Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CHRISTINA M. GOODWIN,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	24-cv-1139 (NRM) (SIL)
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Christina M. Goodwin initiated this case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to
review 	the 	Social 	Security 	Administration’s 	denial 	of 	her 	disability 	benefits.
Following a joint motion to remand, the agency reversed its position and issued a
Notice of Award, entitling Plaintiff to past due disability benefits. 	Plaintiff now
moves for an attorney fee authorization under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 	For the reasons
discussed below, this Court grants Plaintiff’s motion.
BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2020, Plaintiff Christina M. Goodwin retained Daniel A. Osborn,
Esq. (“counsel”), of the firm Osborn Law, P.C., to challenge in federal court the Social
Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of disability benefits. 	Plaintiff signed a
contingency attorney fee agreement (the “First Agreement”) with counsel, which
provides, in relevant part, “[i]f my case is appealed to the Federal Court and results
in the case being sent back to the Social Security Administration for further
evaluation (a remand), or by obtaining my benefits outright by court order, I
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understand 	that 	Daniel 	A. 	Osborn 	will 	be 	entitled 	to 	attorney 	fees 	and
reimbursement of his costs for his work in Federal Court.” First Att’y Fee Agreement,
ECF No. 10-2 at 2.1 	The Agreement further provides that these fees may total “25
(twenty-five) percent of the past-due benefits resulting from my claim or claims
(which I understand may exceed $500.00 per hour),” and that, “[i]f my attorney,
Daniel A. Osborn, is ultimately granted attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b),
he will refund the smaller of the amounts between the 406(b) fees and the EAJA fees
to me the client, or my family.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff and counsel subsequently executed a
substantially similar fee agreement (the “Second Agreement”). 	Second Att’y Fee
Agreement, ECF No. 10-2 at 4–5.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of the SSA’s
adverse decision in her period of disability and disability insurance benefits case
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Compl., ECF No. 1 (Feb. 2, 2024). Counsel had previously
represented Plaintiff in an earlier proceeding challenging the SSA’s denial of benefits,
Goodwin v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 20-CV-2775 (JMA) (E.D.N.Y. June
23, 2020), which resulted in a remand to the agency in 2022. Decl. of Daniel A. Osborn
dated Dec. 8, 2025 (“Osborn Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 10-1. 	Following this remand, the
SSA again denied benefits. 	The agency’s most recent adverse determination was
dated December 1, 2023 and became final on January 31, 2024. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff
sought reversal and remand, as well as costs and attorney’s fees. Id. ¶ 14.
1 All page references use ECF pagination except where noted.
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The SSA filed the administrative transcript, see Administrative Tr. (“A.T.”),
ECF Nos. 4 & 5 (Aug. 16, 2024), and the parties then jointly moved to reverse and
remand the SSA’s determination to the agency for further proceedings. Joint Mot. to
Remand, ECF No. 6 (May 23, 2024).
Following this successful resolution, the parties stipulated to an award of
attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Joint Mot. for Att’y
Fees, ECF No. 9 (Sep. 11, 2024). 	This Court granted the joint motion by a docket
order dated October 29, 2024.
Following remand and further proceedings (wherein Plaintiff was represented
by a different lawyer), the SSA issued a Notice of Award to Plaintiff on November 24,
2025. 	Notice of Award (“Notice”), ECF No. 10-5. 	This Notice of Award indicated
Plaintiff’s past due benefits totaled $207,729.00, Notice at 5, with $51,932.25
withheld for payment of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), id. at 6.
Plaintiff then filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees. 	Mot. for Att’y Fees
(406(b)) (“Mot.”), ECF No. 10 (Dec. 8, 2025). 	This motion included an attorney
declaration, the Notice of Award, the retainer and fee agreements executed between
Plaintiff and counsel, and a statement of attorney time expended. Counsel also filed
a memorandum of law in support of his fees request. Pl. Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot.
for Att’ys’ Fees (“Pl. Mem.”), ECF No. 10-7. 	The SSA filed a response, indicating it
neither consents to nor opposes Plaintiff’s motion. 	Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 12 (Dec.
11, 2025).
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DISCUSSION
The Social Security Act provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant under this subchapter . . . the court may determine and allow
as part of its judgment a reasonable fee . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the total of
the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
Though a motion for attorney’s fees under section 406(b) is filed under Plaintiff’s
name, counsel is the true party in interest. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798
n.6 (2002). 	Section 406(b) permits contingency fee arrangements, provided they
represent “a reasonable fee.” Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1990).
As an initial matter, an application for fees must be made before the expiration
of the 14-day time limit laid down in Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). Sinkler v. Berryhill,
932 F.3d 83, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2019). Here, counsel’s application was made on December
8, 2025, fourteen days after the Notice of Award issued to Plaintiff. 	Counsel’s
application is thus timely.
Second, the Court must confirm that the fee authorization does not exceed 25
percent of the total past due benefits obtained by the claimant. Here, the $51,932.25
fee award requested by counsel is identical to the 25 percent withholding indicated
by the Notice of Award. Compare Pl. Mem. at 1 (requesting $51,932.25 in fees), with
Notice at 6 (indicating amount withheld for possible fee authorization). 	Moreover,
counsel affirmatively indicates he will refund the earlier-awarded EAJA fee amount
to Plaintiff, thereby reducing his total fees below 25 percent of total past due benefits.
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Pl. Mem. at 4 n.1. Accordingly, counsel’s request comports with this facet of section
406(b).
This Court must next evaluate whether counsel’s requested fee authorization
is reasonable. 	The Second Circuit instructs “that courts should ‘approach fee
determinations by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for
reasonableness.’” 	Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 853 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). A reasonableness determination must consider (1) “the
character of the representation and the results the representative achieved”; (2)
whether “the attorney is responsible for delay, lest the attorney profit from the
accumulation of benefits during a delay that the attorney caused”; (3) “whether there
has been fraud or overreaching in making the contingency agreement”; and (4)
whether “the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on
the case — the so-called ‘windfall’ factor . . . articulated in [Wells, 907 F.2d at 372].”
Fields, 24 F.4th at 853 (citation modified) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808).
While the first two factors are “straightforward,” the “windfall” factor is “less
clear.” Id. “Courts must consider more than the de facto hourly rate.” Id. at 854. In
evaluating whether a fee award constitutes a windfall, courts look to (1) “the ability
and expertise of the lawyers and whether they were particularly efficient”; (2) “the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant — including any
representation at the agency level”; (3) “the satisfaction of the disabled claimant”; and
(4) “how uncertain it was that the case would result in an award of benefits and the
effort it took to achieve that result.” Id. at 854–55.
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Applying these factors to the instant case indicates that counsel’s requested
fee authorization is reasonable. 	First, counsel represents that he dedicated 32.6
hours of work to Plaintiff’s case before this Court across two appeals. 	Osborn Decl.
¶ 11. 	Dividing counsel’s requested $51,932.25 fee authorization by these expended
hours indicates counsel would receive a de facto hourly rate of $1,593.01. 	This rate
is well within “the range of effective hourly rates that have previously been deemed
reasonable by courts in this Circuit.” Dorta v. Saul, No. 18-CV-396 (JLC), 2021 WL
776446, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021) (citations omitted); see also Gentile v. Kijakazi,
No. 21-CV-641 (AMD), 2023 WL 6392905, at *2 (E.D.N.Y May 3, 2023) (collecting
cases approving de facto hourly rates between $1,072.17 and $2,100 while finding an
hourly rate of $1,750 to be reasonable); Rubalskaya v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-
CV-4625 (AMD), 2025 WL 2074177, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2025) (approving a de
facto hourly rate of $979.70); Hidalgo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 20-CV-1271
(RPK), 2025 WL 1384246, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025) (finding that a de facto
hourly rate of $2,665.73 constituted a windfall where the attorney only expended 2.9
hours on the case before reducing the hourly rate to $1,500).
A review of the record also indicates that the requested fee authorization is
reasonable. 	While counsel did not file a brief before this Court, the documentation
he submitted indicates he filed a brief in the earlier appeal that led to remand to the
SSA, Counsels’ First Time Records at 2, ECF No. 10-3, and did substantive work on
this case, including reviewing the 1,508-page administrative transcript, see A.T., and
conferring with counsel for the SSA to achieve an early, non-adversarial resolution of
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Plaintiff’s appeal, see Counsels’ Second Time Records at 3, ECF No. 10-4 (indicating
counsel “[r]eview[ed] email re: remand” and “”[e]mail[ed] [Anne Zeigler, counsel for
the SSA] regarding hearing upon remand”). 	Counsel has represented Plaintiff for
years through multiple appeals in federal court. 	It is clear his firm achieved an
excellent result for Plaintiff, prevailing in his efforts to reverse and remand the initial
adverse SSA decision before prevailing again on a subsequent appeal. Counsel acted
expeditiously through the litigation, avoiding undue delay, and there is no allegation
of fraud or overreach by counsel. Moreover, the Agreement executed by counsel and
Plaintiff appears to be standard for practitioners in this area of the law.
Finally, counsel’s requested fee authorization does not represent a windfall.
Counsel was efficient in his handling of the litigation. 	For example, he took the
instant case before this Court to a successful post-filing resolution in six months
through the expenditure of only 3 hours. Further, there is no indication that Plaintiff
is 	dissatisfied 	with 	counsel’s 	representation. 	That 	representation 	ultimately
produced complete success, in the form of two remands to the agency. Finally, counsel
represents that there was a degree of uncertainty as to Plaintiff’s success. Pl. Mem.
at 6.
This Court sees no 	reason to reduce 	counsel’s fee below what Plaintiff
consented to at the outset of this litigation. Counsel’s representation was competent
and 	efficient 	and, 	in 	the 	end, 	produced 	the 	results 	Plaintiff 	sought. 	Fees
authorizations under section 406(b) serve the important end of encouraging attorneys
to accept social security cases on a contingent basis, representing claimants who may
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otherwise struggle to find attorneys. 	Counsel’s requested fee authorization is
reasonable, and he is entitled to the fee authorization that he and Plaintiff outlined
in their Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is
GRANTED. 	The Commissioner is directed to release to counsel the $51,932.25
withheld from Plaintiff’s past due benefits, in accordance with agency policy. 	Upon
receipt of that fee, counsel must promptly refund to Plaintiff $7,288.00, the fee
amount that counsel previously received under the EAJA. 	This case will remain
closed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: January 7, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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