Reeves v. New York City Housing Authority et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL REEVES,
Plaintiff,
-against-
NEW 	YORK 	CITY 	HOUSING
AUTHORITY; JACQUELINE HAYNES;
and JOURDAN NEAL-GRANT,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
23-CV-3646 (NRM) (MMH)
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
By Order dated July 31, 2023, this action was dismissed upon stipulation of
the parties. 	Before the Court are Plaintiff’s July 27, 2025 and October 24, 2025
motions to reopen the case and attendant requests for emergency relief. 	As set forth
below, the requests to reopen this case are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff, who holds a Section 8 housing voucher, commenced
this action by complaint and order to show cause in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. 	Compl., ECF No. 1; Order to Show Cause,
ECF No. 3. 	The Complaint asserted that the New York City Housing Authority
(“NYCHA”) failed to grant Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation in the
form of a voucher for an increased apartment size that would allow him to use
necessary medical devices, and breached a contract to issue subsidy payments on his
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behalf for his private apartment at 217 Boerum Street in Brooklyn, New York. See
Compl. at 11–19.1
On May 16, 2023, the action was transferred to this Court. 	ECF No. 6. 	To
address Plaintiff’s request for emergency relief, see Order to Show Cause, an initial
conference was held before Magistrate Judge Marcia M. Henry at which the Court
learned that “the basis for pro se Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order
has been resolved because NYCHA approved Plaintiff’s application for benefits.”
Minute Entry dated May 26, 2023. 	In particular, NYCHA granted Plaintiff a
reasonable accommodation in the form of a voucher for a two-bedroom apartment.
See Reasonable Accommodation Approval, Ex. B to Def. Decl. in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 17-2. NYCHA moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s
reasonable accommodation had been approved and that, to the extent that Plaintiff
contested his tenant rent share, his rent was pro-rated as required by federal
guidelines based on his immigration status. 	See generally Mem. in Support of Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. 	Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the action was
dismissed by stipulation of the parties shortly thereafter. Stip. of Dismissal, ECF No.
22; Docket Order dated July 31, 2023.
Two years later, on July 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first motion to reopen.
First Mot. to Reopen, ECF No. 23. 	In his motion, Plaintiff alleged that he had
requested his housing voucher be transferred (or “ported”) to Los Angeles, California,
1 Pincites refer to the page numbers generated by the Electronic Case Filing
System (“ECF”).
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where he was then living, but that NYCHA had instead “abruptly closed” his Section
8 case in a retaliatory manner and without due process. Id. at 2–3.2 Plaintiff sought
a preliminary injunction compelling Defendant to reinstate the voucher and port it to
Los Angeles, where he stated he was homeless and sleeping in his car. Id. at 2, 4; see
also Emergency Decl. dated July 28, 2025, ECF No. 24.
Before resolving the motion, the Court ordered Defendant to file a preliminary
written response concerning the status of Plaintiff's Section 8 housing voucher port
request. Order dated Aug. 1, 2025. By letter, supported by exhibits, NYCHA advised
the Court that Plaintiff had been evicted from his apartment in New York on
February 24, 2025. 	Letter dated Aug. 8, 2025 at 2–3, ECF No. 25. 	Subsequently,
NYCHA provided Plaintiff with a transfer voucher that would allow him to port his
voucher to a new apartment within New York City. Id. at 3. However, when Plaintiff
asked NYCHA to cancel that voucher so that he could request a portability voucher
to another location, a NYCHA staff member erroneously informed Plaintiff that his
case had been closed. Id. Plaintiff’s case was not closed, and after Plaintiff filed his
motion to reopen, the parties began working to resolve the portability request. Id.
2 According to the Housing Choice Voucher Portability page of the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development, “portability” in the Section
8 housing voucher program “refers to the process through which the family can
transfer or ‘port’ their rental subsidy when they move to a location outside the
jurisdiction of the public housing agency (PHA) that first gave them the voucher when
they were selected for the program.” 	Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV) Portability,
U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., available at https://www.hud.gov/helping-
americans/housing-choice-vouchers-portability (last visited Jan. 8, 2026).
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In light of NYCHA’s ongoing efforts to resolve Plaintiff's voucher issues, the
Court ordered a further status report. 	Order dated Aug. 11, 2025. By letter dated
August 22, 2025, NYCHA reported that it had issued Plaintiff a portability voucher
for Los Angeles on August 21, 2025. Letter dated Aug. 22, 2025, ECF No. 27.
By letter dated August 1, 2025, but filed on August 27, 2025, Plaintiff
confirmed that the requested portability voucher had been issued. Letter filed Aug.
27, 2025 at 1, ECF No. 29. However, Plaintiff stated, he was unable to find housing
in Los Angeles and had requested the receiving agency, the Housing Authority of the
City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) transfer his voucher to San Diego, California, where
he had “backup housing options.” Id. at 2. According to Plaintiff, HACLA informed
him that “they could not process the transfer because the voucher had not actually
been finalized in their system,” and that “since the voucher still legally belonged to
NYCHA, they returned it to NYCHA for further processing.” Id. NYCHA, however,
redirected Plaintiff back to HACLA, leaving Plaintiff in “administrative limbo.” Id.
The Court ordered NYCHA to respond to Plaintiff’s letter. 	Order dated Aug.
29, 2025. Before the time ordered for NYCHA’s response, Plaintiff further moved for
another second preliminary injunction (incorrectly captioned as a motion for a more
definite statement) alleging that he remained homeless and living in his car, and that
“[i]n the midst of Plaintiff’s Section 8 transfer process, NYCHA abruptly and without
justification cancelled Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation.” 	Mot. dated Sep. 4,
2025, ECF No. 30 at 1–2. Plaintiff later submitted a declaration stating that he had
been informed by a NYCHA representative that his reasonable accommodation was
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cancelled. Decl. dated Aug. 1, 2025, attached to Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl. Reply”), ECF No. 35. 	He also requested that the Court order NYCHA to issue
him an emergency housing or hotel voucher. Mot. dated Sep. 4, 2025 at 2–3.
On September 5, 2025, NYCHA timely opposed Plaintiff’s first motion to
reopen. Mem. in Opp’n, ECF No. 32. The next day, Plaintiff advised the Court that
he had secured temporary hotel accommodations through a San Diego human
services agency and requested that the Court immediately order NYCHA to assume
the costs of the hotel. See Letter dated Sep. 6, 2025, ECF No. 33. Three days later,
in connection with his reply to NYCHA’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to reopen,
Plaintiff sought a third preliminary injunction, requesting the Court order NYCHA
to reinstate his reasonable accommodation and transmit a portability voucher to “the
receiving [public housing agency] identified by Plaintiff.” Pl. Reply at 4–5.
In response to Plaintiff’s filings, the Court ordered NYCHA to report on the
status 	of 	Plaintiff's 	housing 	voucher, 	including 	his 	reasonable 	accommodation
request. Order dated Oct. 23, 2025.
The following day, Plaintiff filed a second motion to reopen the case. 	Second
Mot. to Reopen, ECF No. 38 (Oct. 24, 2025). 	In his second motion, Plaintiff alleged
that NYCHA had issued the portability voucher to San Diego without converting it
from an Emergency Housing Voucher (“EHV”) to a traditional Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher (“HCV”). 	Id. at 4. 	Therefore, Plaintiff alleged, the voucher would
expire with the scheduled closure of the EHV program in March 2026. Id. Plaintiff
alleged that the San Diego Housing Commission (“SDHC”) had “confirmed that the
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voucher received from NYCHA is not eligible for renewal, and that it cannot convert
an EHV to a traditional voucher.” 	Id. 	As a result, Plaintiff claimed, he faced
imminent homelessness. Id. Plaintiff also alleged that the portability voucher failed
to include his reasonable accommodation. Id. In connection with his second motion
to reopen, Plaintiff sought a fourth preliminary injunction, this time requesting that
the Court order NYCHA to convert his voucher to an HCV voucher with his
reasonable accommodations and then reissue the portability voucher. Id. at 6.
By status letter filed on November 3, 2025 with supporting exhibits, NYCHA
explained that Plaintiff had originally received his voucher through the EHV
program, an emergency program administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) which is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2026.
Letter dated Nov. 3, 2025 at 1–2, ECF No. 39.3 	Although not every public housing
agency (“PHA”) participates in the EHV program, NYCHA explained that pursuant
to HUD regulations, “SDHC cannot refuse to assist an incoming EHV [recipient],
regardless of whether it does or does not administer EHVs,” and that if SDHC does
not administer EHVs, it can “either absorb Plaintiff into its regular HCV Program or
bill NYCHA” for the cost of Plaintiff’s voucher. 	Id. at 2. 	NYCHA relied on HUD
guidance that states that like HCVs, EHVs are portable, and a receiving PHA “cannot
refuse to assist an incoming EHV family, regardless of whether the PHA does or does
3 According to the Emergency Housing Vouchers page of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the EHV program “provided 70,000
housing choice vouchers to local PHAs.” 	Emergency Housing Vouchers, available at
https://www.hud.gov/helping-americans/housing-choice-vouchers-emergency 	(last
visited Jan. 8, 2026).
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not currently administer EHVs.” HUD Notice No. PIH 2021-15 at 36, ECF No. 39-5.
If the receiving PHA administers EHVs, it must either absorb the family with an
EHV or bill the initial PHA for the voucher. If the receiving PHA does not administer
EHVs, “the receiving PHA may absorb the family into its regular HCV program or
may bill the initial PHA.” Id. at 36–37. Furthermore, NYCHA represented that its
staff had “verified with the portability specialist at SDHC that the fact that Plaintiff
currently has an EHV should not impact his ability to utilize the voucher in San
Diego, and the portability specialist confirmed that SDHC is administering all port-
ins, including EHVs.” Letter dated Nov. 3, 2025 at 2.
Finally, NYCHA noted that Plaintiff’s 2023 accommodation remains in effect.
Id. at 2; see also Portability Voucher, ECF No. 39-3 (voucher for two-bedroom
apartment); Reasonable Accommodation Approval (granting Plaintiff a voucher for a
two-bedroom apartment). To the extent that Plaintiff contests his tenant rent share,
NYCHA argued, Plaintiff's immigration status renders him eligible only for a pro-
rated voucher. Letter dated Nov. 3, 2025 at 2–3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 60(b) allows a plaintiff to obtain relief from a “final judgment, order, or
proceeding” under certain enumerated circumstances. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 	As
relevant here, a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal is a final judgment from which a party
may seek Rule 60(b) relief. 	See Walker v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 94-CV-5591
(MBM), 1995 WL 625689, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1995). However, the “standard for
granting a [Rule 60(b)] motion to reconsider is strict.” 	Pierre v. Yurchenko, No. 22-
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CV-1171 (NRM) (LB), 2025 WL 1761387, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2025). “Rule 60(b)
provides for relief from judgment on any of several grounds specified in five numbered
subparts, and under a sixth, catch-all provision allowing for relief for ‘any other
reason.’” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co. Inc., 385 F. App’x 29, 31 (2d
Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)). As the Second
Circuit has stated, “a proper case for Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only one of extraordinary
circumstances or extreme hardship.” Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir.
2004) (citation modified); see also Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012)
(requiring “extraordinary circumstances”); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 385 F.
App’x 	at 	31 	(“Rule 	60(b)(6) 	is 	properly 	invoked 	only 	when 	extraordinary
circumstances justify relief or when the judgment may work an extreme and undue
hardship.” (citation modified)).
DISCUSSION
NYCHA has responded only to Plaintiff’s first motion to reopen, arguing that
it should be denied because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the high bar for a motion to
reopen and his new motion is unrelated to the underlying case. 	See Mem. in Opp’n
at 9–11, ECF No. 32. 	In support of the motion to reopen, Plaintiff argues that
NYCHA’s post-2023 conduct constitutes the sort of extraordinary, post-stipulation
events that satisfy Rule 60(b)(6). Pl. Reply at 3. Ultimately, for the reasons explained
below, the Court finds that both of Plaintiff’s motions must be denied. This is because
his first motion is entirely moot, and his second motion, which is moot in part, does
not meet the high bar to reopen a case.
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In his first motion, Plaintiff sought the issuance of a portability voucher to Los
Angeles, which both parties agree was issued on August 21, 2025. See First Mot. to
Reopen at 3–4; Letter filed Aug. 27, 2025 (acknowledging receipt of portability
voucher). Thus, the first motion is entirely moot as Plaintiff has already obtained all
of the relief he sought.
In his second motion, Plaintiff sought the conversion of his voucher into a
standard HCV for use in San Diego and the reissuance of a portability voucher with
his reasonable accommodation. See Second Mot. to Reopen at 6–7. Plaintiff currently
has a portability voucher which includes his reasonable accommodation of a two-
bedroom apartment. 	See Portability Voucher. 	Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks
issuance of a portability voucher with his accommodation, his second motion to
reopen is moot.
Finally, Plaintiff’s request for his voucher to be converted to a traditional HCV
does not meet the high bar of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In light of the HUD guidance
that an EHV may be ported to another PHA and either converted or billed to the
issuing agency, see HUD Notice No. PIH 2021-15 at 36–37, Plaintiff has not shown
that his current portability voucher is not usable. 	Plaintiff’s request to reopen the
case so that he can obtain an order directing that NYCHA, rather than SDHC, convert
his voucher does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). Thus, Plaintiff’s second motion to reopen is denied.
Since the case is closed, the Court may not consider Plaintiff’s requests for
emergency relief.
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The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to
plaintiff and to note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: January 9, 2026
Brooklyn, NY
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