Superb Motors Inc. et al v. Deo et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
SUPERB MOTORS INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs, 	MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against-
23-CV-6188 (JMW)
ANTHONY DEO et al.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Emanuel Kataev
Sage Legal LLC
18211 Jamaica Avenue
Jamaica, NY 11423
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Superb Motors Inc., Team Auto Sales LLC and Robert A. Urrutia
Jeffrey Ruderman
Cyruli Shanks & Zizmor LLP
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2320
New York, NY 10170
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 189 Sunrise Hwy Auto LLC, Northshore Motor Leasing, LLC,
1581 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC,
1632 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1239 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 2519 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76
Fisk Street Realty LLC, 446 Route 23 Auto LLC, Island Auto Management, LLC, Brian
Chabrier, Joshua Aaronson, and Jory Baron
John A. Lentinello
Milber Makris Plousadis & Seiden, LLP
1000 Woodbury Road, Suite 402
Woodbury, New York 11797
Attorneys for Defendants Thomas Jones, CPA and Jones, Little & Co., CPA’s, LLP
Jeffrey Benjamin
The Linden Law Group, PC
250 Park Avenue, Ste 7th Floor
New York, NY 10177
Attorneys for Defendants Anthony and Sarah Deo, Dwight Blankenship, Marc Merckling,
Michael Laurie, Car Buyers NYC, Inc., Gold Coast Cars of Syosset LLC, Gold Coast
Cars of Sunrise LLC, Gold Coast Motors Automotive Group LLC, Gold Coast Motors of
1/19/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
LIC LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Roslyn LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Smithtown LLC,
UEA Premier Motors Corp.
Harry R. Thomasson
3280 Sunrise Highway, Ste Box 112
Wantagh, NY 11793
Defendant Appearing Pro Se
Ariel E. Ronneburger
Cullen and Dykman LLP
333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, 2nd Floor
Uniondale, NY 11553
Attorneys for Defendant Flushing Bank
Anthony C. Valenziano
Sherman Atlas Sylvester & Stamelman LLP
1185 Avenue of Americas, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10036
Attorney for J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
No appearances by the remaining Parties
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
On March 21, 2025, this Court issued an Opinion and Order that addressed several
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 164, 168, 175, 176, and 177), and Motions to Amend (ECF Nos.
178, 181). (ECF No. 230.) In relevant part, the Court concluded as such:
Deo 	Defendants' 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	No. 176 ) 	is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: (a)
Tortious 	Interference 	with 	Contracts, 	Business 	Relations, 	and 	Prospective
Economic Advantage against the Deo Defendants;(b) Defend Trade Secrets Act
Claims, including Misappropriation under the DTSA against the Deo Defendants;
(c) Violation of New York Judiciary Law § 487 against Thomasson; (d) Piercing
the Corporate Veil against Deo;(e) Violation of New York GBL § 349 against Deo;
(f) Permanent Injunction against Deo; Libertas Funding (g) Declaratory Judgment
against Deo (h) Contribution and Indemnification for Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, Breach of Loyalty and Conversion against Deo; and (i) Contribution and
Indemnification for Conversion and Aiding and Abetting Conversion, Fraud,
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Bready of Fiduciary Duty against Thomasson. (ii)the
Bank 	Defendants' 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	Nos. 164, 175 and 177)
are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The following claims are dismissed
with prejudice: (a) Permanent Injunction against Libertas Funding; (b) Plaintiffs'
RICO Claims against Bank Defendants; (c) Conversion claims against the Bank
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Defendants; 	(d) 	Negligence 	and 	Unauthorized 	Payments 	against 	the 	Bank
Defendants; (e) Drawee Liability against Chase Bank; (f)New York UCC §3-419
against the Bank Defendants; (iii) the CPA Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF
No. 168) is GRANTED. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: (a)
Plaintiffs' RICO Claims against CPA Defendants; (b)Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims
against Jones; and (c)Professional Malpractice against the CPA Defendants; (iv)
Plaintiffs' 	Motions 	for 	Leave 	to 	Amend 	(ECF 	Nos. 178 and 181)
are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this Order. Plaintiffs
are directed to file an Amended Complaint consistent with the rulings in the Order
on or before April 4, 2025.
(Id. at 119-121.)
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’1 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Federal Civil
Rule 54(b) and to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (ECF No. 365) in
connection with the above Order (ECF No. 230), that granted motions to dismiss brought by
Defendants Thomas Jones, CPA (“Jones”), Jones Little & Co., CPA’s LLP (“JLC”), and
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). The following parties oppose this application:
Defendants Jones and JLC (collectively, the “CPA Defendants”) (ECF Nos. 368-69), Deo
Defendants2 (ECF No. 375), Harry Thomasson3 (ECF No. 376), Flushing Bank (ECF Nos. 377-
78), and Chase4 (ECF No. 379). Plaintiffs also filed their reply. (ECF No. 389.) For the reasons
that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment and to certify an interlocutory appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (ECF No. 365) is DENIED.
1 All Plaintiffs jointly filed the instant motion. (See ECF No. 365.)
2 The “Deo Defendants” are Anthony Deo, Sarah Deo, Dwight Blankenship, Marc Merckling, Michael
Laurie, Car Buyers NYC Inc., Gold Coast Cars of Syosset LLC, Gold Coast Cars of Sunrise LLC, Gold
Coast Motors Automotive Group LLC, Gold Coast Motors of LIC LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Roslyn
LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Smithtown LLC, and UEA Premier Motors Corp. Their opposition adds no
substantive arguments and simply just adds that they join in on the CPA Defendants’ arguments. (See
ECF No. 375 at 2.)
3 Mr. Thomasson’s opposition adds no substantive arguments and similarly joins in on the CPA
Defendants’ arguments. (See ECF No. 376 at 2.)
4 Defendant Chase’s opposition adds no substantive arguments and joints in on the arguments made in the
substantive oppositions filed by the CPA Defendants and Flushing Bank. (See ECF No. 379 at 2.)
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 provides that,
[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and
all the parties' rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Rule 54(b) certifications “should not be granted routinely.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 949 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, there is a “historic federal policy against piecemeal
appeals.” Id. (quoting Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)).
“Rather, certification should be ‘granted only if there exists [] some danger of hardship or
injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.’” Id. (quoting Cullen v.
Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir.1980)).
To that end, the Second Circuit considers appeals either by final judgments that are
timely presented under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,5 or partial judgments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008). “A final judgment or order is one that
conclusively determines all pending claims of all the parties to the litigation, leaving nothing for
the court to do but execute its decision.” Id. An appealable partial final judgment is one that
adjudicates fewer than all of the pending claims and is entered upon the court's “express
5 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that “[t]he courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States….” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 651 F. App'x 22, 24, 26 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“Our appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to “final decisions” of the district court. 28
U.S.C. § 1291. … However, § 1292(a)(1) functions only as a narrowly tailored exception to the policy
against piecemeal appellate review.”)
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
determination that there is no just reason for delay,” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)) (cleaned
up); see also Poplardo v. Adelberg, No. 23-604, 2023 WL 4504459, at *1 (2d Cir. June 8, 2023)
(denying appeal and finding Circuit lacked jurisdiction as an order granting in part a motion to
dismiss was not a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
Therefore, for a district court to enter a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
the following must be met:
(1) multiple claims or multiple parties must be present,
(2) at least one claim, or the rights and liabilities of at least one party, must finally
be decided within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
(3) the district court must make “an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay” and expressly direct the clerk to enter judgment.
Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi, No. 02-CV-10055(RWS), 2004 WL 541842, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 125 F. App'x 371 (2d Cir. 2005); see id. (quoting Ginett v.
Computer Task Group, 962 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir.1992) (“A claim is deemed to be finally
decided ‘[i]f the decision ends the litigation [of that claim] on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment entered on that claim.’”)).
The Court must carefully determine whether the above is satisfied, or a party’s proposed
appeal will be dismissed. See Zanghi v. Callegari, No. 22-266, 2023 WL 1097560, at *1 (2d Cir.
Jan. 30, 2023) (dismissing appeal as all claims were not finalized); Pearson v. City of New York,
No. 24-1167, 2024 WL 5679217, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2024) (same). “The Second Circuit has
cautioned that Rule 54(b) motions should be granted only when there exists some danger of
hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal. ... Rule
54(b) is to be invoked sparingly.” Medina v. AAM 15 Mgmt. LLC, No. 21-CV-7492 (KMK),
2025 WL 2658615, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2025) (internal citations omitted) (denying Rule
54(b) motion).
Another route to appealability is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Under that statute, when
an order is not otherwise appealable, the district court may certify an appeal when “such order
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation….” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). However, similar to Rule 54(b), this is
used in exceptional circumstances. In other words, Ҥ 1292(b) is reserved for those cases where
an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted litigation.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101
F.3d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1996). “[I]nterlocutory appeals are presumptively disfavored, [and]
district courts have broad discretion to deny certification even where the statutory criteria are
met.” United States ex rel. Quartararo v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d
265, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Keeping these principles in mind, the Court considers the instant motion.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Entering of a Final Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
Plaintiffs first ask this Court to enter a final judgment in favor of the CPA Defendants and
Defendant Chase pursuant to Rule 54(b) because there are “no claims remain[ing]” against these
Defendants such that would allow Plaintiffs to perfect their appeal currently before the Second
Circuit. (ECF No. 365-1 at 5.) The CPA Defendants oppose arguing that Plaintiffs have not
provided a justified reason to have this Court grant this request or separate these claims from the
rest of the case. (ECF No. 369 at 1.) As further discussed below, a review of the relevant three
factors warrants denial.
First, there are multiple claims parties here. Thus, the first factor is easily satisfied.
Second, the claims against the CPA Defendants and Defendant Chase are dismissed at this stage
as the Court granted their respective motions to dismiss and found the same on reconsideration.
(See ECF Nos. 230, 314.) However, “[e]ven when the first two factors are satisfied, the district
court must still make a finding that entry of partial judgment is appropriate.” Lara-Grimaldi v.
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Cnty. of Putnam, No. 17-CV-622 (KMK), 2022 WL 736427, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2022)
(quoting Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi, No. 02-CV-10055, 2004 WL 541842, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 125 F. App'x 371 (2d Cir. 2005)). Therefore, as for the third
factor, there is reason to delay an appeal or final judgment. That is because separability of claims
is not enough and “not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately
appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims.”
Danaher Corp. v. The Travelers Indem. Co., No. 10-CV-121 (JPO), 2016 WL 1255739, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) (internal citations omitted). The third factor is satisfied
only when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which
would be alleviated by immediate appeal, for example, where a plaintiff might be
prejudiced by a delay in recovering a monetary award, or where an expensive and
duplicative trial could be avoided if, without delaying prosecution of the surviving
claims, a dismissed claim were reversed in time to be tried with the other claims.
Timperio v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 18-CV-1804 (PGG), 2020 WL 9211177, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020) (quoting Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d
11, 16 (2d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
None of those circumstances are present here. Notably, Plaintiffs do not argue that such a
situation exists here. Rather, Plaintiffs aver “judicial administrative interests militate in favor of
granting the relief requested as this case was stayed pending the appeal for some time, and the
appeal cannot be decided without a final judgment.” (ECF No. 365-1 at 9.) However, allowing
another possible appeal would further stall this matter, which has already seen far too many
delays and is at odds with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.6 See Netrebko v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., No. 23-
CV-6857 (AT), 2025 WL 2161448, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2025) (“When this matter
concludes, the parties will have a final judgment from which a consolidated appeal may be
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 provides in relevant part that the federal rules “should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
taken.”) Given the absence of real prejudice to Plaintiffs, and the Second Circuit’s disfavoring of
“piecemeal” appeals, denial is required here. See Ginett v. Computer Task Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d
1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating “federal policy generally disfavors “piecemeal” appellate
litigation”); Krandle v. United States, No. 22-CV-4977 (KMK), 2025 WL 674328, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2025) (same).
Plaintiffs further argue in their reply that inter alia there will be no delay because the
appeal may be decided prior to trial as there will likely be summary judgment. (ECF No. 389 at
1, 5.) However, Plaintiffs nor this Court can determine the timeline in the Circuit.
Accordingly, the Court denies the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b).
II. 	Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
Next, Plaintiffs request the Court to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). This application is likewise denied as no exceptional circumstances are present that
should alter the traditional appellate review after finality of this action. See In re Actos End-
Payor Antitrust Litig., No. 13-CV-9244 (RA), 2020 WL 433710, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020)
(quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in
Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting an interlocutory appeal
due to novel issues) (“only ‘exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic
policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.’”)).
First, Plaintiffs’ argument that this case involves novel issues because the March 21,
2025 Order was a 121 page decision is meritless. (See ECF No. 365-1 at 12.) The parties are well
aware of the different legal theories as well as different parties that are part of this case leading to
the lengths of some decisions. All of which are created by the parties’ doings when filing
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
numerous motions. Nonetheless, “[a] controlling question of law exists where a reviewing court
could decide an issue ‘quickly and cleanly without having to study the record,’ and where
reversal would terminate the action, or at least ‘materially affect the litigation's outcome.’”
DeSimone v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 3d 509, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting
Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Based on the
above, no controlling question of law is present here as the Second Circuit would have to “study
the record” given the size of the docket, reversal would not terminate this case and an appeal as
noted below would not materially affect the outcome here. As Flushing Bank also argues,
“[P]laintiffs still have twenty-eight causes of action (including several causes of action under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) asserted against the Deo
Defendants) in their Third Amended Complaint.” (ECF No. 378 at 3.)
Second, just as any other case, adversaries will have differing opinions. Indeed, Plaintiffs
argue that is the case here. (ECF No. 389 at 13.) Yet, to call this a “substantial ground” would
allow the parties to seek interlocutory appeals after each unfavorable ruling. Indeed, “it is not
sufficient that the relevant case law is less than clear or allegedly not in accord, or that there is a
strong disagreement among the parties. A mere claim that a district court's decision was incorrect
does not suffice to establish substantial ground for a difference of opinion.” In re Enron Corp.,
No. 01-CV-16034 (SAS), 2007 WL 2780394, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (internal citations
and quotations omitted) (denying certification).
Third, the immediate appeal will not materially advance the final disposition of this
action. “An interlocutory appeal will be deemed to advance the ultimate termination of litigation
if the ‘appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.’”
Pasha v. New York State Dep't of Health, No. 22-CV-3355 (ER), 2024 WL 3730238, at *2
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (quoting In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Securities & Derivative Litig., 986
F. Supp. 2d 524, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). There are many parties and claims that are to be
litigated. Approving this appeal would delay this action that is now reaching its third year and
quickly approaching 400 docket entries. If upon finality, an appeal is taken and any order is
reversed, this Court may easily deal with any remaining claims at that point.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request to certify an interlocutory appeal is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment under Federal
Civil Rule 54(b) and to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (ECF No. 365)
is DENIED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
January 19, 2026
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 2:23-cv-06188-JMW Document 390 Filed 01/19/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>