Nevels v. TransUnion, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------X
KAREEMA NEVELS,
Plaintiff,
-against-
TRANSUNION, LLC and EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
25-CV-3446(GRB)(SIL)
-------------------------------------------------------------X
STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court in this action arising under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., on referral from the Honorable Gary
R. 	Brown 	for 	Report 	and 	Recommendation,1 is 	Defendant 	TransUnion, 	LLC’s
(“TransUnion”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Kareema Nevels’s (“Plaintiff” or “Nevels”)
Amended Complaint as to it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Federal
Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) for failure to state a claim. See Docket Entry (“DE”) [56].
Nevels opposes the motion. 	DE [56-3]. 	For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
respectfully recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in
part.
1 By way of an August 11, 2025 Electronic Order, Judge Brown referred all dispositive pre-trial motions
to this Court for report and recommendation.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Relevant Facts2
Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 	See Amended
Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), DE [31], ¶ 4. 	TransUnion is a “consumer reporting
agency” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 	Id. at ¶ 5. 	On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff
sent a typewritten “Full File Disclosure Request Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(l)”
to TransUnion, writing “Please send me in writing all information in my consumer
file as of the date you receive this letter regardless of how or where it is stored
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(l).” Id. at ¶ 13.
On May 6, 2025, TransUnion responded to Plaintiff, stating that it was “unable
to determine the nature of [her] request or [her] request was illegible.” 	Id. at ¶ 14.
Nevels claims that the response was improper, as her request was typewritten and
that “[n]o reasonable interpretation supports claiming a clearly typewritten letter
with explicit statutory citations [was] ‘illegible.’” 	Id. 	She further alleges that
TransUnion’s response included a “Disclosure Request Form,” which, according to
her, demonstrated that “TransUnion could read the request well enough to know it
was credit-related but chose not to comply.” Id.
On May 14, 2025, Plaintiff sent TransUnion a second request for her “full
consumer file disclosure . . . .” Id. at ¶ 15. On May 21, 2025, TransUnion provided a
“standard credit report,” which Nevels alleges she “had previously obtained through
2 The facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of this Report
and Recommendation. Trade Pay LLC v. Horowitz, No. 21-CV-442(ENV)(ARL), 2023 WL 12030712,
at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2023) (“Because the instant motion is a motion to dismiss, all facts alleged
in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in plaintiff’s favor.”).
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normal channels,” and which was not the “complete file disclosure that was requested
and required pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §168l(g)(a)(l).” Id. at ¶ 16.
B. 	Procedural Background
1. 	Pleadings and the Instant Motion
By way of a Complaint (“Compl.”) dated July 11, 2025, Plaintiff commenced
this action against both Defendants, asserting a single claim against TransUnion
arising under 15 U.S.C. §168lg(a) and two claims against Experian arising under 15
U.S.C. §168lg(a) and 15 U.S.C. §168li(a)(5)(A). 	DE [1]. 	On September 25, 2025,
Nevels filed the Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this action.
DE [31]. In the Amended Complaint, the claims against Experian are the same, but
Nevels asserts an additional cause of action against TransUnion, which, like her
initial claim, also arises under 15 U.S.C. §168lg(a). 	See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-33. 	She
alleges that, while both claims against TransUnion arise under 15 U.S.C. §168lg(a),
the first is for “Improper Illegible Response” and the second is for “Inadequate File
Disclosure.” Id.
Experian answered the Amended Complaint on November 7, 2025. 	See DE
[52]. 	On November 24, 2025, TransUnion filed the instant motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, which Nevels opposes. 	DE [56], [56-3]. 	In her opposition,
Nevels requests that, in the event the Amended Complaint is dismissed, she be
granted leave to file a second amended complaint. 	See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), DE [56-3], at 9.
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2. 	Plaintiff’s Citations to Non-Existent Legal Authority
In an April 29. 2026 letter, Nevels acknowledged that, in opposition to
TransUnion’s motion to dismiss, she relied upon two cases and a purported Consent
Order 	from 	the 	Consumer 	Financial 	Protection 	Bureau 	that 	“could 	not 	be
independently verified” and that she “does not intend to rely upon any authority that
cannot be independently confirmed.” DE [75]. While not explicitly stated, the Court
interprets Plaintiff’s letter to mean that the authority at issue simply does not exist.
In response, TransUnion suggests that the authority was generated by artificial
intelligence and requests that Plaintiff be sanctioned. DE [76].
Plaintiff’s letter explaining the source of the authority she cites is evasive, and
the Court has serious concerns that this authority was generated using artificial
intelligence without further review by Nevels. 	Even as a pro se litigant, Nevels is
required to make accurate representations to the Court. Butler v. Fidelity Mgmt. &
Rsch. Co. LLC, No. 25-CV-9337(RA)(RFT), 2026 WL 1175334, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
30, 2026) (“[P]ro se litigants are obligated to review the cases cited in their filings to
confirm that they exist, stand for the proposition for which they are cited, and contain
any questions attributed to them.”). Citing to falsified legal authority is categorically
unacceptable and potentially sanctionable. 	See Cartagena v. Dixon, No. 25-CV-
3552(JLR), 2026 WL 673811, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2026) (“Sanctions may be
imposed for submitting false or nonexistent legal authority to the Court.”).
Nevertheless, because the apparently falsified authority that Plaintiff cites
does not impact the Court’s analysis, the Court declines to sanction the pro se Plaintiff
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at this time, but admonishes her that further citations to non-existent legal authority
will result in sanctions. 	Reilly v. Conn. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency, No. 25-CV-
640(VDO), 2025 WL 1726366, at *3 (D. Conn. June 20, 2025) (“Whether the issues
with [the pro se plaintiff’s] filings are the result of artificial intelligence or some other
mistake, the Court cautions [the plaintiff] to ensure that future submissions to any
court contain only accurate representations.”).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).
A claim is considered plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. In deciding a
motion to dismiss, “a court must ‘accept all allegations in the complaint as true and
draw all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.’” 	U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Roche
Diagnostics Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 341, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting LaFaro v. New
York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009)).
It is well-established that pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173 (1980); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct.
2197 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
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complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has held that a court reviewing a pro se complaint must “construe
the complaint broadly, and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it
suggests.” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.
2002) (internal alterations omitted). Nevertheless, “the court need not argue a pro se
litigant’s case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist.” 	Kwon v.
Santander Consumer USA, No. 15-CV-3352(SJF)(AKT), 2017 WL 5495811, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against TransUnion arising under 15
U.S.C. § 1681g(a) for: 	(1) “improper illegible response,” and (2) “inadequate file
disclosure.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-33. The Court recommends dismissal of the first, but
not the second.
A. 	15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) Standard
The FCRA mandates that “‘[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares
a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.”‘ 	Claybrook v. CARCO Grp., Inc., No. 25-CV-162(SJB)(LGD), 2026 WL
74131, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)). 	Pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1681g, “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, and subject
to section 1681h(a)(1) of this title, clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . .
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. [a]ll information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request . . . .” 15 U.S.C. §
1681g(a)(1); see Menton v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ. 468(NRR), 2003 WL 941388,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2003) (“[E]ach consumer has the right to obtain the entirety
of his file in the possession of a credit reporting agency ‘on request.’”).
B. 	Inadequate File Disclosure
Addressing the second cause of action first for the ease of analysis, 	Nevels
asserts that TransUnion violated the FCRA by “failing to provide complete file
disclosure and instead providing only a standard credit report omitting documented
dispute records and other required file information under current CFPB guidance.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff claims that TransUnion’s response “omitted categories of
data that TransUnion demonstrably maintains internally, including dispute records,
investigation results, and data-furnisher verification information.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.
The FCRA defines a “file” as “information on any consumer,” which includes
“all of the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer
reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g).
As TransUnion concedes, the “Second Circuit has yet to address the definition of the
word ‘file’ for the purpose of the FCRA.” 	See TransUnion Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss (“TransUnion Mem.”), DE [56], at 3 (quoting Wimberly v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 18 Civ. 6058(KPF), 2019 WL 6895751, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 18, 2019)). 	Nevertheless, other Courts have recognized that a credit file, as
Plaintiff requested, is more comprehensive than a simple credit report, which is what
TransUnion provided. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 484 F.3d 938,
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941 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We have recently held that ‘file’ means the information
contained in the consumer report produced by the consumer reporting agency.”);
Taylor v. Screening Reports, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 680, 684 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (observing the
“overall consumer oriented focus of the FCRA” and holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to “his entire consumer file pursuant to § 1681g(a)” even where he made a
“general request” to the reporting agency). Accordingly, merely providing a summary
credit report does not necessarily satisfy a consumer’s request for a credit file. 	See
Gillespie, 484 F.3d at 941 (“We conclude that the consumer reporting agency must do
more than simply make an accurate disclosure of the information in the consumer’s
credit file. The disclosure must be made in a manner sufficient to allow the consumer
to compare the disclosed information from the credit file against the consumer’s
personal information in order to allow the consumer to determine the accuracy of the
information set forth in her credit file.”); Watkins v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No.
25-CV-524(DRC), 2025 WL 3763869, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2025) (“The FCRA
requires 	[credit 	reporting 	agencies] 	to 	‘clearly’ 	and 	‘accurately’ 	disclose 	‘[a]ll
information in the consumer’s file’ upon an appropriate request.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1681g(a)(1)); Blevins v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 25-CV-23481, 2025 WL
3753990, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025) (denying motion for judgment on the
pleadings where the “alleged omissions hinder[ed] [the plaintiff’s] ability to verify the
accounts and dispute potential inaccuracies”).
Given the stage of the proceedings, Nevels’s allegations are sufficient to
survive TransUnion’s motion to dismiss her failure-to-disclose cause of action.
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Plaintiff alleges that, in response to her request for her complete file, TransUnion
simply provided a credit report. 	Am. Compl. ¶ 32. 	Under these circumstances, the
statute may require more pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a), making disposition at the
pleading stage inappropriate.
Moreover, while the parties dispute whether TransUnion acted willfully, see
TransUnion Mem. at 9, Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8, this issue is not relevant at the motion to
dismiss 	stage, 	as 	the 	FCRA 	permits 	recovery 	for 	both 	willful 	and 	negligent
noncompliance. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o; see Suluki v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 138
F.4th 709, 721 (2d Cir. 2025) (“To recover damages, a plaintiff must show that the
violation of the FCRA was willful or negligent.”). Accordingly, TransUnion’s alleged
willfulness is an issue to be addressed in discovery and is not appropriately decided
on a motion to dismiss. Based upon the foregoing, the Court respectfully recommends
that TransUnion’s motion to dismiss be denied with respect Plaintiff’s second cause
of action against TransUnion.
C. 	Improper Illegible Response
Nevels also alleges that 	TransUnion 	violated the FCRA 	by “improperly
characterizing [her] clearly typewritten statutory request as ‘illegible’ and failing to
process a valid file disclosure request.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29. The legibility of Plaintiff’s
request does not constitute a separate cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a), and
Nevels does not cite authority establishing otherwise. 	In any event, even if
TransUnion improperly deemed Plaintiff’s request illegible as Plaintiff alleges, the
relief sought is encompassed by her failure-to-disclose cause of action addressed
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above. 	For these reasons, Nevels’s claim that TransUnion deemed her request
illegible is not a viable claim for relief, and the Court recommends that TransUnion’s
motion be granted with respect to this cause of action. See, e.g., Grayson v. Equifax
Credit Info. Servs., No. 18-CV-6977(MKB), 2021 WL 2010398, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2021) (“Because Plaintiff has not pled any facts in support of his claim or indicated
why it is not duplicative of his other claims, the Court dismisses this claim.”).
D. 	Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
Finally, Plaintiff requests leave to file a second amended complaint if the Court
grants TransUnion’s motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. As described above, the only cause
of action for which the Court recommends dismissal is that related to the legibility of
Plaintiff’s request for her claim file. Having concluded that this cause of action is not
recognized under the applicable statute and is encompassed by Plaintiff’s failure-to-
disclose cause of action against TransUnion, the Court recommends that Nevels’s
request for leave to amend be denied. 	See Kalyna v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-
273(AMD)(CLP), 2018 WL 1342488, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (“A motion to
amend is properly denied where the proposed amendment would be futile as a matter
of law . . . .”); Arnold v. Rsch. Found. for the St. Univ. of New York, 216 F. Supp. 3d
275, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (denying motion to amend to add duplicative claim);
Caldwell v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C., No. 08-CV-4207(JFB)(WDW),
2012 WL 1038804, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012) (“[P]laintiffs . . . have failed to
explain how any amendment could possibly state a plausible legal claim. Thus, the
Court declines to grant leave to re-plead.”).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that
TransUnion’s Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. 	The Court
recommends that TransUnion’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action
alleging the legibility of her request for her file be granted. The Court recommends
that TransUnion’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action for failure to
disclose her file be denied. The Court does not recommend that Plaintiff be granted
further leave to amend the Amended Complaint.
V. 	OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served by electronic filing
on the date below. 	TransUnion is instructed to serve Nevels with a copy and
immediately file proof of service via ECF. 	Any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen days of
service. 	See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d).
Failure to file objections within this period waives the right to appeal the District
Court’s Order. 	See Ferrer v. Woliver, No. 05-CV-3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d
Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v.
Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
May 5, 2026
/s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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