Superb Motors Inc. et al v. Deo et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SUPERB MOTORS INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against- 	23-CV-6188 (JMW)
ANTHONY DEO et al.,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Emanuel Kataev
Sage Legal LLC
18211 Jamaica Avenue
Jamaica, NY 11423
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Superb Motors Inc., Team Auto Sales LLC and Robert A. Urrutia
Jeffrey Ruderman
Cyruli Shanks & Zizmor LLP
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2320
New York, NY 10170
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 189 Sunrise Hwy Auto LLC, Northshore Motor Leasing, LLC,
1581 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC,
1632 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1239 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 2519 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76
Fisk Street Realty LLC, 446 Route 23 Auto LLC, Island Auto Management, LLC, Brian
Chabrier, Joshua Aaronson, Jory Baron, Asad Khan, and Iris Baron as Representative of
the Estate of David Baron
Nipun Marwaha1
Marwaha Law Group, PLLC
4940 Merrick Road, Ste 179
Massapequa Park, NY 11762
Attorneys for Defendants Anthony and Sara Deo, Dwight Blankenship, Marc Merckling,
Michael Laurie, Car Buyers NYC, Inc., Gold Coast Cars of Syosset LLC, Gold Coast
1 The address in Counsel’s Notice of Appearance is different than that of the signature block contained in
the instant motion. Counsel shall change and update the firm’s contact information to reflect the correct
information on ECF.
5/21/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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Cars of Sunrise LLC, Gold Coast Motors Automotive Group LLC, Gold Coast Motors of
LIC LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Roslyn LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Smithtown LLC,
UEA Premier Motors Corp.
Harry R. Thomasson
3280 Sunrise Highway, Ste Box 112
Wantagh, NY 11793
Defendant Appearing Pro Se
No appearances by other Parties
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Recently the parties filed their amended pleadings, which included counterclaims
asserted by Defendants Anthony Deo and Sara Deo2 and Defendant Harry R. Thomasson
(“Thomasson” and collectively herein referred to as “Counterclaim Plaintiffs”) against all
individual Plaintiffs. (See ECF Nos. 433, 454.) Plaintiffs (also referred herein as “Counterclaim
Defendants”) collectively move to dismiss all the counterclaims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 473), which Counterclaim Plaintiffs oppose (ECF
No. 485). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaims (ECF No.
473) is GRANTED.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND3
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Anthony Deo and Sara Deo (together, the “Deos’) are the
primary individuals that owned and operated various businesses on Long Island, New York.
(ECF No. 433 at ¶ 3.). Counterclaim Defendant Robert Anthony Urrutia (“Urrutia”) is a resident
2 The “Deo Defendants” are Anthony Deo, Sara Deo, Dwight Blankenship, Marc Merckling, Michael
Laurie, Car Buyers NYC Inc., Gold Coast Cars of Syosset LLC, Gold Coast Cars of Sunrise LLC, Gold
Coast Motors Automotive Group LLC, Gold Coast Motors of LIC LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Roslyn
LLC, Gold Coast Motors of Smithtown LLC, and UEA Premier Motors Corp. While the Counterclaims
are brought only by Anthony Deo and Sara Deo, there are references in the moving papers as to all Deo
Defendants.
3 Familiarity with this action is assumed. However, the Court outlines the factual background alleged in
the Amended Answers with Counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 433, 454.)
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of Costa Rica and owned and operative one or more automobile businesses in New York. (Id. at ¶
4.) “Urrutia resides in Costa Rica for the purposes of 1) living a lifestyle of wealth desired by
Urrutia and his family (there is a lower cost of living in Costa Rica), 2) to avoid paying creditors,
and 3) upon information and belief, Urrutia fled the country having stolen in excess of twenty
million dollars from various businesses, including his own, and from various other businesses,
including Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., he is or is expected to become a wanted man by one
or more law enforcement agencies.” (Id.) “Urrutia always maintained one or more apartments
and/or houses and/or residences in the Greater New York City area (within 75 miles of
Manhattan) to serve as his U.S. residence when he is in the United States, notably 327 Lakewood
Terrace, Newton, New Jersey, 07860.” (Id.) “Urrutia is countersued herein both individually and
on behalf of his businesses known as Superb Motors Inc. and Team Auto Sales LLC.” (Id.)
Counterclaim Defendant Brian Chabrier (“Chabrier”) is an individual who owned and
operated one or more automobile businesses in the New York. (Id. at ¶ 5.) He is sued herein
because he holds interest or ownership in the following businesses: “1581 Hylan Blvd Auto
LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1632 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC,
1239 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 2519 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76 Fisk Street Realty LLC, 446 Route
23 Auto LLC and Island Auto Management, LLC.” (Id.) Counterclaim Defendant Joshua
Aaronson (“Aaronson”), is an individual who owned and operated one or more automobile
businesses in New York. (Id. at ¶ 6.) “Aaronson … holds a corporate interest/ownership known
as 1581 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1632
Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1239 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 2519 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76 Fisk Street
Realty LLC, 446 Route 23 Auto LLC and Island Auto Management, LLC.” (Id.)
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Counterclaim Defendant Jory Baron (hereinafter, “J. Baron”) is an individual who owned
and operated one or more automobile businesses in New York. (Id. at ¶ 7.) “J. Baron … holds a
corporate interest/ownership known as 1581 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC,
1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1632 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1239 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 2519
Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76 Fisk Street Realty LLC, 446 Route 23 Auto LLC and Island Auto
Management, LLC.” (Id.) Counterclaim Defendant Asad Khan (“Khan”) is an individual who
owned and operated one or more automobile businesses in New York. (Id. at ¶ 8.) “Khan …
holds a corporate interest/ownership known as 1581 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1580 Hylan Blvd
Auto LLC, 1591 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1632 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 1239 Hylan Blvd Auto
LLC, 2519 Hylan Blvd Auto LLC, 76 Fisk Street Realty LLC, 446 Route 23 Auto LLC and
Island Auto Management, LLC.” (Id.) Counterclaim Defendant Iris Baron (“I. Baron”) was the
wife of David Baron during his lifetime as well as the “representative of the Estate of David
Baron since his death; she is sued both individually and on behalf of the Estate of David Baron.”
(Id. at ¶ 9.) All the Counterclaim Defendants as sued due to “the false claims advanced
wrongfully against the Deo Defendants to law enforcement, various Courts, and within the
automobile industry are advanced by [them].” (Id. at ¶¶ 4-9.) Counterclaim Plaintiff Thomasson
is an individual who worked as an attorney for the Deos and the various businesses they owned.
(ECF No. 454 at ¶ 3.)
The following allegations are taken from the Amended Complaint filed by the Deos in the
action entitled Deo, et al. v. Baron, et al., case number 2:24-cv-6903 (NJC)(JMW), which has
now been remanded from this Court to the Nassau County Supreme Court, and the docket
number is now 615683/2024. (ECF No. 433 at ¶¶ 10, 18.) Counterclaim Defendants made
various false statements “accusing each of the Deo parties of stealing money, stealing
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automobiles, and stealing corporations worth millions of dollars.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) The false claims
made by the Counterclaim Defendants “are contingent upon the [Counterclaim] Defendants …
proving several of the Aaronson parties (namely Joshua Aaronson, Asad Khan, Brian Chabrier,
Raymond Phelan and the Estate of David Baron) are and remain the owners of two corporations,
NorthShore Motor Leasing, LLC, and 189 Sunrise Hwy Auto LLC (hereinafter, “NorthShore”
and “189 Sunrise”).” (Id. at ¶ 12.) The Counterclaim Defendants are not the owners of
NorthShore and 189 Sunrise as the Deos purchased those entities in February of 2021. (Id. at ¶
13.) The Counterclaim Defendants “provided the Floor Plans to the Deos for NorthShore since it
began operations in 2018, and for 189 Sunrise since the Deos obtained and operated that business
in February 2021.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) There were many disagreements between the Counterclaim
Defendants and the Deos. (Id. at ¶ 15.) In November of 2022, Counterclaim Defendants “left
both NorthShore and 189 Sunrise, turned off and removed all Floor Plans, took all hard corporate
assets of both corporations including, but not limited to, all files, dealer jackets, warranty files,
video files, most (but not all) computers, customer lists, and shut the Deos out of all corporate
software and bank accounts, wrongfully, and without any lawful, valid reason.” (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Counterclaim Defendants left the businesses as they had been caught by the Deos attempting to
steal the businesses, and after the theft failed, the Counterclaim Defendants intentionally ruined
the Deos businesses. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
Counterclaim Defendants have acted in concert and carried out a conspiracy to ruin the
Deos. (Id. at ¶ 19.) That includes the filing of various lawsuits to knowingly and intentionally
harm the Deos. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Counterclaim Defendants also planned to ruin the Deos’
“reputations and business opportunities in the automobile industry by making false criminal and
false civil allegations against all of the Deo parties both in writing and verbally, involving false
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allegations of theft of money, automobiles, and corporate interests of Superb Motors, 189 Sunrise
and NorthShore to: a) the Nassau County, New York, police department; b) the Nassau County,
New York, district attorneys’ office; c) the Suffolk County, New York, police department; d) the
Suffolk County, New York, district attorneys’ office; e) the F.B.I.; f) the U.S. Attorneys’ Office in
and for the U.S. Department of Justice; g) one or more federal grand juries; h) one or more local
automobile wholesalers, including but not limited to Nethanel Orgad; i) various local automobile
industry floor plan providers, including, but not limited to, Nissan Motor Acceptance Company
LLC (“NMAC”), NextGear Capital, Inc., and Ally Financial, Inc. (“Ally”), j) various banks and
lenders involved in the local automobile banking and loaning industries including, but not
limited to, Flushing Bank, Libertas Funding LLC, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”); k)
various local accountants that provide services to the local automobile industry including, but not
limited to, Citrin Cooperman, Jones Little & Co., CPA’s LLP, and Richards, Witt & Charles,
LLP; and l) other unknown individuals in the local automobile industry.” (Id. at ¶¶ 21-23.)
All allegations made by the Counterclaim Defendants were false, defamatory, negligently
and knowingly made to cause the Deos harm and economic loss. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28.) The
allegations of criminal wrongdoing were filed and published, which also constitutes defamation
per se. (Id. at ¶ 26.) All Counterclaim Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the harm,
which remains ongoing. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.)
Thomasson also alleges that he never had any contracts with any Counterclaim
Defendants nor was he ever in privity with any Counterclaim Defendant. (ECF No. 454 at ¶¶ 28-
29.) Thomasson did not represent any Counterclaim Defendant apart from a brief one-month
representation for Superb Motors, but he did not work with or meet any of the Counterclaim
Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-34.) Thomasson never took any money, never stole from the
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Counterclaim Defendants and never committed any criminal wrongdoings against these parties.
(Id. at ¶¶ 35-45.)4
With that, Thomasson brings two counterclaims for (i) Defamation Per Se, and (ii) Libel.
(Id. at 80-83.) The Deos bring four counterclaims for (i) Defamation Per Se, (ii) Libel, (iii)
Tortious Interference with Contracts and Prospective Economic Advantage, (iv) Abuse of
Process. (ECF No. 433 at 76-80.)
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also CompassCare v. Hochul, 125
F.4th 49, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014) (“a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”)).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Annabi v. New York Univ., No. 24-
CV-2601, 2025 WL 1066083, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To
that end, complaints are properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558. When considering a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the Court must assume all well-
pleaded facts to be true, “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Koch v.
4 Both Counterclaim pleadings contain similar, if not the same allegations. As such, the Court did not
repeat allegations and only included allegations that were not already outlined from the other pleading.
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Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). However, this tenet does not apply to
legal conclusions or “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
663. Pleadings that offer only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. More is required. Put differently,
“while a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions. … Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level. To survive dismissal, a complaint must provide enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Go New York Tours Inc. v. Gray Line New York
Tours, Inc., No. 24-cv-2392, 2025 WL 947083, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (quoting Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)).
It is under this legal framework, that the Court analyzes the instant motion.
DISCUSSION
Thomasson brings two counterclaims for (i) Defamation Per Se, and (ii) Libel. (ECF No.
454 at 80-83.) The Deos bring four counterclaims for (i) Defamation Per Se, (ii) Libel, (iii)
Tortious Interference with Contracts and Prospective Economic Advantage, (iv) Abuse of
Process. (ECF No. 433 at 76-80.) Both counterclaim pleadings allege the same and as such, the
Court will analyze the identical claims together. Counterclaim Plaintiffs argue against dismissal
on the grounds that the counterclaims are sufficiently pled (see ECF No. 485 at 6), whereas
Counterclaim Defendants argue otherwise stating that the amended counterclaims fail again5 as a
matter of law and any alleged defamatory statements are privileged (see ECF No. 473 at 1).
5 Counterclaim Plaintiffs filed counterclaims back in October and November of last year. (See ECF Nos.
335-36.) However, following a motion hearing, the parties agreed to stipulate to the filing of an amended
answer with counterclaims. (See Electronic Order dated 3/2/2026; ECF No. 432.)
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As an initial matter, while this case is brought under federal question jurisdiction, the
counterclaims are brought under supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and
New York law for state law tort claims. (See ECF No. 433 at 64-65.) Thus, the Court looks to
New York law to see if the claims withstand the instant motion to dismiss.
I. 	Defamation Per Se and Libel Claims
Under New York law, defamation claims require the following elements to be pled, (i) a
defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff, (ii) publication of that statement to a third
party, (iii) fault, (iv) falsity, and (v) special damages or it must fall under a per se
category. See Greenberg v. Spitzer, 62 N.Y.S.3d 372, 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2017); see
also YCF Trading Inc. v. Skullcandy, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 3d 56, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting
cases) (same). As to the fourth element, special damages do not need to be alleged if a plaintiff
establishes that the defamatory statements constitute defamation per se. Fernandes v. Fernandes,
227 N.Y.S.3d 642, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2025). Here, Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ claims fall
under a per se category because the alleged false statements “tends to injure another in his or her
trade, business, or profession.” Davydov v. Youssefi, 169 N.Y.S.3d 322, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d
Dep't 2022) (internal citations omitted); see also Kesner v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 3d
149, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same) .
A claim for libel is essentially defamatory statements that are written. See Meloff v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (“New York requires a
libel plaintiff to prove five elements: (1) a written defamatory statement of fact regarding the
plaintiff; (2) published to a third party by the defendant; (3) defendant's fault, varying in degree
depending on whether plaintiff is a private or public party; (4) falsity of the defamatory
statement; and (5) injury to plaintiff.”) However, “CPLR 3016(a) provides that, ‘[i]n an action
for libel or slander, the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint.’”
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Oluwo v. Mills, 228 A.D.3d 879, 880, 214 N.Y.S.3d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2024).
“‘Compliance with CPLR 3016(a) is strictly enforced’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
First, these claims fail as a matter of law because there are no specific allegations.
Conclusory allegations of false statements made to harm one’s reputation or business without
more are routinely dismissed. See Bryan v. Slothower, 84 Misc. 3d 1237(A), at *2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Cnty. 2024) (quoting Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1st Dep’t 1999) (discussing
that the defamatory statements must be set forth in the complaint, and “must allege the time,
place and manner of the false statement and [omitted] specify to whom it was made.”)). Even
assuming it was pled adequately – which it is not – these claims fail due to what is known as
litigation privilege.
New York has traditionally accorded an absolute privilege to oral or written
communications made in the course of judicial proceedings and which relate to the
litigation. A statement made in the course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, it may be considered
pertinent to the litigation. The common law litigant's privilege offers a shield to one
who publishes libelous statements in a pleading or in open court for the purpose of
protecting litigants' zeal in furthering their causes.
Aguirre v. Best Care Agency, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 455–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Notably, the “litigation privilege, being absolute, confers immunity from liability
regardless of motive.” Gottwald v. Sebert, 40 N.Y.3d 240, 253, 220 N.E.3d 621 (N.Y. 2023)
(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Boyd v. Lansbury, No. 23-CV-7459 (RER)
(SIL), 2025 WL 948360, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (“The litigation privilege protects
litigants against retaliatory claims based on material statements made in anticipation of
litigation.”) “Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and
therefore may not form the basis of a claim for defamation.” Id. (quoting Lader v. Delgado, 941
F. Supp. 2d 267, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
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Here, the claims for defamation and libel are in connection with “[t]he allegations of
criminal wrongdoing against Plaintiff in Counterclaim by Defendants in Counterclaim pursuant
to their Plan are outrageous, shocking, intentional, knowing, wrongful, fraudulent, and published
repeatedly through the Complaints in the instant and prior actions.” (ECF No. 454 at 80-82; see
also ECF No. 433 at 76-77) (emphasis added). These statements are subject to the litigation
privilege as Counterclaim Plaintiffs rely on the statements made during and within the lawsuits.
If the Court were to conclude otherwise, litigants would be hamstrung to sue and enforce their
rights due to fear of retaliatory defamation claims. See Conte v. Newsday, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d
126, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Statements made in the course of court proceedings are absolutely
privileged under New York common law.”)
Accordingly, the counterclaims in both Amended Answers with Counterclaims for
defamation per se and libel are dismissed.
II. 	Tortious Interference with Contracts and Prospective Economic Advantage
Next, the Deos also include a claim for tortious interference with contracts and
prospective economic advantage. “To set forth a cause of action sounding in tortious interference
with business relations, a plaintiff is required to plead ‘that the defendant interfered with the
plaintiff's business relationships either with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or by means
that were unlawful or improper’” Long Island Thoracic Surgery, P.C. v. Bldg. Serv. 32BJ Health
Fund, 188 N.Y.S.3d 570, 572–73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2023) (internal citations omitted).
Generally, such a claim would be dismissed as duplicative of the other tort claims. However,
given the above dismissal of defamation this claim is no longer duplicative, but it does fail for
other reasons. See Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC, 194 F. Supp. 3d
263, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases that dismissed a tortious interference claim as
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duplicative of the defamation claim as the allegations were the same for both claims); Kesner v.
Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 3d 149, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same).
Here, Deos state in their pleading that,
the Counterclaim Defendants engaged in a pattern of malicious and intentional
conduct designed to damage Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ reputation in the automobile
industry. Counterclaim Defendants had knowledge of existing contracts that
Counterclaim Plaintiffs had with multiple third parties and relied on those contracts
for 	ongoing 	business. Counterclaim 	Defendants 	engaged 	in 	intentional 	and
malicious conduct procuring the breach and deprivation of the benefit of those
contracts.
(ECF No. 433 at ¶¶ 45-48.)
Fatal to this claim, however, is that the Deos do not provide any allegations of improper
means that caused harm to them or how the Counterclaim Defendants interfered with their
businesses. Indeed, the Deos write “[a]s set forth above”, which relates to all the alleged
defamatory statements found in complaints or other court filings and nothing more. That is not
enough to make a prima facie showing of such a claim. See Hello Beautiful Salons, Inc. v.
Dimoplon, 249 N.Y.S.3d 569, 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2026) (finding the claim was
adequately pled when the plaintiff alleged wrongdoing conduct of the defendants and stating,
“[t]o set forth a cause of action sounding in tortious interference with business relations, a
plaintiff is required to plead that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's business
relationships either with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or by means that were unlawful
or improper”)
Accordingly, this claim likewise fails and is dismissed.
III. 	Abuse of Process
The final counterclaim is for abuse of process. “Abuse of process has three essential
elements: (1) regularly issued process, either civil or criminal (2) an intent to harm without
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excuse or justification and (3) use of process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral
objective.” Panish v. Steinberg, 32 A.D.3d 383, 383–84, 819 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Dep’t 2006). The Deos allege that (i) “Counterclaim Defendants made multiple false and
baseless accusations against Counterclaim Plaintiffs in support of numerous meritless causes of
action in the instant case, and in other litigations”, which was “for the specific purpose of
harming Counterclaim Plaintiffs and their automobile businesses.” (ECF No. 433 at ¶¶ 50-55.)
To the extent that Counterclaim Plaintiffs use the words “malicious prosecution” in this claim,
there is no malicious prosecution cause of action alleged and therefore, it will not be addressed.
(See id. at ¶ 54.) (“As a result of Counterclaim Defendants malicious prosecution, including but
not limited to false accusations/complaint allegations of criminal liability.”) Nonetheless, none of
the elements are plead, even in a conclusory fashion. Even if the Court were to assume that the
Complaint is the “process”, those allegations are missing. See Curiano v. Suozzi 469 N.E.2d
1324, 1326 (N.Y. 1984) (“the process used must involve ‘an unlawful interference with one's
person or property’ … the only process issued in the Suozzi v. Parente action was a summons, the
process necessary to obtain jurisdiction and begin the lawsuit, there was no unlawful interference
with plaintiffs' persons or property because the institution of a civil action by summons and
complaint is not legally considered process capable of being abused”).
Accordingly, the claim for abuse of power is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaims (ECF No. 473) is
GRANTED.6
Dated: Central Islip, New York
May 21, 2026
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
6 Counterclaim Defendants also request that the Counterclaim Plaintiffs not be given leave to amend.
(ECF No. 473 at 12-13.)That request is granted as these counterclaims have been pled twice now and the
poorly written as well as conclusory allegations do not provide the Court any reason to believe that
another amended pleading would yield a different result. 	Counterclaim Plaintiffs have not offered any
indication of what amendments they would add that might give life to the counterclaims. Additionally,
this case is headed to summary judgment and trial shortly. Thus, this case will not be further delayed by
another pleading.
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