Yoon v. Honey 490 Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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DANA YOON, on behalf of herself and a class
and collective of similarly situated individuals,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
24 CV 7909 (RPK) (CLP)
Plaintiff,
-against-
HONEY 490 INC., et al,
Defendants.
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POLLAK, United States Magistrate Judge:
On November 13, 2024, plaintiff Dana Yoon, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated (collectively, the “plaintiffs”), commenced this action against defendants Honey 490
Inc., Honey 641 Inc., Honey 681 Inc., Honey 1414 Inc., Honey 2830 Inc., Honey 2132 Inc.,
Honey 810 Inc., Honey 833 Inc., Honey 33 Inc. (collectively, “Honey Nail” or the “Nail Salon”),
ABC Company, Jina Sun, and Jisoo Sun (collectively, “defendants”), alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), and the New York Labor Law
§§ 650 et seq. (“NYLL”), based on defendants’ failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, in
violation of the FLSA and NYLL, failure to pay for all hours worked in violation of NYLL §
191, failure to provide accurate wage notices and wage statements in violation of NYLL §§
195(1), (3), failure to reimburse for mileage and travel expenses, discrimination based on age
and nationality, and violations of the New York Health and Essential Rights Act (“NY HERO
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Act”), NYLL §§ 218-b, 27-d, and Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) standards for
Hazardous Work Environment, 29 U.S.C. § 654. (See Compl.1).
Currently pending before this Court is plaintiff’s motion under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to
conditionally certify a collective action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
persons, employed as a “cosmetologist, nail technician, skin care technician and/or eyelash
extension technician” during the applicable time period, and to authorize that notice be
distributed to members of the putative class. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification without prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that defendants operate a chain of nail salons as an integrated enterprise
under the shared trade name “Honey Nail.”2 (Compl. ¶ 7). Plaintiff alleges that the nail salons
are owned and operated by individual defendants Jina Sun and Jisoo Sun (the “Individual
Defendants”) as a common enterprise, as the individual salons are advertised jointly on
defendants’ website, www.honeynails.com, and share the same logo and provide similar
services. (Id. ¶¶ 8(a)-(c)). The nail salons are also alleged to share payroll methods and have a
single, centralized system of labor relations for employees. (Id. ¶ 8(d)). Finally, they share
supplies and employees which are interchangeable among the various locations. (Id. ¶¶ 8(e)-(f)).
According to the Complaint, the Individual Defendants are the owners and principals of
the Corporate Defendants, and they exercised operational control over all employees, had the
1 Citations to “Compl.” refer to plaintiff’s Complaint, filed November 13, 2024 (ECF No. 1).
2 These include Honey Nail salons located at 1) 490 Myrtle Avenue in Brooklyn, operated by Honey 490 Inc.; 2)
641 Vanderbilt Avenue, Brooklyn, operated by Honey 641 Inc.; 3) 681 Franklin Avenue, Brooklyn, operated by
Honey 681 Inc.; 4) 1414 Cortelyou Rd., Brooklyn, operated by Honey 1414 Inc.; 5) 28030 Jackson Avenue, Long
Island City, operated by Honey 2830 Inc.; 6) 21-32 44th Drive, Long Island City, operated by Honey 2132 Inc.; 7)
810 Fulton Street, Brooklyn, operated by Honey 810 Inc.; 8) 833 11th Avenue, New York, N.Y., operated by Honey
833 Inc.; 9) 33 Eagle Street, Brooklyn, operated by Honey 33 Inc.; and 280 Livingston Street, Brooklyn, operated
by ABC company (collectively, the “nail salons” and/or the “Corporate Defendants”) (Compl. ¶¶ 7(a)-(j)).
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power to fire and hire, supervised and controlled employee work schedules and conditions of
employment, and determined the rate and method of employee compensation during the relevant
times. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff alleges that the Corporate Defendants are an “enterprise engaged in
commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA. (Id. ¶ 11).
Plaintiff brings claims on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective and the NYLL Class for
failure to pay minimum wages and overtime wages under the FLSA and NYLL, and failure to
pay straight time for all hours worked in violation of NYLL 191(1)(a)(i). (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff
alleges that she was employed by defendants from February 26, 2020 until July 6, 2024,
regularly working four days a week, or occasionally three days a week, for over 10 hours per
day, with her shift beginning between 9:20 and 9:30 a.m. and ending at 7:50 p.m. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16).
However, she was required to wait until 10:00 a.m. to clock in, (id. ¶ 15), and perform off-the-
clock work for which she was not paid. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18). She alleges that from 2020 to 2022, she
was paid an hourly wage of $15.00, which increased to $16.00 per hour in 2023, and then to
$17.00 per hour on January 1, 2024. (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ time shaving
practices resulted in pay at less than the minimum wage across all hours worked. (Id. ¶ 17).
Furthermore, on occasion plaintiff was asked to work an additional day at other nail salon
locations; during these weeks, she worked more than 40 hours but was only paid at her regular
rate of pay for her overtime hours. (Id. ¶ 20).
Plaintiff also alleges that she and other members of the NYLL Class were not provided
with wage notices at the time of hiring, nor were they furnished wage statements in compliance
with NYLL § 195. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25). Plaintiff also claims that she was asked to transport two co-
workers to work every Saturday for two months and never received the promised compensation
for mileage driven and additional hours worked. (Id. ¶ 26).
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Furthermore, in bringing a discrimination claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant Jina
singled her out for cleaning duties, noting that plaintiff was “the oldest,” and that a coworker
overheard Jina say that she “disliked older employees,” ultimately leading to the resignation of
that employee. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28). Plaintiff further alleges that when older Korean employees took
short trips to Korea, Jina retaliated against them by reducing their hours and assigning them to
stores with lower earning potential, while younger Chinese employees who took vacations were
not discriminated against and did not face retaliation. (Id. ¶ 29). Moreover, while older Korean
employees were required to report directly to Jina when taking a day off, the younger Chinese
and Hispanic employees were only required to notify their store managers. (Id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff
also alleges that she was forced to work in a hazardous work environment based upon her
exposure to a store manager who had contracted tuberculosis overseas. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32).
Plaintiff asserts minimum wage and overtime violations under the FLSA on behalf of a
collective class of similarly situated employees employed as a “cosmetologist, nail technician,
skin care technician, [and] eyelash extension technician.” (Id. ¶ 33). She alleges that the
members of the collective were subject to substantially similar job requirements, were paid in the
same manner and under common policies and practices, and were not paid proper minimum and
overtime wages. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34). Plaintiff also seeks to bring a class action under the NYLL, for
various wage violations. (Id. ¶¶ 37–54).
On January 14, 2025, defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. (ECF No. 18).
Following an initial conference with this Court, the case was referred to Mediation on February
5, 2025. (Electronic Order, dated Feb. 5, 2025). The Mediation proved to be unsuccessful (see
Report of Mediation Unsettled, dated April 2, 2025), and on March 20, 2025, plaintiff filed the
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instant Motion to Certify FLSA Collective Action (ECF Nos. 21, 22).3 Defendants submitted
their Memorandum in Opposition on April 3, 2025 (ECF No. 23),4 and plaintiff’s reply was filed
on April 8, 2025.5 The motion was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Rachel P.
Kovner on July 31, 2025.
DISCUSSION
I. Conditional Collective Action Certification
A. Legal Standard for Conditional Certification Under FLSA Section 216(b)
Under the FLSA, in order to prevent “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers,” employers are required to compensate covered employees for all work performed,
including overtime. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a), 207(a)(1); see also Reich v. New York City Transit
Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the
FLSA, an employee may bring an action “‘to recover unpaid overtime compensation and
liquidated damages from employers who violate the Act’s overtime provisions.’” Gjurovich v.
Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Hoffmann v.
Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
Under the statute, an employee may bring a collective action “for and [on] behalf of
himself . . . and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). However, unlike a
class action brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a collective
action brought under the FLSA may be brought only on behalf of those employees who
affirmatively “opt in” by giving consent in writing to become a party to the action. Id.;
3 Citations to “Pl.’s Mem.” refer to plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Certify FLSA Collective
Action, filed March 20, 2025 (ECF No. 22-1).
4 Citations to “Defs’ Mem.” refer to defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition, filed April 3, 2025 (ECF No. 23).
5 Citations to “Pl.’s Reply” refer to plaintiff’s reply, filed April 8, 2025 (ECF No. 24).
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Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04; see also Iglesias-
Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Patton v. Thomson
Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
Courts use a two-step analysis to determine whether certification of a collective action
under the FLSA is appropriate. See Castro v. Spice Place, Inc., No. 07 CV 4657, 2009 WL
229952, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009). The first step involves “looking to the pleadings and
affidavits to determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied ‘the minimal burden of showing that the
similarly situated requirement is met.’” Id. (quoting Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D.
193, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). To meet this burden, “plaintiffs need only make ‘a modest factual
showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a
common policy or plan that violated the law.’” Doucoure v. Matlyn Food, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d
369, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. at 261). The
standard for approval under Section 216(b) is “‘considerably less stringent’” than the
requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Avila v. Northport
Car Wash, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Rodolico v. Unisys Corp.,
199 F.R.D. 468, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)).
“Although the Second Circuit has yet to prescribe a particular method for determining
whether members of a putative class are similarly situated, district courts in this circuit look to
the ‘(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses
available to defendants which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and
procedural considerations counseling for or against notification to the class.’” Laroque v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Guzman v. VLM,
Inc., No. 07 CV 1126, 2007 WL 2994278, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007)).
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“The second step, which typically occurs after the completion of discovery, requires the
court to make factual findings whether the class members are ‘actually similarly situated.’”
Avila v. Northport Car Wash, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (quoting Bifulco v. Mortgage Zone,
Inc., 262 F.R.D. 209, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “At that
juncture, the court examines the evidentiary record to determine whether the ‘opt-in’ plaintiffs
are, in fact, similarly situated to the named plaintiff.” Bifulco v. Mortgage Zone, Inc., 262
F.R.D. at 212 (quoting Hens v. ClientLogic Operating Corp., No. 05 CV 381S, 2006 WL
2795620, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If plaintiffs meet the “fairly lenient standard” required by the first step in the analysis, the
court will typically grant “conditional certification” and authorize notice to potential plaintiffs.
See Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. at 367. Although the statute has no
specific provision for issuing such notice, the Supreme Court in Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v.
Sperling held that it was appropriate for courts to authorize such notice under the FLSA in order
to serve the “broad remedial goal” of the Act. 493 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1989); see also Braunstein
v. E. Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a district court
“has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class
under the ‘opt-in’ provision of the [FLSA]”); Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. at 261
n.15. The burden is significantly less than that required to sustain a class certification motion
under Rule 23 because the FLSA’s opt-in provision merely provides an opportunity for potential
plaintiffs to join the action and is only a preliminary determination as to which potential
plaintiffs may in fact be similarly situated. See Patton v. Thomson Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d at
267; Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 104. After discovery, the
court then looks at the record again to “‘make[] a factual finding regarding the similarly situated
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requirement; if the claimants are similarly situated, the collective action proceeds to trial, and if
they are not, the class is decertified.’” Castro v. Spice Place, Inc., 2009 WL 229952, at *2
(quoting Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. at 197). Accordingly, the Court’s analysis
focuses on whether plaintiff is similarly situated to the putative class members.
B. Analysis
1. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Support of Conditional Certification
In moving for conditional certification, plaintiff relies on the allegations in the
Complaint, as well as on the factual assertions made in a Declaration from Ms. Yoon, filed
March 20, 2025 (“Yoon Decl.”) (ECF No. 22-4). In her Declaration, Ms. Yoon states that she
worked as a nail technician at three different nail salons operated by defendants: 1) 490 Myrtle
Ave., Brooklyn; 2) 28-30 Jackson Avenue, Queens; and 3) 833 11th Ave., New York, N.Y. from
February 26, 2020 until July 6, 2024. (Yoon Decl. ¶ 3). Although she worked at only three of
the Honey Nail salons, Ms. Yoon states that she understood all of the salons to be “operated as a
single integrated enterprise, as they shared the same owners, labor policies, payroll system, and
employment practices.” (Id. ¶ 6). She further represents that she was hired by Jina Sun and
Jisoo Sun, and that they are the owners of all the corporate defendants named in this case, and
exercised control over the day-to-day operations of all the Honey Nail salons. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21).
Plaintiff states that she regularly worked four to five days a week, typically starting work
at around 9:20 to 9:30 a.m. and leaving around 7:50 to 8:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 7). Occasionally, she
was required to work beyond her scheduled hours, for which she received no additional pay. (Id.
¶ 9). In addition to defendants’ time-shaving procedures, plaintiff also claimed that when she
worked five days per week, she exceeded 40 hours worked and was never paid overtime. (Id. ¶¶
10-12). She also states that she was not provided with written notice when her pay rate changed.
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(Id. ¶¶ 13-17). Therefore, she was unaware that she was entitled to an hourly wage and overtime
under the law and was prevented from recognizing and asserting her rights to correct these
violations. (Id.)
According to plaintiff, she knows that other cosmetologists, nail technicians, and/or
eyelash extension technicians were not paid minimum and overtime wages “because I have
spoken to them about it.” (Id. ¶ 22). She also states that she knows that other nail workers who
performed similar work were not provided with wage notices, again “because I have spoken to
them about it.” (Id. ¶ 23). She further claims that she personally observed other nail workers
experiencing the same time shaving scheme and wage violations. (Id. ¶ 24). She alleges that she
personally knows at least 14 other nail workers who experienced similar wage theft and unpaid
overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25). Based on her knowledge, plaintiff states that each Honey Nail salon
had at least 14 to 15 similarly situated employees, making the collective potentially over 100
employees across all locations. (Id. ¶ 26).
2. Defendants’ Opposition to Certification
In opposing plaintiff’s motion for collective action certification, defendants submitted the
Declaration of Jisoo Sun (“Sun Decl.”) (ECF No. 23-1), who disputes plaintiff’s claim that
employees were required to be at work before 9:50 a.m. (Sun Decl. ¶ 6). Sun states that if
plaintiff arrived early at work, she did so of her own volition. (Id.) Moreover, according to Sun,
employees routinely left work between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. (Id. ¶ 7). Sun also claims that
employees sign in when they arrive and employees rarely work more than seven hours on any
given day, and that, contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, the employees are permitted to take breaks
when they are not with a client. (Id. ¶ 8). Sun disputes plaintiff’s claim that she was required to
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work more than 10 hours in a given day, arguing that if she was on site more than 10 hours, that
was due to her own choice. (Id. ¶ 9).
Defendants also challenge plaintiff’s allegation that she was required to carpool with
other employees of the company, arguing that they carpooled “because they live close to each
other.” (Id. ¶ 5). Furthermore, defendant alleges that another employee did most of the driving
and plaintiff only drove on Sundays. (Id.) Defendant Sun also asserts that each Honey Salon is
a separate entity, with different owners. (Id. ¶ 12). Finally, defendant Sun challenges plaintiff’s
assertion of similarity between herself and other nail salon workers, arguing that her duties and
responsibilities as a nail technician were “very different” from other employees, such as
cosmetologists and eyelash extension technicians, and that these classes of employees have
different pay structures. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12). Indeed, defendants contend that there were no
cosmetologists or skin care technicians in the salons where plaintiff was employed, and that she
only worked with one eyelash extension technician. (Id. ¶ 11).
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient detail regarding other
potential plaintiffs necessary to establish that they are similarly situated. (Defs.’ Mem. at 5-6).
Defendants note that although plaintiff has dedicated four paragraphs in her declaration to claims
that she is aware of other salon workers who were similarly impacted by defendants’ policies,
she offers no names of other employees, nor does she provide a timeline of when she allegedly
spoke with other employees about similar wage violations. (Id. at 6). While acknowledging that
plaintiff’s burden is “minimal” at this stage, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to meet
her burden of showing that there were other employees subjected to the alleged time-shaving
practices or who worked more than 10 hours a day without overtime wages. (Id. at 7).
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3. Analysis
As an initial matter, to the extent that defendants have submitted the sworn declaration
of Jisoo Sun in opposition to the motion for collective action certification, this Court will not
pass on the merits of the factual disputes raised by that declaration. Courts have held that
defendants “may not defeat a court’s determination that [p]laintiffs are similarly situated by
submitting their own affidavits.” Colon v. Major Perry Street Corp., No. 12 CV 3788, 2013 WL
3328223, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (citation omitted); see also Winfield v. Citibank, N.A.,
843 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining to consider competing declarations
from defendants as “courts in this Circuit regularly conclude that such declarations do not
undermine the plaintiffs’ showing in the first stage of the conditional certification process”)
(citation omitted). Whether plaintiff can sustain her burden of proving that defendants violated
the FLSA is a question that is not properly before this Court on a motion for collective action
certification. See Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 CV 8819, 2006 WL 2853971, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (holding that courts “need not resolve the merits in order to find
plaintiffs and potential opt-in plaintiffs similarly situated for purposes of authorizing notice”);
Laroque v. Domino’s Pizza, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (holding that “the merits of plaintiffs’ claim
are not at issue in a motion for conditional certification”); see also Jason v. Falcon Data Com,
Inc., No. 09 CV 3990, 2011 WL 2837488, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011). At this stage, where
the court must “draw all inferences in favor of the [plaintiff],” Mendoza v. Ashiya Sushi 5, Inc.,
No 12 CV 8629, 2013 WL 5211839, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013), the Court declines to
consider the factual disputes raised by the Sun Declaration.
Turning to defendants’ other arguments, courts have consistently held that a plaintiff’s
affidavit alone is sufficient to justify certification of a collective class. See, e.g, Khamsiri v.
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George & Frank’s Japanese Noodle Rest. Inc., No. 12 CV 265, 2012 WL 1981507, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (granting conditional certification where plaintiff’s declaration alleged
that those “who performed work similar to hers” were “paid less than the statutory minimum
wage”); Iriarte v. Redwood Deli & Catering, Inc., No. 07 CV 5062, 2008 WL 2622929, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2008) (granting conditional certification where plaintiff submitted an
affidavit indicating that other individuals did not receive the wages to which they were legally
entitled, though he had not identified any other employees who sought to opt in); Bowens v.
Atlantic Maint. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 55, 82-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding a single plaintiff’s
affidavit attesting that all workers that held his position were required to work unpaid overtime
hours sufficient to warrant class certification). In addition, “[w]hile part of [p]laintiff’s basis of
knowledge is hearsay, the Court may consider hearsay in deciding a motion for conditional
certification.” Chang Yan Chen v. Lilis 200 West 57th Corp., No. 19 CV 7654, 2021 WL
135248, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2021).
Plaintiff contends that courts have issued notice based on employee declarations and that
a single plaintiff’s affidavit is sufficient to satisfy this burden. (See Pl.’s Mem. at 16 (citing
Zaldivar v. JMJ Caterers, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 310, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2016))); see also Hallissey v.
America Online, Inc., No. 99 CV 3785, 2008 WL 465112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), and Qing Tian
Zhuo v. Jia Xing 39th Inc., No. 14 CV 2848, 2015 WL 1514950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015).
However, in Zaldivar v. JMJ Caterers, the plaintiff not only provided a detailed description of
his own hours and pay, but also named specific employees subject to the same common policies,
and provided specific content of conversations that he had with these other employees about the
actions that he claimed constituted improper pay practices. See Zaldivar v. JMJ Caterers, Inc.,
166 F. Supp. 3d at 320-21. Here, plaintiff has neither identified a single fellow employee with
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whom she spoke about pay practices nor has she provided any information as to when the
alleged conversations took place or in what context. Cf., Mata v. Foodbridge LLC, No. 14 CV
8754, 2015 WL 3457293, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015) (holding that “[i]nformation regarding
where or when these observations or conversations occurred . . . is critical in order for the Court
to determine the appropriate scope of the proposed class and notice process”).
Indeed, courts have denied collective certification where the plaintiff fails to specifically
describe observations about other similarly situated employees or fails to provide any details as
to conversations with other employees. See, e.g., Yang v. Asia Mkt. Corp., No. 17 CV 6886,
2018 WL 2227607, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018) (denying class certification where plaintiff’s
affidavit was “extraordinarily general and vague” and failed to “mention a single specific
conversation that she had with coworkers about [d]efendants’ compensation practices”); Ji v.
Jling Inc., No. 15 CV 4194, 2016 WL 2939154, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2016) (denying class
certification where plaintiff’s attestations about coworkers were limited to their rates of pay, but
did not include that any other similarly situated employees worked overtime hours); Sanchez v.
JMP Ventures, L.L.C., No. 13 CV 7264, 2014 WL 465542, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014)
(denying certification where the plaintiff claimed to have knowledge regarding other employees’
hours and pay through observations and conversations, but failed to provide “any detail as to a
single such observation or conversation”) (emphasis in the original).
Here, the Complaint and plaintiff’s declaration merely reiterate in each instance
boilerplate language that she was aware that other employees were subjected to similar pay
practices “because I have spoken to them about it.” (Yoon Decl. ¶¶ 22, 23). Given plaintiff’s
failure to name or specifically reference any similarly situated employees, provide their positions
or the locations at which they worked, or describe the context and timing of the conversations
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referenced in her declaration (id. ¶¶ 22-27), she has failed to satisfy even the minimal burden of
showing that there were similarly situated employees subjected to the same wage and hour
violations. As the Declaration of Ms. Yoon suggests the possibility that she can make these
showings because she states that she “personally observed” and “personally [knew]” similarly
situated employees (id. ¶¶ 24-25), the Court denies the motion for conditional certification, but
without prejudice to renew if plaintiff submits a supplemental declaration curing the defects
noted above.
4. Defendants’ Arguments Regarding the Form of Notice
Defendants also object to the form of Notice to potential class members proposed by
plaintiff, asserting that: 1) prospective members of the collective should be informed that they
will be required to engage in discovery and testify at trial; and 2) the Notice should contain
defendants’ counsel’s contact information. (Defs.’ Mem. at 8). Defendants also disagree with
plaintiff’s proposal to serve the Notice to employees at eight of defendants’ locations, and to all
Honey Salon employees, including cosmetologists, skin care technicians, and eyelash extension
technicians, even though plaintiff only worked as a nail technician at three of the eight locations.
(Id.) Defendants argue that even if plaintiff has satisfied her burden to show that there are other
nail technicians employed at the three locations where plaintiff worked who are similarly
situated, plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that these other categories of employees were
subject to the same pay policies, nor has she sufficiently shown a common scheme or plan
involving employees engaged in different functions at different locations. (Id. at 8-9 (citing
Gomez v. Tri Boro Waterproofing Inc., No. 16 CV 2953, 2017 WL 11508011, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 11, 2017))). Thus, defendants argue that the proposed Notice is overbroad and that the
recipients should be limited accordingly. Finally, defendants argue that the period for the Notice
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should be limited to two years because plaintiff has not demonstrated in her pleading or
supporting declaration that the defendants acted willfully in violating the FLSA. (Defs.’ Mem.
at 9).
As discussed above, the Court has found that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden
of establishing that there are similarly situated employees sufficient to warrant certification of a
collective comprised of even just the nail technicians employed at the same three locations that
plaintiff worked. Accordingly, the Court finds no need to address the defendants’ objections to
the form of Notice at this time.
CONCLUSION
Having considered the various submissions of the parties, the Court denies without
prejudice plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification of the defined collective and does not
address defendants’ arguments with respect to plaintiffs’ proposed Notice and Consent to Join
forms. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a supplemental declaration to support a renewed motion
for conditional certification.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 2, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ Cheryl L. Pollak
Cheryl L. Pollak
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
Case 1:24-cv-07909-RPK-CLP Document 25 Filed 01/02/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
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