USA v. Deonarain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
MEMORANDUM
v. 	AND ORDER
25-CR-0210-SJB
BRANDON DEONARAIN,
Defendant.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Defendant Brandon Deonarain is seeking to plead guilty to a single count of a
Superseding Information, charging him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4): assault
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. (Def.’s
Letter Requesting to Accept Guilty Plea dated Dec. 8, 2025 (“Def.’s Letter”), Dkt. No. 33
at 1). The Court issues this order regarding jurisdiction to clarify that Deonarain may
do so, while also stipulating to the “jurisdictional” element of the offense.
Though this crime is defined as an offense occurring “within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a), and the
Government must prove that the alleged offense took place there, the requirement is
not one relating to jurisdiction, belying both its name and the common legal
understanding of the term “jurisdiction.”
To prove a defendant’s guilt under this provision, the Government must
establish two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant assaulted
another person by striking, beating or wounding him, and (2) that the assault took place
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See United
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States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting same elements for 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(6), plus additional element of resulting “serious bodily injury”).
This second element is at issue here. If the Government went to trial, it
appears—at least as the record stands today—it may not be able to prove that element.
Why not? The alleged offense took place on the steps of the Central Islip Federal
Courthouse. (Def.’s Letter at 1). But an offense that occurs at a federal building is not
automatically within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. See Davis, 726
F.3d at 363–64. For there to be such jurisdiction, the State of New York must have
transferred jurisdiction to the federal government, and the federal government must
have accepted such jurisdiction. See id. Otherwise, the Courthouse is just another
federal building on land over which New York still retains jurisdiction; though
surprising, not actually that uncommon. The federal government has not accepted such
jurisdiction over the lands upon which there are “federal military installations, post
offices, and hospitals,” even when it owned that land.1 Id. at 364. It holds title over the
land as a simple “ordinary proprietor.” Id. (quotations omitted).
And that appears to be true over the land on which this Courthouse sits. At
least, as far as the Government can tell now. In a letter filed on November 7, 2025, the
Government could not locate any evidence that the federal government accepted
jurisdiction over the land purchased from Suffolk County, and the deed evidencing the
sale bears no indication of such transfer and acceptance of jurisdiction. (Gov’t’s Letter
1 And the federal government owns and manages “roughly 28% of the 2.27
billion total land acres” in the United States. Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Cong. Rsch.
Serv., R42346, Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data 1 (2020).
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dated Nov. 7, 2025 (“Gov’t’s Letter”), Dkt. No. 29 at 1; Deed, attached to Gov’t’s Letter
as Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 29-1). The Government noted that it conferred with officers of the
General Services Administration (“GSA”), and “learned that there is no record of a
notice of acceptance of jurisdiction, and GSA does not believe one was ever filed for the
Courthouse.” (Gov’t’s Letter at 1). Further, the deed contains covenants running to the
benefit of Suffolk County, including that the land may not be used for an overnight
detention center, (see Deed at 2 (“The Government, by acceptance and recording of this
Deed, covenants and agrees for itself, its successors and its assigns, that . . . [t]he Federal
Courthouse and Federal Building shall not be designed or altered for the overnight
housing and/or custody of prisoners or detainees.”)), which suggests the opposite of a
transfer of jurisdiction.
But this is not a barrier to Deonarain pleading guilty. He said that he will
stipulate to this Courthouse being in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States and will waive any direct appeal or collateral challenge to that
element. (Def.’s Letter at 5). Two questions arise: why would he want to do that, and
can he? Deonarain would be pleading to a misdemeanor and avoiding trial on the more
serious felony charges in the indictment obtained by the Government. (See Indictment
filed June 24, 2025, Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2 (charging Deonarain with witness tampering and
obstruction of justice, neither of which has this jurisdictional element)).
And he can proceed in this manner, because this second element is not actually
“jurisdictional,” i.e., related to subject matter jurisdiction (which is non-waivable).
“[C]ourts have consistently determined that the jurisdictional element of federal crimes
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does not present a pure question of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” United
States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases); United States v. Lacey,
569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A ‘jurisdictional element’ is simply an element of a
federal crime. . . . It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court’s constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a
case . . . . As an offense element, it does not implicate the court’s power to hear a case
and can be waived by a guilty plea[.]” (citation omitted)); e.g., Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 964
(“Because proof of FDIC insurance is an element of the crime of bank robbery under 18
U.S.C. § 2113, we conclude that any challenge claiming that the government failed to
prove at trial that essential element does not thereby undermine the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, or its power to hear the case.”).
“A federal court’s jurisdictional power to adjudicate federal criminal cases comes
from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, not from the individual criminal statute under which a defendant
is convicted.” United States v. McBride, 26 F. App’x 785, 786 (10th Cir. 2001). As noted,
whether the alleged assault took place within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction is an element of the charged crime, not a free-standing, threshold
“jurisdictional” element. And so, a defendant can stipulate to the factual basis for that
element, and waive any rights associated with challenging the Government’s ability to
prove that fact. Indeed, this happens regularly, with a more commonly known element
to federal crimes: the interstate commerce element. E.g., United States v. Gelzer, 829 F.
App’x 562, 565 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Here, the parties stipulated to the fact that the store that
was robbed was engaged in interstate commerce by selling products that traveled in
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interstate commerce and the district court was entitled to rely on that stipulation in
finding a factual basis for Clark’s guilty plea.” (quotations omitted)); United States v.
Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166–67 (8th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). And of course,
Deonarain’s plea and stipulation can affect him and only him—the Government cannot
rely on it to prove “jurisdiction” in any other case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge
Date: 	January 7, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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