Gregory James Weaver and Mary Janine Weaver

-UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
In re: 	GREGORY JAMES WEAVER and 	No. 13-10-12204 JA
MARY JANINE WEAVER,
Debtors.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the First Application by Attorneys for the Debtors
for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses and Costs (“Fee
Application”) filed by William F. Davis & Associates, P.C. (the “Law Firm”), counsel for the
Debtors. The Fee Application seeks approval of $8,508.95 for the period from March 9, 2009
through August 6, 2010 consisting of 7,547.00 in attorneys’ fees, $505.09 in associated taxes,
and $456.86 in expenses. The Chapter 13 Trustee filed an objection to the Fee Application
asserting, among other things, that the requested fees were excessive under the facts and
circumstance of the case, that some of the charges were for clerical or other standard office tasks,
that the charges incurred in preparing the Fee Application were excessive, that the hourly rate
charged by Johnathan Peek is too high, and that allowance of the Fee Application in full will
render the Debtors’ confirmed plan unfeasible.1 See Docket No. 44.
The Court held a final, evidentiary hearing on the Fee Application on January 7, 2011,
and took the matter under advisement. 	After considering the evidence presented at the final
hearing, reviewing the Fee Application, and being otherwise sufficiently informed, the Court
finds that some of the requested fees must be disallowed. 	Accordingly the Court will grant, in
part, and deny, in part the pending Fee Application.
1 At the final hearing, the Chapter 13 Trustee stated that while feasibility would not likely be an issue, given the fact
that the Debtors have agreed to contribute tax refunds to the plan for tax years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014,
whether the refunds will be sufficient cannot be determined until the end of the plan term.
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FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on April 30,
2010. 	Their plan was confirmed on July 22, 2010. The Firm’s billings statements reflect total
fees incurred in the amount of $8,397.00, fee adjustments in the amount of $850.00, and total
fees billed in the amount of $7,547.00. The fees adjustments resulted from the Law Firm
reducing Mr. Davis’ hourly rate for the case from $250.00 to $200.00, and Ms. Steiling’s hourly
rate for the case from $175.00 to $150.00.
Andrea Steiling handled most of the work for the Debtors in connection with this case
performed by an attorney, having billed 28.6 of the 36.7 hours of attorney time billed to the
Debtors. Paralegals in the Law Firm billed 22.7 hours in connection with the case. Ms. Steiling
started working at the Law Firm in May of 2009, where she began by doing initial client
consultations, progressed to handling Chapter 7 cases, then Chapter 13 cases, and now she has
been assisting with work on some Chapter 11 cases. 	Since 2009, she has handled a total of 127
chapter 7 cases for which she had full responsibility for about ninety percent of the work. 	She
has also filed fifteen Chapter 13 cases for which she testified she is responsible for nearly ninety-
eight percent of the work.
The Schedules filed of record reflect assets valued at $229,320.00, tax debt of about
$6,000.00, and non-priority unsecured claims totaling $123,372.20. Schedule A lists one
property, the Debtors’ former residence. Schedule D lists three secured creditors consisting of
creditors holding first and second mortgages against the Debtors’ former residence and a car
loan. Schedule E lists two tax debts. Schedule F lists twenty-three (23) non-priority unsecured
claims totaling $123,372.20. Schedule G lists one executory rental agreement and one cell
phone contract. Schedule H does not list any co-debtors. Schedules I and J reflect monthly
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income after payroll deductions of $6,252.54 and monthly expenses of $7,127.11. Form B22C
filed upon commencement of the case reflects currently monthly income on Line 11 of
$9,250.63, a household size of five on Line 16, and negative monthly disposable income under
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) on Line 59 of ($342.95). Schedule I reflects that one of the household
members is age 68. Amended Form B22C filed July 19, 2010 reflects currently monthly income
on Line 11 of $9,250.63, a household size of four on Line 16, and negative monthly disposable
income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) on Line 59 of ($142.24).
An order was entered July 22, 2010 confirming the chapter 13 plan filed on the petition
date. Both the plan and the order confirming the plan provide for monthly payments under the
plan in the amount of $170.00 for a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and the New
Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue filed objections to the plan.
In connection with the Weavers’ bankruptcy case, Ms. Steiling testified that initially there
was some question as to whether the Weavers might be able to obtain a discharge in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case, but that based on their income level they decided to file a Chapter 13 case. Ms.
Steiling also testified that there was an issue as to whether Mrs. Weaver’s father should be
included in the household size for purposes of completing the Form B22C, and, if so, whether his
social security income must also be included. After conducting legal research, she concluded,
based on the majority of the case law she found, that such income must be included if the parent
is included in the household size.
The Debtors filed a motion to assume an executory contract (a cell phone contract) and a
motion to assume an unexpired lease (a rental agreement), which were granted without objection.
Ms. Steiling resolved the objections to the Debtors’ plan filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee and the
State of New Mexico Taxation Department. 	Ms. Steiling had to amend the Debtors’ Schedule C
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to correct the applicable exemption scheme, having initially elected the exemption scheme under
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) for debtors ineligible to claim those exemptions, 2 and to claim exemptions
under Nevada law. Ultimately, the Weavers surrendered their home and confirmed their plan,
which allowed them to pay their tax claims through the plan and discharge a significant amount
of unsecured debt. 	After payment of taxes, attorneys’ fees and trustee’s fees, little, if any, of the
plan payments will be available to pay holders of non-priority, unsecured claims.
Gerald Velarde testified at the final hearing as an expert in the area of Chapter 13 practice
generally. He was not qualified as an expert to testify on the range of fees typically charged in
Chapter 13 cases in this district generally, nor the basis for that range of fees. 	Mr. Velarde
testified that his fees charged in connection with Chapter 13 cases average between $3,000.00
and $3,200.00, and that overall his fees for representing Chapter 13 debtors range from
$1,900.00 at the low end of the spectrum for a simple Chapter 13 case and up to $7,500.00 or
more for a more complex Chapter 13 case. After reviewing the docket in this proceeding, Mr.
Velarde observed that the two complicating issues in this case were the issue of whether to
include Ms. Weaver’s father in the household, and which exemption scheme should be selected.
In his opinion, based on his assessment of the complexity of the case, Mr. Velarde testified that
he would have likely charged between $3,500.00 and $3,600.00 to represent the Weavers in this
Chapter 13 case. Mr. Velarde’s assessment of the complexity of the case was based solely on his
review of the documents filed of record.
The Retainer Agreement with the Law Firm attached as Exhibit A to the Fee Application
identifies a standard, anticipated fee of $3,000.00 for a simple Chapter 13 proceeding, including
filing fee, taxes, and other costs. 	See Exhibit 1. The pre-printed estimate of $3,000.00 was
2 Based on the Debtors’ place of domicile within the 730-day period prior to commence of the bankruptcy case,
Nevada exemption laws apply. Nevada is an “opt out” state, meaning that if Nevada exemption laws apply,
exemptions set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) are not available to the debtor.
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crossed out in this case and $2,000.00 was written in. Id. 	The Weavers paid the Law Firm a
retainer of $2,500.00.
DISCUSSION
Attorneys representing debtors in a Chapter 13 case are entitled to:
reasonable compensation . . . for representing the interests of the debtor in connection
with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such
services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).
The other factors set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) are:
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time
at which the service was rendered toward the completion of a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time
commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or
task addressed;
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or
otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation
charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).
The party requesting compensation from the estate bears the burden of demonstrating that the
requested fees are reasonable.3 Generally when, as in this district, the Court has not approved a
“no look” fee, the starting point for determining the reasonableness of requested fees charged by
attorneys representing debtors in bankruptcy cases is the lodestar method.4 Under the lodestar
3 See In re Recycling Indus., Inc. 243 B.R. 396, 403 (Bankr.D.Colo. 2000)(stating that “[i]t is well settled that the
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of compensation is on the fee applicant.”)(citing In re Narragansett
Clothing Co., 210 B.R. 493, 497 (1 st Cir. BAP 1997)(remaining citation omitted).
4See, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)(stating that “[t]he most useful
starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”); In re Miniscribe, Corp., 309 F.3d 1234, 1244 (10 th Cir.
2002)(noting that the Tenth Circuit “has long applied the . . . lodestar factors to assess ‘reasonableness’ of attorneys’
fees in a variety of contexts . . . and has also specifically determined that the test applies to attorney fee
determinations under §330(a)(1)” and adopting the lodestar method as the appropriate measure for calculating
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method, the fee is determined by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended by the
reasonable hourly rate.5
Assessing the Reasonableness of the Requested Hourly Rates
In assessing the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates, 	11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F)
directs the Court to consider the customary rates charged in the market place for similarly skilled
attorneys who practice outside the area of bankruptcy.6 No evidence was presented as to the
range of hourly rates charged by comparably skilled attorneys who practice in areas other than
bankruptcy. 	But the Court is not restricted to this criterion or required to rely solely on evidence
presented at the hearing in assessing the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates.7 The
Court has discretion to determine a reasonable hourly rate and can rely on its own experience and
knowledge of customary hourly rates in deciding a reasonable hourly rate.8
reasonable compensation for a chapter 7 trustee). See also, In re Yates, 217 B.R. 296, 299 (Bankr.N.D.Okla.
1998)(noting in the context of an application for approval of a flat fee in by a Chapter 13 debtor’s attorney, that “[a]s
a general rule in bankruptcy cases, the lodestar method, namely the number of hours expended times customary
hourly rate, is used to determine attorney fees.”)(citation omitted). But cf. In re Howell, 226 B.R. 279, 281
(Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1998)(stating that “[r]outine Chapter 13 cases are not appropriate cases for the use of the lodestar
method. Instead, they are much more susceptible to a standard rate or flat, fixed rate approach, based on all the
relevant legal factors.”).
5Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d
439 (1986)(stating that the lodestar figure is “the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate”); In re
Reconversion Technologies, Inc., 216 B.R. 46, 52 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1997)(explaining generally that under the
“lodestar” method, the “number of hours expended times a reasonable hourly rate, is used to determine attorney
fees” such that “[t]he ‘total number of hours reasonably worked on the case’ is ‘multiplie[d] ... by the reasonable
hourly rate’ ”)(citing In re Cent. Metal Fabrication, Inc., 207 B.R. 742, 748 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1997( and quoting In
re Cascade Oil Co., 126 B.R. 99, 103 (K.Kan. 1991)). See also, In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6 th Cir.
1991)(stating that the lodestar calculation is determined by “multiplying the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the
number of hours reasonably expended.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
6 Section 330(a)(3)(F) provides, in relevant part:
In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded . . . the court shall consider . . .
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by
comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
11 U.S.C. §330(a)(3)(F).
7See In re Roffle, 216 B.R. 290, 293 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1998)(acknowledging that “the Court does look to the market
place to ascertain whether the rates charged are reasonable for comparably skilled attorneys outside the bankruptcy
arena” but that the comparable rates of non-bankruptcy attorneys is not the “sole criteria” the Court can consider,
given the mandate in § 330(a)(3) to consider other factors “including the benefit and necessity of services to the
debtor.”)
8 See Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, (noting that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees
is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area” (citation
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The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the hourly rate of $150.00 charged by Jonathan
Peake, an associate at the Law Firm. The Fee Application reflects that $150.00 is the lowest
hourly rate charged by an attorney at the Law Firm who worked on the Debtors’ bankruptcy
case. 	The Court finds that the hourly rate of $150.00 for work performed by Jonathan Peake is
reasonable. Andrea Steiling, the attorney who performed the majority of the work on this case,
reduced her normal hourly rate from $175.00 to $150.00. Similarly, William Davis, whose
customary hourly rate for work performed on behalf of debtors is $250.00, reduced his rate to
$200.00 in this case. The Court finds that these reduced hourly rates are reasonable.
Assessing the Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Expended in this Case
Attorneys are required to exercise billing judgment in reviewing time entries, and to
make billing adjustments when warranted.9 “Not every hour or part of an hour spent by an
attorney is ‘billable’ and it is incumbent on the attorney to exercise ‘billing judgment’ when
submitting [fee] applications to the court.” In re Stromgberg, 161 B.R. 510, 517 (Bankr.D.Colo.
1993). “Generally, holding an intra-office conference for the purpose of training attorneys is not
compensable.” In re New Boston Coke Corp., 299 B.R. 432, 445 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 2003)(citing
In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 233 B.R. 768, 780 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1999), rev’d on other grounds,
252 B.R. 393 (W.D.Ky. 2000)(“[w]hile training . . . associates and new professionals are
necessary functions, the costs associated therewith are [overhead] expenses to the firm.”).
and internal quotation marks omitted) and that “[a] district judge can ‘turn to her own knowledge’ to supplement the
evidence.”)(quoting Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686, 689 n.4. (10th Cir. 1990)); In re Recycling Industries, Inc., 243
B.R. 396, 404 n. 6 (Bankr.D.Colo. 2000)(noting that when there is no evidence of prevailing market rates, the court
“may use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.”)(citation omitted); In re Lady
Baltimore Foods, Inc., 2004 WL 2192365 (Bankr.D.Kan. January 27, 2004)(unreported)(stating that the Court “may
also use its own knowledge and experience in determining reasonableness”).
9 See In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 132 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1991)(“In applying for fees, attorneys
‘should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.’”)(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40
(1983)); In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 583 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)(law firms are expected to make
billing adjustments to exclude time for unproductive efforts).
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Further, the Court remains obligated to scrutinize the time records to evaluate the propriety of an
attorney’s requested compensation, even when no objection is filed.10 And while the Court need
not slavishly critique each individual time entry in order to assess reasonableness,11 the Court
cannot make a conclusory determination that a fee is reasonable or unreasonable, but must
articulate specific reasons for its determination and show its calculation.12 The Court’s duty to
assess the reasonableness of the overall fees charged is particularly critical in Chapter 13 cases,
where the debtors generally have little or no incentive to keep fees low if holders of non-priority
unsecured claims will be paid less than in full.13 Debtors have little or no incentive to keep fees
low when, as here, the Debtors’ attorneys’ fees are paid through the plan and the plan payments
will remain the same regardless of the amount of allowed fees. The Court may draw on its own
experience with attorney charges in bankruptcy cases in this district to determine a reasonable
fee.14
10 See, In re Tahah, 330 B.R. 777, 780-81 (10 th Cir. BAP 2005)(stating that “bankruptcy courts have a duty to
independently evaluate the propriety for the compensation requested under §330.”); In re Cascade Oil Co., Inc., 126
B.R. 99, 106 (D.Kan. 1991)(stating that “[i]n the absence of objections to the fee applications, the court still has the
independent judicial duty to determine whether compensation is reasonable.”)(citations omitted).
11 See Tahah, 330 B.R. at 781 (acknowledging that “the analysis under §330 does not require a detailed review and
discussion of the line by line entries.”).
12 See In re Cain, 356 B.R. 787 (10 th Cir. BAP 2007)(unreported)(stating that “[t]he court’s order on attorney’s fees
must allow meaningful review and it must articulate the decisions it made, give principled reasons for those
decisions, and show its calculation.”)(citing Adams v. Mathis, 752 B.R. 553, 554 (11th Cir. 1985)). See also,
Cascade Oil, 126 B.R. at 107 (noting that “[a] conclusory statement on whether a fee is reasonable or unreasonable
is generally not sufficient.”)(citation omitted).
13See Stromberg, 161 B.R. at 517 (noting that, “because of the peculiarities of Chapter13, court scrutiny of Chapter
13 fee applications . . . is critical” especially since “[t]he debtors in Chapter 13 Cases really have no interest in
exerting any control or objecting to their attorneys’ fees charged.”)(citation omitted).
14See In re Pryor, 2007 WL 1073884, *1 (Bankr. D.Md. Feb. 8, 2007)(reducing the allowed fees for chapter 13
debtor’s counsel in reliance on the court’s “own experience in examining literally thousands of cases that pass
through the bankruptcy process”); In re Burton, 278 B.R. 645, 649-50 (Bankr. M.D.Ga. 2001) (stating, in connection
with evaluation of attorneys’ fees in a Chapter 13 case that “[t]he court may draw on its own experience with the
present case and similar cases to determine a reasonable fee.”)(citing Citibank, N.A. v. Multiponics, Inc. (In re
Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 731 (5 th Cir. 1980)). See also, In re Spillane, 884 F.2d 642, 647 (1 st Cir.
1989)(affirming district court’s reduction in approved hourly rate that was based on the district court’s own
experience); In re Hammeken, 2010 WL 2940801, *1 (Bankr. D.Ariz. July 21, 2010) (stating that “the court employs
its own experience, both as an attorney and as a judge, to attorney fee applications.”).
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Electronic Filing of Documents is Noncompensable Clerical Work
Clerical tasks are generally not compensable from the bankruptcy estate, even if such
tasks are performed by paralegals or attorneys.15 Such tasks are considered part of office
overhead.16 The Fee Application reflects time charged for filing documents electronically
through the Court’s CM/ECF system, and for time for electronically transmitting proposed
orders to the Court for consideration. The Law Firm argued that filing electronically is not
equivalent to hand-delivering documents to the clerk’s office for filing, and that, because
electronic filing requires selecting the proper document to file, navigating through the CM/ECF
interface and preparing a docket entry, it is appropriate to bill for such work. This Court
disagrees. Even though some training in using the Court’s CM/ECF system is required, filing a
document electronically is not a billable task, whether performed by the attorney or performed
by a non-attorney under the direction and permission of the attorney with a CM/ECF account. It
is the type of cost that should be absorbed in a legal firm’s office overhead. Further, unless some
explanation to the Court is required in connection with electronically transmitting proposed
orders for entry, the task is clerical and not separately compensable. 	No evidence was presented
relating to the submission of orders for entry. Accordingly, the time the Law Firm charged for
15 See In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 131 B.R. 474, 489 (Bankr.D.Utah. 1991)(stating that “[i]f clerical or
secretarial services shift to the paraprofessional, the service is overhead and not a reasonable charge to the estate.”);
In re Lorenzen, 2010 WL 5524696, *1 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.2010) (“The court disallows the compensation of clerical or
stenographic employees of the professional for the performance of routine clerical or administrative activities in the
normal course of the professional's business, such as photocopying, secretarial work, or routine filing.”).
16 See CF & I Fabricators, 131 B.R. at 490, n. 16 (noting that when considering whether time billed by a paralegal is
compensable, the Court should consider “whether payment for the service is included in overhead [as part of] . . .
the rate charged to the estate by the professional.”). Accord Narragansett Clothing, 210 B.R. at 499 (overhead such
as clerical and secretarial duties is not compensable); In re Wheeler, 439 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr. E.D.Mich.
2010)(“Clerical services should not be billed separately to clients, but should be included in the office
overhead”)(citation omitted); In re Guzman, 2009 WL 607401 (Bankr. D.N.M. March 5, 2009)(“Tasks that are
purely secretarial or clerical in nature are not compensable from the bankruptcy estate and are considered part of
office overhead.”)(citation omitted).
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filing documents through the Court’s CM/ECF system and for the electronic submission of
orders for entry in the amount of $160.00 will be disallowed.
Fees That Exceed a Reasonable Charge for Services Rendered Should Be Disallowed
Overall, there is nothing in the Fee Application nor in the docket in the Debtors’
bankruptcy case to indicate that this case was particularly complex. The Debtors scheduled one
parcel of real estate, their former residence, two mortgages against the residence and a lien on a
vehicle, personal property with an aggregate value of $27,135.69, priority tax debt in the amount
of $5,991.13 and non-priority unsecured claims totaling $123,372.20. The chapter 13 plan
proposed on the petition date was confirmed. The plan objections filed by the Chapter 13
Trustee and the New Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue were of a type that is not out
of the ordinary in chapter 13 cases.
The two issues in the case that the Law Firm identified in particular in support of its Fee
Application concerned the applicable household size for purposes of determining disposable
income under the means test if the income of a parent is excluded and the need to claim
exemptions under Nevada law. Whether a debtor can exclude all income of a parent who resides
with the debtor for purposes of calculating current monthly income but include the parent in the
household size for purposes of claiming expense deductions when calculating disposable income
under the means test is not a particularly difficult issue.17 If it is unclear whether an extended
family member may or must be included in the household size, charging for alternative B22C
calculations is appropriate. Further, analyzing the need to claim exemptions pursuant to 11
17 See 11 U.S.C. §101(10A)(B)(providing that “any amount paid . . . on a regular basis for the household expenses of
the debtor or the debtor’s dependents” is included in “current monthly income.”); In re Hays, 2008 WL 1924233, *2
(Bankr.D.Kan. 2008)(reasoning that “[i]f Debtors intend to claim this daughter as a dependent on the expense side
of the means test equation, which would be to their benefit, they will also be required to acknowledge that she is a
dependent on the income side of the equation, as well.”)(citation omitted).
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U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A)18 under the laws of a foreign state that has opted out of the exemption
scheme set forth in 11 U.S.C.§ 522(d), although not typical in most chapter 13 case, is not
complex.
Preparing Form-Like Documents
Chapter 13 practice is generally “form” based, so that a firm that regularly represents
Chapter13 debtors develops forms that can be used for routine motions, such as motions to value
collateral and motions to assume executory contracts. In fact, sample Chapter 13 forms are
posted on the Court’s website for use in connection with Chapter 13 practice. 	The Law firm
filed one motion to assume an executory contract, and one motion to assume an unexpired lease
in the case. These motions were three pages each, including the signature block and mailing list,
and appear to be form-like documents. See Docket Nos. 14 and 15. 	The motions were granted
without objection, and the orders the Law Firm prepared granting the motions appear to be
simple, form-based documents. See Docket Nos. 21 and 22. 	The Law Firm billed $300.00 for
drafting the motions and orders. 	The Court finds that this amount is excessive and will disallow
$120.00 of the amount charged for the preparation of these documents.
Charges for Preparation of the Petition, Schedules,
Statement of Financial Affairs, Form B22C
The Billing Statements reflect that in April 2010 the Law Firm prepared the initial papers
for filing in the bankruptcy case, including the Petition, Schedules, Statement of Financial
18 Section 522(b)(3)(A) provides:
subject to subsections (o) and (p), any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d)
of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in
which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located at a single State for such 730-day period, the
place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or
for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place;
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
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Affairs, Form B22C and Statement of Social Security Number and Statement of Intention. For
this work, exclusive of time communicating with the client and any intra-office conferences, the
Law Firm charged $1,306.00 including (a) 7.1 hours of time billed for services of a legal
assistant to prepare the first draft of the Petition, Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs
and 1.2 hours to make revisions; (b) 2.3 hours of legal assistant time to prepare the Form B22C,
(c) 0.80 hours of legal assistant time to prepare a Statement of Social Security Number,
Statement of Intention, and Declaration; and (d) $250.00 of attorney time to review the package
of documents prior to filing. Taking into account the information disclosed in the Schedules,
Statement of Financial Affairs, and Form B22C, including nature of the debtors’ assets and
liabilities and their income and expenses, the Court will disallow as excessive $500.00 of the
amount charged for preparation of these documents. 	The Court is not disallowing any of the
time the Law Firm charged for meeting or otherwise communicating with its clients in
connection with this work.
Charges for Amending Form B22C, Claiming Exemptions
Under Nevada Law and for Intra-Office Conferences
The time reflected in the Fee Application for researching certain issues and for discussing
the case with the senior attorney also appears to be excessive. When a less-experienced attorney
researches areas of law in which a more experienced attorney would already be well-versed, and
when supervision is required as part of the training process, billing judgment requires a reduction
in time charged.19 The Law Firm already made a billing adjustment in recognition of these
19 Cf. In re Associated Grocers of Colorado, Inc., 137 B.R. 413, 422 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1990)(finding it improper to
delegate research of sophisticated bankruptcy issues to attorneys inexperienced in bankruptcy law without any
corresponding reduction in the time billed); In re Grayhall Resources, Inc., 1990 WL 314011, *11 (Bankr.D.Colo.
March 21, 1990)(unreported)(observing that less experienced attorneys “must spend significant hours in research on
matters which would be second nature to experienced counsel[ ]” and that it is a failure in billing judgment to seek
compensation from the estate “the time spent in educating the associates.”).
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factors by reducing the hourly rate for Ms. Steiling in this case from $175.00 to $150.00.
However, the Court finds that a further adjustment is required.
The Firm charged $1,500.00 to research whether the Debtor’s fathers’ social security
income must be included in the calculation of disposable income if he is included in the
household size, to amend Form B22C to exclude the father from the household size, and to
communicate with the Debtors regarding the same. The Court finds that such charges exceed the
amount of a reasonable charge by $750.00, and therefore will disallow that amount.
The Law Firm charged $270.00 to research Nevada exemption law and amend schedule
C to claim exemptions under Nevada law. The Court finds that such charges exceed the amount
of a reasonable charge by $70.00, and therefore will disallow that amount.
The Law Firm charged $686.50 for intra-office conferences, of which $620.00 was
charged for meetings between Mr. Davis and Ms. Steiling. Meetings between lawyers in a law
firm in the representation of a client can be necessary and appropriate for a variety of reasons,
such as to develop strategy, formulate judgments on matters, coordinate efforts, and delegate
work. Given the nature and complexity of this chapter 13 case, however, the Court finds that the
amount charged for intra-office conferences exceeds a reasonable fee by $300.00 and therefore
will disallow that amount.
Other Charges
The Court has determined that certain other charges exceed a reasonable charge for tasks
performed, as follows:
Date 	Task 	Time
Spent
Amount
Charged
Amount
Disallowed
05/12/10 	Prepare Certificate of Pay
Advices (SD)
0.50 	47.50 	$19.00
Various 	Review Plan Objections filed
by the Trustee and Taxation
1.20 	180.00 	$120.00
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and Revenue
(ADS)
07/23/10
to
07/28/10
Preparation of Fee
Application
(ADS, DK, SD)
3.10 	366.00 	$91.00
The amount allowed for preparation of the Fee Application takes into account the greater detail it
contains as compared with fee applications typically filed in chapter 13 cases in this district
seeking approval of a lesser amount of attorneys’ fees.
Summary of Disallowed Charges
In summary, the total amount for disallowed fees consists of:
Fees for filing documents electronically on
CM/ECF and for electronic submission of
orders to the Court
$160.00
Fees for preparing schedules and other first day
papers
$500.00
Fees for preparing motions to assume leases
and executory contracts and corresponding
orders
$120.00
Fees for conducting legal research relating to
household size and amending Form B22C
$750.00
Fees for researching applicable exemption law
and amending Schedule C
$70.00
Fees for Intra-Office conferences 	$300.00
Other fees 	$220.00
TOTAL DISALLOWED AMOUNT: 	$2,120.00
In assessing the reasonableness of the requested fees, the Court recognizes that certain
factors, such as the number and length of client meetings necessary to gather information and to
keep the client informed, the demanding nature of certain clients, and the relative completeness
of a client’s records can affect the amount of time it takes to perform necessary tasks. But when
the Court determines that excessive fees were charged in light of the degree of complexity of the
issues presented, a downward adjustment in the allowed fees is necessary. 	Based on the
foregoing, the Court determines that $2,120.00 of the requested fees must be disallowed because
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they are not reasonable or necessary. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will
be entered.
______________________________________
ROBERT H. JACOBVITZ
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Date entered on docket: March 11, 2011
COPY TO:
William F. Davis
Andrea Steiling
Attorneys for Debtors
6709 Academy NE, Suite A
Albuquerque, NM 87109
Kelley L. Skehen
Chapter 13 Trustee
625 Silver Ave. SW, Suite 350
Albuquerque, NM 87102
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