Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------- X
AMARJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
- against -
ANDREA QUARANTILLO, In her official
capacity as the Long Island Field Office
Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Services; JUDITH ALMODOVAR, In her
official capacity as the New York Field Office
Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, In her official
capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; TODD M. LYONS, In his
official capacity as Acting Director Of
Immigration & Customs Enforcement;
PAMELA BONDI, In her official capacity as
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Respondents.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
25-cv-6392 (BMC)
----------------------------------------------------------- X
Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release
from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention because, according to petitioner,
ICE detained and will soon deport the wrong Amarjit Singh. For the reasons below, the petition
is denied.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns three immigration files: Amarjit Singh, Alien Number (A#) 073 423
276; Ramjit/Ranjit Singh, A# 072 766 052, and Paramjit Singh, A# 073 644 871. According to
U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) records, between 1994 and 1995, these
individuals entered the United States in violation of the immigration laws and were subsequently
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
ordered removed. A 2019 investigation concluded that these files all relate to the same person
who was entering the country under different identities.
At the core of this habeas petition is the file relating to Amarjit Singh, A# 073 423 276.
ICE records show that this person entered the United States without inspection in Arizona around
1995 filed an asylum application in California the following year. That asylum application was
denied and was unsuccessfully appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The
Ninth Circuit rejected the petition for review on November 17, 1999.
Soon afterward, on December 3, 1999, the applicant requested, and was granted,
advanced parole which allowed him to legally enter the United States for the next year. The
parole authorization, which petitioner admits relates to him, states that it belongs to “an applicant
for adjustment of status [who] intends to return to the United States to resume processing of the
adjustment of status application.”
On September 15, 2000, the applicant filed a motion for the BIA to reopen his case under
the Convention Against Torture. With that motion now pending, he entered the United States in
Michigan on October 27, 2000, pursuant to the advanced parole authorization. The BIA
subsequently denied the motion on January 31, 2001, and a warrant of deportation was issued on
March 15, 2001.
All of this came to a head last year when petitioner submitted his fingerprints as part of
his most recent immigration filing. Those fingerprints matched the prints in the consolidated
files, and in 2025, another investigation was launched. Like the 2019 investigation, the 2025
investigation concluded that petitioner is the same person as the three identities in the now-
consolidated file, who had previously been removed in 2009. So, when petitioner appeared for
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
an interview for his latest filing, ICE detained him pursuant the 2001 removal order. In other
words, the 2001 removal order was “reinstated” against petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.
Petitioner appears to have seen this coming. Four months before his arrest, petitioner,
through counsel, notified USCIS that he believed his immigration file was mixed up with a
person with the same name and A#. He based this conclusion on documents from USCIS
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). USCIS’s production of FOIA
materials apparently included applications for immigration benefits that related to a person with
the same name and A# as petitioner, but which petitioner states he did not file.1 In sum,
petitioner contends that everything in the file before the parole authorization from December 3,
1999, relates the “other” Amarjit Singh. But as the Government has shown, the California
asylum application was submitted by the same person – petitioner – who entered the United
States in Michigan on October 27, 2000.
DISCUSSION
Shortly after his arrest, petitioner filed the instant petition, challenging his detention on
due process grounds. In opposition to the petition, the Government challenges the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and responds to the merits of petitioner’s due process claim. For the
reasons below, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction and denies the petition.
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Relying heavily on Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2011), the Government
contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the petition. In most circumstances, the
Government would be correct because the Immigration and Nationality Act contains many
“jurisdiction-stripping provisions.” See Mahdawi v. Trump, 136 F.4th 443, 452 (2d Cir. 2025);
1 Petitioner contends that the immigration applications produced under FOIA describe life experiences that are not
his, and include photographs of a person other than petitioner.
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
see also, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (limiting “judicial review of an order of removal” to the Courts of
Appeal).
But here, the Government is wrong, because petitioner independently challenges the
constitutionality of his detention, not the underlying removal order. See Ozturk v. Hyde, 136
F.4th 382, 401 (2d Cir. 2025) (“Construing an independent constitutional challenge to detention
as necessarily implying a challenge to removal would lead to what Jennings [v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 293 (2018)] called an ‘absurd’ result.”).
Delgado recognized that not every case brought “against immigration authorities is [a]
challenge to a removal order.” 643 F.3d at 55. Pointing to a decision from the Sixth Circuit,
Delgado noted that the “district court, not court of appeals, ha[s] jurisdiction where plaintiffs’
‘habeas petition[] challenges only the constitutionality of the arrest and detention, not the
underlying administrative order of removal[.]’” Id. (quoting Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416,
420 (6th Cir. 2006)). Likewise here, petitioner’s constitutional challenge is separate from his
removal order, and concerns only the due process under which his current detention was
predicated.
II. 	Due Process
ICE detaining and potentially deporting the wrong person, of course, raises constitutional
concerns.2 See Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2019) (colorable
constitutional challenge that ICE “lacked probable cause to lodge the detainer” because plaintiff
“was the wrong person”). Here, petitioner claims that his imminent deportation is predicated on
mistaken identity.
2 Petitioner here does not, and likely could not, argue that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because his
detention is predicated on mistaken identity. See Martinez v. Muentes, 340 F. App’x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (“a
mistaken identity can provide the basis for probable cause”); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1971) (police
officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a
warrant).
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
“Parties claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to prevail,
‘allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process.’” Garcia-Villeda
v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 19 (1st
Cir. 2004)).3 The “challenged process” here is ICE’s reinstatement of the deportation order, the
process of which is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.8:
In establishing whether an alien is subject to [reinstatement], the immigration
officer shall determine the following:
. . .
The identity of the alien, i.e., whether the alien is in fact an alien who was
previously removed, or who departed voluntarily while under an order of
exclusion, deportation, or removal. In disputed cases, verification of identity shall
be accomplished by a comparison of fingerprints between those of the previously
excluded, deported, or removed alien contained in Service records and those of
the subject alien. In the absence of fingerprints in a disputed case the alien shall
not be removed pursuant to this paragraph.
. . .
Whether the alien unlawfully reentered the United States. In making this
determination, the officer shall consider all relevant evidence, including
statements made by the alien and any evidence in the alien’s possession. The
immigration officer shall attempt to verify an alien’s claim, if any, that he or she
was lawfully admitted, which shall include a check of Service data systems
available to the officer.
In petitioner’s case, his identity is disputed, and ICE verified his identity by fingerprint
comparison.4 The question therefore is whether ICE considered “all relevant evidence, including
3 How much process someone is due depends on circumstance, and immigration law is one sphere where that
amount is minimal. The Court will not undertake an academic analysis of the issue, however, because the process to
which petitioner was due is explicitly outlined by federal regulation.
4 Petitioner does not seriously challenge the scientific adequacy of fingerprint analysis. Nor could he, because “[i]t
is without question that fingerprint analysis [is] a scientifically sound technique for identification[.]” See United
States v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). That said, fingerprint analysis is only regarded as
ironclad in criminal cases because the experts’ examination and conclusion of a “match” is pressure-tested on cross
examination. ICE’s fingerprint analysis here does not appear to be akin to in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Mahmood, No. 17-cv-1562, 2020 WL 532062, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 3, 2020) (discussing “the report of a
fingerprint examiner with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security”); Marks v. Clark, No. 06-cv-1796, 2007 WL
2042243, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2007) (discussing a “fingerprint comparison performed by the Department of
Homeland Security Forensic Laboratory”). The Government does not describe the extent of the analysis but,
according to petitioner, “officers visually checked the biometrics [and] concluded that ‘the prints match[.]’” If
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
statements made by [petitioner]” and made an “attempt to verify [petitioner’s] claim [that he]
was lawfully admitted[.]”
Petitioner’s due process argument boils down to that ICE did nothing to verify his claim
of a “mix up” before reinstating the deportation order against him. Whether ICE did so then is a
moot issue because the Government has now done so in response to the petition, and has reached
the same conclusion.5 “The Government has significant discretion to enforce the immigration
laws [but] it must do so consistent with the requirements of its own regulations and the Due
Process Clause.” Zongbo Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4). ICE and the Government’s conclusion that petitioner is not the “wrong” Armajit Singh
comports with those requirements.
petitioner is correct, ICE’s conclusion might not be based on a “scientifically sound technique for identification.”
See Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 100. And, as petitioner points out, “No underlying biometric comparison report,
image quality score, or chain-of-custody evidence [was] produced.” However, this level of proof is not generally
required in non-criminal cases, and petitioner provides no reason to doubt the fingerprint analysis itself. Petitioner’s
challenge is narrowed to ICE’s recordkeeping: “DHS offers no explanation how ten-print cards taken in separate
jurisdictions and decades apart were labeled, scanned, and indexed – or how mis-labeling at any stage is excluded.”
But for the reasons stated herein, that argument is unavailing.
5 The Court’s own review of the record compels the same conclusion. Petitioner never stated that October 27, 2000,
was the “first” time he entered the United States. In his attorney’s 2025 letter to USCIS, he said that date was when
petitioner “last entered.” This verbiage is consistent with a 2014 immigration application filed by petitioner’s
current spouse, stating “his last date of arrival in the US was as a Parolee on 10/27/2000.” Further, petitioner admits
that he was previously married to Madeline Garcia and that she petitioned USCIS on his behalf. ICE’s 2019
investigation confirmed that this marriage occurred in New York on March 27, 1997, and that the petition related to
Ms. Garcia was filed on August 8, 1997. In other words, petitioner effectively admits to entering the United States
at least once before October 27, 2000, and petitioner provides no lawful basis for that entry. Lastly, the record
suggests that the California asylum applicant moved to New York. The BIA’s January 2001 decision in the
California asylum application was mailed to a New York lawyer, and the March 15, 2001, deportation warrant was
mailed to the applicant’s personal address in Elmhurst, NY – the same address listed on the December 3, 1999,
advanced parole application, which petitioner admits relates to him.
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
CONCLUSION
Due process is not a results-based function. Petitioner was afforded the process to which
he was due, and ICE concluded that he was deportable pursuant to the reinstated removal order.
Accordingly, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________
U.S.D.J.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January 6, 2026
Case 2:25-cv-06392-BMC Document 15 Filed 01/06/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>