Automotive Lift Institute, Inc. v. Dami Co., LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
AUTOMOTIVE LIFT INSTITUTE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAMI CO., LLC, doing business as Tech-
Center Hawaii,
Defendant.
5:25-cv-1010
(ECC/MJK)
Sharon M. Sulimowicz, Esq., for Plaintiff
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Automotive Lift Institute, Inc. brings this action against Defendant Dami Co.,
LLC, doing business as Tech-Center Hawaii, asserting causes of action for copyright and
trademark infringement and related claims. Dkt. No. 1. Defendant has failed to answer the
complaint or otherwise appear in this action. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a
default judgment. Dkt. No. 17. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is granted as to
liability with respect to its copyright infringement claim and for an award of damages.
I. 	FACTS1
According to the complaint, Plaintiff is a “not-for-profit trade association of manufacturers
and marketers of automotive lifts throughout North America” whose mission is to “promote the
safe design, construction, installation, service and use of automotive lifts.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 9.
Plaintiff is accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and has established
1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint, supporting declarations, and
accompanying exhibits, and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion.
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certification programs for automotive lifts to ensure compliance with ANSI standards. Id. at ¶¶ 10-
11.
Plaintiff also “develops and publishes various documents including certification standards,
lifting points guides and safety materials for automotive lifts.” Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff has registered
several of these documents and obtained Certificates of Copyright Registration. Id. at ¶ 13.
Specifically, Plaintiff owns U.S. Copyright Registration No. TX0009138584 for the document
“ANSI/ALI 	ALOIM:2020 	STANDARD 	FOR 	AUTOMOTIVE 	LIFTS 	– 	SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATION, INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE” (the ANSI/ALI
ALOIM Standard). Id.; see Dkt. No. 17-2 (Certificate of Registration for the ANSI/ALI ALOIM
Standard). Plaintiff also commissioned another entity to register Copyright Registration No.
TX0007988577 on Plaintiff’s behalf for the document “Quick Reference Guide – Vehicle Lifting
Points for Frame Engaging Lifts as Prepared for The Automotive Lift Institute, Inc.” (the Lifting
Points Guide). Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 15. Plaintiff offers the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard and the
Lifting Points Guide for sale to various entities in the industry. Id. at ¶ 17. According to Plaintiff’s
President, Plaintiff sells the digital version of the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard for $22.00 per
download, with no associated hard costs. Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 8.
Plaintiff has also developed an ALI Lift Inspector Certification Program (Certification
Program). Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 20. Inspectors who successfully complete the Certification Program are
permitted to “hold themselves out as ALI Certified Lift Inspectors” and can issue Inspection
Reports and labels containing ALI’s trademarked logo “Automotive Lift Institute – ALI – Certified
Lift Inspector,” identified as U.S. Serial Number 85071769 and U.S. Registration Number
4238142. Id. at ¶ 23.
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Defendant, a Hawaii limited liability company, performs automotive lift inspections but
has never completed Plaintiff’s Certification Program. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. Defendant nonetheless
“holds itself out as a certified automotive lift inspector” and has “created a logo for its business
that, while not identical to ALI’s trademarked logo, appears very similar having the same look and
feel such that it could be construed as being associated with Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28. Defendant
“has also included QR codes on inspection stickers that, when scanned, provide[] the user with
access to the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard and ALI’s Lifting Points Guide in violation of
Plaintiff’s copyright.” Id. at ¶ 31.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing the complaint on July 30, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. After
requesting and receiving extensions of time to accomplish service of process, Plaintiff filed proof
of service on Defendant indicating that Joseph D’Amico was personally served. Dkt. No. 11.2
Upon Plaintiff’s request, Dkt. No. 14, the Clerk entered Defendant’s default on March 26, 2026,
Dkt. No. 15 (Clerk’s Entry of Default). Plaintiff thereafter moved for default judgment. Dkt. No.
17. Plaintiff served Defendant with the motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 18.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Standards
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process for entry of a
default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993). First, the
Clerk of Court enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a) by notation of the party’s default on the
Clerk’s record of the case. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
2 Nothing in Plaintiff’s submissions explains who Mr. D’Amico is or his relationship to Defendant.
According 	to 	a 	search 	of 	the 	Hawaii 	Business 	Express 	business 	records
(https://hbe.dcca.hawaii.gov/search-and-buy), however, Mr. D’Amico is a member of Defendant.
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shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). This first step is
nondiscretionary. See United States v. Conolly, 694 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2017). Second, after
the Clerk of Court enters a default against a party, if that party fails to appear or otherwise move
to set aside the default pursuant to Rule 55(c), the plaintiff may apply to the Court for a default
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
Considering the Second Circuit’s “oft-stated preference for resolving disputes on the
merits,” default judgments are “generally disfavored.” Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 95-96. “The decision
whether to enter default judgment is committed to the district court’s discretion . . . .” Greathouse
v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2015). When evaluating a plaintiff’s application for a
default judgment, “a court is required to accept all [] factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.
2009). “Nevertheless, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute
a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law.” Doe v.
Rees, No. 24-cv-274 (MAD/ML), 2025 WL 834786, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2025) (quoting
LaBarbera v. ASTC Lab’ys Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations
and citations omitted)); see also TAGC Mgmt., LLC v. Lehman, Lee & Xu Ltd., 536 F. App’x 45,
46 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]rior to entering default judgment, a district court is required to determine
whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law.”) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff has met the procedural requirements and is entitled to an order of default under
Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 55.2(b). Accordingly, the
Court will address liability.
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B. 	Liability of Defendant
Although the complaint asserts twelve causes of action, Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment is premised on only two: copyright infringement and trademark infringement. See
generally Dkt. No. 17-10. Because Plaintiff’s motion does not seek any damages with respect to
the trademark infringement claim, the Court addresses only the copyright infringement claim.
Copyright infringement “is established when the owner of a valid copyright demonstrates
unauthorized copying.” Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d
127, 131 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Great Bowery, Inc. v. Royal Beauty Studio Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 3d 187, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2026) (“To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must show ‘(i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the
copyrighted work.’” (citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that it is the sole owner of U.S. Copyright Registration No.
TX0009138584 for the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard document. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 14. Plaintiff has
also submitted a copy of this Certificate of Registration with its motion for default judgment
indicating an effective registration date of December 9, 2020. Dkt. No. 17-2. Thus, Plaintiff has
satisfied the first element of its copyright infringement claim by establishing ownership of a valid
copyright. See Great Bowery, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 3d at 209-10 (noting that a certificate of
registration “constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright” and that,
alternatively, a plaintiff’s “assertion of the existence of a valid copyright, even without producing
the certificate, is satisfactory in cases of default as the allegations in a complaint are accepted as
true” (citations omitted)).
Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has “included QR codes on inspection stickers
that, when scanned, provide[] the user with access to the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard” in violation
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of Plaintiff’s copyright. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 31.3 Plaintiff therefore has sufficiently alleged that Defendant
infringed 	Plaintiff’s 	copyright 	by 	providing 	the 	copyrighted 	material 	to 	others 	without
authorization. See Great Bowery, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (concluding that the complaint’s
allegations were sufficient to establish that the defaulting defendant copied “constituent elements”
of the copyrighted work where the complaint alleged that the defendant displayed the work on its
“Instagram without authorization”).
Accordingly, default judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
with respect to liability on Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement.
C. 	Remedies
A party’s default “is not considered an admission of damages.” Cement & Concrete
Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). “There must be an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff,
and a district court may determine there is sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented
at a hearing or upon a review of detailed affidavits and documentary evidence.” Id. (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2)).
Here, Plaintiff seeks statutory damages for Defendant’s copyright infringement pursuant
to 17 U.S.C. § 504 and attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. See generally Dkt.
No. 17-10.
3 The complaint contains no allegations with respect to when or over what time period Defendant
allegedly provided users with access to Plaintiff’s copyrighted work. However, the affidavit of
Plaintiff’s counsel references a cease-and-desist letter sent to Defendant in July 2024. See Dkt. No.
17-3 ¶ 8.
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1. 	Statutory Damages
A copyright infringer “can be held liable for either actual damages and profits obtained or
for statutory damages.” Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)). The copyright owner may elect to recover, instead of actual damages, “an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work” in an
amount between $750 and $30,000 “as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).4 Here,
Plaintiff asserts that it is unable to verify the “number of ‘downloads’ of the copyrighted work[]”
and therefore requests the “maximum amount of statutory damages of $30,000 for the infringement
of the ANSI/ALI ALOIM Standard.” Dkt. No. 17-10 at 6-7.
District courts “enjoy wide discretion in setting statutory damages.” Castillo v. G&M
Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 171 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Courts consider the following six
factors when determining the amount of statutory damages to award for copyright infringement:
(1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits
earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder;
(4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the
infringer’s cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value
of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the
parties.
Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant’s default makes it impossible to meaningfully ascertain factors two, five,
and six. Regarding factor one, the Court can draw an inference from Defendant’s default that
Defendant willfully infringed the copyright. See Great Bowery, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 3d at 216.
Regarding factor three, Plaintiff asserts that it sells the digital version of the work for the relatively
small amount of $22, all of which is profit, although it is unknown how many times Defendants
4 For willful infringement, the maximum permissible award per infringed work rises to $150,000.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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offered the work to others or how many of those individuals would have otherwise purchased the
work from Plaintiff.5 The deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties, factor four, “warrants
a significant award.” See Sadowski v. Render Media Inc., No. 17-cv-9045, 2020 WL 1178629, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020), report-recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5968668 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
8, 2020). Thus, factors one and three weigh in favor of a significant statutory damages award to
Plaintiff, while factor three does not suggest a large award is necessary.
“While some courts . . . have granted in full a plaintiff’s request for statutory damages in
similar copyright infringement cases where a defendant had defaulted, such cases typically include
facts demonstrating that the defendant continued its infringing conduct despite receiving notices
to end such activity.” Id. (collecting cases). Plaintiff has not pleaded such facts, and the Court
therefore concludes that an award of $25,000, instead of the requested $30,000 is appropriate. See
id. (citing cases awarding similar amounts).
2. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $10,641.41,
representing $6,997.91 in billed attorney’s fees, $2,000 in unbilled and anticipated attorney’s fees,
and $1,643.50 in costs. See Dkt. No. 17-3 ¶¶ 16-19.
The Copyright Act provides that a court “may allow the recovery of full costs” and “award
a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. Attorney’s
fees are not guaranteed but “may be awarded ‘only as a matter of the court’s discretion.’” Stokes
v. MilkChocolateNYC LLC, 681 F. Supp. 3d 226, 243 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy,
5 Plaintiff has provided no information regarding the amount of any licensing fee it charges for the
work, a factor commonly considered by courts when awarding statutory damages. See Mango v.
BuzzFeed, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that “courts in this Circuit
commonly award, in cases of non-innocent infringement, statutory damages of between three and
five times the cost of the licensing fees the defendant would have paid”) (citation omitted).
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Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). In exercising its discretion the court “considers a number of
nonexclusive factors, such as ‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the
factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence.’” Id.
Here, because Defendant has failed to respond to the complaint, “there are no defenses or
claims for the Court to assess—leaving only compensation and deterrence as factors for the Court
to consider.” Id. (citation omitted). Although Plaintiff makes no argument as to why the Court
should exercise its discretion to award costs and attorney’s fees in this case, the Court concludes
that such an award is appropriate here, where Defendant’s infringement can be deemed willful, for
purposes of both compensation and deterrence. See id.
“In calculating attorney’s fees, the district court must first determine the ‘lodestar—the
product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case—
[which] creates a presumptively reasonable fee.’” Stanczyk v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 273, 284
(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)). This
approach requires a district court to set “a reasonable hourly rate, taking account of all case-specific
variables,” and determine “the appropriate billable hours expended.” Lilly v. City of New York, 934
F.3d 222, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). To arrive at a lodestar calculation, the party
seeking an award of attorney’s fees “should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the
rates claimed.” Stokes, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 244 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983)).
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted invoices she sent to Plaintiff that indicated the type of
work that she and her paralegal performed on behalf of Plaintiff in this action. See Dkt. No. 17-3
(attorney affidavit); Dkt. No. 17-6 (invoices). Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that her paralegal
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performed approximately 5.8 hours on this matter, a figure which is corroborated by the Court’s
review of the invoices submitted. See Dkt. No. 17-3 ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s counsel does not specify the
number of hours she worked on this matter but seeks to recover $6,275 in attorney’s fees. Based
on counsel’s asserted regular hourly rate of $325 through 2025 and $400 beginning in 2026, and
because the invoices indicate that counsel billed 0.9 hours in 2026, this figure appears to be for
approximately 19.1 hours. Although the invoices submitted seem to document at least that many
hours billed, some of the time entries appear to include block billing with work performed for other
matters. See Dkt. No. 17-6 at 4-9, 12. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to decrease the
number of hours counsel expended for which fees may be awarded to 15.0 hours. The Court further
finds that a total of 20.8 hours—15.0 attorney hours and 5.8 paralegal hours—is a reasonable
number of hours for a case involving a default judgment in a copyright infringement. See
Automotive Lift Inst., Inc. v. Autokato Engineering, LTD, No. 25-cv-106 (FJS/MJK), 2026 WL
3026255, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2026) (reducing hours to 25 hours and collecting cases finding
8.5 to 28.9 hours reasonable in similar cases). The Court declines to award attorney’s fees for
additional work counsel anticipates. See id.
With regard to the appropriate hourly rate for this work, Plaintiff requests the following
hourly rates: $325.00 per hour for Attorney Sulimowicz, who has been a member of the New York
Bar for 30 years, for work done prior to 2026 and $400.00 per hour for work done after January 1,
2026; and $125.00 per hour for Ms. Springer, a paralegal. Dkt. No. 17-3 ¶¶ 13-15.
In calculating the lodestar, district courts should use the prevailing hourly rate “in the
community,’ which means the “district where the district court sits.” Arbor Hill Concerned
Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). (citations
omitted). “A review of cases in this District indicates that the following hourly rates (or rate ranges)
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are reasonable: $250-$350 for partners; $165-$200 for associates; and $80-$95 for paralegals, legal
assistants, and other paraprofessionals.” UFCW Local One Health Care Fund v. Greene Great
Am., Inc., No. 23-cv-1441 (BKS/MJK), 2025 WL 1506163, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025)
(footnotes and citations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rate of $325 for
Attorney Sulimowicz is reasonable given her 30 years of practice, although the Court declines to
award any fees using a $400 hourly rate. Because the requested hourly rate for Ms. Springer, a
paralegal, exceeds even the highest hourly rate in this District for paralegals, the Court reduces the
hourly rate for Ms. Springer to $95. See Automotive Lift Inst., 2026 WL 3026255, at *5 (reducing
Ms. Springer’s hourly rate to $95).
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees of $5,426, for 15 attorney hours at
$325 per hour and 5.8 paralegal hours at $95 per hour.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $1,643.50 “for the cost of filing the original
action and service of the pleadings, as well as having to hire a private investigator to locate
Defendant in Texas.” Dkt. No. 17-3 ¶ 16. The invoices counsel sent to Plaintiff contain an August
30, 2025 charge in the amount of $286.00 for “ASP Docs LLC” and a September 29, 2025 charge
in the amount of $286.00 for “ASP DOCS – PI fee.” Dkt. No. 17-6 at 15-16. Plaintiff did not
submit any invoices or documentation for these charges, and it is not clear what these charges are
for.6 Although the second charge includes a notation that it is a “PI fee,” Plaintiff’s documentation
indicates that the private investigator it hired was from Copeland Investigations. Accordingly, the
Court in its discretion declines to award Plaintiff either charge for “ASP Docs.”
6 The results of a Google search for “ASP Docs LLC” suggest that this entity is a document
management company.
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Plaintiff seeks to recover $666.50 for the costs of hiring a private investigator to locate
Defendant in Texas. The invoice from Copeland Investigations, however, is for the amount of
$600.00. Dkt. No. 17-7. Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded $600.00 for this cost. Lastly, the Court
will award Plaintiff $405.00 in costs for the filing fee because Plaintiff’s billing records and the
Court’s docket substantiate these costs. See Automotive Lift Inst., 2026 WL 3026255, at *6.
Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of
$6,431.00.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, Dkt. No. 17, is GRANTED as to
liability with respect to its copyright infringement claim against Defendant; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of statutory damages in the amount of
$25,000.00 and to an award of attorney’s fees and costs of $6,431.00; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Plaintiff’s favor as set forth
above and close this action; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on
Defendant by regular mail at Defendant’s last known address and file a certificate of service upon
completion of such service.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15, 2026
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