Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Henry Paul Paza Iza, by his next friend, Martha C. Iza,
Petitioner,
-v-
Anthony J. Larocco, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Nassau County; William Joyce, in his official capacity as
District Director of New York for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE); Kristi Noem, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as United
States Attorney General,
Respondents.
2:25-cv-6915
(NJC)
OPINION AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
On December 16, 2025, Martha C. Iza (“Ms. Iza”), proceeding pro se, filed an emergency
petition for a writ of habeas corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as next friend
to her son, Henry Paul Paza Iza (“Mr. Iza”) challenging the legality of Mr. Iza’s detention by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), arguing that ICE detained Mr. Iza in violation
of Section 236(a) of the Immigration and National Act (“INA”) 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“Section
1226”), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. The Petition seeks a writ of habeas
corpus immediately releasing Mr. Iza on his own recognizance or under parole, a low bond or
reasonable conditions of supervision. (Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1 at 8.)
It also seeks an order “directing Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted
within 7–15 days to safeguard [Mr. Iza’s] Procedural Due Process rights,” among other relief.
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(Pet. at 8.) Because the Petition seeks emergency and time-sensitive relief, the Court broadly
construes it to seek a temporary restraining order (“TRO Motion”) to enjoin Respondents from
continuing to detain Mr. Iza under potentially unlawful grounds, in addition to seeking a writ of
habeas corpus.1
The Respondents are: Anthony J. LaRocco, Nassau County Sheriff; William Joyce,
Deputy Field Office Director in the U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) Field
Office for New York City; Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”); and Attorney General Pamela Bondi. Joyce, Noem, and Bondi are collectively
referred to as the “Respondents.”2 Respondents argue that Mr. Iza’s detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that this statute requires his detention. Respondents make no arguments
specific to Mr. Iza but instead rely entirely on the arguments they made in a different case:
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL 3314420
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). Respondents invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“Section 1225(b)(2)”),
which governs the mandatory detention of certain noncitizens who are “seeking admission” to
1 It is well-established that “Courts should liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by
pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Diaz v.
Kopp, 146 F.4th 301, 305 (2d Cir. 2025). In this case, the Petition’s request for urgent relief
conveys a request for a temporary restraining order. At the December 22, 2025 conference in this
matter, counsel for Respondents confirmed that Respondents also understand the Petition to also
seek temporary relief pending a final adjudication of the request for a writ of habeas corpus. (See
ECF No. 11, Dec. 22, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 6:9–12 (Respondents confirming they understand the
Petition to include a request for a temporary restraining order).)
2 LaRocco has not entered an appearance in this action or responded to the Court’s December 16,
2025 Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 3). As addressed below, Mr. Iza is no longer detained in
the Nassau County Correctional Center, and the Parties do not suggest that his lack of
appearance precludes a grant of the requested relief as to the Respondents.
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the United States. They argue that Mr. Iza’s detention is supported by that statute and that he has
no right to additional process under the Due Process Clause.
Following the Court’s issuance of an Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 3), Respondents
submitted a written response to the Petition on December 19, 2025. (“Dec. 19 Letter,” ECF No.
6). On December 22, 2025, the Court held a teleconference on the TRO Motion. For the reasons
stated on the record and set forth in the written Order (“TRO Order,” ECF No. 8), the Court
granted the TRO Motion, ordered ICE to immediately release Mr. Iza from detention, and
prohibited ICE from re-detaining him under Section 1225(b)(2) for the duration of the TRO,
which was set to expire fourteen days later on January 5, 2025, pursuant to Rule 65, Fed. R. Civ.
P. (TRO Order at 15.) Respondents released Mr. Iza from ICE detention later that evening. (ECF
No. 9.)
At this time, the Court considers the merits of the Petition, which remains pending
despite Mr. Iza’s temporary release. Shortly after Mr. Iza arrived in the United States in 2022,
ICE paroled him into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“Section 1182(d)(5)(A”),
which permits noncitizens to be paroled “into the United States” for urgent humanitarian or
significant public benefit purposes. With that authorization, Mr. Iza lawfully moved to New
York. He resided continuously in the United States for more than three years, applied for asylum,
was granted a five-year work authorization by United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) starting in June 2024, worked as an electrician, and was scheduled to appear
for a USCIS interview in 2029. He has never been charged or even convicted of any crime in this
country. However, Mr. Iza was unexpectedly arrested and detained by ICE in or near the parking
lot of a Home Depot in Jamaica, New York.
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A textual analysis of Section 1225(b) compels the conclusion that none of the provisions
of that statute authorizing the mandatory detention of noncitizens apply to Mr. Iza. Neither at the
time of his arrest, nor at any point thereafter, was he subject to mandatory detention under
Section 1225(b)(2) as a noncitizen who, among other things, was “seeking admission” to the
United States. Although Respondents do not explicitly invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (“Section
1225(b)(1)”), the brevity of their legal briefs and factual submissions in this matter and their
incorporation by reference of all arguments raised in Rodriguez-Acurio leads this Court to
consider whether this mandatory detention provision applies to Mr. Iza. However, based on the
text of Section 1225(b)(1), it does not. Neither at the time of his arrest, nor at any point
thereafter, was Mr. Iza subject to mandatory detention pending expedited removal, whether as an
“arriving alien” under 8 U.C.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) or as a noncitizen designated for such
treatment under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).
Moreover, Mr. Iza’s parole into the United States in 2022 under Section 1182(d)(5)(A)
was premised by law on a determination that he did not pose a safety risk. Nothing in the record
before this Court shows any change in circumstances. No one at DHS or ICE ever made any
individualized determination that Mr. Iza poses a flight or public safety risk before he was
suddenly arrested and detained on December 14, 2025. Mr. Iza’s detention is a clear
infringement of his significant liberty interest in being free from imprisonment—the
quintessential interest triggering the procedural due process protections of the Fifth Amendment,
the hallmark of which is the requirement to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. In
light of Mr. Iza’s significant interest in physical liberty, even as a noncitizen subject to
discretionary detention under Section 1226(a), the high risk of erroneous deprivation resulting
from his detention without any notice or opportunity to be heard, and the government’s failure to
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show that detention is needed to protect public safety or guard against any risk of flight,
Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza without providing any notice or opportunity to be heard
before a DHS officer or immigration judge is a violation of his right to procedural due process.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained below and in Rodriguez-Acurio, which is
incorporated by reference in this Opinion and Order, Respondents detained Mr. Iza under
Section 1226(a) and did so in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights to procedural due process.
The Petition is therefore granted in part and Respondents are prohibited from detaining Mr. Iza
and denying him bond in any subsequent proceeding on the basis that he must be detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), absent a change in relevant circumstances consistent with this Opinion
and Order. The Court does not resolve the Petition’s request for attorney’s fees and costs at this
time but permits Mr. Iza to file an application for attorney’s fees and costs by February 2, 2026.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
I. 	Entry into the United States and Release on Parole
Mr. Iza is an Ecuadorian national. (Decl. of Mincheol So (“So Decl”), ECF No. 7-1 ¶ 3.)
According to the Petition, he fled his native country due to threats to his life. (Pet. at 4.) Mr. Iza
entered the United States on or around December 6, 2022, near El Paso, Texas. (Pet. at 2, 13; So
Decl ¶ 3.) According to ICE Deportation Officer Mincheol So, a Border Patrol Agent (“BPA”)
with United States Boder Patrol (“USBP”), which is a subdivision of Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”), encountered Mr. Iza near El Paso, determined that he had unlawfully
entered the United States from Mexico, and arrested and transported him to a nearby Border
Patrol facility for processing. (So Decl ¶ 3.) So further attests that Mr. Iza was released on parole
as an alternative to detention by the issuance of a Form I-94. (Id.) So’s Declaration is silent
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regarding the length and nature of Mr. Iza’s parole (id.), but the Petition states that Mr. Iza’s
parole was in effect until February 7, 2023. (Pet. at 2.)
The record contains a DHS Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien signed
by Border Patrol Agent Carlos Padilla and Examining Officer John C. Murray, which indicates
that Mr. Iza was released on parole on December 7, 2022 at “1227.” (Form I-213 (“Form I-
213”), ECF No. 7-4 at 1.) The narrative section of the form indicates that Mr. Iza was “released
with I-94 as an alternative to detention as a condition of parole . . . due to detention capacity at
Central Processing Center in El Paso, TX.” (Id. at 2). According to the Form I-213, “[t]he facts
of the case were explained to the subject by BPA Carlos Padilla.” (Id.)
The top of the Form I-94 provided by Respondents is titled “Departure Record,” below
which there is a DHS stamp containing handwritten text that includes the date “feb. 07, 2023”
and “212(d)(5),” as well as additional illegible handwriting. (Form I-94 (“Form I-94”), ECF No.
7-2 at 1.) Under the “Departure Record” heading, are the sub-headers “Port,” “Date,” and
“Manner.” (Id.) Neither the So Declaration nor any of Respondents’ filings address the
references to February 7, 2023 and “212(d)(5)” on the Form I-94. These markings appear to refer
to the fact that Mr. Iza’s release on humanitarian parole pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A) was in
effect through February 7, 2023. This reading is supported by the Petition, which states that Mr.
Iza “was paroled into the United States until February 7, 2023.” (Pet. at 2.)
The record also contains two forms that appear to have been created by ICE, but were not
provided to Mr. Iza. The first is an ICE Form I-385, Alien Booking Record. (Form I-385 (“Form
I-385”), ECF No. 7-5).) So fails to address when or who at DHS or ICE created this record and
how it was used. (See So Decl.) The record includes Mr. Iza’s name and File Number
(corresponding to Mr. Iza’s Alien Registration Number (“A-Number”)) and lists his date of
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apprehension as December 6, 2022, but is otherwise undated. (Id.) On the face of the form is the
statement: “Report to an ICE office within 60 days or face removal.” (Id.) The second form is an
ICE Form G-56/PD dated December 7, 2022, which includes Mr. Iza’s name, A-Number, and an
address in the Bronx, New York, which is presumably the address to which Mr. Iza was released
on parole. (Form G-56/PD (“Form PD G-56), ECF No. 7-6; see also Form I-213 (listing the
same address as associated with Mr. Iza’s “US POC”).) The Form PD G-56 references an
attachment of ICE Field Office locations and indicates that Mr. Iza must report to a local ICE
office within 60 days of release. (Form PD G-56.) It contains the following statement:
You have been released in the discretion of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the
United States and are now required to contact your local ICE Field Office to complete
processing.
Contacting ICE will ensure that DHS has your address and contact information up to
date. Once you contact ICE for the first time, ICE will evaluate how you can meet the
continuing filing requirements which may include in-person reporting. Failure to contact
the local ICE office may lead to you being taken into custody or placed on additional
forms of supervision or monitoring.
(Id.) The Form PD G-56 further provides that failure to contact the local ICE office may result in
arrest and/or loss of the right to possible relief. (Id.)
No information in the record, whether the face of each document, the So Declaration, or
any of Respondents’ letter briefs show that either the Form I-385 or Form PD G-56 were
provided to Mr. Iza. Neither document bears his signature in English or Spanish. The So
Declaration does not address either document or explain when they were created or whether or
when they were provided to Mr. Iza, whether in English or Spanish. (See So Decl.) Nor do
Respondents’ letter briefs represent that the Form I-385 and Form PD G-56 were actually
provided to Mr. Iza. (See ECF No. 4 (“Dec. 17 Letter”), Resp. to Order to Show Cause, ECF
No. 6 (“Dec. 19 Letter”), Supp. Letter, ECF No. 7 (“Dec. 22 Letter.”).) Counsel for Respondents
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asserted during the TRO hearing that Mr. Iza was issued a Form G-56 Notice to Appear when he
was released from custody, but noted that Respondents could not confirm whether Mr. Iza
checked in with ICE within 60-days. (Id at 9:15–17.) Ms. Iza, when asked if she knew whether
Mr. Iza had checked in with ICE within 60-days of his release reported that he did check in. (Id.
at 9:18–10:23.)3
At the hearing, the Court ordered Respondents to file any additional supplemental
information in support of their asserted bases for detaining Mr. Iza by December 29, 2025—one
additional week. (Elec. Order, Dec. 22, 2025.) However, Respondents indicated they would not
file any additional evidence or make any further legal arguments (ECF No. 13), thereby failing to
provide factual submissions showing that the Form I-385 and Form PD G-56 were not simply
internal agency records but were actually provided to Mr. Iza, that he was aware of any 60-day
deadline to check in with ICE following his release pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A), or that he
failed to check-in with ICE at any time. Accordingly, the record does not establish that Mr. Iza
was required to check in with ICE within 60 days of his release on parole on December 7, 2022,
that Mr. Iza failed to comply with any requirements to check-in with ICE at any time after his
release on parole, or that Respondents’ relied upon any such failure to arrest and detain Mr. Iza
on December 14, 2025.4
3 Respondents’ supplemental response to the Petition, which was provided only after the Court
required Respondents to supplement their three-page response to the Petition, provided a short
letter accompanying the So Declaration and attached documents, including the Form I-385 and
Form PD G-56. (See Dec. 22 Letter.) The So Declaration does not address the Form I-385 or
Form PD G-56 in any way, although it does address the other attachments to Respondents’
December 22, 2025 Letter. The December 22, 2025 Letter provides no information about either
document other than listing them as attachments. (Id.)
4 To the extent that Respondents’ counsel sought to argue that Mr. Iza failed to appear at any ICE
check-ins and that such failure supports ICE’s detention of him in 2025, Respondents fail to
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II. 	Asylum Application and Work Authorization
Following his release on parole, Mr. Iza kept his address current with USCIS. (Pet. at 2.)
On November 20, 2023, Mr. Iza—then living in New York—filed an application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. (Id. at 2, 22.) The first
page of the I-589 application for asylum and withholding of removal is attached to the Petition
and shows that Mr. Iza provided his A-Number and mailing address in Jamaica, New York. (Id.
at 22.) Mr. Iza also applied for work authorization, and USCIS issued him a Form I-765
Employment Authorization Document, which authorizes him to work in the United States from
June 25, 2024 through June 26, 2029. (Dec. 23 Filing at 3; see also ECF No. 11, Dec. 22, 2025
Hr’g Tr. (“TRO Hearing”) at 15:6–23 (testimony by Mr. Iza’s employer that Mr. Iza is
authorized to work in the United States).)
Prior to his December 14, 2025 arrest and detention, Mr. Iza’s only appointment with any
division of DHS was a USCIS appointment scheduled for March 26, 2029. (Id. at 2, 22; ECF No.
10 at 1). Mr. Iza had not been served with a Notice of Removal or provided a date in
immigration court at any time prior to his arrest. (Pet. at 2 (“[Mr. Iza] was not issued a notice to
appear in court [upon being paroled into the United States]” and “had no scheduled court
dates.”); So Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7 (stating that on December 16, 2025 Mr. Iza was served with a Notice to
Appear in Immigration Court on January 2, 2026).)
substantiate this assertion with factual submissions or legal argument. See In re Demetriades, 58
F.4th 37, 54 (2d Cir. 2023) (recognizing that where a party refers to an issue in only “a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by any effort at developed argumentation, it must be
deemed waived[]—or, more precisely, forfeited”).
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III. 	ICE Arrest and Detention
On the morning of December 14, 2025, ICE agents detained Mr. Iza in or near the
parking lot of the Home Depot located at 92-30 168th Street, Jamaica, New York (“Home
Depot”). (Pet. at 1; So Decl. ¶ 4) ICE transported him to the Central Islip Processing Center in
Central Islip, New York, where he was served with a Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest. (So Decl.
¶ 4.) Later that day, ICE transported Mr. Iza to the Nassau County Correctional Facility. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On December 16, 2025, ICE served Mr. Iza with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), Form I-
862, and charged him as inadmissible pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as a noncitizen present in the United
States without parole or a noncitizen who arrived in the United States at a place or time other
than as designated by the Attorney General. (Id. ¶ 5.) The NTA further ordered Mr. Iza to appear
in Immigration Court on January 2, 2026. (Id.; Notice to Exec. Office of Immigration Review,
Form I-830 (“Form I-830”) at ECF No. 7-2.) According to So, the NTA was filed with the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) on December 18, 2025, which commenced
removal proceedings against Mr. Iza under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (So Decl. ¶ 7.)
On December 17, 2025, ICE transferred Mr. Iza from the Nassau County Correctional
Center to a “hold room” in 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York, before subsequently
transferring him to the ICE Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, later that day.
(So Decl. ¶ 6.)
On December 22, 2025, the Court held a teleconference with the Parties. (Elec. Order,
Dec. 22, 2025.) After hearing from both sides, it granted the TRO Motion for the reasons
explained on the record and a written TRO Order. (See TRO Order.) Later that day, ICE released
Mr. Iza from the ICE Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (ECF No. 9.)
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 16, 2025, Ms. Iza filed the Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, as Mr. Iza’s next friend. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition claims that ICE’s detention
of Mr. Iza, which commenced on December 14, 2025, violates his Fifth Amendment rights to
procedural due process and substantive due process and his rights under the Administrative
Procedure Act and Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id. at 1–3, 7.) The Petition clams that the
detention violated due process because ICE detained Mr. Iza without any “notice, an opportunity
to respond, or an individualized determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to the
community” and because Respondents denied Mr. Iza the ability to contact counsel. (Id. at 2)
Shortly after the Petition was filed on December 16, 2025, the Court issued an Order to
Show Cause requiring Respondents to demonstrate why the Petition should not be granted. (ECF
No. 3.) The Order to Show Cause further ordered that Mr. Iza should not be removed from the
United States or from the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New York, or
the District of New Jersey absent further orders of this Court. (Id.)
The Court also issued a separate Order requiring Respondents to address where Mr. Iza
was being detained and to confirm that he had not been transferred out of this Court’s
jurisdiction in violation of the Order to Show Cause. (Elec. Order, Dec. 16, 2025.) On December
17, 2025, Respondents filed a letter confirming that, as of the date and time of that submission,
Respondents were detaining Mr. Iza in the Nassau County Correctional Center in East Meadow,
New York. (Dec. 17 Letter.)
On December 19, 2025, Respondents filed a Response to the Court’s Order to Show
Cause (Dec. 19 Letter), reporting that, on December 17, 2025, Mr. Iza was transferred to a hold
room at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York, and then subsequently transferred to an ICE
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facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (Id.) In the December 19, 2025 letter, Respondents explained
that they submitted the letter:
in lieu of a formal responsive memorandum to conserve judicial and party resources and
to expedite the Court’s consideration of this case, in light of the Court’s decision on the
principal legal issues in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodova, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL
3314430 (E.D.N.Y., Nov.28, 2025).
Id. Respondents “acknowledge[d] that the Court’s decision [in Rodriguez-Acurio] would control
the results in this case” because the facts concerning the detention of Ms. Rodriguez-Acurio and
Mr. Iza are “materially indistinguishable.” (Id. at 2.) Respondents “incorporate[d] by reference
the legal arguments [they] presented in Rodriguez-Acurio and respectfully submit[ted] that the
Court can decide this matter without further briefing.” (Id.)
On December 20, 2025, the Court issued an Order noting that the Response to the Order
to Show Cause failed to identify the specific statutory basis for Mr. Iza’s detention, whether
Section 1225(b)(1), Section 1225(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and/or some other Immigration and
Nationality Act provision. (Elec. Order, Dec. 20, 2025.) The Court further noted that the
Response failed to confirm that all documents material to Respondents’ asserted statutory basis
for detaining Mr. Iza had been provided in the December 19, 2025 submission. (Id.) In light of
the time sensitivity expressed in the Petition, the Court ordered Respondents to file a
supplemental submission by December 22, 2025 at 11:00 am identifying the specific
Immigration and Nationality Act provisions invoked as the basis for Mr. Iza’s detention and all
documents demonstrating why such a statutory basis applies to Mr. Iza, including any DHS and
USCIS records. (Id.)
On December 22, 2025, Respondents filed a letter stating that Mr. Iza was being detained
pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) (Dec. 22 Letter), along with the following supporting
submissions:
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(1) the declaration from ICE Deportation Officer Mincheol So, dated December 19, 2025
(ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit A);
(2) a Form I-94 Departure Record relating to Mr. Iza, listing December 7, 2022 as the
“Date of Action” (ECF No. 7-2, Exhibit B);
(3) a Form I-830 Notice to the Executive Office of Immigration Review, dated
December 16, 2025 (ECF No. 7-3, Exhibit C);
(4) a Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien relating to Mr. Iza, dated
December 7, 2022 (ECF No. 7-4, Exhibit D);
(5) a Form I-385 Alien Booking Record relating to Mr. Iza, listing December 6, 2022 as
the date Mr. Iza was apprehended (ECF No. 7-5, Exhibit E); and
(6) a Form PD G-56 Notice to Appear relating to Mr. Iza, dated December 7, 2022 (ECF
No. 7-6, Exhibit F).
The Court held a TRO hearing on December 22, 2025 with counsel for Respondents and
Ms. Iza appearing pro se. (Elec. Order, Dec. 22, 2025.) Without objection from Respondents,
Mr. Iza’s employer, Jorge Brito, served as a Spanish language interpreter for Ms. Iza during the
hearing. (Elec. Order, Dec. 22, 2025.) The Court heard from the parties and, for the reasons
stated on the record, granted the TRO Motion, ordering ICE to immediately release Mr. Iza from
detention and prohibiting ICE from re-detaining him under Section 1225(b)(2) until expiration of
the TRO Order in fourteen days on January 5, 2026, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The Court
further ordered the parties to file any additional documents or legal arguments in support of their
respective positions on the Petition by December 29, 2025 at 5:00 pm. (TRO Hearing at 13:1–6.)
On December 23, 2025, Ms. Iza filed two documents: (1) a scanned copy of a USCIS
Form I-765 Employment Authorization Document issued to Mr. Iza on or around June 25, 2024,
which authorizes him to work in the United States until June 24, 2029, and (2) a document that
confirms an ICE appointment scheduled for March 26, 2029, but which does not include a name
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or any other information identifying the individual whom the appointment concerns. (ECF No.
10.)
Notwithstanding the brevity of Respondents’ prior submissions, on December 29, 2025,
Respondents filed a letter informing the Court: “Respondents do not intend to submit any
additional documents or arguments in this matter.” (ECF No. 13, “Dec. 29 Letter”.) Respondents
did not attach any factual submissions, such as a declaration from a DHS or ICE official
explaining the Form I-385 Alien Booking Record or Form PD G-56 Notice to Appear, that had
been attached to Respondents’ December 22, 2025 submission but not addressed by their letter
briefs or the So Declaration.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which
“authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320
F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 241(c)); see also Hechavarria v. Sessions, 891
F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2018).5 Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims by
noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their detention. Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Hechavarria, 891 F.3d at 53 (“[A]t its historical core, the
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and
it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”). Additionally, “[c]laims that the
discretionary process [used to detain someone] . . . was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in
5 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks, brackets,
alterations, and citations.
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federal court on habeas because they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.” Velasco Lopez,
978 F.3d at 850.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Next Friend Standing
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing and “signed and verified by the
person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her] behalf.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. A
person acting on behalf of the person for whom the habeas petition is filed is known as a “next
friend.” See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (1990). “A ‘next friend’ does not himself
become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause
on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.” Id. at 163. There are
two prerequisites for next friend standing: (1) the next friend “must provide an adequate
explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real
party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action”; and (2) the next friend
“must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate”
and must “have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Id. at 163–64.
Here, Ms. Iza filed the Petition as next friend to her son, Mr. Iza, who was detained by
ICE without notice or opportunity to be heard on December 14, 2025. The Petition explains that
Mr. Iza could not file the Petition himself because, while detained by ICE, he “was not provided
an opportunity to call counsel or provided with information on relief available or challenges he
could make to these Procedural Due Process Violations.” (Pet. ¶ 12.) Further, Mr. Iza “was not
provided with access to a law library or any means that would allow him to prepare even a Pro se
habeas corpus.” (Id.) Additionally, “given strict limitations on call time,” Mr. Iza was not
“allowed to call any nonprofit nor have any opportunity to seek representation” in order to file
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the emergency habeas petition. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Further, while Ms. Iza was filing this petition, Mr.
Iza was in the process of being transferred from facility to facility. (See Dec. 19 Letter at 2
(stating that on December 14, 2025, Mr. Iza was transported to Central Islip, New York, and then
later transferred to Nassau County Correctional Facility that same day).) Mr. Iza did not have
access to counsel or the ability to prepare a pro se habeas petition while detained in the Nassau
County Correctional Facility from December 14, 2025 through December 17, 2025.
Accordingly, Ms. Iza has sufficiently demonstrated that the courts were inaccessible to Mr. Iza at
the time she filed this emergency Petition on his behalf.6
Further, Ms. Iza has shown that she has a significant relationship with Mr. Iza as his
mother.7 She has also demonstrated dedication to his best interests, including by appearing
before the Court at a TRO hearing on short notice and by timely filing additional documentation
in response to the Court’s Order. (See Elec. Order Dec. 22, 2025 (setting a telephone TRO
hearing for later that day); TRO Hearing at 13:1–6; ECF No. 10.) Accordingly, the Court
considers the Petition filed by Ms. Iza on behalf of Mr. Iza, who “remains the real party in
6 Although Mr. Iza is not currently detained, his release on December 22, 2025 was solely
pursuant to the TRO Order, which is set to expire today (January 5, 2026). Accordingly, the
Petition is not moot and the Court must address the merits of the Petition, which challenges
Respondents’ assertion that they may detain Mr. Iza without a pre-deprivation determination by a
DHS officer or immigration judge that Mr. Iza presents a public safety or flight risk. See J-C-R-
M v. Wamsley, No. 3:25-cv-990, 2025 WL 3527108, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 9, 2025) (holding that
because petitioner “was confined at the time he filed his Petition and is seeking release based on
alleged unlawful confinement,” the court still rules on the habeas petition even though the
petitioner is no longer confined because unlawful confinement goes to the “core” of habeas).
Notably, Respondents do not represent that they will refrain from again seeking to arrest and
detain Mr. Iza pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) without ensuring that he is first provided such
notice and process.
7 Ms. Iza provided a signed declaration in which she attested that she is Mr. Iza’s mother (Pet. at
11) and attached a copy of Mr. Iza’s birth certificate, which lists Ms. Iza as his mother. (Pet. at
13.)
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interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163; see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 703 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding that the detained person is the “real party in interest” in a habeas petition filed by
a next friend), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
II. 	Statutory Framework
The Court incorporates by reference the entirety of Discussion Section I of its Opinion
and Order in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, in which this Court explains the statutory
framework for removing noncitizens from the United States through removal and expedited
removal proceedings, ICE’s mandatory and discretionary detention of noncitizens under the
INA, and the release of applicants for admission detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2)
“temporarily . . . on parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which is known as the humanitarian parole statute
(“Section 1182(d)(5)(A)”). See Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 2:25-cv-
6065, 2025 WL 3314420, at *8–11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025).
III. 	Analysis
The Petition seeks an order requiring “Respondents to release Petitioner on his own
recognizance or under parole, a low bond or reasonable conditions of supervision.” (Pet. at 8.) It
claims that Respondents violated Mr. Iza’s procedural and substantive due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment and his rights under the APA and INA by detaining him starting on
December 14, 2025 without any pre-deprivation “notice, an opportunity to respond, or an
individualized determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to the community. . . .” (Pet. at
2, 7–8.)
As noted, Respondents take the position that “the Court’s decision [in Rodriguez-Acurio]
would control the results in this case” because the facts concerning the detention of Rodriguez-
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Acurio and Mr. Iza are “materially indistinguishable.” (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.) Respondents do not
make any arguments or address any facts particular to Mr. Iza. Instead, Respondents “incorporate
by reference the legal arguments [they] presented in Rodriguez-Acurio and respectfully submit
that the Court can decide this matter without further briefing.” (Id.) In response to this Court’s
order directing Respondents to specify the statutory basis for Mr. Iza’s detention, Respondents
filed a December 22, 2025 letter in which they invoke only Section 1225(b)(2) as the basis for
Mr. Iza’s detention, rather than Section 1225(b)(1), Section 1226(c), or any other INA provision.
(Dec. 22 Letter.)
Moreover, although the record indicates that Mr. Iza was paroled into the interior of the
United States on December 7, 2025, none of Respondents’ submissions address the specific
statutory basis for parole, such as whether Mr. Iza was released on humanitarian parole under
Section 1182(d)(5)(A) or a different form of parole. Nor do they address whether Mr. Iza was
instructed to check in with ICE 60 days after his release on parole, such as through provision of
the Form I-385 Alien Booking Record (ECF No. 7-5) or the Form PD G-56 Notice to Appear
(ECF No. 7-6). Nor do Respondents provide any factual submissions showing that Mr. Iza failed
to appear at any required ICE check ins at any time following his release on parole. Indeed,
Respondents’ December 29, 2025 response to the Court’s invitation for supplemental briefing
and factual submissions indicates that Respondents do not find it material to address any of these
factual or legal issues, thus conveying that they rest on their position that Mr. Iza’s detention is
authorized by Section 1225(b)(2) and that his facts are “materially indistinguishable” from those
of Ms. Rodriguez-Acurio. (See Dec. 29 Letter at 1 (“Respondents do not intend to submit any
additional documents or arguments in this matter.”).) The Court thus considers the arguments
Respondents’ set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio in support of the invocation of mandatory detention
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pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420 at *12; (Dec. 22
Letter).
In Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents made three arguments relating to mandatory detention
under Section 1225(b)(2), which the Court considers as having been made with respect to Mr.
Iza as well. First, they argue that Mr. Iza’s detention is governed by the mandatory detention
provision set forth in Section 1225(b)(2), not the Section 1226(a) discretionary detention
framework. Id. Second, they contend that courts apply an “entry fiction” to claims by noncitizens
whereby the only procedural due process rights that noncitizens like Mr. Iza possess are those
that Congress has provided by statute. Id. And finally, Respondents argue that even if the Court
were to find that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and Section 1226(a), the proper remedy is to require a bond
hearing before a DHS officer with the option of appeal to an immigration judge, as opposed to
release. Id.
For the reasons explained below, Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply to Respondents’
detention of Mr. Iza between December 14 and 22, 2025, for the reasons explained in Rodriguez-
Acurio, which are incorporated by reference in this Opinion and Order. See Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 WL 3314420 at *22–25. Accordingly, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza was necessarily
carried out pursuant to the Section 1226(a) discretionary detention framework.
Contrary to Respondents’ contentions, Mr. Iza—as a noncitizen who was paroled into the
interior of the United States, has continuously resided in New York for more than three years,
has developed deep community ties, and was granted five years of work authorization from 2024
to 2029—has a liberty interest in being free from detention that is absent any procedural due
process protections. The Court therefore applies the balancing test laid out in Mathews v.
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Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), as it did in Rodriguez-Acurio, and concludes that
Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza without any pre-deprivation notice and opportunity to be
heard, much less any individualized determination by a DHS officer or immigration judge as to
whether detention is appropriate based on public safety concerns or flight risk, violates his Fifth
Amendment rights. This Court therefore incorporates by reference the procedural due process
analysis set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420 at *25–31. Accordingly, and in
consideration of Mr. Iza’s weighty liberty interests alongside Respondents’ interests in enforcing
immigration laws and the substantial risk of erroneous deprivation stemming from Respondents’
arrest and detention of Mr. Iza without any notice or opportunity to be heard, Mr. Iza’s detention
violated his right to procedural due process.
Finally, despite Respondents’ contentions that the proper remedy for such a violation is to
require a bond hearing before a DHS officer with the option of appeal to an immigration judge,
such a relief would be futile for the reasons set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio, which are also
incorporated by reference herein. 2025 WL 3314420 at *31–33. Disposing of the matter as law
and justice require necessitates Mr. Iza’s release from detention and relief guarding against his
re-detention in violation of this Court’s determination that he is not subject to mandatory
detention under Section 1225(b).
A. Mr. Iza was not Detained Under Section 1225(b)
Section 1225(b)(2) provides that:
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). As this Court previously set out in Rodriguez-
Acurio, according to its plain text, to be subject to mandatory detention under this statute, a
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noncitizen must be: (1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. 2025 WL 3314420, at *22. There is no dispute that Mr.
Iza is an “applicant for admission” and he is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted” as set forth in Section 1225(b).
In Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents argued that because the petitioner in that case was an
“applicant for admission,” she was also inherently and necessarily “seeking admission” to the
United States and thereby satisfied all three criteria required for mandatory detention under
1225(b)(2). 2025 WL 3314420, at *22–23. In light of Respondents’ December 19, 2025 letter,
Respondents adopt precisely the same argument with respect to Mr. Iza. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.)
However, based on the record before the Court, Mr. Iza is not detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) for the reasons set out in Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *22–24.
Mr. Iza is not “seeking admission” because he has been living in the United States since
December 2022. “Indeed, it would be illogical to find that [Mr. Iza] is still in the process of
‘arriving’ in the United States when [he] has been continuously residing in the United States for
more than three years” and, as recently as June 2024, USCIS granted him authorization to work
in the United States for five years. Id. at *21; see also (Dec. 23 Filing at 3; ECF No. 11, TRO
Hearing at 15:6–23 (Mr. Iza’s employer confirming that Mr. Iza has work authorization)). Like
Ms. Rodriguez-Acurio, Mr. Iza is an applicant for admission, but clearly he is not presenting
himself at the border and was not recently apprehended just after entering, and thereby is not
“seeking admission” as required for mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2). Moreover,
while Mr. Iza’s application for asylum and withholding of removal may indicate that he
continues to “‘seek something,’ what he seeks is not ‘admission’ or ‘lawful entry’ to the United
States, but to obtain a lawful means to remain here” where he has been continuously residing for
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more than three years. Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(emphasis in original).
Respondents do not identify any active process of seeking admission attributable to Mr.
Iza. (See generally Dec. 17 Letter; Dec. 19 Letter; Dec. 22 Letter; Dec. 29 Letter.) Respondents
note that they “respectfully disagree[] with the Court’s decision in Rodriguez-Acurio” but do not
advance any additional arguments other than what they previously set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio.
(Dec. 19 Letter at 2.) Respondents’ arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons already set forth
in Rodriguez-Acurio. As this Court has explained, an “overwhelming, lopsided majority” of
district courts have rejected Respondents’ arguments concerning Section 1225(b)(2). 2025 WL
3314420, at *23 (quoting Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6582, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025
WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)). Indeed, at the time Rodriguez-Acurio was
decided, Respondents’ position that all noncitizens who have come into the United States
without authorization, but have been living in the United States must be detained “ha[d] been
challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts,” and the challengers “ha[d] prevailed,
either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of those cases decided by over 160 different judges
sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025
WL 3314420, at *23 (quoting Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4, which was
decided two days before Rodriguez-Acurio). Such decisions are not binding, and the Court has
independently considered Respondents’ arguments with respect to Mr. Iza. Nonetheless, the
overwhelming caselaw from across this Circuit and, indeed, the country, reflects the novelty of
Respondents’ arguments and demonstrates “that the law still means what it always has meant.”
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *23.
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Accordingly, Mr. Iza was detained by ICE while present in the United States but not
while actively seeking admission into the country. Therefore, Respondents’ detention of him
from December 14, 2025 through December 22, 2025, was not carried out pursuant to Section
1225(b)(2).
Respondents do not address the import, if any, of Mr. Iza’s release on humanitarian
parole under Section 1182(d)(5)(A) or the apparent expiration of that parole in February 2023 as
set forth in the Form I-94 and Petition on the statutory basis for Mr. Iza’s detention. (See Form I-
94; Pet. at 2.) For example, Respondents do not argue that the expiration of humanitarian parole
is material to the question of whether Section 1225(b)(2) applies to Mr. Iza. Indeed, in
Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents argued that the expiration of humanitarian parole subjected the
petitioner in that case to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(1)—a provision
Respondents explicitly decline to invoke here.
The Court nevertheless incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in Rodriguez-
Acurio concerning the inapplicability of Section 1225(b)(1) to noncitizens like Mr. Iza, who are
released from ICE detention and permitted to move to the interior of the United States pursuant
to the humanitarian parole provision in Section 118d(2)(5)(A). Respondents concede that Mr. Iza
was released on parole shortly after his entry to the United States as shown by the Form I-213,
Form PD G-56, and Form I-385, even though they do not identify the statutory basis for such
release on parole. The Form I-94 indicates that Mr. Iza’s release on parole was pursuant to
Section 1182(d)(5)(A) based on the handwritten notation “212(d)(5),” which presumably refers
to INA Section 212(d)(5)(A), which is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Here, Mr. Iza was never served
with a notice of expedited removal and Respondents do not rebut the Petition’s express statement
that he was not subject to such proceedings. (Pet. at 2 (“He has been in the United States for
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more than 2 years and is not subject to expedited removal proceedings.”).) For all of the reasons
explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, Section 1225(b)(1) cannot be the basis for Mr. Iza’s detention
because neither the Arriving Aliens Provision nor the Designation Provision of Section
1225(b)(1) authorizes the expedited removal and the detention of noncitizens who, like Mr. Iza,
were paroled into the United States under Section 1182(d)(5)(A). Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL
3314420, at *14–22. As is the case with Rodriguez-Acurio:
Section 1182(d)(5)(A) may permit [Mr. Iza] to be returned to ICE custody, but [his] case,
which necessarily includes the procedures required before detention, ‘shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission,’ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), and any other applicant for admission residing in the United States for
more than three years would be detained under Section 1226.
Id. at 18; see also Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029, 2025 WL 3654098, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
17, 2025) (agreeing with the reasoning of Rodriguez-Acurio and holding that the text of Section
1225(b)(1) “exempts noncitizens who are both presently on parole and those who were paroled
in the past”); O.F.B. v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-6336, 2025 WL 3277677, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
25, 2025) (holding that “Section 1225 does not apply to a noncitizen like Petitioner [whose
parole has expired but], who has been living in the United States for years, and that his detention
can only be authorized if it came about as a result of procedures compliant with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a).”).8
8 As noted above, the Court makes the factual finding that the record does not show that Mr. Iza
failed to check in with ICE, whether 60 days after his release on parole or at any time thereafter,
or that any such failure was the basis for Respondents’ arrest and detention of Mr. Iza on
December 14, 2025. (See supra Factual Findings § I at 5–8.) Respondents were given the
opportunity to provide additional arguments and documentation but did not do so. (See Dec. 29
Letter.) Moreover, Respondents do not argue that any failure by Mr. Iza to check in with ICE is
material to their argument that he is detained under Section 1225(b) rather than Section 1226(a).
See United States v. Graham, 51 F.4th 67, 80 (2d Cir. 2022). Indeed, Respondents entirely rely
on their arguments in Rodriguez-Acurio, where Respondents made no such arguments.
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B. Mr. Iza was Detained Under Section 1226(a)
As explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, Sections 1225 and 1226 are “mutually exclusive—a
noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary
detention under § 1226.” 2025 WL 3314420, at *24. Because Respondents’ arguments involving
Section 1225(b)(2) are unpersuasive, Mr. Iza’s detention was governed by Section 1226(a).
Further supporting this conclusion is the fact that Mr. Iza was arrested on a DHS Warrant for
Arrest that was issued pursuant to Section 1226(a). (Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest (“Warrant”),
ECF No. 6-1.) The face of the Warrant authorizes an immigration officer to serve the Warrant
“pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 287 of the
title 8, Code of Federal Regulations . . . .” Id.; see Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *24
(finding that Sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and National Act and part 287 of title 8 of
the Code of Federal Regulations correspond to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1357 and 8 C.F.R. 287.1–
287.12.); see also Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 485 (finding that Petitioner’s Notice of
Custody Determination and warrants for arrest, all pursuant to 1226, “unequivocally
establish[ed]” that he was detained pursuant to Section 1226(a)). Although not dispositive
standing alone, Mr. Iza’s arrest on a warrant invoking Section 1226 supports the conclusion that
his detention is governed by Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework. See Sampiao
v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11981, 2025 WL 2607924, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (holding that to
mandate the petitioner’s detention “in these circumstances would contravene Congress’s intent
that Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework apply to all noncitizens arrested on a
warrant except those subject to Section 1226(c)’s carve out”); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
12052, 2025 WL 2370988, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025) (“Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply
to noncitizens who are arrested on a warrant issued by the Attorney General while residing in the
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United States.”); cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (holding that Section
1226(a) “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings”). Thus, based on the current record, Mr. Iza’s detention was
governed by Section 1226(a).
C. Procedural Due Process
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. When evaluating a procedural
due process claim, there are “two elements: (1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that
was deprived and (2) deprivation of that interest without due process.” Radwan v. Manuel, 55
F.4th 101, 123 (2d Cir. 2022); see also Nnebe v. Daus, 931 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2019).
I. 	Mr. Iza’s detention infringes on his protected liberty interest
The Petition argues that Mr. Iza’s detention by ICE triggered his right to procedural due
process because any decision to detain him is subject to Section 1226(a) and there is no dispute
that “ICE detained him without notice, an opportunity to respond, or an individualized
determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to the community.” (Pet. at 2, 5.) In
Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents cited several cases, including Department of Homeland Security
v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020), to argue that the petitioner in that case did not have
a right to any additional process than what the Section 1225 mandatory detention scheme
affords. Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *25. Respondents’ December 19, 2025 letter
incorporates by reference such arguments made in Rodriguez-Acurio. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.)
As a preliminary matter, as established above, Mr. Iza was not detained from December
14, 2025 through December 22, 2025 pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2); accordingly, his detention
was governed by Section 1226(a), and he was entitled to the protections afforded by that statute.
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Section 1226(a) vests DHS with “broad authority to arrest and detain noncitizens, but due
process must account for the wide discretion that Section 1226(a) vests in the Government to
arrest any person in the United States suspected of being removable.” 2025 WL 3314420, at *29
(quoting Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 492) (emphasis in original).
Thus, for all of the reasons set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio, which are incorporated by
reference here, Respondents’ arguments misstate the law. See 2025 WL 3314420, at *25–27.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Due Process Clause “covers noncitizens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850; see
also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (noncitizen who entered the country in
violation of the law cannot be “deprived of [her] liberty” without receiving “due process of
law”). In habeas proceedings concerning executive detention, courts must conduct “the most
searching review” to ensure the legality of detention that “occur[s] without the procedural
protections required in courts of law.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850–51. Thuraissigiam does
not support Respondents’ position because it “stands for the limited principle that those ‘at the
threshold of entry’ stand on a different footing for due process purposes than noncitizens ‘who
have established connections in this country.’” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *26
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107).
Mr. Iza was paroled into the interior of the United States in 2022, has been living in New
York since that time, has developed significant community ties, and was granted authorization to
work in the United States from 2024 to 2029. Therefore, the cases cited by Respondents in
Rodriguez-Acurio, including Thuraissigiam, are distinguishable. Mr. Iza therefore has a liberty
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interest in being free from detention that is afforded procedural due process protection. See
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 850 (confirming that the Fifth Amendment “covers noncitizens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). That liberty interest
was necessarily infringed when ICE detained him on December 14, 2025.
II. 	Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza violated his rights to procedural due
process
Courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test “when determining the adequacy of
process in the context of civil immigration confinement.” Munoz Materano v. Artera, No. 25-cv-
6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2025). Under that test, the determination of
what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment requires consideration of: (1) the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of
that interest through the procedures used; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335.
Applying that test, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza violated his Fifth Amendment
Procedural Due Process rights.
i. 	Mr. Iza’s detention infringed on his liberty interest
As already established, the Petition invokes “the most significant liberty interest there
is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851. As a result,
Mr. Iza’s private interest in his liberty is significant. ICE detained him without any notice,
explanation, or an opportunity to be heard on December 14, 2025, after arresting him in or near
the Home Depot parking lot. (Pet. at ¶¶ 11–12.) From December 14 to 17, 2025, Respondents did
not afford Mr. Iza the opportunity to call counsel or access to a law library, thereby preventing
him from preparing this Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–14, 18.) Nor was
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Mr. Iza able to communicate with any existing or potential counsel in order to prepare for
removal proceedings while detained even though Respondents served him on December 16,
2025—just two days after ICE detained him—with a Notice to Appear for an immigration court
hearing on January 2, 2025. (See Pet. at 2; So Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Form I-862, ECF No. 7-3.) Further,
for the duration of his detention prior to this Court’s issuance of a TRO ordering his release, Mr.
Iza was separated from his mother and could not work at his job as an electrician. (Pet. at 1
(demonstrating his mother’s efforts to find him in the ICE inmate locator after he was suddenly
arrested and detained); TRO Hearing at 15:3–10 (confirming that Mr. Iza works as an electrician
and that “he will report to work if he’s released.”).) In addition, significant weight is afforded to
Mr. Iza’s interest in liberty because has been in living in the United States since 2022—more
than three years. (Pet. at 2.) Accordingly, Mr. Iza has a significant private interest in being free
from imprisonment while his removal proceedings are pending. (Form I-862, ECF No. 7-3).
ii. 	Risk of erroneous deprivation
There is also a high risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures—or lack
thereof—used to detain Mr. Iza. Respondents do not contest that they did not provide Mr. Iza
notice and an opportunity to be heard before a DHS officer or immigration judge prior to
detaining him on December 14, 2025. For the same reasons set forth fully in Rodriguez-Acurio,
there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty in detaining Mr. Iza without any notice or
opportunity to be heard. See 2025 WL 3314420, at *29–30. The additional procedural safeguard
of requiring that any detention to be preceded by a bond hearing before an immigration judge
would squarely address that risk. See id.; Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 495; Hyppolite v.
Noem, No. 24-cv-4304, 2025 WL 2829511, at *13–14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (finding an
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“extremely high” risk of erroneous deprivation where a person is detained under Section 1226(a)
without any pre-deprivation notice or an opportunity to be heard).
iii. 	Government’s interest
The Attorney General may have a legitimate government interest in ensuring the
appearance of noncitizens at immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community.
See Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854 (holding that “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain
individuals under [Section 1226(a)] is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “ensuring that noncitizen[s] do not abscond and . . . ensuring they do not
commit crimes.”); Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 496. However, there is nothing in the record
suggesting that Mr. Iza is a flight risk or a danger to his community. There is absolutely no
evidence that Mr. Iza has been suspected, much less charged, arrested, or convicted of any crime.
Moreover, Respondents fail to provide any information to even suggest that Mr. Iza failed to
check in with ICE or USCIS as required. By contrast, shortly after Mr. Iza’s entry into the United
States on or around December 6, 2022, Respondents released Mr. Iza on Section 1182(d)(5)(A)
parole, permitting him to move to the interior of the United States. Indeed, Mr. Iza’s release on
parole “necessarily involved the determination that [he] posed no flight or public safety risk.”
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *30 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); R.I., v. Wofford, No.
25-cv-01637, 2025 WL 3768205, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (“By regulation, immigration
officials may parole a noncitizen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit, provided the noncitizen presents neither a security risk nor
risk of absconding . . . . Such release therefore reflects a determination that the noncitizen is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.” (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)).) Further, Respondents
have not addressed any of the Mathews v. Eldrige factors with respect to Mr. Iza’s detention.
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* * *
Weighing all of the Matthews v. Eldrige factors—the significant liberty interest at stake,
the high risk of erroneous deprivation, and Respondents’ failure to demonstrate that his detention
was required to advance any legitimate government interest in ensuring Mr. Iza’s appearance at
removal proceedings or preventing danger to the community—Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza
with no notice or opportunity to be heard and no showing of changed circumstances following
release on parole violated his procedural due process rights. See, e.g., Lopez Benitez, 795 F.
Supp. 3d at 496; Huamani Tumba v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL 3079014, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). Any future detention on the same basis would do so as well, absent
changed circumstances consistent with this Opinion and Order. Because the Court finds that
Respondents’ detention of Mr. Iza violated his rights to procedural due process, it declines to
reach his substantive due process claims and claims under the INA and APA.
IV. 	Remedy
Upon finding a constitutional violation, a district court “may” grant a writ of habeas
corpus and “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C §§ 2241(a), 2243.
Release from detention is the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v.
Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).
Here, the Petition requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering
Respondents to release Mr. Iza on his own recognizance, or under parole, a low bond, or other
reasonable conditions of supervision, and award Mr. Iza reasonable costs and attorney’s fees,
along with any other relief the Court deems just and proper. (Pet. at 8–9.)9
9 The Petition also seeks an order enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr. Iza away from
this Court’s jurisdiction pending these proceedings and requiring Respondents to show cause as
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This Court hereby incorporates by reference Section III of its opinion in Rodriguez-
Acurio, in which this Court provides the legal basis for ordering release as well as injunctive
relief enjoining Respondents from invoking Section 1225(b) as the basis for subjecting Mr. Iza to
mandatory detention, absent a change in relevant circumstances. See 2025 WL 3314420, at *31–
32. A bond determination by a DHS officer or an immigration judge would not remedy the core
constitutional violation at issue here. Mr. Iza’s detention was unlawful from its inception because
ICE detained him under the wrong statute and without any notice or opportunity to be heard,
much less the procedures required under Section 1226(a). Accordingly, “dispos[ing] of the
matter as law and justice require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, necessitates Mr. Iza’s continued release
from detention as well as relief guarding against re-detention in violation of this Court’s
determination that he is not subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b).
Accordingly, because Mr. Iza was already released from detention pursuant to the Court’s
December 22, 2025 TRO Order (ECF No. 9), pending the issuance of a final order of removal
against Mr. Iza, Respondents are enjoined from denying Mr. Iza bond in any subsequent
proceeding on the basis that he must be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), absent a change
in relevant circumstances consistent with this Opinion and Order. The Court does not rule on the
request for attorney’s fees and costs at this time, but notes that Ms. Iza filed the Petition pro se as
next friend to Mr. Iza and that no counsel has filed a notice of appearance for Mr. Iza since his
to why the writ should not be granted within seven to fifteen days of the filing of the Petition.
(Pet. at 8.) These two requests for relief are dismissed as moot in light of the Court’s issuance of
a December 16, 2025 Order requiring Respondents to show cause as to why the Petition should
not be granted by December 19, 2025, and enjoining them from removing Mr. Iza from the
United States or outside of the Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York, or
District of New Jersey. (ECF No. 3.)
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release pursuant to the TRO on December 22, 2025. Nevertheless, Mr. Iza may file any
application for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in pursuing this action by February 2, 2026.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above and in this Court’s prior opinion in Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 WL 3314420, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Pending the issuance of any final
removal order against Mr. Iza, Respondents are enjoined from denying him bond in any
subsequent proceeding on the basis that he must be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
absent a change in relevant circumstances consistent with this Opinion and Order.
At this time, the Court reserves ruling on the request for attorney’s fees and costs set
forth in the Petition. Mr. Iza may file an application for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in
pursuing this action by February 2, 2026.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
January 5, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
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