Eva Charles v. Centers Health Care, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
KAHANA ROSE EVA CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
-against-
CENTERS FOR HEALTH CARE, LLC, CYRINA
BENJAMIN, DAVID GREENBERG, LINDA
PONCE, BARBARA ELLIS, AND ISAAC SABO,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-CV-2199 (NGG) (JAM)
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Kahana Charles brings this employment action against
Defendants the Centers for Health Care, LLC (the "Center"),
Cyrina Benjamin, David Greenberg, Linda Ponce, Barbara Ellis,
and Isaac Sabo (the "Individual Defendants," together with the
Center, "Defendants") alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (''Title VII"), the New York State Human
Rights Law (the "NYSHRL''), and the New York City Human
Rights Law (the "NYCHRL"). 1 (Comp!. (Dkt. 1) 'l'l 156-259.)
Pending before the court is Defendants' fully briefed motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 on the Complaint. 2 (Mem. of L. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for
Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") (Dkt. 44); Mem. of L. in Opp'n to for
Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp.'') (Dkt. 48); Reply Mem. of L. in Further
Supp. ("Def.'s Reply") (Dkt. 51).) Defendants move for an order
of summary judgment dismissing the Complaint.
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII); N.Y. Exec. Law§ 290 et seq. (tile
NYSHRL); N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-101 et seq. (tile NYCHRL).
2 All subsequent references to Rules are to tile Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. When quoting cases, unless otllerwise noted, all alterations are
adopted and all citations, emphases, internal quotation marks, and ellipses
are omitted.
1
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For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Plaintiff has
not raised a genuine dispute of material fact to support her dis-
crimination 	and 	retaliation 	claims 	and 	GRANTS 	IN 	PART
Defendants' motion as to those claims. However, the court finds
that Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to
her hostile work environment claims and DENIES IN PART De-
fendants' motion as to those claims. Accordingly, the court also
GRANTS IN PART Defendants' motion as to Plaintiffs aiding-
and-abetting claims insofar as they derive from her discrimina-
tion and retaliation claims, but DENIES IN PART Defendants'
motion as to Plaintiffs aiding-and-abetting claims insofar as they
derive from Plaintiffs hostile work environment claims.
I. 	BACKGROUND3
Plaintiff is a transgender woman. 	(Def.'s 56.1 ("Def.'s 56.1")
(Dkt. 47) 'l 1; Pl.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. ("Pl.'s 56.1") (Dkt. SO)
'l 1.) In August 2021, she started working for the Center as a
3 The following facts are drawn from the parties' respective E.D.N.Y. Civil
Rule 56.1 statements, the true and accurate copies of the documents relied
on in, and attached to, those statements, and the parties' briefing. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.l(c)(l)(A) ("A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is gen-
uinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials."). Unless otherwise noted, these facts are not in dispute.
To the extent an assertion or denial of fact is not supported by admissible
evidence, the court disregards that assertion or denial. See E.D.N.Y. Civ. R.
56.l(d) ("Each statement by the movant or opponent under Rule 56.l(a)
and (b), including each statement denying and controverting any state-
ment of material fact, must be followed by citation to evidence that would
be admissible."); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.
2001) ("[W]here there are no citations or where the cited materials do not
support the factual assertions in the [Rule 56.1) Statements, the Court is
free to disregard the assertion[s)."), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
2
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Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA''). (Id.) During her employ-
ment, 	she 	reported 	directly 	to 	various 	Nurse 	Supervisors,
including Defendant Ellis, (Pl.'s 56.1 'I 3; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter
Stmt. (Dkt. 52) 'I 3.), and Defendant Benjamin, the Director of
Nursing who oversaw the nursing department. (Pl.'s 56.1 'I 3;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 3.)
A. 	Specific Comments and Individuals that Plaintiff
Claims to have Reported to the Individual
Defendants
It is undisputed that throughout Plaintiffs time at the Center, she
made complaints to the Center's leadership about colleagues
making inappropriate comments towards her, including about
her transgender status. (Pl.'s 56.1 '158; Def.'s 56.1 '158). How-
ever, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff identified specific
individuals when making her complaints. The Individual Defend-
ants each testified that Plaintiff repeatedly refused to provide
them with the names of any employees who allegedly made in-
appropriate comments towards her. (Def.'s 56.1 '160.) According
to Plaintiff, however, she did provide the names of such employ-
ees, 	including 	verbally 	identifying 	certain 	employees 	to
Defendant Greenberg after he showed her images of employees'
work !Ds.4 (Pl.'s 56.1 '1'160, 164, 166-67.)
Plaintiff says that another CNA employed by the Center named
Tenant asked Plaintiff if she was the "famous 'Ms. Charles"' and
told Plaintiff that she had learned about Plaintiffs transgender
status from "gossip" at the Center. (Pl.'s 56.1 '1'198-100; Def.'s R.
4 Although Greenberg denies that Plaintiff identified any individuals to
him, (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1'1164, 166-167), the court must view
the evidence at this stage "in the light most favorable" to Plaintiff because
she is "the nonmoving party.'' Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S.
206, 216 (2015) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). The
same is true for many facts that the court discusses below.
3
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56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 98-100.) Plaintiff testified that she com-
plained to Benjamin about Tenant's comments on two separate
occasions, but was sent away without any investigation ensuing.
(Pl.'s 56.1 '1'1102-107.)
Plaintiff also testified that Simone Grant, another Center em-
ployee, said openly and loudly "for everyone to hear" that
Plaintiff should never have been hired to be in the union because
"that f*gg*t don't do nothing."5 (Pl.'s Depo. Tr. (Dkt. 49-1) at
226:5-25; Pl.'s 56.1 'I 130.) Plaintiff states that she reported
Grant's comment to Defendant Ponce, the Human Resources Di-
rector. (Pl.'s 56.1 'I 131.) Plaintiff testified that Ponce told her
that she would "follow up" about Plaintiffs complaint, but never
did. (Id. '1132.)
Plaintiff submitted a statement to Benjamin complaining that
Debra Thomas, a fellow CNA, had told an X-ray technician that
Plaintiff was transgender. (Def.'s 56.1 '163; Pl.'s 56.1 'I'! 63, 134-
35.) Although Benjamin investigated and found the complaint
unsubstantiated, the Center required Thomas to undergo in-ser-
vice training on teamwork and respecting others. (Def.'s 56.1 'I
67; Pl.'s 56.1 '167.) Benjamin did not speak with the X-ray tech-
nician because he was not an employee of the Center and
Benjamin did not know his identity. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt.
'1'166, 136.) Plaintiff also sent a letter to Ponce about the incident
with Thomas, but Ponce did not take any action on it. (Pl.'s 56.1
'1'1138-39.) Ponce testified that she did not take any action be-
cause 	she 	did 	not 	oversee 	investigations 	into 	employee
complaints, and because Benjamin had already completed her
investigation by the time that Ponce received the letter. (Def.'s R.
5 Defendants note that the "testimony Plaintiff cites does not even mention
[] Grant and describes what she allegedly said to Sabo." (Def.'s R. 56.1
Counter Stmt. 'I 130.) Another portion of Plaintiffs Deposition, however,
does mention the altercation and quote. (Pl.'s Depa. Tr. at 226:5-25.)
4
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56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 138-39.) However, Plaintiff points totes-
timony by Ponce and Greenberg that they were unaware of any
investigation by Benjamin.6 (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'f 140, 142.)
Plaintiff had an interaction with a patient, Marlene, who told
Plaintiff that she would never consider Plaintiff to be a woman.
(Pl.'s 56.1 '1108; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1108.) Nickso Mar-
tellus, Assistant Director of the Center, witnessed the comment
and discussed it with Plaintiff afterwards. (Pl.'s 56.1 '1109; Def.'s
R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 109.) Plaintiff testified that Martellus
told her not to "go near Marlene" and reassigned her so that she
no longer needed to care for Marlene. (Pl.'s 56.1 '1110; Def.'s R.
56.1 Counter Stmt. '1110.) Martellus then said that she would
report the incident to Benjamin, who Plaintiff believes took no
further action. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 111-12; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt.
'l'l 111-12.) Plaintiff did not care for Marlene after the incident,
but remained responsible for bringing her food. (Pl.'s 56.1 '1113;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1113.)
B. 	General Complaints Plaintiff Claims to have Raised
with the Individual Defendants
Plaintiff also raised general complaints with the Individual De-
fendants. She had multiple discussions with Defendant Sabo--
then-Assistant Hospital Administrator-about employees making
fun of her because she was transgender. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 143-46,
162; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 143-46, 162.) On at least
three occasions, she complained to Ponce. (Pl.'s 56.l '1'1147-48;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 147-48.) Greenberg directed
6 Defendants point to competing testimony in which they claim that Green-
berg discussed with Benjamin and Ponce the need to investigate. (Def.'s R.
56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 142.) Those citations, however, selectively quote
Greenberg's testimony. He stated that he "honestly can't recall" what he
had said to Benjamin and Ponce, but that he "probably'' discussed the need
to "address what's going on over here." (Greenberg Tr. (Dkt. 49-4) at
45:11-17.)
5
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Ponce to draft a statement titled "Note To File," stating that Plain-
tiff had approached Ponce regarding general complaints. (Pl.'s
56.1 'l'l 149-150; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l 149-150.)
Greenberg, however, did not have further discussions with Ponce
regarding the Plaintiff's complaints. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l 151; Def.'s R.
56.1 Counter Strnt. '! 151.) Plaintiff also had a separate conver-
sation with Greenberg in which she told him that she was
generally being "harassed" and "alienated" in her unit by other
employees. (Pl.'s 56.1 '! 165; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '! 165.)
Similarly, Plaintiff told Ellis about issues she was experiencing at
the Center, including being called a "male" and not being ac-
cepted for her "gender." (Pl.'s 56.1 '! 152; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter
Strnt. '! 152.) Ellis testified that each time Plaintiff told her about
these issues, she told Plaintiff to talk to Benjamin. (Pl.'s 56.1 'I
153; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. '! 153.) The parties disagree as
to whether Plaintiff spoke to Benjamin to complain more gener-
ally about her work environment and discrimination. (Pl.'s 56.1
'l'l 154-55; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 154-155.) Regardless,
Plaintiff testified that she felt "nothing was being done" when she
complained to Benjamin and Sabo because they did not call her
in to discuss her complaints. (Pl.'s 56.1 '! 161.)
C. 	Altercations Involving Plaintiff that Individual
Defendants Investigated
Plaintiff was also involved in at least four verbal altercations dur-
ing her time at the Center. This section addresses the first three;
and the fourth, which led to her termination, is addressed below.
Infra Section I.D.
The first altercation occurred on October 8, 2021 between Plain-
tiff and Nurse Latoya Meikle. (Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 5-6; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 5-
6.). At the time of the incident, Meil<le did not know that Plaintiff
was transgender and Plaintiff did not report that Meil<le made
any discriminatory comments during the altercation. (Def.'s 56.1
'l'l 6, 8; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 6, 8.) 	However, during the altercation with
6
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Meikle, Plaintiff maintains that another CNA-Laudanie Louis-
saint-pressed up against Plaintiff's buttocks because she was
transgender. (Def.'s 56.1 '19; Pl.'s 56.1 'I'! 9, 88, 91; Def.'s R. 56.1
Counter Strnt. 'I 91.) Benjamin investigated, including taking
statements from Plaintiff and Meilde. (Def.'s 56.1 'I 7; Pl. 's 56.1
'I 7.) Plaintiff testified that she disclosed her transgender status
to Benjamin for the first time during that meeting. (Pl.'s 56.1 'I
90.) Prior to this incident, no one had made complaints about
Plaintiff or raised allegations of misconduct against her with Ben-
jamin. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'I 96-97; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'I 96-
97.) Following the investigation, Benjamin issued a Disciplinary
Action Form ("DAF") to Plaintiff, stating that Plaintiff acted "un-
acceptib [ly]" by "using profanity and making threats" and issuing
her a written warning. (Pl.'s 56.1 '112-13; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter
Strnt. '1'112-13.) Meikle received a "nearly identical DAF to the
one Plaintiff received." (Def.'s 56.1 '115; Pl.'s 56.1 '115.) Plaintiff,
however, refused to sign the DAF because she did not agree that
its contents were accurate. (Def.'s 56.1 '1'114, 92; Pl.'s 56.1 '1'114,
92.)
The second altercation occurred on March 16, 2022 between
Plaintiff and another CNA, Judith Noel, in the Center's shower
room. (Def.'s 56.1 '1'117, 114; Pl.'s 56.1 '1'117, 114.) During that
argument, Plaintiff states that Noel told her "you think you are a
real woman, but you went to surgery and had a vaginoplasty."
(Pl.'s 56.1 'l'I 18, 114, 118-19.) Noel denies making this state-
ment. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. '1'1114, 118-19.) After the
incident, both gave statements to Human Resources. (Def.'s R.
56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'I 18, 115-17; Pl.'s 56.1 '1'1115-17.) Benja-
min again investigated, but determined that because it was
Plaintiff's word against Noel's, she could not move forward other
than by giving both individuals a code of conduct training. (Pl.'s
56.1 '1'118-19, 120-22; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. '1'119, 120-
22.) Plaintiff also claims that she reported Noel calling Plaintiff
gay and stating her dislike for "LGBT" individuals. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'I
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156-60.) Defendants deny that Plaintiff identified Noel by name.
(Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1'1156-60.)
Plaintiff's third altercation occurred the following month, April
2022, with Nurse Ezra Rowe. (Def.'s 56.1 'I 20; Pl.'s 56.1 'I 20.)
Benjamin testified that during her investigation of this incident
she spoke with Plaintiff and at least seven other witnesses. (Def.'s
R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 21.) Plaintiff contends that Benjamin
only spoke with her after the Center had already determined to
discipline her and that she received a "write-up" at the same
time.7 (Pl.'s 56.1 '1'121, 123.) Benjamin determined that Plaintiff
had acted inappropriately and unprofessionally by ''yelling [and]
carrying on very loudly on the unit, in the resident care area."8
(Def.'s 56.1 'I 22; Pl.'s 56.1 'I 22; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I
124.)
D. 	Actions that the Center Took to Address Plaintiffs
Complaints and Altercations
At this point, all agree that the Center took at least some action
to address Plaintiffs complaints. On June 27, 2022, Plaintiff met
with Greenberg, Benjamin, Ponce, Sabo, and a representative
from 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East ("the Union").
(Def.'s 56.1 '168; Pl.'s 56.1 'I 68; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I
161.) The meeting was held to address Plaintiffs complaints of
7 The "write-up" that Plaintiff refers to appears to be her DAF, which she
received on May 4, 2022, and which stated that Plaintiffs behavior was
"unacceptable" and "impacts negatively." (Def.'s 56.1 'l 24; Def.'s R. 56.1
Counter Stmt. 'l 24.)
8 Two other incidents purportedly occurred in 2022. The first involved a
complaint from a resident's family member about Plaintiff. (Def.'s 56.1 'l
26; Pl.'s 56.1 '] 26.) The second arose from a dispute with Nurse Melissa
Dyer. (Def.'s 56.1 '] 28; Pl.'s 56.1 '128.) An Assistant Director of Nursing
witnessed the exchange and wrote a statement attesting that Plaintiff and
Dyer "had a loud verbal dispute at the nursing station" that "was very un-
professional.'' (Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 29, 31; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 29, 31.)
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harassment and inappropriate comments from colleagues, in-
cluding about her transgender status. (Def.'s 56.1 'l 68; Pl.'s 56.1
'l 68; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l 161.) The parties dispute
whether Plaintiff gave the names of anyone who made those
comments. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 70, 171; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l
70, 171.) Plaintiff testified that Greenberg showed her images of
employees' work IDs and she identified individuals who made
discriminatory comments towards her, which Defendants deny.
(Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 166-67; Def. R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l 166-67.)
Defendants contend that during the June 2022 meeting, Green-
berg asked Plaintiff if there was anything the Center could do to
make her workplace environment more comfortable and less
stressful. (Def.'s 56.1 'l 71; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l 71.)
Plaintiff testified that Greenberg said he could not do anything
about her complaints, and could not ''ban everybody," and told
her that "if you're feeling that [the Center] is not a safe place for
you to work [], then you should find another place to work."
(Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 71, 168-69.) Defendants claim that Plaintiff takes
these statements out of context, or that Greenberg did not say
them at all. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l 168-69.)
Plaintiff testified that after the meeting there was no "decision"
made, no investigation pending, and no discussion of next steps
or actions. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 172-73, 177-78.) Greenberg testified
that this was because he was left with the impression that Plain-
tiff would let them know whether she would be happier working
at a different facility, whether she wanted to change her shift, or
whether she had any other suggestions for addressing the diffi-
culties she allegedly was experiencing. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 172-73, 176;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l 172-173, 176.) Sabo and Benja-
min similarly testified that neither of them was assigned any task
or responsibility concerning Plaintiffs complaints after the meet-
ing. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 174-75; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Strnt. 'l'l 174-
75.)
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Plaintiff testified that she sent a follow-up letter the next day (the
"June 28th Letter''), and produced the letter allegedly written in
June 2022 in discovery. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 180-81.) In the June 28th
Letter, Plaintiff purportedly "follow[ed] 	up with the meeting
[and] investigation" and stated that Greenberg could have made
sure that the work environment at the Center was "free" from
being ''.judge[d], harassed, or hostile." (Id. 'l'l 72, 180-81.) The
letter also stated that "if action were taken ... from the start,"
she would not have been a victim of "depression, anxiety'' or feel
"uncomfortable." (Id. 'I'! 72, 182.) Defendants, however, contend
that the Center "never received" Plaintiffs June 28th Letter,
pointing to Benjamin's testimony. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I
72, 180.) Plaintiff points to Ponce's testimony that Greenberg
gave her the June 28, 2022 letter "to put in [Plaintiffs] chart''-
though Ponce did not discuss the contents of the letter with
Greenberg or with Plaintiff. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 184-85.)
Plaintiff also sent an additional letter two days after the meeting
(the "June 29th Letter"), which she also produced in discovery.
(Def.'s 56.1 'I 73; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 73, 183.) The June 29th Letter
reiterated Plaintiffs concerns about discrimination relating to her
gender identity but neither named any individuals who allegedly
harassed her nor suggested any actions she wished the Center to
take. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 73.) Benjamin instructed
Ponce to place the letter in Plaintiffs chart. (Pl.'s 56.1 'I 187;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'I 187.) But, as with the June 28th
Letter, Benjamin and Ponce did not discuss the contents further.
(Pl.'s 56.1 'l 188; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1188.)
That September, the Center held a series of mandatory town hall
meetings (the 'Town Halls"). 	(Def.'s 56.1 'l 74.) Defendants
maintain that during the Town Halls the Center retrained staff
on its anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, as well as
employee tolerance and acceptance. (Id.) Plaintiff disagrees. (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that these were merely listed as "talking points"
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ahead of the meeting but not "discussed" at the one she attended.
(Id.; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 206-207.) Instead, she contends that "lateness"
and "abuse"were the topics discussed. (Def.'s 56.1 'l 74; Pl.'s 56.1
'l 208.) Plaintiff further asserts, pointing to Greenberg's testi-
mony, that the Center held the meetings because it ''.just had to
show [Plaintiff] that [it was] doing something" in response to her
complaints. (Def.'s 56.1 'l 74; Pl.'s 56.1 'l 209) Defendants point
to competing testimony from Benjamin and Greenberg, who
were presenters at the Town Halls, that anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment 	policies, 	and 	employee 	tolerance 	and 	ac-
ceptance were topics covered during each town hall meeting.
(Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 74-75, 206-209.)
Plaintiff testified that she continued to complain about her
coworkers between June 2022 and March 2023, when she was
terminated. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l 190.) Defendants note that Plaintiff has
provided no documentation beyond her own testimony of raising
complaints other than the incidents that Benjamin was already
investigating. (Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l 190.)
E. 	Plaintiffs Final Altercation with McNeil that Led to
Her Termination
Several months after the Town Halls, on March 11, 2023, Plain-
tiff had an altercation with another CNA, Crystal McNeil. (Def.'s
56.1 'l 34; Pl.'s 56.1 'l 34.) Defendant Ellis, who was on the other
side of the floor when the altercation occurred, reported hearing
a ''very loud commotion" and seeing Plaintiff trying to move to-
ward McNeil. (Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 35-37; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 35-37.) Ellis
attempted to physically restrain Plaintiff. (Def.'s 56.1 'l 37; Pl.'s
56.1 'l 37.) According to Plaintiff, the incident began with McNeil
yelling at her and calling her a "f**king f*gg*t" and a "gay a*s."
(Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 37-38, 192-193, 196.) Plaintiff maintains that she
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went to report McNeil's comments to Nurse Powell, but that Pow-
ell was unreceptive. 9 (Id. 	"f"f 37-38, 194-196.) McNeil then
purportedly continued to harass Plaintiff, who eventually re-
sponded. (Id. "f"f 37-38, 195.) Plaintiff states that her response
did not involve profanity; but Powell stated that Plaintiff had a
"loud verbal outburst." (Id. "I 198; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. "I
198.) Ellis stated the same. (Pl.'s 56.1 "I 198.)
Plaintiff then testified that she was pulled aside and advised to
"stop" and immediately complied. 10 (Id. "f"f 37-38, 199; see also
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. "I 200.) Ellis, however, testified that
she tried to physically restrain Plaintiff and move her into a dif-
ferent room to avoid a physical altercation. 	(Def.'s R. 	56.1
Counter Strnt. '[ 199.) Plaintiff testified that McNeil continued to
yell at Plaintiff and that no one tried to stop McNeil. (Pl.'s 56.1 "I
200.) A staff member who witnessed the event called security,
who escorted both Plaintiff and McNeil out of the building.
(Def.'s 56.1 "f"f 39-40; Pl.'s 56.1 "f"f 39-40.) Both were immedi-
ately suspended pending further investigation by Benjamin.
(Def.'s 56.1 "f"f 41-42; Pl.'s 56.1 "f"f 41-42.)
Benjamin conducted an investigation into the incident, which in-
cluded collecting and reviewing at least ten witness statements
and speal<lng with Plaintiff, McNeil, and other witnesses. (Def.'s
56.1 "I 43; Pl.'s 56.1 "I 43.) Plaintiffs written statement did not
mention McNeil mal<lng discriminatory comments, but Plaintiff
maintains that she mentioned McNeil's alleged discriminatory
comments to Powell verbally. (Pl.'s 56.1 "I'! 44, 194, 196.) Benja-
min consulted with Greenberg and Ponce, and then terminated
both Plaintiff and McNeil's employments. (Def.'s 56.1 "f"f 45, 49;
9 In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that Powell was "the charge nurse on
[her] floor." (Pl.'s Depo. Tr. (0kt. 49-1) at 176:16-18.)
10 Although Plaintiff notes in her Rule 56.1 statement that Benjamin had
pulled her aside, she testified in her deposition that it was Ellis who did so.
(Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '1'137-38.)
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Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 45, 49.) Plaintiff was issued a termination notice de-
scribing the incident and explaining the Center's finding that she
was culpable, which she refused to sign. (Def.'s 56.1 '['[ 47-48;
Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 47-48.) Plaintiff testified that the notice did not ac-
curately describe the incident and that she "did nothing wrong."
(Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 202-203.) Further, she claims that her termination
was retaliation for "defend [ing]" herself against McNeil and oth-
ers. (Pl.'s 56.1 '[ 214.)
The Union grieved both Plaintiff and McNeil's terminations.
(Def.'s 56.1 '['[ 51, 54; Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 51, 54.) With regard to Plain-
tiff, the Center offered to reinstate her, with the condition that
Plaintiff sign an agreement indicating that, among other things,
any further "violation of issues pertaining to Unprofessional Con-
duct/Failure to Follow Policy & Procedure and Breach of Work
Rule by [Plaintiff] within twenty-four (24) months from the date
of [the] Agreement shall constitute just cause for discharge."
(Def.'s 56.1 '[ 52; Pl.'s 56.1 '[ 52.) Benjamin testified that prior to
Plaintiff's termination, she had never included a "last chance pro-
vision" as part of an employee's discipline. (Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 216-19;
Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '['[ 216-19.) Plaintiff rejected the
Center's offer. (Def.'s 56.1 '[ 53; Pl.'s 56.1 '[ 53.) Plaintiff testified
that she did so because she did not wish to return to a work en-
vironment in which she had faced discriminatory comments and
nothing was being done to address them. (Pl.'s 56.1 '['[ 53, 210.)
She further testified that she was "afraid" that if she returned, the
"same thing'' would happen again. (Id. '['[ 54, 212.) Plaintiff also
testified that the agreement's language gave Plaintiff the impres-
sion that "if she were attacked by her coworkers and forced to
defend herself and her rights in the near future," she would again
be terminated. (Id. '[ 215.)
By contrast, McNeil's termination was converted to a six-week
suspension. (Id. '['[ 57, 204.) Greenberg testified that the Union
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asked that the Center show "understanding'' toward McNeil be-
cause the incident was her first disciplinary action. (Pl.'s 56.1 '[
205; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '[ 56.) McNeil was not offered
a "last chance agreement" comparable to the one presented to
Plaintiff. (Pl.'s 56.1 '[ 217; Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. '[ 217.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of!aw.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although the moving party
bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact, "once such a showing is made, the non-
movant must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a gen-
uine issue for trial."' Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., 68 F.4th
99, 108 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224
F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000)). "An issue of fact is genuine if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35
(2d Cir. 2008). "A fact is material if it might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law." Id. The court must construe
the evidence at this stage "in the light most favorable to ... the
nonmoving party." Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S.
206, 216 (2015) 	(citing Scott v. 	Harris, 	550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007)). However, on summary judgment, the court's role is not
to ''weigh the evidence, or assess the credibility of the witnesses,
or resolve issues of fact," but rather to "determine whether there
are issues to be tried." United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d
Cir. 1994). "Resolutions of credibility conflicts and choices be-
tween conflicting versions of the facts are matters for the jury,
not for the court on summary judgment.'' Id.
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings four sets of claims. She alleges three claims
against the Center under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NY-
CHRL: (1) discrimination, (2) a hostile work environment, and
(3) retaliation. (Pl.'s Opp. at 13-26.) She also alleges aiding-and-
abetting claims against the Individual Defendants under the
NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. (Id.) As explained below, Plaintiff has
raised genuine issues of material fact as to her hostile work envi-
ronment claims, but not as to her discrimination or retaliation
claims.
A. 	Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff's discrimination claims are based on the Center's deci-
sion to terminate her employment but not McNeil's after their
March 2023 altercation. (Pl.'s Opp. at 14-16.) Plaintiff contends
that she was treated differently than her "similarly situated non-
transgender colleague," McNeil, and was terminated "under cir-
cumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on
her sex, gender, and sexual orientation." (Id.) The court first ad-
dresses Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim before turning to
her NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims.
1. 	Title VII Claim
Under Title VII, it is unlawful "for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). Under Title VII,
Discrimination claims can be based on "disparate treatment'' or
"disparate impact." Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52
(2003); see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e). Disparate-treatment cases arise if "an em-
ployer has treated a particular person less favorably than others
because of a protected trait." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577. Such a plain-
tiff "must establish 'that the defendant had a discriminatory
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intent or motive' for taking a job-related action." Id. (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 	977, 985-86
(1988)).
Courts analyze Title VII discrimination claims under the three-
part burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Under the first step
of this framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
by producing evidence that she "(1) is a member of a protected
class; (2) was performing [her] duties satisfactorily; (3) was dis-
charged; 	and 	that 	(4) 	[her] 	discharge 	occurred 	under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the
basis of [her] membership in the protected class." 11 Graham v.
Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000); see St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,506 (1993) (calling this burden
"minimal").
A plaintiff may establish an inference of discrimination by show-
ing that her employer treated her less favorably than a "similarly
situated" employee outside of her protected group. Graham, 230
F 3d. at 39. 'Whether two employees are similarly situated ordi-
narily presents a question of fact for the jury." Id. To establish an
inference of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she was
"similarly situated" in "all material respects" to the comparator
employee. Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219,230 (2d Cir.
11 Both parties frame the second Graham element more permissively, re-
quiring only that the plaintiff show "she was qualified for the position she
held." (See Def.'s Mot. at 11 (quoting Mercedes v. New York City Dep't of
Educ., 779 F. App'x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order)); Pl.'s Opp. at
13 (quoting Mcconkey v. Churchill Sch. & Ctr., No. 24-CV-6091 (LlL) 2025
WL 2062195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2025)).) The court need not resolve
whether that formulation governs Title VII wrongful termination claims at
the summary judgment stage. Cf Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d
297, 307 (2015) (applying that standard at the motion to dismiss stage);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (applying it in a failure-to-hire case).
As explained below, Plaintiffs claim fails at the pretext stage regardless.
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2014) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39). Although what consti-
tutes "all material respects" will vary from case to case, the
touchstones are "whether the plaintiff and those [she] maintains
were similarly situated were subject to the same workplace
standards" and ''whether the conduct for which the employer im-
posed discipline was of comparable seriousness." Graham, 230
F.3d at 39. Their "circumstances must bear a 'reasonably close
resemblance,' but need not be 'identical."' Brown, 756 F.3d at 230
(quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then, under the sec-
ond step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the burden shifts to
the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the employer's decision. 411 U.S. at 802. The defend-
ant 	"must 	clearly 	set 	forth, 	through 	the 	introduction 	of
admissible evidence, the reasons for the [employment decision]."
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981).
If the defendant succeeds in articulating a non-discriminatory
reason, under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant's employment decision was "more likely than not" based, "in
whole or in part," on discrimination." Bart v. Gulab Corp., 96
F.4th 566, 576 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Walsh v. New York City
Housing Auth., 828 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 2016)); see Namibar v.
Cent. Orthopedic Grp., 158 F.4th 349, 363 (2d Cir. 2025). The
plaintiff can satisfy this burden in two ways. The first is to estab-
lish that the defendant's proffered explanation is pretextual (i.e.
false) "by showing that [its] proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Here, a showing that sim-
ilarly situated employees outside the plaintiffs protected group
"received more favorable treatment" can suffice. Graham, 230
F.3d at 43 (citing Hargett v. Natal Westminster Bank, USA, 78
F.3d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1996)). The second is to show that even
if the employer's explanation was not pretextual, discrimination
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was at least one "motivating factor'' in the employer's adverse
employment decision. Bart, 96 F.4th at 570.
The court finds that Plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima fa•
cie case under McDonnell Douglas, but fails to meet her burden
under the third step of McDonnell Douglas to show either that
Defendants' proffered non-discriminatory reason for her termi-
nation was pretextual or that discrimination was a motivating
factor in Defendant's decision to terminate her. 411 U.S. at 802-
03.
The parties disagree as to whether Plaintiff has satisfied the
fourth element of her prima facie case-that the adverse action
took place under circumstances "giving rise to an inference of
discrimination." 12
Plaintiff argues that her termination "giv[es] rise to an inference
of discrimination" based on her sex, gender, or sexual orientation
because the Center fired her but not McNeil-a non-transgender
employee-following their involvement in the same altercation.
230 F.3d at 38; (Pl.'s Opp. at 14). Plaintiff contends that she and
McNeil were "similarly situated" in "all" material "respects" be-
cause both were "employed as CNAs" at the Center, both were
"subject to the same workplace standards," and both were "ac-
cused 	of 	'unprofessional 	conduct'" 	arising 	from 	the 	same
incident. (Pl.'s Opp. at 14-15 (quoting Def.'s 56.1 'l 77).) Plaintiff
further contends that McNeil's conduct was not only of "compa-
rable seriousness" to her own, but was in fact more serious
because McNeil directed "discriminatory epithets" at Plaintiff
during the altercation while Plaintiff "did not return the same."
12 Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has satisfied the first three Gra-
ham elements of her prima facie case. See 230 F.3d at 38; (Pl.'s Opp. at 14
n.12; Def.'s Reply at 1). As noted, the court expresses no view on whether
to adopt the more permissive formulation of the second Graham element
that both parties endorse. See 230 F.3d at 38; (Def.'s Mot. at 11; Pl.'s Opp.
at 14).
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Graham, 230 F.3d at 38; (Pl.'s Opp. at 15 (citing Def.'s 56.1 'l'l
200-202; Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 192-98, 200-02)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish that the ad-
verse action took place under circumstances "giving rise to an
inference of discrimination." Graham, 230 F 3d. at 38; (See Def.'s
Mot. at 12-14.) Defendants point to the absence of any discrimi-
natory statements made by the Center's leadership regarding
Plaintiffs transgender status. (Def.'s Mot. at 13.) Defendants also
point to the fact that Plaintiff was not replaced by any other em-
ployee, 	transgender or otherwise. 	(Id.) 	With respect to 	the
differential treatment between Plaintiff and McNeil, Defendants
acknowledge that while both were initially discharged, McNeil's
termination was subsequently "converted to a six-week suspen-
sion," whereas Plaintiff ''was presented with a Last Chance
Agreement in order to be reinstated.'' 	(Def.'s Mot. at 14 (citing
Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 52, 57).) Defendants assert that this difference re-
flects 	the fact that McNeil and Plaintiff were not "similarly
situated" because Plaintiff "had received multiple written warn-
ings and verbal counselings prior to her altercation with McNeil,
whereas McNeil was never disciplined previously." (Id. 	( citing
Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 12, 23, 30-33, 55-56); Reply at 2.) While that dis-
tinction 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	analysis 	of whether Defendants'
proffered rationale is pretextual, it does not defeat Plaintiffs
prima facie case. Plaintiff and McNeil were still "subject to the
same performance evaluation and discipline standards" even if
their disciplinary histories differed, and a comparator need not
be "identical" to be similarly situated. Graham, 230 F.3d at 39,
40. Plaintiff therefore meets the "minimal" burden necessary to
establish her primafacie case. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.
Defendants have met their burden under McDonnell Douglas's
second step to offer a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
differential treatment. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
They contend that Plaintiffs behavior during her altercation with
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McNeil (which occurred in the presence of "staff, residents, and
family of residents") was "unacceptable by any objective meas-
ure," and that the decision to terminate her was made following
Benjamin's "thorough investigation" of the incident. (Def.'s Mot.
at 14 (citing Def.'s 56.1 ffff 37, 39-43, 45).) Defendants also argue
that the more lenient treatment of McNeil was justified by her
clean disciplinary record as compared to Plaintiffs history of
''warnings and verbal counselings." (See Def.'s Mot. at 14; Reply
at 2.) It is undisputed that McNeil, unlike Plaintiff, did not have
any prior instances of written discipline. (Def.'s 56.1 Counter
Stmt. ff 55.) Because "evidence of employee misconduct'' may
support "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [Plaintiffs]
termination," Defendants have met their burden. Ruiz v. Cnty. of
Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir. 2010).
At McDonnell Douglas's third step, Plaintiff fails to produce evi-
dence sufficient to show either that Defendants' stated reasons
are pretextual or that discrimination was a motivating factor in
her termination. See Bart, 96 F.4th at 576. Plaintiff argues that
the disciplinary incidents prior to the McNeil altercation are
''based on contested facts," see (Pl.'s Opp. at 16); supra Section
LC, but the truth of the underlying events leading to those disci-
plinary 	actions 	is 	immaterial 	to 	the 	question 	of whether
Defendants were motivated by Plaintiffs disciplinary record
when deciding to terminate her. See McPherson v. New York City
Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff also
emphasizes that the Center disciplined and ultimately termi-
nated her despite having "knowledge" of McNeil's and others'
discriminatory statements towards her during the altercation and
prior incidents. (Pl.'s Opp. at 16); supra Sections LC, E. However,
Defendants having knowledge of discriminatory statements by
other employees is not proof that the Center itself had a discrim-
inatory motive when dismissing Plaintiff. See Bart, 96 F.4th at
570. Nor would that render the Center's stated rationale for ter-
minating Plaintiff-her own misconduct 	during 	the 	McNeil
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incident and prior disciplinary history-"unworthy of credence."
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Bart, 96 F.4th at 576. Thus, Plaintiff
has not rebutted the Center's stated rationale for her termination.
Because Plaintiff has not raised a "genuine issue" of fact to rebut
Defendants' nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, her
Title VII discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment.
2. 	NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims Against the Center
Plaintiffs discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and the NY-
CHRL fare no better.
NYSHRL discrimination claims are "analyzed identically'' to Title
VII claims. Cooper v. New York State Dep't of Lab., 819 F.3d 678,
680 n.3 (2d Cir. 2016). Because Plaintiff has failed to raise gen-
uine issues of material fact under Title VII, she has similarly failed
to do so under the NYSHRL. Smith, 196 F.3d at 363 n.1.
NYCHRL discrimination claims must be analyzed independently,
and are construed more favorably to plaintiffs than Title VII
claims. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d
102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). Under the NYCHRL, to defeat summary
judgment, a "plaintiff need only show that her employer treated
her less well, at least in part for a discriminatory reason." Id. at
110 n.8. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment "only if
the record establishes as a matter of law that 'discrimination
play[ed] no role' in its actions." Id. (quoting Williams v. N. Y.C.
Haus. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38, 40 n.27 (1st Dep't 2009) (em-
phasis in original)). Even under this more permissive standard
however, Plaintiffs NYCHRL claim fails. Plaintiff argues that the
record contains evidence that she was treated "less well" than
McNeil because of her transgender status, and points to portions
of the record showing that Plaintiff was given a "last chance
agreement," which Benjamin had never included as part of an
employee's discipline, and which was not included in McNeil's
final discipline. (Pl.'s Opp. at 17 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'l'I 216-19).)
21
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But evidence of differential treatment alone is insufficient; Plain-
tiff must tie that differential treatment "at least in part'' to "a
discriminatory reason." Mihailik, 715 F.3d 110 n.8; (See Def.'s
Mot. at 16). Because she has not shown that the Center's offer of
a "last chance agreement'' was because of her transgender status,
her NYCHRL discrimination claim also fails.
* 	* 	*
Accordingly, the court grants Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on all Plaintiffs discrimination claims.
B. 	Hostile Work Environment Claims
Plaintiffs hostile work environment claims rest on the Center's
failure to address the persistent harassment she faced due to her
transgender status. As the court explains below, Plaintiff has pre-
sented triable hostile work environment claims under Title VII,
the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.
1. 	Title VII Claim
For a plaintiffs hostile work environment claim to survive sum-
mary judgment, a plaintiff must make two showings: (1) that the
harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the con-
ditions 	of the 	victim's 	employment 	and 	create 	an 	abusive
working environment," and (2) that there is a "specific basis for
imputing the conduct creating the hostile work environment to
the employer. 	Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir.
2009). Further, it is "axiomatic" that the plaintiff also must show
that the hostile conduct occurred "because of a protected charac-
teristic." Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2015).
Where, as here, the alleged harassers are not the plaintiffs super-
visor, the plaintiff satisfies the second requirement by showing
that her employer "was negligent in failing to prevent harass-
ment from taking place." Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421,
448-49 (2013). "Evidence that an employer did not monitor the
workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a
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system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged
complaints from being filed" is all "relevant'' to assessing such
negligence. Id. at 449.
Plaintiff has satisfied the first requirement. She has developed a
record of instances of abuse from her coworkers due to her
transgender status. Plaintiff testified that CNA Tenant, for exam-
ple, told Plaintiff that employees were "gossip[ing]" about her
transgender status." (Pl.'s Opp. at 17-18 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'f'l 98-
100); Def.'s R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. 'l'l 98-100.) Grant called Plain-
tiff a "f*gg*t'' in the workplace. (Pl.'s Opp at 18 (citing Pl.'s 56.1
'l 130).) CNA Thomas discussed Plaintiffs gender identity with
an X-Ray technician, "revea][ing]" her gender identity, and ask-
ing the technician why he was "flirting with [Plaintiff]" if she
''was born a man ... she had the surgery." (Id. at 19 (citing Pl.'s
56.1 'l'l 133-34) .) CNA Noel told Plaintiff ''you think you are a
real woman, but you went to surgery and had a vaginoplasty."
(Pl.'s 56.l '!'! 114).) Plaintiff has produced evidence demonstrat-
ing "sufficiently severe or pervasive" harassment due to her
transgender status. Duch, 588 F.3d at 762.
The parties' core disagreement lies in whether Plaintiff can im-
pute that harassment to the Center. See Vance, 570 U.S. at 448-
49. Defendants maintain that any harassment cannot be imputed
to the Center. Defendants argue that Plaintiff made only one
complaint about a 	specific employee 	(her complaint about
Thomas which was addressed by the Town Halls at which em-
ployees received anti-discrimination training), but otherwise "did
not identify any specific employees who purportedly made inap-
propriate comments," despite Defendants' repeated requests that
she do so (Def.'s Mot. at 17-18 (citing Def.'s 56.1 '! 60).) Accord-
ing to Defendants, 	Plaintiffs "unwillingness" to provide 	the
Center ''with the information needed to investigate her com-
plaints and ... take corrective action" precludes liability. (Id. at
18 (citing Sha/cry v. Trigen Energy Corp., No. 04-CV-1279 (SCR),
23
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2006 WL 44099, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2006)).) Plaintiff main-
tains that she did identify specific individuals on at multiple
occasions. (Pl.'s Opp. at 18-19 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 136-37, 160-
78) .) Specifically, Plaintiff testifies that she identified offending
individuals 	to 	Greenberg verbally by looking at employees'
"badges or "[work] IDs" and identifying who made the specific
comments. (Id. at 19-20 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 fjfj 166-67).) Plaintiff
also points to the June 29th Letter in which she states that during
the meeting she "described all of the times [she] complained
about other employees here." (Id. at 20.) Although Defendants
challenge Plaintiffs evidence on these points, (see Reply at 6- 7),
the court must view Plaintiffs evidence "in the light most favor-
able" to her at this stage, Young, 575 U.S. at 216. Additionally,
"choices between conflicting versions of the facts are matters for
the jury, not for the court on summary judgment." Rem, 38 F. 3d
at 644. Based on Plaintiffs evidence, "a reasonable jury'' could
find that she identified to the Center the specific employees that
she mentioned. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d at 35.
The question then becomes whether the Center "failed to re-
spond to complaints" such that it could be found to be "negligent
in failing to prevent harassment from taking place." Vance, 570
U.S. at 448-49 (2013). Defendants assert that the Center's re-
sponse to Plaintiffs complaints, which included meetings and
investigations, was reasonable. (Def.'s Mot. at 20.) Plaintiff con-
tends that the Center "elected to look the other way, allowing
harassment to go unchecked" in response to her complaints. (Pl.'s
Opp. at 17.) For example, Plaintiff testified that at the June 2022
meeting where she shared complaints, she was told that nothing
could be done about her complaints because it was not possible
to "ban everybody'' and points to testimony from Sabo, Benja-
min, and Greenberg that there were no next steps tal<en after the
meeting. (Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 71, 168-69, 172-75, 177-78; Pl.'s Opp. at
20.)
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Defendants also point to the mandatory Town Halls held in re-
sponse 	to 	Plaintiffs 	complaints, 	and 	contend 	that 	it 	is
"inconceivable" that the Town Halls did not address Plaintiffs
concerns. (Reply at 7.) They note that "[d]uring the [Town
Halls], employees were retrained on anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment 	policies, 	and 	employee 	tolerance 	and 	ac-
ceptance." (Def.'s Mot. at 20 (citing Def.'s 56.1 'l 74).) Plaintiff
maintains that such topics were merely "talldng points" for the
Town Hall, and that the only topics discussed were "lateness" and
"abuse." (Pl.'s Opp. at 21 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 206-208).) She also
points to Greenberg's testimony that the Town Halls were held
just "to show [Plaintiff] that we're doing something." (Id. ( citing
Pl.'s 56.l 'l 209).) She also testified that before the Center agreed
to hold the Town Hall, Greenberg told her "if you're feeling that
[the Center] is not a safe place for you to work [], then you
should find another place to work.'' 13 (Id. at 20 (citing Pl.'s 56.1
'l 169) .) Plaintiff asserts that she raised further concerns to Ben-
jamin about ongoing harassment after the Town Halls to no avail.
(Id. at 21 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'l 190).) Defendants dispute Plaintiff's
narrative as to Greenberg's testimony and the topics discussed at
the Town Halls. (Reply at 7-8.)
At this stage, the court must view the evidence "in the light most
favorable" to Plaintiff. Young, 575 U.S. at 216. It suffices that
Plaintiff has supported her account with evidence "that a reason-
able jury'' could credit. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d at 35. A
13 Defendants deny this. They contend that it would be "illogical" for
Greenberg to have told Plaintiff that she should "find another place to
work" if she was unhappy because he also asked during the meeting how
the Center could "make this environment safer and comfortable and free
of what you are going through." (Def.'s Mot. at 19 (citing Comp!. 'l'l 89,
90) .) While that may be, it is a question for the jury to decide, not the court
at the summary judgment stage. See Young, 575 U.S. at 216; City of Water-
bury, 542 F.3d at 35.
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reasonable jury could find that the Center "failed to respond" ad-
equately to her complaints, and that the Center was "negligent
in failing to prevent harassment'' of Plaintiff "from taking place."
Vance, 570 U.S. at 448-49. 	Additionally, "the promptness and
adequacy of an employer's response is generally a question of fact
for the jury." Dobrich v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat Div., 106
F. Supp. 2d 386, 394 (D. Conn. 2000). Thus, Plaintiff has pre-
sented a material dispute as to whether such harassing conduct
could be imputed to the Center. See Duch, 588 F.3d at 762.
2. 	NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims
Plaintiff also presents adequate claims under the NYSHRL and
the NYCHRL. "Hostile work environment claims under Title VII
and the NYSHRL are governed by the same standard." 14 Tolbert
v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Summa v. Hof-
stra Univ., 	708 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2013)). And the
NYCHRL has a "uniquely broad and remedial purpose," and its
provisions "shall be construed liberally." Id. § 8-130; see Mihalik
v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 114 (2d
14 Defendants claim that the standard under the NYSHRL is "higher" than
under Title VII for hostile work environment claims based on nonsupervi-
sory employees' conduct. (Def.'s Mot. at 16.) That framing is misleading.
Defendants are correct that under the NYSHRL, "an employer may not be
liable for a nonsupervisory employee's discriminatory conduct under the
NYSHRL unless it "encouraged, condoned, or approved it." Cornelius v.
Moody's Invs. Serv., Inc., 224 N.Y.S.3d 46, 48 (1st Dep't 2024); Hoitv. Cap-
ital Dist. Transp. Auth., 805 F. App'x 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary
order) (stating the same). But as another court in this district has ex-
plained, Cornelius does not impose a heightened standard. It merely
affirms that following NYSHRL's 2019 amendments, employer liability for
a hostile work environment "depends on the plaintiff showing that the em-
ployer knew (or reasonably should have known) about the harassment but
failed to take appropriate remedial action." Trapani v. Freeport Pub. Sch.
Dist., No. 24-CV-3005 (JS) (SIL), 2025 WL 2306658, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May
2, 2025) (emphasis added) (quoting Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec.,
No. 19-CV-10042 (KPF), 2021 WL 76410, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021)).
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Cir. 2013). "For a hostile work environment claim under the NY-
CHRL to survive summary judgment," a plaintiff "need only show
the existence of unwanted [discriminatory] conduct." Menas v.
Uncle Nearest, 	Inc., 	No. 	22-CV-1449 	(PKC) 	(PK), 	2025 WL
917347, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025). Plaintiffs Title VII showing
satisfies the NYSHRL's identical standard and clears the NY-
CHRL's lower bars, and she therefore raises triable issues under
both statutes. See Smith, 790 F.3d at 439; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at
114.
* 	* 	*
In sum, Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute of material fact to
survive summary judgment on her hostile work environment
claims.
C. 	Retaliation Claims
Plaintiffs retaliation claims focus on the Center's purported deci-
sion to terminate her employment for reporting discriminatory
comments and actions directed at her. The court addresses Plain-
tiffs Title VII retaliation claim first, followed by her NYSHRL and
NYCHRL claims.
1. 	Title VII Claim
"Although retaliation claims under Title VII are governed by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3, rather than§ 2000e-2, which governs discrim-
ination claims, the McDonnell Douglas framework'' still applies to
them. Carrv. New York City TransitAuth., 76 F.4th 172, 178 (2d
Cir. 2023). "[T]o establish a prima fade case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in protected ac-
tivity [under Title VII], (2) the defendant was aware of that
activity, (3) she was subjected to a retaliatory action, or a series
of retaliatory actions, that were materially adverse, and (4) there
was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
materially adverse action or actions.'' Id. at 180. A plaintiff can
establish this final element either "directly, through evidence of
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retaliatory animus" toward the plaintiff, or "indirectly," through
"circumstantial evidence." Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., 94
F.4th 218, 240 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d
159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010)).
As in the discrimination context, "a defendant may rebut a prima
fade showing of retaliation by providing a legitimate, non-retal-
iatory reason for the allegedly retaliatory action." Carr, 76 F.4th
at 178 (citing Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 70
(2d Cir. 2015)). If it does so, the plaintiff then "must show a con-
nection between the protected activity and the adverse action,
that is, that the retaliation was a 'but-for' cause of the employer's
adverse action."' Namibar, 158 F.4th at 367 (quoting Banks v.
Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242,275 (2d Cir. 2023)); see Ya-Chen,
805 F.3d at 70; Carr, 76 F.4th at 178.
Plaintiff has established a prima facie case under this standard.
Both sides appear to agree that she engaged in protected activity
by complaining to the Center about the discriminatory harass-
ment she faced from fellow employees. (See Def.'s Mot. at 22-23;
Pl.'s Opp. at 23 n.4; Reply at 8.) Regarding the fourth element,
Plaintiff testified that she complained to Powell during her alter-
cation with McNeil (which occurred a week before she was
terminated) that McNeil had called her a "f**king f* gg*t'' and a
"gay a*s." (Pl.'s Opp. at 24 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 ff 196); see also Pl.'s
56.1 ff 196.) The Center contends that Plaintiff has failed to pro-
vide 	any "contemporaneous evidence" 	that she 	complained
specifically about McNeil's discriminatory remarks during their
altercation. (Reply at 9; see Def.'s Mot. at 23.) Instead, Defend-
ants note that Plaintiffs written report merely stated that McNeil
was "screaming and using profanity." (Reply at 9; see also Def.'s
R. 56.1 Counter Stmt. ff 192-94.) Defendants argue that even if
Plaintiff complained verbally to Powell about such statements,
she has provided "no evidence that Powell relayed any such com-
plaint to Benjamin or any other decisionmaker .'' (Reply at 9.;
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Def.'s 56.1 '145.) However, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Plaintiff complained to Powell verbally prior to her termination,
thus "establish[ing] a causal connection to support a [] retalia-
tion claim by showing that the protected activity was closely
followed in time by the adverse employment action." 15 Banks, 81
F.4th at 277 (internal quotation omitted).
Nevertheless, Defendants raise a legitimate, non-retaliatory rea-
son for terminating Plaintiff. 	Defendants contend 	that their
decision to terminate Plaintiff was based on her behavior during
the altercation with McNeil and her "substantial" prior discipli-
nary record. (Def.'s Mot. at 24.) Given the evidence cited by
Defendants in support of this explanation, it suffices to rebut her
retaliation claim just as it did her discrimination claim. (See id. at
14-16 (citing Def.'s 56.1 'l'l 37, 39-43, 45).)
AB with Plaintiff's discrimination claim, she has failed to rebut the
Center's proffered non-discriminatory explanation for its action.
"Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment at the pretext stage." Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC,
737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013); Namibar, 158 F.4th at 367.
Other than temporal proximity, Plaintiff has provided no affirm-
ative evidence to show that she would not have been terminated
"but for'' reporting McNeil's-or anyone else's-comments. (Re-
ply at 8-9 (citing Pl.'s Opp. at 23-24).) Accordingly, the court
must dismiss her Title VU claim.
2. 	NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims
The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL "employ a more liberal standard"
than Title VII for retaliation claims. Edelman v. NYU Langone
15 Given that Plaintiff has presented adequate evidence of her complaints
about McNeil to Powell to survive summary judgment, the court declines
to consider her alternative argument that her complaints to the Center
eight months prior to her termination "can still be actionable under Title
VII." (Pl.'s Opp. at 24.)
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Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 45 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Qorrolli v.
Metro. DentalAssocs., 124 F.4th 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2024) (ap-
plying same standard at summary judgment for retaliation claims
under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL)). To establish aprimafacie
case under those statutes, however, a plaintiff must still "demon-
strate 	that 	she 	took 	an 	action 	opposing 	her 	employer's
discrimination and that, as a result, the employer engaged in con-
duct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging
in such action." Id. Like under Title VII, a defendant can rebut a
plaintiffs primafacie case with "legitimate [non-retaliatory] rea-
sons for its actions." Id. (quoting Ya-Chen, 805 F.3d at 75-76).
The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show "either that
the defendant's reasons were pretextual, or that the defendant's
stated reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that
its conduct was based at least in part on discrimination." Id.
(quoting Ya-Chen, 805 F.3d at 75-76 (collecting cases for the NY-
CHRL standard)); see also id. at 45 n.9 (citing Qorrolli, 124 F.4th
at 122-23 to apply the same standard to the NYSHRL).
Even under the "more liberal" NYSHRL and NYCHRL, Plaintiff
has failed to rebut Defendants' proffered "legitimate reasons for
its actions." See Edelman, 141 F.4th at 45 (quoting Qorrolli, 124
F.4th at 122-23; Ya-Chen, 805 F.3d at 75-76). As under Title VII,
"evidence of temporal proximity alone is not enough to demon-
strate retaliation under the NYCHRL." Forresterv. Corizon Health,
Inc., 752 F. App'x 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order); see Ya-
Chen, 805 F.3d at 76-77 (affirming a grant of summary judgment
when an NYCHRL retaliation plaintiffs sole rebuttal to a defend-
ant was that her adverse employment decision "came soon after"
her complaint at issue). Given that the NYSHRL applies the same
standard, it yields the same result. See Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 122-
23. Thus, under both statutes, Plaintiff fails to establish a claim
for retaliation.
* 	* 	*
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For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants' motion
for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs retaliation claims.
D. 	Aiding-and-Abetting Claims
Finally, Plaintiff brings aiding-and-abetting claims against the In-
dividual Defendants. The court agrees that these claims must be
dismissed insofar as they stem from the Center's purported dis-
crimination and retaliation, but disagrees insofar as they stem
from the Center's hostile work environment.
The NYSHRL mal<es it an unlawful discriminatory practice "for
any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce" an employer to
discriminate or unlawfully retaliate, "or attempt to do so." N.Y.
Exec. Law § 296(6). The NYCHRL has "virtually identical" lan-
guage. Williams v. New York Housing Auth., 61 F.4th 55, 76-77
(2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158
(2d Cir. 2004)); see N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-107(6) ("It shall be
an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet,
incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden
under this chapter, or to attempt to do so.") Thus, the "same
standards" apply to claims under both statutes. Williams, 61
F.4th at 76-77 (quoting Feingold, 366 F.3d at 158). Under those
standards, a co-worker who "actually participates in the conduct
giving rise to a discrimination claim" is liable even if "that co-
worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff."
Feingold, 366 F.3d at 158.
Under the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL, an individual can only be
found liable for aiding and abetting acts of discrimination if the
plaintiff first establishes the employer's liability. Stidhum v. 161-
10 HilLside Auto Ave., LLC, No. 21-CV-07163 (OEM) (LB), 2025
WL 327973, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2025) (citing Falchenberg
v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Educ., 338 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2009) (sum-
mary order)); De Figueroa v. New York, 403 F. Supp. 3d 133, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 2019). As such, Plaintiffs failure to raise triable claims
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for discrimination and retaliation necessitates the same outcome
for aiding-and-abetting liability under those claims.
Plaintiff has, however, presented a genuine dispute of material
fact as to her hostile work environment claims against the Center.
"A supervisor's failure to take adequate remedial measures in re-
sponse to a complaint of discrimination can ... constitute actual
participation." McHemyv. Fox News Network, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51,
68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Parra v. City of White Plains, 48 F.
Supp. 3d 542, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). Viewing the evidence "in
the light most favorable to" Plaintiff, Young, 575 U.S. at 216, a
reasonable jury could find that each individual defendant "actu-
ally participate[d]" in the same conduct, Feingold, 366 F.3d at
158. The Individual Defendants all testified that they were aware
of Plaintiffs numerous complaints. (Pl.'s Opp. at 25 (citing Pl.'s
56.1 'l'l 98-100, 103-06, 108-09, 113, 130-37, 140, 142, 156-57,
160, 164, 166-67, 170); Def.'s Mot. at 8 (citing Def.'s 56.1 at 'l'l
58-61).) Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute regarding whether
Defendants took meaningful remedial measures to address or
eliminate the hostile work environment that she faced. (Pl.'s Opp.
at 25-26 (citing Pl.'s 56.1 'l'l 143-48, 150-59, 160-65, 171, 186-
89).)
The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as
to Plaintiffs aiding-and-abetting claims pertaining to discrimina-
tion and retaliation, but denies their motion as to Plaintiffs
aiding-and-abetting claims pertaining to her hostile work envi-
ronment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART Defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff regarding
her discrimination and retaliation claims. It DENIES IN PART De-
fendants' motion regarding Plaintiffs hostile work environment
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s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
claims. Similarly, the court GRANTS IN PART Defendants' mo-
tion regarding Plaintiffs aiding-and-abetting claims stemming
from discrimination and retaliation, but DENIES IN PART De-
fendants' 	motion 	regarding 	her 	aiding-and-abetting 	claims
stemming from a hostile work environment.
The court DIRECTS the parties to appear before the assigned
magistrate judge for the preparation of a joint pre-trial order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	Brooklyn, New York
October 9, 2026
33
NICHOIAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge
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