF No. 21-1 at 4; ECF No. 23 at 2.) A hearing was held before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) on January 21, 2026. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4.) On March 27, 2026, the ALJ issued a
Final Decision and Order finding that South Amboy High School afforded L.N. a “free appropriate
public education” and dismissing the petition. (Id.; ECF No. 23 at 2; ECF No. 1-2 (ALJ Decision).)
Plaintiff alleges that following the ALJ’s decision, the District scheduled meetings to
update L.N.’s IEP but Plaintiff was not provided notice of these meetings or was otherwise
unavailable to attend. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4-5.) The Board represents that Plaintiff did receive notice
5 	Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
6 	School districts provide a “free appropriate public education” to disabled children “by
designing and administering a program of individualized instruction that is set forth in an
Individualized Education Plan . . . . The IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential.” Mary T. v.
Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
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of these meetings and that Plaintiff cancelled or rescheduled them, and asserts that the New Jersey
Department of Education, Office of Special Education (OSE) determined that the District did not
exclude Plaintiff from participation in the IEP process. (ECF No. 23 at 2-3.) On May 7 and 12,
2026, the District convened IEP meetings and updated L.N.’s IEP, placing her at South Amboy
High School beginning on or about May 26, 2026. (See ECF No. 21-1 at 5; ECF No. 23 at 3, 9, 11.)
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not attend these meetings. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4-5; ECF No. 23
at 3.)
On May 13, 2026, Plaintiff commenced this action challenging the ALJ’s Final Decision
and Order. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Plaintiff seeks an interim order that L.N. “can remain in her current
program [Rock Brook] under ‘stay put’ until this appeal is over,” and a finding that the ALJ erred
in determining that South Amboy High School provides L.N. a free appropriate public education.
(Id. at 4.) The Board contends that it was first served with the Complaint in this matter on May
28, 2026, and “[p]rior to that date, Plaintiff had not, at any time, informed the District that she had
appealed, or intended to appeal, the Final Decision, and the District had not received a copy of the
Complaint in this matter or received any type of notice of Plaintiff’s filing of the Complaint.”
(ECF No. 23 at 3-4; see also ECF No. 4 (“Summons Returned Executed” filed by G.N. indicating
service was executed on May 28, 2026)).
Meanwhile, in accordance with the May 12, 2026 IEP, L.N. began attending South Amboy
High School on May 26, 2026. (ECF No. 21-1 at 5; ECF No. 23 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that this
change in placement was “without parental consent” and she “had no choice but to send [L.N.]
there because the Board terminated [L.N.’s] placement at Rock Brook.” (ECF No. 24 at 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that on July 14, 2026, Plaintiff, who only speaks Spanish, attended an IEP
meeting held by the District with the assistance of an interpreter. 	(ECF No. 21-1 at 6.) At the
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meeting, the parties discussed “how L.N. was doing at South Amboy High School, particularly in
connection with her related services (speech-language therapy, occupational therapy, and physical
therapy).” (Id.; see also ECF No. 32-1 ¶ 7 (Certification of L.N.’s case manager).) It is undisputed
that “[a]fter the meeting was over, and the interpreter had already hung up, the case manager
presented a form to G.N. called, ‘Consent to Implement Revised IEP Prior to 15 Days.’” (ECF
No. 21-1 at 7; ECF No. 32-1 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that she could not read or understand this form.
(ECF No. 21-1 at 7, 15.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff signed the form. (Id. at 7; ECF No. 23 at 6-7.)
The Board asserts that Plaintiff voluntarily executed this form and by doing so, she agreed to
implement the proposed IEP for services at South Amboy High School for the 2026-2027 school
year and waived stay put. (ECF No. 23 at 4.)
On September 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion seeking an order directing the
Board “to maintain L.N.’s placement [at Rock Brook] during the pendency of this appeal and to
refrain from changing her placement from Rock Brook to an in-district program without Plaintiff’s
informed written consent.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 16.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The IDEA “requires participating states to provide disabled children with a free and
appropriate education.” Gloucester Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. E.N. on Behalf of A.N., Civ. No. 21-939,
2022 WL 1104848, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2022) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). “The premise
of the IDEA is that parents and schools working together to design an IEP is the ideal way to reach
the statute’s goal of a [free and appropriate education] for every child.” M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist.,
744 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 2014). In order to accomplish this goal, the Act “establishes an elaborate
procedural mechanism to protect the rights of those children.” Red Bank Bd. of Educ. v. J.Z., Civ.
No. 15-5268, 2015 WL 4773392, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015).
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“Congress anticipated . . . that ‘the collaborative process’ may at times break down,” and
if it does break down, “the Act allows [a] party to respond to a stalemate in the discussions by
requesting an impartial due process hearing before a state or local administrative officer.” Ridley
Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d at 117 (quoting Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012)).
During the pendency of this process, the “stay-put provision” pursuant to § 1415(j) of the IDEA
applies. See Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted).7 	Section 1415(j) provides that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or [LEA] and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall
remain in the then-current educational placement of the child[.]” 	20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 	“[T]he
question of what constitutes a student’s ‘current educational placement’ under IDEA’s stay put
provision is one of law.” 	Somerville Bd. of Educ., 2011 WL 32521, at *7. A student’s “then-
current educational placement” under § 1415(j) is “the IEP ‘actually functioning when the “stay
put” is invoked.’” Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d at 118 (emphasis added) (quoting Drinker, 78 F.3d
at 867); see also S.K. ex rel. N.K. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 07-4631, 2008
WL 4561512, at *14 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2008) (“In other words, it is generally the placement associated
with the child’s most recent IEP.”).
The stay-put provision “serves ‘in essence, as an automatic preliminary injunction,’
reflecting Congress’s conclusion that a child with a disability is best served by maintaining her
educational status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is resolved.” Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d
at 118 (quoting Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864); see also Y.B. on behalf of S.B. v. Howell Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 4 F.4th 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[T]he Supreme Court explained that ‘stay-put’s’
7 	At the time of this decision the stay-put provision was codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
However, the language of the provision did not change when it was moved to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d at 117.
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expansive text is limited by the IDEA’s purpose—to ‘strip schools of the unilateral authority they
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students . . . from school.’ ” (emphasis in original)
(quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988))); Davis on behalf of Davis v. D.C., 2023 WL
5209559, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2023) (“Section 1415(j) is only a shield to temporarily block
the [d]istrict from fundamentally changing a student’s educational placement; it is not a ‘sword to
effectuate affirmative remedies.’”). The plaintiff need not satisfy the traditional requirements for
a preliminary injunction; instead, “an injunction under the stay-put provision is only available
where the [LEA] proposes or effects a change in a student’s educational placement.” 	Mastery
Charter Sch., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (citation modified). The court must identify the student’s
current educational placement at the time the stay-put provision was invoked and determine
whether the LEA effected a change in that placement in contravention of the stay-put provision,
entitling the student to relief. Id. at 756-57; Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864.
However, when parents unilaterally relocate their child, the stay-put provision in § 1415(j)
does not apply. J.F. v. Byram Twp. Bd. of Educ., 629 F. App’x 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2015). Instead,
§ 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) of the IDEA provides that “the [LEA] shall provide such child with a free
appropriate public education, including services comparable to those described in the previously
held IEP, in consultation with the parents until such time as the [LEA] adopts the previously held
IEP or develops, adopts, and implements a new IEP that is consistent with Federal and State law.”
20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(2)(C)(i)(I).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The parties agree that § 1415(j) governs the present dispute and L.N.’s “then-current
education placement” under the stay-put provision is Rock Brook, as that was the “actually
functioning” placement at the time Plaintiff filed her due process petition. (ECF No. 27 at 2, 4;
ECF No. 28 at 1, 3.) Where the parties disagree is whether Plaintiff “otherwise agree[d]” to change
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L.N.’s then-current educational placement under the stay-put provision, § 1415(j).8 (ECF No. 21-
1 at 10-16; ECF No. 23 at 4-13; ECF No. 28 at 3-4; ECF No. 31; ECF No. 32.) Section 1415(j)
provides that “[d]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless
the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall
remain in the then current educational placement of such child[.]” (emphasis added). The Court
will evaluate both the May 12, 2026 and July 14, 2026 IEPs to determine whether Plaintiff
otherwise agreed to change L.N.’s educational placement from Rock Brook to South Amboy High
School.
With regards to the May 12, 2026 IEP, emails in the record demonstrate that the District
scheduled a meeting on May 7, 2026, with L.N.’s case manager communicating to Plaintiff that
“[t]he court decision was made to transition [L.N.] back to South Amboy High School and this
meeting is to discuss the process which will begin next week.” (ECF No. 14 at 44.) The day of
the meeting, Plaintiff indicated she was unavailable to attend.9 (Id. at 44-48.) The District declined
to reschedule the meeting, gave Plaintiff the option to attend virtually, and went ahead with the
meeting, which Plaintiff did not attend. 	(Id. at 45-46.) After the meeting, L.N.’s case manager
informed Plaintiff of the plan for L.N. to transition from Rock Brook to South Amboy High School,
8 	Ordinarily, determining whether a change in placement occurred for purposes of stay-put
“is something of an inexact science” and the touchstone of the analysis is whether the modification
in question “is likely to affect in some significant way the child’s learning experience” In re Educ.
Assignment of Joseph R., 318 F. App’x 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified). The Court
need not conduct such analysis here, where the parties do not dispute that there was a change in
L.N.’s placement. (See ECF No. 21-1 at 5; ECF No. 23 at 5; ECF No. 31 at 1; ECF No. 32 at 1, 3.)
9 	Plaintiff’s emails to L.N.’s case manager are mostly in Spanish, and translation was not
provided. However, context provided by the case manager’s responses makes clear that Plaintiff
repeatedly asked to reschedule the May 7 meeting in the morning before it was due to start. (ECF
No. 14 at 52 (calendar invite showing the meeting was scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m.); id. at
44-48 (emails from Plaintiff asking to reschedule on May 7, 2026 with timestamps of 8:39 a.m.,
9:16 a.m., 10:14 a.m., 10:48 a.m., and 11:05 a.m.).)
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and informed Plaintiff that “[t]he [D]istrict and Rockbrook are available on Tuesday, May 12, at
11:30 a.m. to hold [L.N.]’s annual review IEP meeting” and asked Plaintiff to confirm whether she
would attend in person or virtually. (Id. at 49.) On May 11, 2026, L.N.’s case manager emailed
Plaintiff that the IEP meeting was scheduled for May 12, 2026, at 11:30 a.m. 	(Id. at 55.) 	The
record does not show Plaintiff responded to either email. At 11:51 a.m. on May 12, 2026, L.N.’s
case manager emailed Plaintiff that “[w]e are all here at Rockbrook for [L.N.’s] annual review
meeting. We have a Google Meet open for you to join.” (Id. at 57.) Plaintiff did not reply until
4:14 p.m., stating, “You are doing whatever you please—and however you please—without
consulting me at all. You are holding meetings, yet you only send me an email on the very day of
the meeting. Did you know that what you are doing is illegal?” (Id.; see also id. at 65 (translations
of Plaintiff’s May 13, 2026 emails expressing that she never confirmed she was available for the
May 12, 2026 meeting time).)
Based on the record before the Court, the Court does not find that Plaintiff consented to the
May 12, 2026 IEP or otherwise agreed to change L.N.’s educational placement under the stay-put
provision. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (“Parents and guardians
play a significant role in the IEP process.”); Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. A.F. by
& through D.F., 506 F. Supp. 3d 293, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (holding the IDEA requires that “there
must be a process of written notice, parent consent, evaluation, creation and review of documents,
and development of an IEP in conjunction with school staff and parents, all of which is known as
the IEP process” (citation modified)). 	The Court finds the Third Circuit’s decision in W.B. v.
Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs.,
486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007), instructive on this point. There, the plaintiff brought federal and state
constitutional 	and 	statutory 	claims 	against 	school 	officials 	following 	the 	settlement 	of
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administrative proceedings under the IDEA. Id. at 487-88. The district court dismissed the case
based on a waiver of claims contained in the parties’ settlement agreement and the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded. Id. at 497-99. The court held that when considering the waiver of IDEA
claims, the court will apply a “more searching standard[] reserved for waivers of civil rights claims,
rather than general contract principles,” which includes inquiring into “the totality of the
circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement,” and “declin[ing] to enforce the agreement
unless its execution was knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 497-98. The court explained that summary
judgment in favor of the defendant was inappropriate because there was a factual dispute as to
whether the settlement agreement was clear and specific as to a waiver of any damages claims and
there was “certainly a factual dispute” as to whether the plaintiff understood the agreement.
Matula, 67 F.3d at 498-99; see also G.W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 19-13734, 2022 WL
17850251, *5-7 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2022) (applying Matula and denying summary judgment in favor
of the defendant where there were disputed questions of material fact regarding whether parties’
settlement agreement resolving the plaintiff’s IDEA due process petition was entered into
knowingly and voluntarily).
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not attend the May 12 meeting nor did Plaintiff
consent to or sign the resulting IEP. It is also unclear from the contemporaneous correspondence
whether Plaintiff was sent a copy of the May 12, 2026 IEP after that meeting. 	(ECF No. 14 at
44-59.) Also, there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff otherwise agreed to change L.N.’s
educational placement based on the May 12 meeting. To the contrary, when Plaintiff was advised
that L.N. would be moved from Rock Brook to South Amboy High School, Plaintiff expressed
frustration that she was not being consulted and that what the District was doing was “illegal,” (id.
at 57), and that she “had no choice but to send [L.N. to South Amboy High School] because the
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Board terminated [L.N.’s] placement at Rock Brook,” (ECF No. 24 at 2). Thus, based on Matula’s
more searching standard, the Court does not find that Plaintiff consented to the May 12, 2026 IEP
or “otherwise agreed” to change L.N.’s educational placement under the stay-put provision.
Moreover, the stay-put provision is in effect for the entirety of the dispute process and that
an aggrieved party “shall have 90 days from the date of the decision of the hearing officer” to
initiate a civil action appealing the ALJ’s decision. 	20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see, e.g., Ridley
Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d at 124 (holding that section 1415(j) “states that the child shall remain in the
current educational placement ‘until all [IDEA] proceedings have been completed[.]’” (first
alteration in original) (emphasis in original)); Somerville Bd. of Educ., 2011 WL 32521, at *10 (“It
is clear and we so find, that TCS was the operative placement actually functioning at the time the
dispute first arose. We therefore conclude that it must remain the Stay Put Placement until the
entire case is resolved either by agreement or further litigation.” (citation modified)); L.Y. ex rel.
J.Y. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 384 F. App’x 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have held that the current
educational placement refers to the operative placement actually functioning at the time the dispute
first arises.” (emphasis added)). As of May 12, 2026, Plaintiff had yet to file her appeal and the
90-day appeal period had yet to run.
The Board cites no caselaw in support of its contention that the stay-put provision is lifted
during the 90-day period between the final administrative decision and the deadline to appeal that
decision. (ECF No. 23 at 8.) The Court also notes that such a reading would be at odds with the
stay-put provision’s purpose, which is “to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had
traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students,
from school.” 	Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (citation modified). 	Therefore, the Court holds that the
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District’s May 12, 2026 IEP, effecting a change in L.N.’s placement on May 26, 2026, violated the
stay-put provision as L.N.’s then-current educational placement was Rock Brook.10
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the stay-put provision does not entitle Plaintiff to the
requested relief because on July 14, 2026, Plaintiff gave her signed consent to change L.N.’s
educational placement to South Amboy High School. (ECF No. 23 at 1-2.) Plaintiff contends that
she never agreed to a change in L.N.’s placement despite this signed form, because (1) she was not
fully informed of all relevant information and the consent form is misleading, (2) she was not
informed in her native language, (3) she did not understand the activity for which consent was
sought, and (4) the consent form did not advise Plaintiff that her consent was revocable. (ECF No.
21-1 at 10-16.) The parties agreed that the material facts are undisputed, an evidentiary hearing is
not required, and this Motion may be decided on the papers. (ECF No. 31 at 1; ECF No. 32 at 3.)
On July 14, 2026, Plaintiff signed a form titled “Consent to Implement Revised IEP Prior
to 15 Days.” (ECF No. 21-4.) The form was signed in relation to an IEP meeting the District held
and Plaintiff attended on that date. (ECF No. 21-1 at 6-7; ECF No. 23 at 4.) The IEP states that
the meeting was “a 30 day review meeting [] held to discuss [L.N.’s] progress at South Amboy
High School.” (ECF No. 22 at 33). As English is not Plaintiff’s native language, an interpreter
was provided for her at the meeting. (ECF No. 21-1 at 6; ECF No. 23 at 4.) It is also undisputed
that Plaintiff was presented with the consent form after the IEP meeting was over, the interpreter
10 	The Board also argues that this May 2026 change in placement was required by N.J.
Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.7(l), which provides that “[t]he decision of the administrative law judge
is final, binding on both parties, and to be implemented without undue delay unless stayed in
accordance with N.J.A.C. 1:6A.” 	(ECF No. 23 at 2, 8-9, 11-12.) 	However, the Board cites no
caselaw holding that this “undue delay” requirement overrides the stay-put provision, and takes
effect before the end of the 90-day period to appeal the ALJ’s decision. Furthermore, the IDEA
regulations provide that “[a] decision made in a hearing conducted pursuant to §§ 300.507 through
300.513 or §§ 300.530 through 300.534 is final, except that any party involved in the hearing may
appeal the decision . 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(a) (emphasis added).
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was no longer available, and the form was not translated into Spanish. (ECF No. 21-1 at 7, 14;
ECF No. 32-1 ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff represents that she did not read the form but signed it nonetheless
because she understood her signature to mean only that “L.N. was receiving the same related
services as she had at Rock Brook and that she was doing well with her related services,” not that
she consented to change L.N.’s stay put placement. (ECF No. 21-1 at 7.) The Board argues that
Plaintiff’s representation is not credible as Plaintiff previously reviewed IEP forms in English and
was able to decide whether to sign or withhold consent, and “[t]here is no reason for Plaintiff to
sign a form only for purposes of documenting the IEP team’s discussion as to how L.N. was
progressing in her related services” as Plaintiff is surely familiar with the IEP process. (ECF No.
32 at 1-2.)
The Court finds Plaintiff did not otherwise agree to change L.N.’s educational placement
by signing the July 14, 2026 consent form. Matula, 67 F.3d at 498-99; see also Drinker, 78 F.3d
at 868 (holding that an agreement to change a child’s stay put placement must be “affirmative” and
“explicit.”); J.E. v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 807 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (affirming
agreement where parties “engaged in discussions” with each other regarding placement and did
not “qualify[] their agreement or mak[e] any reference to an actual intent of not following the plan”
for placement.); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(3)-(4) (specifying that when an LEA proposes to change
the “educational placement of the child” the LEA must provide written prior notice to the parents
“in the native language of the parents, unless it clearly is not feasible to do so.”).
The July 14, 2026 consent form does not address the stay put dispute. The form labeled,
“Consent to Implement Revised IEP Prior to 15 Days,” explains that “[t]his form is to be used for
all IEPs that are developed after consent for the initial IEP has been provided.” (ECF No. 21-4
at 2.) It further states that “[t]o have the IEP services start before the 15 days expire, you must
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sign below” but even if a parent does not sign, “the IEP will be implemented after the 15th day
from the date notice is provided.”11 (Id.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff never saw the July 14, 2026
IEP before signing the form, (ECF No. 21-1 at 7; ECF No. 22 at 3), at the meeting the parties only
discussed “‘how L.N. was doing at South Amboy High School’ (i.e., the in-district placement that
the IEP team previously recommended for L.N. and that was ordered through the March 2026 ALJ
decision), including L.N.’s progress with respect to the IEP related services of speech-language
therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy,” and no one informed Plaintiff that her
signature on the consent form would waive Plaintiff’s right to challenge L.N.’s placement under
the stay-put provision, (ECF No. 32 at 1-2, 3; ECF No. 32-1 ¶¶ 7, 9.) No interpreter translated the
form for Plaintiff nor was one even available to her at the time the form was presented after the
IEP meeting ended. 	(ECF No. 21-1 at 14; ECF No. 32-1 ¶ 6); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(3)-(4)
(requiring that written notice of a change in placement be provided in the parent’s native language).
The Board’s argument that Plaintiff’s contentions are not credible because she has attended other
IEP meetings in the past and did not previously ask for forms to be translated into Spanish is
unpersuasive. (ECF No. 32 at 1-2.) The record indicates Plaintiff did not explicitly consent to the
July 14, 2026 IEP nor did Plaintiff waive her rights under the IDEA’s stay-put provision. 	See
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 868. Thus, L.N.’s operative placement at the time the dispute arose between
the parties was Rock Brook as set forth in L.N.’s East Windsor Township School District IEP that
11 	The consent form also states that in signing the form, the parent or guardian agrees that
they have “received a copy of the proposed IEP and agree to have the IEP services start before the
15 calendar days have expired.” (ECF No. 21-4 at 2.) Plaintiff contends that she never saw the
July 14, 2026 IEP before signing this form, (ECF No. 21-1 at 7), which is supported by the record
which shows the IEP was sent to Plaintiff on July 20, 2026, (ECF No. 22 at 3), after the form was
already signed.
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the District adopted for the 2024-2025 school year upon L.N.’s enrollment. 	(ECF No. 27 at 3;
ECF No. 28 at 3.)
Lastly, Defendant argues that the purpose of the stay-put rule would be frustrated if the
Court ordered L.N. to be placed back at Rock Brook, because that would disrupt L.N.’s education
which she is currently receiving at South Amboy High School. (ECF No. 23 at 12-13.) The Court
notes that while it is well-established that the stay-put provision seeks to preserve the status quo,
the status quo “refers to the operative placement actually functioning at the time the dispute first
arises,” which in this case was Rock Brook. Rena C. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d 404, 415 (3d
Cir. 2018). L.N. is entitled to return to Rock Brook for the pendency of this appeal unless Plaintiff
expressly agrees to a mutually acceptable alternative.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: October 15, 2026
______________________________
G EORGETTE CASTNER
UNITED STATES D ISTRICT JUDGE
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