USA v. Merchant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-against-
ASIF MERCHANT,
Defendant.
------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-CR-362(EK)
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Currently before the Court is the government’s motion
to withhold certain classified materials from discovery pursuant
to Section Four of the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16. 	For the reasons explained below, the motion is largely
granted. 	The Court reserves judgment on one item discussed
below.
I. 	Background
On September 10, 2024, a grand jury sitting in this
District returned a two-count indictment against Asif Merchant.
The indictment charged him with attempting to commit an act of
terrorism transcending national boundaries, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2332b, and murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958(a). 	Indictment, ECF No. 16. 	The government alleges that
Merchant traveled to the United States to kill government
officials. 	Gov’t’s Mem. in Supp. (“Br.”) 6. 	In April 2024,
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Merchant allegedly flew from Pakistan to Turkey, and then to the
United States. 	Id. at 9. 	Shortly thereafter, he contacted an
individual to assist him in contracting one or more hitmen. 	Id.
at 7. 	That individual reported Merchant’s conduct to law
enforcement and became a confidential source. 	Id. 	The
confidential source introduced Merchant to undercover law
enforcement officers posing as hitmen. 	Id. 	Merchant then paid
the undercover officers $5,000 as an advance, and explained his
plan. 	Id. 	He was arrested shortly thereafter.
The government has moved for a protective order
permitting it to withhold more than a million classified items
from discovery. 	The prosecution collected that material from
[REDACTED], and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 	The motion was
accompanied by a classified brief in support. 	Mot. for
Protective Order; Br.1 	Following receipt of the motion, the
Court held separate ex parte, in camera conferences with the
government and defense counsel. 	See Docket Entries dated Aug. 6
and Aug. 13, 2025.2 	At the Court’s request, both parties
1 The government’s application to file the instant motion, including all
supplemental submissions, ex parte and under seal is granted because
disclosure of the contents would compromise the government’s interest in
protecting national security and would defeat the purpose of this protective
order. 	See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
2 This is a relatively common practice in CIPA prosecutions. 	See, e.g.,
United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In a case involving
classified documents, ex parte, in camera hearings in which government
counsel participates to the exclusion of defense counsel are part of the
process that the district court may use in order to decide the relevancy of
the information.”). 	Accordingly, the Court will produce four versions of
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submitted supplemental letters after their respective
conferences. 	See Gov’t Ltr. dated Aug. 27, 2025; Def. Ltr.
dated Aug. 27, 2025. 	The government also provided the Court
with a sample of the classified material in this case. 	Later,
the Court held a second conference with the government and
requested further briefing, and in November and January,
requested that the government furnish certain additional
documents for in camera review. 	See Docket Entry dated Sept.
16, 2025; Classified Order dated Nov. 25, 2025 (“Nov. 2025
Order”); Classified Order dated Jan. 12, 2026 (“Jan. 12, 2026
Order”); Classified Order dated Jan. 13, 2026 (“Jan. 13, 2026
Order”).
Apart from the discovery the government seeks to
withhold, it has provided Merchant with several productions of
unclassified discovery. 	See Br. 26-28; ECF Nos. 52, 60, 66, 69,
72 (detailing productions). 	The government has confirmed that,
to the extent it seeks to withhold documents because it obtained
them through classified methods, rather than because of the
documents’ contents, it has endeavored to obtain those same
this Order. 	First, a version including all classified information, and
sensitive information provided by both parties will be made available for the
Second Circuit in case of appeal. 	Second, a version without classified
information, and with no sensitive information provided by the parties will
be made available for the public. 	Third, a version with classified
information, but no sensitive information provided by the defense will be
made available to the government. 	Finally, a version without classified
information, or sensitive information provided by the government will be made
available to the defense.
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materials via unclassified methods and, where possible, produced
those returns to Merchant. 	Gov’t Ltr. dated Aug. 27.
In December, after the government produced recordings
of certain declassified phone calls, Merchant moved for
discovery of all recorded communications of his. 	ECF No. 65
(“Def. Ltr.”). 	The government opposes this request. 	ECF No. 68
(“Gov’t Ltr. dated Dec. 9, 2025”).
II. 	Legal Standards
CIPA was “designed to establish procedures to
harmonize a defendant’s right to obtain and present exculpatory
material upon his trial and the government’s right to protect
classified material in the national interest.” 	United States v.
Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996).3 	Section 4 of CIPA
provides:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the
United 	States 	to 	delete 	specified 	items 	of 	classified
information 	from 	documents 	to 	be 	made 	available 	to 	the
defendant 	through 	discovery 	under 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of
Criminal 	Procedure, 	to 	substitute 	a 	summary 	of 	the
information 	for 	such 	classified 	documents, 	or 	to
substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove.
18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 4. 	Section 4 “clarifies district courts’
power under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) to issue
protective orders denying or restricting discovery for good
3 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
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cause, which includes information vital to the national
security.” 	United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 140 (2d
Cir. 2010). 	Relatedly, Rule 16 itself provides that “[a]t any
time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer
discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1).
The Section 4 inquiry proceeds through several steps.
The Court must first determine “whether the material in dispute
is discoverable.” 	Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 141. 	To do so, we
look to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 	See In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93,
116 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[s]ection four provides that, if the
discovery to be provided to the defense pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure includes classified information, the
district court” may authorize various remedies). 	If the
materials are discoverable, we assess “whether the state-secrets
privilege applies.” 	Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 141. 	If the
privilege applies, the Court must determine “whether the
information is helpful or material to the defense” — that is,
“useful to counter the government’s case or to bolster a
defense.” 	Id. 	If so, the Court must then evaluate any proposed
substitutions or admissions the government has offered to
balance the public’s interest in the flow of information and the
defendant’s right to prepare his defense.
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A. 	Discoverability
Rule 16 requires the government to disclose specified
items including oral, written, or recorded statements made by
the defendant, as well as certain categories of documents and
objects, including those “material to preparing the defense.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1).
B. 	State-Secrets Privilege
The state-secrets privilege allows the government to
“withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be
inimical to national security.” 	United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d
72, 79 (2d Cir. 2008). 	It applies if “(1) there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged, and (2) the privilege is lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer.” 	Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d
at 141; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8, 10
(1953) (describing this standard in civil cases, prior to the
enactment of CIPA). 	With respect to the first requirement,
“[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.
Nonetheless . . . courts must exercise the traditional
reluctance to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
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military and national security affairs.” 	United States v.
Zubaydah, 595 U.S 195, 205 (2022).
C. 	Helpful or Material to the Defense
Information is “helpful or material to the defense” if
it is “useful to counter the government’s case or to bolster a
defense.” 	Aref, 533 F.3d at 80. 	“To be helpful or material to
the defense, evidence need not rise to the level that would
trigger the Government’s obligation under Brady . . . to
disclose exculpatory information.” 	Id.4 	Nevertheless,
“classified information is not discoverable on a mere showing of
theoretical relevance in the face of the government’s classified
information privilege.” 	United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617,
623 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
“Only when information is relevant or helpful to the
defense must the Court then take the third step of balancing the
‘public interest in protecting the flow of information against
the individual’s right to prepare his defense.’” 	United States
v. Mostafa, 992 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting
4 “Brady and its progeny require the Government to disclose material
information that is favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” 	United States v. Rodriguez, 496
F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2007). 	Information is exculpatory if it “relates to
the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” 	United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71,
112 (2d Cir. 2017). 	Information is impeaching if it has “the potential to
alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution
witness.” 	United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002). 	Evidence
is subject to disclosure under Brady even if it has “both an inculpatory and
exculpatory effect.” 	DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 195 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957)).5 	Depending
on how that balance comes out, the Court may authorize the
Government to substitute evidence under CIPA, including
summaries or admissions. 	18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 4.
III. 	Discussion
The Court has endeavored to conduct a searching review
of the classified materials that the government seeks to delete.
To review these materials, the Court requested random samples
from each category of the 1.6 million items the FBI obtained
[REDACTED], as well as specific documents for in camera review.
See Tr. of Proceedings on Aug. 6, 2025 28:9-17 (“First Gov’t
Tr.”); Nov. 2025 Order; Jan. 2026 Order. 	This approach is
consistent with the observation that, in a case involving
millions of items, review of every document is “an impossible
task for all practical purposes.” 	United States v. Medunjanin,
No. 10-CR-19, 2012 WL 13186383, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012);
see also United States v. Shehadeh, 857 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294 n.3
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on a “random sample of such materials
selected by the Court for in camera review”); United States v.
El-Hanafi, No. 10-CR-162, 2012 WL 603649, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
5 Although the “relevant or helpful” formulation here is slightly
different from the “material and helpful” standard recited above, courts have
repeatedly applied this final step in the CIPA Section 4 analysis. 	See,
e.g., United States v. Hossain, No. 19-CR-606, 2020 WL 6874910, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020); United States v. Schulte, No. 17-CR-548, 2019 WL
3764662, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019).
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24, 2012) (relying on samples and requesting production of
“materials that the Court believed might be relevant”). 	The
Court also scrutinized the government’s brief, which
“describ[ed] much of the information in detail.” 	Zazi, No. 10-
CR-60, 2011 WL 2532903, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011).
In his ex parte conference, Merchant’s counsel raised
[REDACTED].
[REDACTED]
Counsel also indicated [REDACTED].
As set forth in the government’s submissions, the
materials that are the subject of this motion fall into five
categories and were obtained from [REDACTED] agencies. 	The
government does not intend to use any classified material at
trial. 	Tr. of Proceedings on Sept. 11, 2025 (“Second Gov’t
Tr.”), at 33:10-11. 	For four of these five categories,
including documents from the [REDACTED], and FBI, the government
argues that even if these materials are discoverable, they are
not material or helpful to the defense and they are covered by
the state-secrets privilege. 	For the final category, FBI
materials obtained via a “sensitive” investigation technique,
the government argues these materials are not discoverable in
the first instance.
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A. 	The Government’s Process
The government requested that the [REDACTED] search
their records for information regarding Merchant and the crimes
charged in the indictment. 	Br. 49. 	This included searches for
Merchant’s name, known aliases, phone numbers, email addresses,
as well as searches for Merchant’s [REDACTED] and the
government’s confidential source. 	Id. 	In response, [REDACTED].
Id. at 114, 137. 	AUSAs [REDACTED]. 	Id. at 114, 137.
[REDACTED]. 	Id. at 114; 142.
The government’s process for reviewing FBI documents
was different. 	The government possesses materials that were
part of the FBI’s case file pertaining to Merchant. 	Id. at 49.
The FBI also searched other databases in its possession for
information regarding Merchant. 	Id. at 50. 	In particular, the
government is in possession of 1.6 million “products” obtained
[REDACTED]. 	Id. at 54. 	[REDACTED]. 	Id. at 98-99. 	The Court
requested random samples from each category of document.
The government has attested that, in light of the
sheer number of documents at issue, it enlisted a group of
special agents, analysts, and linguists to conduct an initial
relevance review of this material. 	AUSAs trained these
reviewers on the scope of materials discoverable under Rule 16,
Brady, Giglio, and the Jencks Act. 	Oct. 3 Ltr. 6. 	Training
materials taught reviewers to understand possible defenses,
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including the coercion defense, and to identify exculpatory
evidence. 	Br. Ex. 7, at 14. 	These individuals then reviewed
the FBI documents and tagged some as conceivably relevant, for
further AUSA review. 	Oct. 3 Ltr. 6-7.
Also in the government’s possession are a document
provided by a [REDACTED] and approximately two hundred FBI
reports [REDACTED]. 	AUSAs reviewed each of these documents.
Br. 107.
B. 	The Government Has Properly Invoked the State-Secrets
Privilege
The government has properly invoked the state-secrets
privilege. 	[REDACTED] have provided a declaration explaining
the risk of disclosure.6 	As it pertains to [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] Decl., Br. Ex. 6, at ¶ 31. 	[REDACTED]. 	Id. ¶ 34.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
As to the FBI material, [REDACTED]. 	Holstead Decl.,
Br. Ex. 2, at ¶¶ 26-27. 	[REDACTED]. 	Specific to the
[REDACTED], the FBI has declared that it [REDACTED] indicated to
[REDACTED] that [REDACTED]. 	Id. ¶ 71.
Even if it is broadly assumed that the United States
engages in such [REDACTED], harm may still inure. 	The Supreme
6 [REDACTED]. 	So too have the Directors of the FBI [REDACTED]. Patel
Decl., Br. Ex. 1; [REDACTED].
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Court has “reason[ed] that a former [REDACTED] insider’s
confirmation of confidential cooperation” [REDACTED] could
“damage [REDACTED].” 	[REDACTED]. 	Confirmation by an insider —
as opposed to speculation — would leave virtually no doubt as to
the veracity of the information at issue. 	Id. 	The Court
concludes that there is “a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.” 	Abu-Jihaad, 630
F.3d at 141.
C. 	The Materials Are Not Material or Helpful to the
Defense and May Be Withheld
The government seeks to delete nearly all of the
documents from discovery, on the basis that even if any of them
are discoverable, they are not material or helpful to the
defense and they are protected by the state-secrets privilege.
a. 	Many Documents Are Evidently Not Helpful or
Material
Many of the materials described in the government’s
submissions are plainly not helpful or material to the defense.
Several of them are inculpatory, if anything. 	And “inculpatory
information[,] which the government does not intend to offer at
trial . . . cannot conceivably help a defendant.” 	United States
v. Rahman, 870 F. Supp. 47, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying
Roviaro). 	The documents the government seeks to withhold are
replete with such examples. 	[REDACTED]. 	Such material tends to
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demonstrate motive. 	[REDACTED]. 	This acknowledgement
[REDACTED] undercuts Merchant’s defense [REDACTED].
The government also seeks to withhold many documents
because they are cumulative — even duplicative — of material
actually produced. 	This includes many documents that it
produced to Merchant in unclassified discovery, or that it is
planning to produce. 	For example, the government wishes to
delete a [REDACTED] that it produced in unclassified discovery
[REDACTED]. 	Id. at 90. 	[REDACTED]. 	Because the unclassified
productions provide the relevant information (without risking
sources and methods), the government need not provide that same
information in classified form. 	See United States v. Saipov,
No. 17-CR-722, 2019 WL 5558214, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019).
Some FBI documents, though flagged as potentially
relevant by reviewers, are not so. 	For example, the government
is in possession of [REDACTED] that are [REDACTED] in nature.
Id. at 87-88. 	The government is correct that such [REDACTED]
are irrelevant. 	Other materials may have some tenuous
relevance, but are inculpatory, if anything. 	[REDACTED]. 	These
materials arguably demonstrate Merchant’s connection to the
individuals with whom he allegedly interacted throughout the
charged scheme.
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b. 	Documents Regarding the [REDACTED]
Certain categories of documents merited closer
scrutiny. 	These include the many documents related to
Merchant’s involvement in the [REDACTED], given [REDACTED].
The government has already produced a large volume of
unclassified documents related to Merchant’s involvement in the
garment industry. 	See, e.g., Br. 67-72 (describing, among other
things, contents of Merchant’s electronic devices). 	The
government possesses other classified documents and [REDACTED]
related to the [REDACTED] that it wishes to delete. 	See, e.g.,
id. at 65 [REDACTED]; id. at 92 [REDACTED]. 	After the
government produced certain declassified [REDACTED], Merchant
moved for an order directing the government to turn over
[REDACTED], not just [REDACTED]. 	Def. Ltr. 2. 	Merchant has
asserted that the remaining [REDACTED] might [REDACTED]. 	Def.
Ltr. 4 (emphasis added). 	The Court directed the government to
identify any discovery already produced to Merchant from which
he could [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]. 	Nov. 2025 Order. 	In
response, the government filed a lengthy itemization of
materials including [REDACTED] from which Merchant could so
argue. 	Gov’t’s Dec. 5 Ltr. 3-5; id. Ex. F. 	The government adds
that it is “not aware of anything [REDACTED] that is
meaningfully unique such that its content is not accounted-for
in the unclassified production.” 	Id. at 3.
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The Court is satisfied that the material the
government seeks to withhold is cumulative of the materials
already produced. 	The unclassified discovery Merchant possesses
will allow counsel to raise these arguments at trial, and we see
no indication of anything unique or sufficiently different in
the classified materials that would make such an argument more
persuasive. 	The unclassified discovery shows [REDACTED] as in
the documents the government seeks to delete. 	See, e.g., Br. 65
[REDACTED]; Dec. 5 Ltr. 3-5 [REDACTED]. 	Among other things, the
unclassified materials include several documents related to
[REDACTED] dated after Merchant’s alleged entry to the United
States, including up to the day of his arrest.7 	Merchant thus
will be able to argue [REDACTED]. 	The unclassified discovery
also contains a trove of items from which Merchant can argue
[REDACTED] more generally, and to rebut the government’s
[REDACTED]. 	We are thus satisfied Merchant will have
“substantially the same ability” to argue he was involved in
legitimate business. 	Mostafa, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
Merchant contends that he might be able to use
[REDACTED] to impeach witnesses who “may suggest that [he] was
observed [REDACTED] about the alleged plot” or acting “in a way
to avoid surveillance.” 	Def. Ltr. 4. 	But the government has
7 [REDACTED]. 	Id.
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affirmed that it will not argue that “evidence [Merchant] was
[REDACTED] proves he was engaged in the murder-for-hire plot
[REDACTED].” 	Gov’t Ltr. dated Dec. 9, at 4. 	Thus, [REDACTED]
are at most “theoretical[ly] relevan[t],” and may be deleted.
Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623.
c. 	Documents Regarding the Confidential Source
The Court reviewed [REDACTED] reports that referenced
Merchant’s conversations with the government’s confidential
source, in light of [REDACTED]. 	Br. 139-40. 	However, these
documents would tend, if anything, [REDACTED], as they tend to
demonstrate that [REDACTED].
The FBI materials also include [REDACTED] Merchant had
with the confidential source [REDACTED], which the Court
requested from the government. 	Br. 84-85. 	The government’s
response includes [REDACTED]. 	See Gov’t’s Jan. 13 Ltr. 	The
[REDACTED] is largely in Urdu, and the government has not
provided a full translation to the Court. 	Instead, the
government has provided a one-paragraph summary by an FBI
linguist. 	Id. 	The Court reserves judgment on this exchange,
pending further submissions from the government. 	See Jan. 13,
2026 Order.
d. 	Documents Regarding the [REDACTED]
The [REDACTED], which the Court reviewed, largely
includes [REDACTED], which is of course already in Merchant’s
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possession. 	See United States v. Boulos, No. 13-CR-612, 2015 WL
502170, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015) (information that the
defendant “already possess[es]” properly withheld under CIPA).
The [REDACTED] is also, if anything, inculpatory, as it
describes, for example, [REDACTED]. 	Dec. 5 Ltr. Ex. A. 	The
document may thus be withheld.
Some [REDACTED] relate to Merchant’s [REDACTED] of a
[REDACTED]. 	Br. 64. 	In light of the possible [REDACTED], the
Court requested and reviewed specific documents listed in the
government’s brief. 	Nov. 2025 Order. 	The government cannot
confirm if each [REDACTED] item was produced to Merchant in
unclassified discovery, given certain safeguards it initiated in
connection with its review. 	See, e.g., United States v. Sun,
No. 24-CR-346, 2025 WL 1220040, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2025)
(“The execution of the [warrant] was complete when the FBI
agents generated a responsive report . . . . Any search after
that . . . would have required a new warrant.”). 	Nevertheless,
these documents would not support [REDACTED]. 	They only list
basic and uncontroverted information, as in the [REDACTED]. 	See
Dec. 5 Ltr. Exs. B-E. 	As a final safeguard, the Court also
asked the government whether “its review revealed indications of
suspicious behavior by [REDACTED] related to Merchant
[REDACTED].” 	Nov. 2025 Order. 	In response, the government
reports that it is “not aware of any suspicious behavior by
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[REDACTED] related to the defendant [REDACTED].” 	Dec 5 Ltr. 2;
see also Sept. 11 Tr. 37:13-21 (“[W]e have not seen anything
that would indicate that there was any coordination between
[REDACTED] . . . or [REDACTED] to entrap Mr. Merchant.”).
e. 	Other Potentially Helpful or Material
Documents
The Court reviewed [REDACTED]. 	These documents are
not material or helpful to the defense. 	To be sure, the
government alleged in the initial complaint that Merchant’s
activities “are consistent with a person engaged in” plotting on
behalf of [REDACTED]. 	Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1 (sealed). 	But the
operative indictment makes no mention of [REDACTED]. 	And the
government has committed to present no evidence regarding
Merchant’s involvement with [REDACTED]. 	Second Gov’t Tr. 35:11-
16; Dec. 5 Ltr. 2.
Two [REDACTED] that the Court reviewed indicate that
[REDACTED] initially [REDACTED]. 	Br. 139; [REDACTED] Decl. ¶ 27
[REDACTED]. 	But an “[REDACTED] state of mind as the
investigation progressed is ordinarily of little or no relevance
to the question of the defendant[’s] guilt.” 	United States v.
Johnson, 529 F.3d 493, 500 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United
States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 119 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The
district court did not err in concluding that [REDACTED] prior
beliefs about Karpeles as a possible DPR suspect were not
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relevant to the charges against Ulbricht.”); United States v.
Gilmore, 2021 WL 4151009, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2021) (“That
a law enforcement officer believed, at one time, that all the
robberies were committed by the same person does not make it
more likely that the same person actually committed all the
robberies.”).
Finally, the Court reviewed one [REDACTED] indicating
that [REDACTED], one of Merchant’s relatives denied transferring
him money for terroristic purposes [REDACTED]. 	Br. 140-41.
This material is arguably relevant, as Merchant is alleged to
have obtained [REDACTED]. 	Id. at 15-17. 	But it is not
exculpatory, as Merchant’s relative’s state of mind is not
relevant to Merchant’s guilt. 	Cf. United States v. Fernandez,
2014 WL 7180225, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014) (“A defendant’s
denial of guilt is hardly surprising and of little or no value
to proving his guilt or involvement or that of anybody else.”).
Merchant also stated in a proffer with the government that he
had not revealed his intentions to his relatives. Id. at 141.
D. 	FBI Materials [REDACTED] Is Not Discoverable
The FBI [REDACTED]. 	Br. 105. 	This [REDACTED]. 	Id.
[REDACTED]. 	Id. 	Because the [REDACTED], the government
[REDACTED]. 	Id. at 106. 	The government argues that these
materials are not discoverable and even if they were, they are
neither helpful nor material to the defense and are protected by
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the state-secrets privilege. 	Id. at 105-06. 	The government’s
request is granted.
These reports are not discoverable under Rule 16. 	Nor
would they support a valid defense, as “the way in which the
Government conducted its investigation is not relevant to the
Government’s burden of proof at trial.” 	United States v.
Montanez, 2024 WL 4582387, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2024); see
also United States v. Saldarriaga, 204 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir.
2000) (“[REDACTED] does not tend to show that a defendant is not
guilty of the crime with which he has been charged.”).
Nor are the reports discoverable under the Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500, or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 —
at least at this point. 	The Jencks Act and Rule 26.2 “require
the government to turn over witness statements” after a witness
is called at trial if, among other requirements, the statement
“relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified.” 	United States v. Artis, 523 F. App’x 98, 100-01 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)). 	The government reports
that even if the author of any of these reports testified at
trial, the information within the reports would be outside the
scope of their anticipated testimony. 	Br. 106.
Even if the materials were discoverable, the
government has properly asserted the state-secrets privilege.
The government [REDACTED]. 	Holstead Decl. ¶¶ 62, 64.
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[REDACTED]. 	Id. 	¶ 64. 	The Court thus concludes that “there is
a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
be divulged.” 	Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 141.
Thus, even if any of these materials were
discoverable, because the government has properly invoked the
state-secrets privilege and the materials are not helpful or
material to the defense, they may be deleted from discovery.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the government shall be
permitted not to disclose to Merchant or his counsel the
classified materials identified in its motion, except as to the
one exchange that is the subject of the Court’s January 13
Order, as to which the Court reserves judgment. 	The
government’s application to file its CIPA motion and all
supplemental submissions ex parte and under seal is granted.
The government is directed to complete classification review of
this Order by 3:00 P.M. on January 26, so the Court may file a
redacted version of this Order on the public docket and
distribute a copy to the defense ahead of the January 27 status
conference.
The Classified Information Security Officer is
respectfully directed to maintain securely the government’s
classified submissions, the defense’s ex parte letter, the
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transcripts of the ex parte, in camera hearings on August 6,
August 9, and September 11, 2025, the Court’s orders dated
November 25, 2025, January 12, 2026, January 13, 2026, and this
Order, and to make those materials available in the event of an
appeal.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	January 14, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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