Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation of B v. Madoff et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 	FOR PUBLICATION
--------------------------------------------------------X
In re:
BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT 	SIPA LIQUIDATION
SECURITIES LLC, 	No. 08-01789 (BRL)
Debtor. 	(Substantively Consolidated)
--------------------------------------------------------X
IRVING H. PICARD, as Trustee for the
Liquidation of BERNARD L. MADOFF
INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC,
Adv. Pro. No. 09-1503 (BRL)
Plaintiff,
v.
PETER B. MADOFF, MARK D. MADOFF,
ANDREW H. MADOFF, and SHANA D.
MADOFF
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10111
Telephone: 	(212) 589-4200
Facsimile: 	(212) 589-4201
By: 	David J. Sheehan
John Siegal
Marc D. Powers
Attorneys for Plaintiff Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone: 	(212) 373-3000
Facsimile: 	(212) 757-3990
By: 	Martin Flumenbaum
Stephen J. Shimshak
Andrew J. Ehrlich
Hannah S. Sholl
Attorneys for Defendant Andrew H Madoff, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Mark
D. Madoff
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LANKLER SIFFERT & WOHL LLP
500 Fifth Avenue
33rd Floor
New York, NY 10110
Telephone: 	(212) 921-8399
Facsimile: 	(212) 764-3701
By: 	Charles T. Spada
Attorney for Defendant Peter B. Madoff
SMITH VALLIERE PLLC
75 Rockefeller Center
21st Floor
New York, NY 10019
Telephone: 	(212) 755-5200
Facsimile: 	(212) 755-5203
By: 	Timothy A. Valliere
Attorney for Defendant Shana D. Madoff
Before: Hon. Burton R. Lifland
United States Bankruptcy Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS TRUSTEE’S COMPLAINT
Before this Court are the motions (the “Motions to Dismiss”) of Mark D. Madoff1 and
Andrew H. Madoff, Peter M. Madoff, and Shana D. Madoff (the “Defendants”) seeking to
dismiss the complaint (the “Complaint”) filed in the above-captioned adversary proceeding by
1 Mark D. Madoff passed away on December 11, 2010. The parties have stipulated that Mark D. Madoff in the
above-captioned adversary proceeding is substituted by the Estate of Mark D. Madoff and Andrew H. Madoff, as
Executor. See Stipulation and Order Substituting Party at p. 2 (dated Apr. 19, 2011) (Dkt. No. 47). For ease of
reference, the Estate of Mark D. Madoff and Andrew H. Madoff, Executor, are referred to herein as Mark Madoff or
Mark.
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Irving H. Picard, Esq. (the “Trustee,” or “Plaintiff”), trustee for the substantively consolidated
Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”)2 liquidation (“SIPA Liquidation”) of Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) and Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”), pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), made applicable herein by Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 7012. 3
The instant Complaint differs from all others connected to the Madoff Ponzi scheme in
one significant respect: its named Defendants are Madoff’s brother, two sons, and niece. As set
forth in the Complaint, the Defendants held senior management positions at BLMIS, which, the
Trustee asserts, was “operated as if it was the family piggy bank,” with the Defendants living in
multi-million dollar homes and relying on BLMIS funds to pay for vacations, travel, and other
personal expenses—all while failing to fulfill their responsibilities as high ranking employees of
the business. 	This failure was unsurprising given their close familial relationship with Madoff
and proximity to BLMIS, both of which undergird the claim at the heart of the Trustee’s
Complaint: that if anyone was in a position to prevent Madoff’s scheme, it was the Defendants,
who, instead, stood by profiting mightily while allowing it to persist. 	The Defendants
nevertheless steadfastly contend their involvement with BLMIS was entirely legitimate, and
2 SIPA sections 78fff(b) and 78fff-2(c)(3) allow a SIPA Trustee to utilize the avoidance powers enjoyed by a
bankruptcy trustee. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 2011 WL 3568936, at *12 n. 10 (In re BLMIS II)
(2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) (“A SIPA liquidation is a hybrid proceeding.”). SIPA section 78fff(b) provides that “[t]o
the extent consistent with the provisions of this chapter, a liquidation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance
with, and as though it were being conducted under chapters 1, 3, and 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of title
11.” 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b). SIPA section 78fff-2(c)(3) states, in relevant part: “whenever customer property is not
sufficient to pay in full the claims set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1), the trustee may
recover any property transferred by the debtor which, except for such transfer, would have been customer property if
and to the extent that such transfer is voidable or void under the provisions of Title 11.” 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(3).
3 There is no paucity of decisional law regarding Bernard Madoff and the Trustee’s restitutional litigation relating to
this Ponzi saga. Instructive and pertinent to the factors to consider when parsing a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss
arising from the Madoff case is the recent decision of U.S. District Judge Kimba Wood (the “District Court”)
reviewing the Trustee’s pleading sufficiency in another Madoff matter set at the same pleading stage as this one.
Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 11 MC 0012, 2011 WL 3897970, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2011) (Merkin II).
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they, above all others, were betrayed by their family’s patriarch. But even if they were victims
of the cruelest betrayal, the Complaint alleges that the Defendants’ failures to fulfill their
responsibilities at BLMIS facilitated egregious harms.
The Trustee accordingly seeks to avoid and recover transfers made to the Defendants in
the collective amount of over $198 million under various sections of the Bankruptcy Code (the
“Code”) and New York Debtor and Creditor Law4 (the “NYDCL”); as well as to utilize sections
of the Code to disallow and equitably subordinate those claims filed by the Defendants in the
SIPA proceeding (collectively, the “Bankruptcy Claims”).5 In addition, the Trustee seeks tort
damages for BLMIS by bringing claims under New York common law for breach of fiduciary
duty, 	negligence, 	conversion, 	unjust 	enrichment, 	constructive 	trust, 	and 	accounting 	(the
“Common Law Claims”). 	The Complaint, however, contains some correctable pleading
deficiencies, and will need to be amended in part in order to stand as a matter of law.6 Thus, as
set forth below, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part.
BACKGROUND
A comprehensive discussion of the facts underlying the SIPA Liquidation and Madoff’s
Ponzi scheme is set forth in this Court’s prior decisions. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.
LLC, 424 B.R. 122, 125–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (In re BLMIS I), aff’d, Nos. 10-2378, et al.,
4 N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 270 et seq. (McKinney 2001).
5 In accordance with this Court’s decision in Picard v. Merkin the Trustee withdrew the claim for immediate
turnover of alleged customer property pursuant to section 542 of the Code. 440 B.R. 243, 249–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010) (Merkin I) (dismissing the Trustee’s turnover claim); see also Letter to Judge Burton R. Lifland in response to
the Court’s August 4, 2011 request for a supplemental brief addressing the decision in Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC,
No. 11-CV-0763, et al. (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) at p. 2, n.1 (No. 09-01503) (dated Aug. 12, 2011) (Dkt. No. 50)
[Hereinafter “Trustee’s Supplemental Letter”].
6 The Complaint, like in a game of horseshoes, is a leaner rather than a ringer in that it misses the target,
but comes close enough to score. For further discussion on leaners and ringers,
see http://www.horseshoepitching.com/rules/Content.html (last visited on Sept. 21, 2011).
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2011 WL 3568936 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) (In re BLMIS II); 	see also Picard v. Merkin (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 249–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Merkin I),
leave to appeal denied, 2011 WL 3897970, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) (Merkin II).
I. 	THE DEFENDANTS
A. 	Peter B. Madoff
Peter B. Madoff (“Peter”) is Madoff’s brother and was BLMIS’s Senior Managing
Director and Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”). 	He is a law school graduate and held a
number of securities licenses with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”),
including Series 1, 4, and 5. Peter was the Director of the Securities Industry Financial Markets
Associations (“SIFMA”), a member of the Board of Governors and the Executive Committee of
the National Stock Exchange, the Vice Chairman of the FINRA Board of Governors, as well as a
Director of the National Securities Clearing Corporation. 	He also served on NASDAQ’s
Executive Committee Board of Governors. Compl. ¶ 6.
As the CCO of BLMIS, Peter was allegedly responsible for adopting and administering
compliance procedures to prevent and detect fraud and to identify and address significant
compliance issues in accordance with SEC and FINRA regulations. 	Compl. ¶¶ 28–36. 	His
duties included, inter alia, preparing the annual review of BLMIS’s investment advisory
business’s (“IA Business”) compliance program, performing qualitative tests of BLMIS’s
internal 	compliance 	procedures, 	and 	assessing 	whether 	such 	procedures 	were 	effectively
implemented. Compl. ¶¶ 28–36.
Peter is alleged to have received at least $60,631,292 from BLMIS, including, but not
limited to, withdrawals of fictitious profits from investment advisory accounts at BLMIS (“IA
Accounts”); salaries and bonuses from 2001 to 2008 in the total amount of $20,067,920; loans
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totaling $13,244,649.30; and various other payments funding purchases of real estate, business
investments, a life insurance policy, personal credit card bills, and the purchase and restoration
of an Aston Martin automobile.7 Compl. ¶¶ 65–73.
B. 	Mark D. Madoff and Andrew H. Madoff
Mark D. Madoff (“Mark”) and Andrew H. Madoff (“Andrew”), Madoff’s sons, were Co-
Directors of Trading at BLMIS and served as Controllers and Directors of Madoff Securities
International Ltd. (“MSIL”), a U.K. affiliate of BLMIS.8 Both held securities licenses with
FINRA, including Series 4, 7, 24, and 55, and were members of various securities organizations.
Mark was Chairman of the FINRA Inter-Market Committee, Governor of the Securities Traders
Association (“STA”), Co-Chair of the STA Trading Committee, a member of the FINRA
Membership Committee and Mutual Fund Task Force, President of the Securities Trader
Association of New York (“STANY”), Chairman of the FINRA Regulation District Ten
Business Conduct Committee, and Chairman of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (“SIFMA”) NASDAQ committee. Similarly, Andrew was Chairman of the Trading,
Trading 	Issues 	and 	Technology, 	and 	Decimalization 	and 	Market 	Data 	Committees 	and
Subcommittees at SIFMA. 	He was also a member of the FINRA District Ten and NASDAQ
Technology Advisory Committees. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8.
Andrew and Mark were purportedly responsible for ensuring compliance with BLMIS’s
7 Peter transferred his ownership interest in the Aston Martin to the Trustee on May 4, 2011. Shortly thereafter, the
Trustee won approval from this Court to retain an auctioneer to transport, store, repair and sell the Aston Martin at
auction. See Order Authorizing the Sale of the Property of the Estate at p. 2 (No. 08-01789) (dated June 15, 2011)
(Dkt. No. 4165). In August 2011, the Aston Martin was sold at auction for $225,000. See Notice of Sale of Aston
Martin (No. 08-01789)(date Sept. 21, 2011)(Dkt. 4377).
8 MSIL was placed into liquidation in the U.K. shortly after the commencement of this SIPA liquidation. On April
14, 2009, the joint provisional liquidators for MSIL filed a chapter 15 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Florida seeking recognition of the U.K. liquidation. Following a transfer of that case to
the Southern District of New York, this Court granted recognition of the U.K. liquidation as a foreign main
proceeding. See Order Recognizing Foreign Proceeding at p. 2 (No. 09-12998) (dated June 6, 2009) (Dkt. No. 25).
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policies and procedures, as well as applicable securities laws. Compl. ¶¶ 28–36, 47–49.
Mark allegedly received at least $66,859,311 from BLMIS, including, but not limited to,
withdrawals of fictitious profits from IA Accounts; salaries and bonuses from 2001 to 2008 in
the total amount of $29,320,830; real estate loans in the amount of $15,126,589; and payments
funding real estate purchases, business investments, and personal credit card bills. 	Compl. ¶¶
74–84. 	Likewise, Andrew allegedly received at least $60,644,821 from BLMIS, including, but
not limited to, withdrawals of fictitious profits from IA Accounts; $31,105,505 in salary and
bonuses between 2001 and 2008; loans totaling $11,285,000; and various other payments
funding business investments, the purchase and maintenance of a boat, and personal credit card
expenses. Compl. ¶¶ 85–94.
C. 	Shana Madoff
Shana 	Madoff 	(“Shana”), 	Madoff’s 	niece, 	served 	as 	the 	in-house 	Counsel 	and
Compliance Director for BLMIS. 	She is a law school graduate and a member of the FINRA
Consultative Committee; 	STANY; 	NASD’s Market Regulation Committee, the SIFMA Self-
Regulatory and SRO Committee, and the SIFMA Continuing Education Committee. Compl. ¶ 9.
Like Peter, Shana was purportedly responsible for monitoring BLMIS’s operations and
ensuring compliance with federal securities laws and regulations and corresponding FINRA rules
and regulations. Compl. ¶¶ 28–36, 43–46.
Shana allegedly received at least $10,607,876 from BLMIS, including, but not limited to,
withdrawals of fictitious profits from IA Accounts; salaries from 2001 to 2008 in the amount of
$3,832,878; as well as various payments funding the purchase of a home, business investments,
interior decoration, rent, and personal credit card expenses. Compl. ¶¶ 95–98.
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MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a cause of action for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–
56 (2007); EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7008. 	A recitation of the elements of the cause of action supported by mere conclusory
statements, however, is insufficient. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Rather, a complaint must state “a
plausible claim for relief,” id. at 1950, which would be the case where “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged,” id. at 1949. 	Finally, in determining plausibility, this Court must
“draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” id. at 1950, to decide whether the factual
allegations “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
DISCUSSION
I. 	THE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS
In Counts Two through Ten of the Complaint, the Trustee seeks to avoid and recover
payments totaling $198,743,299 made to or for the benefit of the Defendants pursuant to sections
544, 547, 548, 550, and 551 of the Code and various sections of the NYDCL. 	The Trustee
alleges that more than 383 transfers totaling $141,034,907 to or for the benefit of the Defendants
in the six year period (the “Six-Year Transfers”) prior to December 11, 2008 (the “Filing
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Date”),9 and are avoidable and recoverable under sections 544, 550(a), and 551 of the Code and
sections 273 through 276 of the NYDCL. Compl. ¶106. Of the Six-Year Transfers, at least 129
totaling $58,666,811 were allegedly made within two years prior to the Filing Date (the “Two-
Year Transfers”) and are avoidable and recoverable under sections 548(a)(1), 550(a), and 551 of
the Code. 	Compl. ¶ 107. 	Of the Two-Year Transfers, $7,364,048 was received by the
Defendants within one year of the Filing Date (the “Preferences”) and avoidable and recoverable
under Code sections 547, 550(a), and 551. Compl. ¶ 108. Additionally, the Trustee alleges that
BLMIS transferred a further $57,708,392 to the Defendants prior to six years before the Filing
Date. 	Compl. ¶ 109. 	Finally, in Counts Eleven and Twelve of the Complaint, the Trustee
requests that the proofs of claims filed by the Defendants in the SIPA Liquation should be
disallowed and equitably subordinated pursuant to relevant sections of the Code.
A. 	Actual Fraud Under the Code and the NYDCL
In Counts Three and Five of the Complaint, the Trustee seeks to avoid and recover, under
a theory of actual fraud, Two Year Transfers pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(A), and Six Year
Transfers under section 544 of the Code and section 276 of the NYDCL (collectively, the
“Actual Fraudulent Transfers”). 	With regard to the Trustee’s Actual Fraudulent Transfers
claims, although the Complaint adequately alleges the element of intent, it fails, in many
instances, to state the factual circumstances constituting the fraud as required by Rule 9(b).
Pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Code, a trustee must establish the debtor “made
such transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.” 	11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
Under section 276 of the NYDCL, a trustee similarly may avoid any “conveyance made . . . with
9 On December 11, 2008, Bernard Madoff was arrested by federal agents for violation of criminal securities laws,
including, inter alia, securities fraud investment adviser fraud, and mail and wire fraud. Contemporaneously, the
Securities Exchange Commission filed a complaint in United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Compl. ¶ 13; see also In re BLMIS I, 424 B.R. at 125–32.
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actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either
present or future creditors.” 	NYDCL § 276. 	A claim brought under either statute must be
supported by enough factual allegations to satisfy the pleading requirements set forth under Rule
9(b). 	Am. Tissue, Inc. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 79, 106–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Andrew Velez Constr., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (In re Andrew
Velez 	Constr., 	Inc.), 	373 	B.R. 	262, 	269 	(Bankr. 	S.D.N.Y. 	2007). 	Specifically, 	the
“circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” must be pled with “particularity,” but “[m]alice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind” may be pled generally. FED. R. CIV.
P. 9(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7009.
i. 	The Trustee Has Adequately Alleged the Element of Intent in His
Actual Fraudulent Transfer Claims in Accordance with Rule 9(b)
As a matter of law, the “Ponzi scheme presumption” establishes the debtors’ fraudulent
intent as required under both the Code and the NYDCL. Gowan v. The Patriot Group, LLC (In
re Dreier LLP), 452 B.R. 391, 428 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 	There is a presumption of actual
intent to defraud because “transfers made in the course of a Ponzi scheme could have been made
for no purpose other than to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.” Id. at 423; McHale v. Boulder
Capital LLC (In re The 1031 Tax Group), 438 B.R. 47, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“If the Ponzi
scheme presumption applies, actual intent for purposes of section 548(a)(1)(A) is established as a
matter of law.”) (internal quotations omitted). 	The breadth and notoriety of the Madoff Ponzi
scheme leave no basis for disputing the application of the Ponzi scheme presumption to the facts
of this case, particularly in light of Madoff’s criminal admission. 	See Picard v. Cohmad Sec.
Corp. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), No. 09-1305, 2011 WL 3274077, at *8 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011); Picard v. Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 445 B.R. 206,
221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv.
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Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying on transferor’s criminal guilty plea to
establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme). 	Moreover, while it is conceivable that “certain
transfers may be so unrelated to a Ponzi scheme that the presumption should not apply,” the
Actual Fraudulent Transfers at issue here, including redemptions of fictitious profits and
payments of salaries, “serve[d] to further [the] Ponzi scheme,” and are therefore presumed
fraudulent. In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. at 11.
The Ponzi scheme presumption applies only to the transferor’s intent. 	See Patriot, 452
B.R. at 424. 	The Defendants, however, posit that the transferee’s fraudulent intent must be
established to state a claim under section 276 of the NYDCL. 	The District Court rejected this
precise argument in Merkin II, explaining that “relevant cases, together with analysis of the
statute, convince the Court that, to state a claim under Section 276, a plaintiff need allege
fraudulent intent by only the transferor.” 	2011 WL 3897970, at *6 (citing Patriot, 452 B.R at
435) (emphasis added); 	see also Cohmad, 2011 WL 3274077, at *9 (“[I]t is the transferor’s
intent alone, and not the intent of the transferee, that is relevant under NYDCL § 276.”) (quoting
Patriot, 452 B.R. at 433); 	Gowan v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. (In re Dreier LLP), No. 10-5458,
2011 WL 3319711, at *8) (Bank. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011) (holding that for the “reasons stated [in
Patriot], the plaintiff is only required to plead the fraudulent intent of the transferor under DCL §
276”). The District Court reasoned that “transferee’s intent . . . is material under the statute, but,
because Section 278 is an affirmative defense, the transferee’s intent should be considered on a
full evidentiary record, either at the summary judgment phase or at trial.” Merkin II, 2011 WL
3897970, at *6. Consequently, “[f]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the trustee need state
with particularity only the circumstances constituting the fraud and allege the requisite actual
intent by the transferor to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.” 	Id. (emphasis added). 	Thus,
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irrespective of whether an actual fraudulent transfer claim is brought under the Code or the
NYDCL, a transferee’s good faith “need not be negated by the Trustee in the Complaint” as the
Defendants contend. 	Cohmad, 2011 WL 3274077, at *9 (quoting Sec. Prot. Inv. Corp. v.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293, 318 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). 10 The element of intent for
each of the Trustee’s Actual Fraudulent Transfer claims is therefore established as a matter of
law by virtue of the Ponzi scheme presumption.
ii. 	The 	Trustee 	Has 	Not 	Identified 	All 	of 	the 	Actual 	Fraudulent
Transfers with Particularity Under Rule 9(b)
The fraudulent intent of the debtor/transferor is one essential element of a prima facie
claim brought under either section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Code or section 276 of the NYDCL. 	A
second requirement is that the transfers sought to be avoided must be identified with particularity
in accordance with Rule 9(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7009. Here, many of the
Actual Fraudulent Transfers are not so identified.
To satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement, a party must ordinarily allege: 	“(1) the
property subject to the transfer, (2) the timing and, if applicable, frequency of the transfer and (3)
the consideration paid with respect thereto.” Pereira v. Grecogas Ltd., (In re Saba Enters., Inc.),
421 B.R. 626, 640 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); 	see also United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller
Features Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 198, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 	Where the actual
10 Accordingly, the Defendants’ arguments that they “took for value” and “in good faith” are affirmative defenses
under sections 548(c) of the Code and 278 of the NYDCL and thus “should be considered on a full evidentiary
record, either at the summary judgment phase or at trial.” Merkin II, 2011 WL 3897970, at *6 (citing Patriot, 452
B.R at 435); see also Mendelsohn v. Jacobowitz (In re Jacobs), 394 B.R. 646, 659 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“An
innocent purchaser must affirmatively show good faith in order to take advantage of [NYDCL] section 278(2).”);
Bayou Superfund LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II LP (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 631 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The good faith/value defense provided in Section 548(c) is an affirmative defense, and the burden
is on the defendant-transferee to plead and establish facts to prove the defense.”). 	If the affirmative defense
“appears on the face of the complaint,” however, an exception to this rule may apply. Pani v. Empire Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1998). This exception does not apply here. Indeed, the Trustee sufficiently
alleges the Defendants had notice of fraud and were cognizant of the irregularities in their own IA Accounts.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ affirmative defense of good faith is not a viable ground for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).
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fraudulent transfer claim is asserted by a bankruptcy trustee, however, courts in this district take
“a more liberal view. . . since a trustee is an outsider to the transaction who must plead fraud
from second-hand knowledge.” 	Nisselson v. Softbank AM Corp. (In re MarketXT Holdings
Corp.), 361 B.R. 369, 395 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Picard v. Taylor (In re Park South
Sec., LLC), 326 B.R. 505, 517, 516, 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
As the Second Circuit recently noted, “[f]raud is endlessly resourceful and the unraveling of
weaved-up sins may sometimes require the grant of a measure of latitude to a SIPA trustee.” In
re BLMIS, 2011 WL 3568936, at *8, n.7 (granting SIPA trustees discretion to determine the
method to calculate net equity).
Of course, “relaxing the particularity requirement” of Rule 9(b) does not “eliminate” it.
Devaney v. Chester, 813 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1987). Pleadings still must be particular enough
to fulfill Rule 9(b)’s purpose: 	“to protect the defending party’s reputation, to discourage
meritless accusations, and to provide detailed notice of fraud claims to defending parties.”
Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.. (In re Tronox Inc.), 429 B.R. 73, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010) (citing In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc., 238 B.R. 558, 581 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)); see
also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[S]ince Rule 9(b) is
intended to provide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiff’s claim, to safeguard a defendant’s
reputation from improvident charges of wrongdoing, and to protect a defendant against the
institution of a strike suit . . . the relaxation of Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirement for scienter
must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory
allegations.”). 	Such is not the case here where opacity, rather than particularity, best describes
the allegations underlying the Trustee’s Actual Fraudulent Transfer claims in Counts Three and
Five of the Complaint.
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To begin with, the Trustee fails to specify which Count he seeks to employ to avoid each
Actual Fraudulent Transfer. 	For example, under Count Three, the Complaint fails to identify
which of the Two Year Transfers are additionally Preferences.11 Similarly, with respect Count
Five, the Complaint states $57,708,392 was transferred at some time earlier than six years prior
to the Filing Date without specifying how many individual Actual Fraudulent Transfers comprise
this sum. 	The Trustee does not provide how he arrives at: 	(1) the total sum he seeks to avoid
under Counts Three or Five, (2) the total number of discrete Actual Fraudulent Transfers
included in each sum, and (3) which statutory look back period he intends to apply to each of
these Transfers, and no inference to ameliorate these deficiencies can be drawn on the basis of
the allegations contained in the Complaint.
Second, piecing together the facts contained in the Complaint reveals that the majority of
the Actual Fraudulent Transfers are not identified completely. 	Peter’s 1954 Aston Martin
provides an illustrative example: 	allegedly there were four payments totaling approximately
$274,562 for its purchase and restoration, but it is not clear how, to whom, or when those
payments were made. Compl. ¶ 73; see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of M. Fabrikant
& Sons Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.), 394 B.R. 721, 734
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasizing “the Amended Complaint does not identify any specific
transfer, transferor, transferee, or date of transfer”); 	see also Alnwick v. European Micro
Holdings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 629, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing intentional fraudulent
transfer claim that failed to identify the assets transferred and identified the date of transfer as
“on or about 2001”). 	Similarly opaque are the allegations that between 2002 and 2008 the
11 Pursuant to section 547(b)(4)(B) of the Code, the one year statutory look back period applies because the
Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Defendants are “insiders” of BLMIS under section 101(31) of the Code,
which defines an “insider” of a debtor corporation as an individual who was, among other things, a director, officer,
or person in control of the debtor, or a relative of a director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§
101(31)(B), 547(b)(4)(B). .
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Defendants used BLMIS funds to pay company credit card bills that included personal charges.
Compl. ¶¶ 73, 84, 94, 98; see Fed. Nat‘l. Mortgage Ass’n v. Olympia Mortgage. Corp., No. 04-
CV-4971, 2006 WL 2802092, at *2, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (“[T]he Amended Complaint .
. . aggregates the transfers into lump sums over three to five year time periods [and] does not,
with respect to each transaction, specify the mechanism of transfer or even the type of property
transferred.”).
Rectifying the majority of these pleading deficiencies upon amendment should not prove
to be a Herculean task. For example, more detailed information appears to be readily accessible
to the Trustee given that the Complaint already includes information related to the credit cards
used by the Defendants as well as examples of personal charges paid by BLMIS. Compl. ¶¶ 73,
84, 94, 98. 	Similarly, since the Trustee has indicated that four payments were made for the
purchase and restoration of the Aston Martin, he likely can specify the method, amount, and date
of each of those payments without much difficulty. Compl. ¶ 73. The Complaint as it currently
stands, however, has too many porous and disparate factual allegations to provide a legal basis to
sustain many of the Trustee’s Actual Fraudulent Transfer claims.12 See Fed. Nat’l. Mortgage
Ass’n, 2006 WL 2802092, at *9 (finding allegations insufficient for the heightened Rule 9(b)
pleading standard where the Amended Complaint did “not identify how many transfers plaintiff
is challenging or the specific dates and amounts of those transfers”); Fabrikant, 394 B.R. at 733
(noting that “[a]llegations that a debtor made an aggregate amount or series of cash or other
transfers over a period of time” failed to meet the particularity standard set forth under Rule
9(b)).
12 It bears noting that of the complaints filed by the Trustee in connection with Madoff Ponzi scheme, those that
withstood Rule 9(b) scrutiny included multiple exhibits detailing the payments that the Trustee sought to avoid as
actual fraudulent transfers. See, e.g., Cohmad, 2011 WL 3274077, at *7; Chais, 445 B.R. at 220; Merkin I, 440
B.R. at 258. No such exhibits were attached to the Complaint.
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Notwithstanding these pleading deficiencies, the Complaint nevertheless identifies a few
Actual 	Fraudulent 	Transfers 	with 	Rule 	9(b) 	particularity 	(the 	“Particularly 	Pled 	Actual
Fraudulent Transfers”). See Fed. Nat’l. Mortgage Ass’n., 2006 WL 2802092, at *18 (dismissing
the Complaint as to all but one actual fraudulent transfer, which was pled with sufficient
particularity). 	For each of these Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers, the Complaint
alleges the transferee, transferor, and specific dates and amounts: 	Peter received a $9 million
loan from the operating account for BLMIS’s IA Business at JP Morgan Chase Bank (the “703
Account”) on December 12, 2007, Comp ¶ 73; 	Mark redeemed $1,956,205 from his IA
Account, numbered 1M0142, on or about July 24, 1998, $5,331,853 from his IA Account on or
about April 3, 2002, and $1,956,205 from his children’s IA Account, numbered 1M0143, on or
about July 24, 1998, Compl. ¶¶ 78, 79, 82; 	and Andrew redeemed $1,956,205 from his IA
Account, numbered 1M0140, on or about July 24, 1998, $5,331,853 from his IA Account,
numbered 1M0140, on or about April 3, 2002, and $1,956,305 from his children’s IA Account,
numbered 1M0141, on or about July 24, 1998, Compl. ¶¶ 88, 89, 92. Another two Particularly
Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers13 were made on October 31, 2000 to satisfy capital calls: one
from BLMIS’s operating account in the amount of $1,223,237.19 satisfied a capital call due to
Madoff Technologies LLC by Shana, Compl. ¶ 98, and the second, in the amount of $54,915.25,
satisfied a capital call due to Madoff Technologies LLC by Peter Madoff and came from one of
BLMIS’s operating accounts, Compl. ¶, 73; 	see Fed. Nat’l.. Mortgage Ass’n, 2006 WL
2802092, at *2 (upholding claim against Samuel Pinter to avoid and recover a transfer of
13 The Court assumes that the Trustee seeks to recover these two transfers under a benefit theory pursuant to section
550(a)(1) of the Code. Compl. ¶ 73 (“[T]he Trustee has identified the following transfers to Peter or on his behalf
for which BLMIS received no corresponding benefit or value.”) (emphasis added); see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc.,
234 B.R. at 317–18 (“At this juncture, all the Trustee needs to demonstrate is a possible legal theory such that he is
allowed to go forward and put on evidence. Although this benefit theory is not explicitly stated in the Complaint,
recovery under § 550(a) is not subject to a particularized pleading standard and I am allowed to consider theories
that are not articulated, so long as there are facts alleged to support them.”).
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$300,000 that was made from Olympia to Midwood in October 2002 to satisfy a loan taken by
Samuel Pinter). Therefore, this is not the death knell of the Complaint.
Accordingly, except with regard to Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers, Counts
Three and Five14 of the Complaint are dismissed, with leave to amend the Complaint within forty
five days.
B. 	The Trustee Has Sufficiently Pled the Application of the Discovery Rule to
Avoid the Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers Occurring Prior to Six
Years Before the Filing Date
All but one of the Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers occurred more than six
years prior to the Filing Date. 	Consequently, these Transfers can be avoided only by invoking
New York’s “discovery rule,” which permits a plaintiff to commence a cause of action
predicated on actual fraud within two years of the date the fraud was or should have been
discovered with reasonable diligence. 	NYCPLR §§ 213(8), 203(g); 	see Silverman v. United
Talmudical Acad. Torah Vyirah, Inc. (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), 446 B.R. 32, 67 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“New York state law fixes the limitations period for claims under the DCL. A
claim based on actual fraud under DCL Section 276 must be brought within the later of six years
from the date of the fraud or conveyance, or two years from the date that the fraud should have
been discovered.”). 	For reasons stated below, Trustee has standing under section 544(b) to
invoke the discovery rule for the Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers that occurred
more than six years before the Filing Date.
Pursuant to well-established case law, so long as a bankruptcy trustee provides sufficient
14 Count Five’s request for attorneys’ fees under section 276-a of the NYDCL is not ripe for determination at this
early stage. 	See Patriot, 452 B.R. at 435 (finding that “attorneys' fees will only be recoverable if the Trustee
establishes at trial actual fraudulent intent by Defendants”); see also Cohmad, 2011 WL 3274077, at *10 n.10
(“While the transferee's intent is an element of a claim under section 276–a, unlike under section 276, attorneys' fees
will be recoverable provided that the Trustee establishes fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants at trial.”).
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notice to the defendants of at least one category of creditors that have standing to avoid an actual
fraudulent transfer under non-bankruptcy law, the trustee has standing to assert that actual
fraudulent transfer claim under section 544(b) of the Code. 	Global Crossing Estate Rep. v.
Winnick, No. 04-CIV-2558, 2006 WL 2212776, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2006) (“[T]o identify
the category of creditors with potentially viable claims . . . is unquestionably enough to put
defendants on notice of the creditors who supply the basis for the right to sue, and will permit
them to answer, seek relevant discovery, and defend against these claims.”); see also Musicland
Holding Corp. v. Best Buy Co. (In re Musicland Holding Corp.), 398 B.R. 761, 780 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (failing “to locate a case in this district supporting the proposition that the
plaintiff must name the qualifying creditor in the complaint, or suffer dismissal”). Indeed, “there
is no authority for the proposition that [a bankruptcy trustee] must be more specific than to
identify the category of creditors with potentially viable claims” in order to state a claim under
section 544 of the Code. Winnick, 2006 WL 2212776, at *11; see In re RCM Global Long Term
Cap. Appreciation. Fund, Ltd., 200 B.R. 514, 523–24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
pleading the existence of an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim is sufficient); see also In
re Musicland, 398 B.R. at 780 (“Thus, RCM supports the proposition that the plaintiff may plead
the existence of the qualifying creditor generally, and prove the existence of an actual, qualifying
creditor at trial.”).
The Complaint provides sufficient notice to the Defendants of at least one category of
creditors on whose claims the Trustee bases his standing to avoid transfers under New York’s
discovery rule: defrauded BLMIS customers. Specifically, it states that “[a]t all times relevant
to transfers, the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by BLMIS was not reasonably discoverable by at
least one unsecured creditor of BLMIS,” 	Compl. ¶ 161, and that “[a]t all times relevant to the
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transfers, there have been one or more creditors who have held and still hold matured or
unmatured unsecured claims against BLMIS that were and are allowable . . . .” 	Compl. ¶ 162.
These allegations, when viewed in conjunction with the aforementioned case law, compel this
Court to conclude the Trustee has standing under section 544(b) of the Code to avoid and recover
the Particularly Pled Actual Fraudulent Transfers made more than six years before the Filing
Date.
C. 	Constructive Fraud Under the Code and the NYDCL
In Counts Four, Six, Seven, and Eight of the Complaint, the Trustee seeks to avoid and
recover, 	under 	a 	theory 	of 	constructive 	fraud, 	Two 	Year 	Transfers 	pursuant 	to 	section
548(a)(1)(B) of the Code, and Six Year Transfers under section 544 of the Code and sections
273–275 of the NYDCL (collectively the “Constructive Fraudulent Transfers”). This Court finds
most, but not all, of the allegations corresponding to the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers
provide sufficient information to sustain the Trustee’s avoidance claims under the liberal
pleading standards of Rule 8(a), as set forth below.
Section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code requires the Trustee to show, inter alia, BLMIS did not
receive “reasonably equivalent value” for any of the transfers alleged to be fraudulent. 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(B). 	Similarly, under sections 273 through 275 of NYDCL, the Trustee must
demonstrate BLMIS did not receive “fair consideration” for the same. NYDCL §§ 273–275. It
has been found, “‘reasonably equivalent value’ in Section 548(a)(1)(b), [and] ‘fair consideration’
in the [NYDCL] . . . have the same fundamental meaning.” 	Balaber-Strauss v. Sixty-Five
Brokers (In re Churchill Mortgage Inv. Corp.), 256 B.R. 664, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(Churchill I), aff’d, Balaber-Strauss v. Lawrence, 264 B.R. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Churchill II).
Fair consideration can be established by showing either a lack of “fair equivalent” property or a
lack of good faith on the part of the transferee. 	NYDCL § 272 (defining “fair consideration”);
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see Patriot, 2011 WL 2412581, at *39 (“To defeat a motion to dismiss, the Trustee need only
allege a lack of ‘fair consideration’ by pleading a lack of ‘fair equivalent’ value or a lack of good
faith on the part of the transferee.”); 	Silverman v. Sound Around, Inc. (In re Allou Distribs.,
Inc.), 404 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[F]air consideration has two components—
the exchange of fair value and good faith—and both are required.”) (internal quotations
omitted).15
Under both the Code and the NYDCL, courts consistently hold that “claims 	of
constructive fraud do not need to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b).” 	Bank of Commc’ns v. Ocean Dev. Am., Inc., No. 07-CIV-4628, 2010 WL 768881, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010). Rather, the Trustee need only satisfy Rule 8(a) by providing a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2);
see also Enron Corp. v. Granite Constr. Co. (In re Enron Corp.), No. 03–93172, 2006 WL
2400369, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (“The Court does not see any reason to break
with its precedent in applying Rule 8(a) in evaluating the pleadings in a constructive fraudulent
conveyance matter herein.”); 	Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. at 319 (“The pleading of
constructive fraud [under the NYDCL], as opposed to actual fraud, must only comply with
F.R.C.P. 8(a) . . . .”). 	The purpose of this pleading requirement is to ensure that the defendant
receives “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Scheidelman
v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 423 B.R. 598, 612 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Twombly,
15 Contrary to the Defendants’ position, BLMIS was insolvent at the time of the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers
given that Ponzi schemes are, by definition, at all times insolvent. See Armstrong v. Collins, Nos. 01 Civ. 2437, et.
al., 2010 WL 1141158, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010); Daley v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286
B.R. 480, 486 n. 17 (D. Conn. 2002) (“[A] number of courts have held that an enterprise engaged in a Ponzi scheme
is insolvent from its inception and becomes increasingly insolvent as the scheme progresses.”); see also
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 8 (1924) (noting Charles Ponzi, the namesake of the Ponzi scheme, “was always
insolvent, and became daily more so, the more his business succeeded. He made no investments of any kind, so that
all the money he had at any time was solely the result of loans by his dupes.”).
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550 U.S. at 545) (internal quotations omitted). 	Indeed, “the sole consideration should be
whether, consistent with the requirements of Rule 8(a), the complaint gives the defendant
sufficient notice to prepare an answer, frame discovery, and defend against the charges.”
Nisselson v. Drew Indus., Inc. (In re White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp.), 222 B.R. 417, 429
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
The Defendants concede that Rule 9(b) is typically not applicable because the conduct of
the transferee is normally irrelevant to constructive fraud, which merely looks at the value given
and the solvency of the transferor. 	They contend nevertheless that Rule 9(b) does apply in the
instant proceeding because the underlying allegations sound in fraud. But not every allegation of
wrongful conduct sounds in fraud for purposes of Rule 9(b); 	the Trustee has not alleged, and
need not allege for purposes of constructive fraud, that the Defendants were involved in the kind
of misrepresentation or deceit that would require a heightened pleading standard. 	Instead, the
only relevant allegation to this Constructive Fraudulent Transfer claim is that the Defendants
breached fiduciary duties by failing to perform compliance responsibilities and therefore did not
provide value for their wages. 	Such a breach of a fiduciary duty does not implicate Rule 9(b).
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., No. 00
Civ. 8688, 2002 WL 362794, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2002) (holding breaches of fiduciary duties
“by conduct not amounting to fraud, such as by breaching its duties of care, disclosure and
loyalty” do not require the heightened standards of Rule 9(b)) (emphasis added). 	Furthermore,
the Second Circuit has indicated that Rule 8(a) applies to constructive fraud claims even in cases
where the courts consider the transferee’s knowledge of the fraud and underlying conduct. 	See
Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sharp Int’l Corp.), 403 F.3d 43, 53–54 (2d
Cir. 2005) (discussing constructive fraud and raising Rule 9(b) only in subsequent discussions of
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actual fraud); Silverman v. Actrade Capital, Inc. (In re Actrade Fin. Techs. Ltd.), 337 B.R. 791,
801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]n [Sharp], the Second Circuit considered a motion to dismiss a
complaint that asserted claims of constructive and intentional fraudulent conveyance under New
York State law. 	It held that the intentional fraud claims had to be pleaded in compliance with
Rule 9(b) but did not imply that the constructive fraud claims had to meet any such
requirement.”).
i. 	The Trustee Has Sufficiently Pled that BLMIS Did Not Receive Value
for Purposes of Constructive Fraud Under the Code and the NYDCL
The 	Constructive 	Fraudulent 	Transfers 	that 	the 	Trustee 	seeks 	to 	avoid 	include
Defendants’ withdrawals of fictitious profits and receipt of salaries, bonuses, gifts, and loans
from BLMIS. 	The Trustee has adequately alleged all of the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers
were made for less than “reasonably equivalent” or “fair equivalent” value.
With respect to the Defendants’ withdrawals of profits from their BLMIS IA Accounts,
courts have consistently held that fictitious profits from a Ponzi scheme are deemed to have been
received for less than reasonably equivalent value and can be avoided. See Sender v. Buchanan
(In re Hedged-Inv. Assoc., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding payments in
excess of original investment do not provide any value); Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757
(7th Cir. 1995) (“The paying out of profits to [the defendant] not offset by further investments by
him conferred no benefit on the corporations . . . .”); In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because Appellants provided no value in exchange for the fictitious profits
they received, that portion of their redemption payments is voidable as a constructive fraudulent
conveyance.”); 	Patriot, 452 at 440 n.44 (“The Court’s conclusion that the Defendants did not
provide reasonably equivalent value for the payments in excess of principal is consistent with
those courts that have held that investors in a Ponzi scheme are not entitled to retain the fictitious
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profits they received.”). 	In addition, the Trustee’s allegations, if proven, show that BLMIS
received nothing in return for the gifts and loans the Defendants received. Although promissory
notes were exchanged for some of these Constructive Fraudulent Transfers, the Trustee has
sufficiently alleged such notes were executed pro forma without intent to repay. 	In particular,
the Trustee could not find any payment of principal, interest, or otherwise that was given in
exchange for the loans since the time they were made, which in some instances dates back to
2003.
The Defendants unsuccessfully argue that their services constituted reasonably equivalent
value and fair consideration given to BLMIS in exchange for their salaries. 	In support of this
contention, the Defendants rely upon Churchill I where the court found the brokers provided
value for the commissions they received by performing their duties. 	256 B.R. at 667. 	The
Defendants posit that their salaries cannot be avoided since, they claim, the Trustee has not
alleged their salaries “were disproportionate to like commissions paid for like services in the
marketplace . . . by similar but legitimate business entities.” 	Id. at 679. 	The Defendants are
mistaken: the Trustee has sufficiently alleged they breached fiduciary duties to BLMIS, and thus
did not provide services that might otherwise have constituted adequate consideration in
exchange for their receipt of salaries and bonuses. See Section II.C. infra.
Notwithstanding the Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, this conclusion is consistent
with the decision in Churchill I. 	There, the trustee sought to recover commissions paid to
brokers by debtors for bringing investors into a Ponzi scheme, on the theory that services
enlarging the scope of the debtors fraudulent scheme do not give value. In rejecting the trustee’s
theory, the Churchill I court reasoned that the debtors’ involvement in a fraudulent enterprise did
not determine whether value was given under section 548 of the Code. 	256 B.R. at 679. 	The
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focus, instead, should be on the specific transaction, and a court should concentrate on the “value
of the goods and services provided rather than on the impact the goods and services had on the
bankrupt enterprise.” 	Id. at 680. 	The court in Churchill I went on to hold that because the
trustee conceded there was nothing unlawful or fraudulent in the way the brokers were hired or
carried out their duties, the brokers “earned what they were paid fairly and without wrongdoing,”
and the claims to recover their commissions dismissed as a matter of law. Id.
In contrast to Churchill I, where the brokers faithfully carried out their duties, the Trustee
here takes direct aim at the “astronomical” compensation—including payments to Mark and
Andrew of $4.8 million in 2006 and over $9 million in 2007—that was paid despite the
Defendants’ failure to fulfill their employment duties. Compl. ¶¶ 74, 85. Therefore, even if the
Defendants’ wages were proportionate to the wages of senior management in legitimate
enterprises, a fact the Trustee does not concede, the Defendants returned less than reasonable
equivalent value to BLMIS as a result of their alleged lack of faithful service. See Churchill I,
256 B.R. at 684 (“Nor shall this decision prejudice the Trustee’s right to assert fraudulent
conveyance claims based upon evidence showing that commissions were paid (for example, to
insiders) that exceeded the value of broker services.”).
In any event, the Court need not make a finding as to whether the Defendants’ services
constituted adequate value, as these issues often involve factual inquiries inappropriate for a
motion to dismiss. 	In re Actrade Fin. Techs. Ltd., 337 B.R. at 804 (“[T]he question of
reasonably equivalent value . . . is fact intensive, and usually cannot be determined on the
pleadings.”). At this early stage, the Trustee has adequately pled a lack of reasonably equivalent
value with regard to the transfers for purposes of section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code and sections
273 through 275 of the NYDCL.
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ii. 	The 	Trustee 	Has 	Pled 	Nearly 	Every 	Constructive 	Fraudulent
Transfer in Satisfaction of Rule 8(a)
In accordance with the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), “[t]he plaintiff need
not provide specific facts to support its allegations.” 	Fabrikant, 394 B.R. at 735 (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)). 	This is because Rule 8(a) does not require that “a
complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, as long as it gives each
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the facts upon which it rests.” Anwar v.
Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). 	Indeed, courts have found that allegations aggregating transfers into lump
sums over several years without identifying the number of transfers, the dates of the transfers, or
the amount of any specific transfer will satisfy Rule 8(a) pleading requirements. 	See, e.g., The
Unencumbered Assets, Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc.
Inv. Litig.), 617 F. Supp. 2d 700, 722 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“Though the complaint fails to specify
the exact dates and amounts of the dividend payments, this claim is subject to Rule 8’s liberal
pleading standard . . . .”); 	Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 2006 WL 2802092, at *9 (finding
complaint alleged constructively fraudulent transfers despite aggregating “the transfers into lump
sums over three to five year time periods” without identifying the mechanism of the transfer).
Accordingly, many of the allegations underlying the Constructive Fraudulent Transfers in
the Complaint satisfy the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a), including a number of the
allegations that aggregate these Transfers over several years. 	For instance, the Trustee’s
allegation that $6,645,000 was transferred to Mark’s attorney in May and June of 2008 for the
purchase of a Nantucket home provides sufficient information to apprise the Defendants of the
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claim. 16 Compl. ¶ 84. 	The facts surrounding these Constructive Fraudulent Transfers provide
Mark with sufficient notice of what the Trustee intends to prove; 	namely, that a transfer of
$6,645,000 for the purchase of a home is avoidable under the Code and the NYDCL because
Mark provided less than reasonably equivalent value to BLMIS, while it was insolvent.
Similarly, the Complaint aggregates Constructive Fraudulent Transfers over the six years (the
“Six Year Aggregations”), and consequently fails to identify whether any of these Transfers,
occurred within two years of the Filing Date. For example, withdrawals by Mark and Andrew of
at least $7.3 million from IA Accounts after April 2004, Compl. ¶¶ 80, 90, and transfers between
2002 and 2008 to pay for personal expenses charged to the Defendants’ credit cards. Compl. ¶¶
73, 84, 94, 98. While it is unclear what amount is sought as avoidable under the Code and what
amount is sought under the NYDCL, the Defendants have notice of the Trustee’s allegations that
the Defendants provided insufficient value for the Six Year Aggregations at a time that BLMIS
was insolvent. As such, the allegations contain sufficient information for Defendants to prepare
for litigation on the merits, satisfying Rule 8(a). See Fabrikant, 394 B.R. at 736 (holding Rule
8(a) was satisfied despite the complaint aggregating transfers over “a period lasting nearly four
years” and it was impossible to determine what amount was sought under the Code).
Other allegations are not as satisfactory. 	Certain aggregations in the Complaint (the
“Longer Aggregations”)17 include transfers that extend beyond any applicable look-back period18
16 These are just illustrative examples of some of the many Constructive Fraudulent Transfers that have been
adequately pled. Only those identified in the following paragraphs have not been so pled.
17 The Longer Aggregations include: (1) the Defendants’ salaries and bonuses between 2001 and 2008, Compl. ¶¶
65, 74, 85, 96 (this does not include the $4.8 million dollar bonus to both Mark and Andrew in 2006 which has been
properly pled under the NYDCL, and the bonus of over $9 million dollars to both Mark and Andrew in 2007 which
has been properly pled under the Code and the NYDCL, Compl. ¶¶ 74, 85); (2) transfers from BLMIS between
1996 and 2008 funding a life insurance policy for Peter, Compl. ¶ 73; (3) payments on Peter’s behalf between
January 18, 2000 and April 11, 2006 to limited partnerships where Peter was an investor, Compl. ¶ 73; 	(4)
payments in 2002 to the Beacon Point Marine in Connecticut where Andrew kept a boat, Compl. ¶ 94; (5) payments
in 2001 and 2002 to “Lock and Hackle,” a fly fishing and hunting membership club in Miami, Florida on Andrew’s
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and it is unclear which ones, if any, the Trustee seeks to avoid as constructively fraudulent. Other
transfers are listed in the Complaint without providing any date associated with the transfer (the
“Undated Transfers”),19 and this Court is unable to determine whether the Trustee is even
seeking to avoid them as constructively fraudulent. 	To the extent that the Court is unable to
determine whether a transfer falls under the look-back period of any applicable law, the
Trustee’s claim to avoid it as a Constructive Fraudulent Transfer fails under Rule 8(a) to provide
“the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 	claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
While discovery is sometimes necessary to assist a trustee in clarifying the circumstances
surrounding particular Constructive Fraudulent Transfers—for instance when the trustee has no
access to the debtor’s books and records or the books and records are in shambles—the Trustee
here has not provided any such explanation. Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss the Trustee’s
Constructive Fraudulent Transfer claims are granted with respect to the Longer Aggregations and
the Undated Transfers, with leave to amend the Complaint within forty five days. 	As to the
remainder of the Trustee’s Constructive Fraudulent Transfer claims, the Motions to Dismiss are
denied.
behalf, Compl. ¶ 94; and (6) Shana’s withdrawals of fictitious profits from her IA Account prior to December 2008,
Compl. ¶ 97.
18 In the context of constructive fraud, the New York discovery rule is not available to allow a plaintiff to avoid
transfers occurring more than six years before the Filing Date. See Tenamee v. Schmukler, 438 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The statute of limitations for . . . constructive fraud is six-years, although unlike the case of actual
fraud the two year discovery rule does not apply.”); Williams v. Infra Commerc. Ansalt, 131 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding constructive fraud claims under the NYDCL do “not receive the benefit of the discovery
rule, since actual intent to defraud is not an element of that statute”).
19 The Undated Transfers are: 	(1) payments from BLMIS to finance Peter’s, Mark’s, and Andrew’s ownership
stakes in Madoff Brokerage Trading and Technology, LLC, Compl. ¶ 73, 84, 94; (2) payment by BLMIS of to fund
Peter’s share of a capital call by Madoff Technologies, LLC, Compl. ¶ 73; and (3) payments by MSIL for the
purchase and restoration of Peter’s Aston Martin automobile, Compl. ¶ 73.
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iii. Section 546(e) Does Not Provide a Basis for Dismissing The Trustee’s
Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Claims
Mark and Andrew unsuccessfully argue their withdrawals of fictitious profits are
insulated from liability by the “safe harbor” of section 546(e) of the Code, which provides, in
relevant part, that “the trustee may not avoid . . . [a] settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for
the benefit of) a . . . stockbroker . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 	11 U.S.C. §
546(e). 	“Settlement payment” is defined as a “preliminary settlement payment, a partial
settlement payment, an interim settlement payment . . . or any other similar payment commonly
used in the securities trade.” 	11 U.S.C. § 741(8). 	A “stockbroker” is a person who has a
customer and “that is engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(53A)(A), (B). A “securities contract” is defined as, inter alia, “a contract for the purchase,
sale, or loan of a security.” 	11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i)-(xi). 	Mark and Andrew contend that the
Constructive Fraudulent Transfers made from their IA Accounts are settlement payments by a
stockbroker pursuant to a securities contract, and thus cannot be avoided. See Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants Mark and Andrew Madoff’s Motion to Dismiss at p. 38, 39 (No.
09-01503) (dated March, 15, 2010) (Dkt. No. 13) [Hereinafter “Mark and Andrew Mot.”].
In Merkin I, this Court addressed virtually identical arguments, and found that they were
at best premature, as section 546(e) provides an affirmative defense that, unless clearly
established on the face of the Complaint, does not tend to controvert the Trustee’s prima facie
case. 	440 B.R. at 266; see also Merkin II, 2011 WL 3897970, at *12 (“This Court finds no
substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to the correctness of the standards relied on by
the Bankruptcy Court in its refusal – at the pleading stage – to dismiss on the grounds of . . .
546(e) [is an] affirmative defense.”); DeGirolamo v. Truck World, Inc. (In re Laurel Valley Oil
Co.), No. 07–6109, 2009 WL 1758741 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 16, 2009). Assuming, arguendo,
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that the section 546(e) defense were timely, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that it
applies to the transactions at issue. 	Whether Madoff, through BLMIS, was a stockbroker
“engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities” is dubious. 	11 U.S.C. §
101(53A)(B). 	Courts have held that Ponzi scheme operators do not affirmatively “make
securities transactions happen” on behalf of legal “customers,” and thus do not fit the definition
of “stockbroker” for purposes of section 546(e). See Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d
805, 817 (9th Cir. 2008); Wider v. Wootton, 907 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1990). As asserted in
the Complaint, Madoff, through BLMIS, “never in fact purchased any of the securities he
claimed to have purchased for customer accounts.” 	Compl. ¶ 25; 	see Merkin II, 2011 WL
3897970, at *12 (finding “no substantial grounds for difference of opinion” with this Court’s
determination in Merkin I that Madoff is not a stockbroker as a matter of law); see also Merkin
I, 440 B.R. at 266-68.
For the same reason, it is doubtful whether the payments from BLMIS to the Defendants
are settlement payments as contemplated by the statute. Settlement payments subject to the safe
harbor of section 546(e) must be made in the context of a “securities transaction.” 	See In re
Enron Creditors Recovery Grp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 09-5122, 09-5142, 2011 WL 2536101, at
*7 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (noting “[w]e like our sister circuits, agree that in the context of the
securities industry a settlement refers to the completion of a securities transaction . . . .”) (internal
quotations omitted); 	Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2009);
(“[A] settlement payment is generally the transfer of cash or securities made to complete the
securities transaction.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 	Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining settlement is “the
completion of a securities transaction”); 	Jackson v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing
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Corp.), 263 B.R. 406, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The term ‘settlement’ as commonly used in
connection with purchases and sales in the securities trade refers to acts that occur at different
states of the process towards completion of the securities transaction.”). 	While the Second
Circuit recently defined “transaction in securities” broadly, In re Enron Creditors Recovery
Group, 2011 WL 2536101, at *6-7 (holding settlement payment does not require change in
ownership of the security and limiting the requirement of “commonly used in the securities
trade” in connection with settlement payments), it suggested that “settlement payments” must be
made in relation to an actual securities transaction, id. at *7 (“Because Enron’s redemption
payments completed a transaction in securities, we hold that they are settlement payments within
the meaning of § 741(8).”) (emphasis added); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of Quebecor World (USA) Inc., v. Am. United Life Ins. Co. (In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc.),
No. 08–01417, 2011 WL 3157292, at *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (“The practical effect
of the [Enron] opinion is to make it more difficult for a plaintiff . . . to maintain a viable cause of
action for avoidance in relation to prepetition transfers made to complete a transaction involving
a security.”) (emphasis added). 	Here, where securities may never have been bought, sold, or
otherwise existent at BLMIS, withdrawals from IA Accounts may not constitute “settlement
payments” under section 546(e) of the Code. 	Certainly in this case, where the Defendants
received astronomical returns on comparably negligible investments,20 the Trustee is entitled to
discovery in order to ascertain the extent of the Defendants’ knowledge about the fraudulent
activities affecting their IA Accounts.
20 Specifically, Andrew invested only $912,062 into IA Accounts, yet he redeemed $17,117,566; Mark invested
only $745,482 into IA Accounts, yet he redeemed $18,105,456; Peter invested only $32,146 into IA Accounts, yet
he redeemed $16,252,004; and Shana invested only $1,364,975 into IA Accounts, yet she redeemed $1,666,436.
Compl. ¶¶ 66, 76, 86, 97. Additionally, some IA Accounts showed purported gains despite lacking any principal to
support such gains. Compl. ¶¶ 67, 77-80, 87-90.
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Additionally, even if BLMIS were a stockbroker, the Court is unable to conclude that a
“securities contract” ever existed. 	The Defendants do not explain what qualifies as an
investment contract in this case and merely conclude that “the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a
‘securities contract’ certainly covers the transactions here.” 	Mark and Andrew Mot. at p. 39.
Surely the IA Account agreements are not investment contracts as a matter of law; 	this Court
has previously questioned whether they effect “the purchase, sale, or loan of a security” between
the parties or contemplate any particular security transaction. 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A). At most,
they merely authorize Madoff to act as “agent and attorney in fact to buy, sell and trade in stocks,
bonds, options and any other securities” in the future on the Fund Defendants’ behalf. 	See
Merkin I, 440 B.R. at 267.
Moreover, as this Court has previously held, the application of section 546(e) must be
rejected as contrary to the purpose of the safe harbor provision and incompatible with SIPA.
Section 	546(e) 	was 	intended 	to 	promote 	stability 	and 	instill 	investor 	confidence 	in 	the
commodities and securities markets. Merkin I, 440 B.R. at 267 (citing H. Rep. No. 97–420, at 1
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583 (stating the purpose of 546(e), as amended, is
to protect “the stability of the market”)); Mishkin v. Ensminger (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing
Corp.), 247 B.R. 51, 105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that a goal of 546(e) is to “promote
investor confidence”). Courts have held that to extend safe harbor protection in the context of a
fraudulent securities scheme would be to “undermine, not protect or promote investor confidence
. . . [by] endorsing a scheme to defraud SIPC,” and therefore contradict the goals of the
provision. Id. (declining to extend section 546(e)’s safe harbor protection to a party implicated
in a fraudulent scheme). Further, in the context of a SIPA proceeding, applying the safe harbor
provision would negate its remedial purpose by eliminating most avoidance powers granted to a
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trustee under SIPA. 	See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(b), 78fff–2(c)(3).21 Simply put, the Constructive
Fraudulent Transfers sought to be avoided emanate from Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, and
the safe harbor provision does not insulate transactions like these from attack. Indeed, it defies
credulity that the Defendants, who are insiders on the basis of the facts alleged, were ever
contemplated to be the parties eligible to invoke the safe harbor provision under section 546(e).
In light of the foregoing, I hold that the Defendants’ arguments under section 546(e) fail to
establish a basis for dismissing the Trustee’s Constructive Fraudulent Transfer claims.
D. 	The Trustee Has Failed To Adequately Allege Preference Claims
The Trustee has insufficiently pled Count Two of the Complaint to avoid and recover
Preferences.
i. 	The 	Trustee 	Has 	Adequately 	Pled 	the 	Statutory 	Elements 	of 	a
Preference Claim
Section 547(b) of the Code provides that a trustee may avoid a transfer from BLMIS, if
the transfer is made to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent debt,
while the debtor was insolvent, and within one year before the date of the filing of the petition if
the creditor was an insider, as well as allows such creditor to receive more than it would in a
chapter 7 liquidation. 	11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 	Claims to avoid and recover preferential payments
are not held to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Family Golf Ctrs., Inc. v.
Acushnet Co. (In re Randall’s Island Family Golf Ctrs.), 290 B.R. 55, 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003). Accordingly, under Rule 8(a), the Trustee must provide only a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
The Trustee has adequately pled the requisite elements with regard to the Preferences.
The Trustee has sufficiently alleged the Defendants are insiders of BLMIS subject to a one-year
21 Significantly, in the context of a SIPA proceeding, the Code provisions, including section 546(e), are incorporated
only “to the extent consistent with the provisions of [SIPA].” SIPA § 78fff(b) (emphasis added).
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preference look back period, as all of the Defendants are close relatives of Madoff and were
officers or senior managers at BLMIS. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (defining insiders of a
corporate debtor to include officers of the debtor and “relative[s] of a general partner, director,
officer, or person in control of the debtor”). Additionally, as discussed above, Ponzi schemes are
presumptively insolvent, and the Trustee need not allege specific facts supporting the insolvency
of BLMIS at the times of the preferential transfers. Finally, the Trustee alleges the Preferences
were compensation for services performed by the Defendants prior to payment, and suffice to
show the payments were to a creditor on account of an antecedent debt. See Pryor v. Cohen (In
re Blue Point Carpet, Inc.), 102 B.R. 311, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that salary payments
paid on the date due were avoidable preferences).22
ii. 	The 	Trustee 	Has 	Not 	Identified 	the 	Preferences 	with 	Sufficient
Information
The Trustee’s Preference claims fail to provide the minimum information required by
Rule 8(a). The Trustee’s allegations aggregate the transfers into a lump sum without specifying
the number of Preferences, the amount of any specific Preference, or which defendant received
any specific Preference.23 While Rule 8(a) does not require specific factual detail, such bare
allegations fail to provide sufficient notice for the Defendants to prepare an answer or affirmative
defenses, such as whether the transfer was made in the ordinary course of business or whether
22 Salary payments are often subject to the affirmative defenses enumerated in section 547(c) of the Code, such as
transfers made in the ordinary course of business. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (“[T]he creditor or party in interest
against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the non-avoidability of a transfer under
subsection (c) of this section.”); Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“A creditor asserting the [ordinary course of business] defense bears the burden of proving each of the three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.”). As no Defendant has raised these affirmative defenses and their
applicability is not clear from the face of the Complaint, the court need not address at this time whether they apply
to defeat the Preference claims.
23 The only allegation in the Complaint specific to the Preferences is that “the compensation payments received by
the four . . . Defendants during the period from December 11, 2007 [to] the Filing Date in the collective amount of
$7,364,048 were made during the one year period prior to the Filing Date and are additionally recoverable as
avoidable preference payments . . . .” Compl. ¶ 108. The Complaint does not contain any facts or allegations that
sufficiently detail the specific transfers made within one year of the Filing Date.
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there was a contemporaneous exchange for new value. See State Bank and Trust Co. v. Spaeth
(In re Motorwerks, Inc.), 371 B.R. 281, 293-94 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). 	The allegations here
are dissimilar to the trustee’s allegations in Court-Appointed Receiver for Lancer Management
Group LLC v. 169838 Canada, Inc., where the court found that the Complaint contained
sufficient factual information despite “lumping” the defendants together without identifying the
transfers attributable to each Defendant. No. 05-60235-CIV, 2008 WL 2262063, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
May 30, 2008). 	In that case, the complaint contained an exhibit indicating the particular
transfers 	from 	particular 	funds 	on 	particular 	dates, 	and 	accordingly 	provided 	sufficient
information for the defendants to form an answer despite not identifying which defendant
received which transfer. Here, by contrast, the Preferences and the Defendants are both grouped
together without any specifics provided. Again, while dismissal might not be required in all such
circumstances, the Trustee has not come forth with any explanation for these minimalistic
pleadings. The Trustee’s Preference claims in Count Two are therefore dismissed with leave to
amend within forty five days.
E. 	The Trustee Fails to Adequately Plead his Claims To Recover Subsequent
Transfers From the Defendants
The Trustee has insufficiently pled Count Ten of the Complaint to recover funds
subsequently transferred to the Defendants (the “Subsequent Transfers”) under section 550(a)(2)
of the Code and section 278 of the NYDCL. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (allowing recovery from
“any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee”); 	NYDCL § 278 (allowing
recovery from “any person”); Farm Stores, Inc. v. Sch. Feeding Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 374, 255
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[E]ach transferee . . . is liable to the creditor to the extent of the value
of the money or property he or she wrongfully received.”) (emphasis added).
In determining whether a claim to recover fraudulent transfers from a subsequent
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transferee is adequately pled, Rule 8(a) governs. 	Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. at 317–18
(“[R]ecovery under § 550(a) is not subject to a particularized pleading standard . . . .”); 	see
Silverman v. K.E.R.U. Realty Corp. (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), 379 B.R. 5, 30 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2007) (indicating “in order to prove a Section 550(a)(2) claim, [the] burden is not so onerous as
to require ‘dollar-for-dollar accounting’ of ‘the exact funds’ at issue” and that “if dollar-for-
dollar accounting is not required at the proof stage, then surely it is not required at the pleading
stage either”). The purpose of this pleading requirement is to ensure the defendant receives “fair
notice of what the. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” In re Henderson, 423 B.R.
at 612 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Complaint merely alleges that “[o]n information and belief, some or all of the
transfers were subsequently transferred by one or more [of the Defendants] to another Family
Defendant, either directly or indirectly” without providing any sort of estimate of the amount of
the purported Subsequent Transfer, or when or how such Transfer occurred. 	Compl. ¶ 167.
While the Complaint’s failure to indicate specific amounts does not in and of itself warrant
dismissal of the Subsequent Transfer claims, K.E.R.U. Realty Corp., 379 B.R. at 30–31 (finding
a subsequent transfer claim adequately pled where the complaint stated, “at least tens of millions
of dollars were fraudulently diverted from [debtor] to [initial transferees] . . . [and] a portion of
these fraudulently diverted funds was transferred from the [initial transferees] to, or for the
benefit of, the [subsequent transferees]”), its failure to provide even a modicum of specificity
with respect to the Subsequent Transfers so as to put the Defendants on notice as to which ones
the Trustee seeks to recover does so warrant. See Gowan v. Amaranth LLC (In re Dreier LLP),
No. 10-03493, 2011 WL 2412601, at * 11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2011).
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The Amaranth court held similarly vague allegations to be insufficient to sustain a
subsequent transfer claim. 2011 WL 2412601, at * 11 (“The only scintilla of evidence put forth
by the Trustee is a bald assertion that ‘it is likely that Amaranth Partners invested the money
DLLP transferred to it pursuant to the Note Fraud to Amaranth LLC. . . . The Trustee merely
asserts that ‘[o]n information and belief, Amaranth Partners transferred its Transfers to
Amaranth LLC.’”) (emphasis in the original). 	To arrive at this conclusion, the Amaranth court
distinguished the facts alleged by the trustee in that case from those alleged by this Trustee in
Merkin I and concluded that in Merkin I, “the complaint satisfied the Rule 8(a) pleading
requirement because it provided ‘fair notice’ to the defendants of the claims against them
because certain exhibits attached to the complaint indicated the percentage of fees and
commissions that the defendants purported to receive on account of the transfers to an initial
transferee.” 	Amaranth, 452 B.R. at 465 (citing Merkin I, 440 B.R. at 270). 	Indeed, the
complaint in Merkin I identified the subsequent transfers in predetermined amounts in the Funds’
Offering Memoranda, which was attached as an exhibit, and “thus adequately apprises the
Merkin Defendants, the alleged recipients of these fees, of which transactions are claimed to be
fraudulent and why, when they took place, how they were executed and by whom.” 440 B.R. at
270 (internal quotations omitted). No such information is provided here.
Accordingly, Count Ten of the Complaint to recover Subsequent Transfers is dismissed
with leave to amend within forty five days.
F. 	The Trustee has Sufficiently Pled a Basis For Disallowing the Defendants’ SIPA
Claims
The Trustee has sufficiently pled Count Eleven of the Complaint to disallow the
Defendants’ SIPA claims under section 502(d) of the Code, which states, “the court shall
disallow any claim of any entity . . . that is a transferee of a [voidable] transfer.” 	11 U.S.C. §
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502(d). The purpose of this section is to “preclude entities that have received voidable transfers
from sharing in the distribution of assets unless and until the voidable transfer has been returned
to the estate.” In re Mid. Atl. Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604, 609 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also In
re MacMenamin’s Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing the distinction
between “transfer” and “obligation” as relevant to a determination of the applicability of section
502(d)) (citing In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 333 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
The Defendants are allegedly “the recipients of transfers of BLMIS’ property which are
recoverable” under the Code and SIPA, and those transfers have not been returned to the Trustee.
Compl. at ¶ 174 (emphasis added). As a result, the Trustee’s claim under section 502(d) of the
Code is adequately pled. 	The Motions to Dismiss Count Eleven of the Complaint are therefore
denied.
G. 	The Trustee Has Adequately Alleged a Claim for Equitable Subordination
of the Defendants’ SIPA Claims
The 	Trustee 	has 	sufficiently 	pled 	Count 	Twelve 	of 	the 	Complaint 	to 	equitably
subordinate the Defendants’ SIPA claims, pursuant to section 510(c) of the Code, which
empowers this Court to “subordinate for the purposes of an allowed interest to all or part of
another allowed interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
“To plead equitable subordination successfully, a complaint must contain enough facts to
satisfy each part of the following three-part test: (1) that the [Defendants] engaged in inequitable
conduct, (2) that the misconduct caused injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage
on the defendant-claimant, and (3) that bestowing the remedy of equitable subordination is not
inconsistent with bankruptcy law.” In re Hydrogen, L.L.C., 431 B.R. 337, 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010) (citing In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977)). Such subordination is
confined to offsetting “specific harm that creditors have suffered on account of the inequitable
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conduct;” it “is remedial, not penal.” In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. 314, 327-29 (D. Del.
2003); 	see also Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 	Thus, undoing inequality is at the core of 510(c)’s grant of authority.
Societa Internazionale Turismo, S.p.A v. Barr (In re Lockwood), 14 B.R. 374, 380-81 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981). 	(“The fundamental aim of equitable subordination is to undo or offset any
inequality in the claim position of a creditor that will produce injustice or unfairness to other
creditors in terms of bankruptcy results.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The Complaint is replete with allegations that the Defendants have left much to undo.
See Comp ¶¶ 28-29, 32, 37-39, 43, 45, 47-49, 51-58, 73, 94, 98, 182. 	As explained in-depth
below, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to
BLMIS and those breaches directly harmed the same. See Section II.C. infra; Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of the Debtors v. Austin Fin. Servs., Inc., (In re KDI Holdings, Inc.), 277
B.R. 493, 511 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (observing that the remedy of equitably subordination has
been applied in cases, where it was found that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties). It
additionally alleges that the Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of BLMIS due to
their failures to adequately perform these duties. 	See Section II.E. infra. 	These factual
allegations set out the Defendants’ “inequitable conduct” injurious to creditors, and moreover,
these allegations establish that the remedy of equitable subordination in this instance would not
be inconsistent with bankruptcy law. 	See Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am. (In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 	Thus, in the event one
exists, any allowed interest of the Defendants in the BLMIS SIPA Liquidation should be
equitably subordinated. Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss count twelve of the Complaint are
denied.
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* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss the Bankruptcy Claims are denied
except with regard to the Trustee’s Preference claims in Count Two, Actual and Constructive
Fraudulent Transfer claims in Counts Three through Nine to the extent stated herein, and
Subsequent Transfer claims in Count Ten, with leave to amend the Complaint within forty five
days.
II. 	THE COMMON LAW CLAIMS
Through the Common Law Claims the Trustee seeks to recover damages suffered by
BLMIS as a result of the Defendants’ failure to perform duties arising from their management
roles at BLMIS. 	To support these Claims, the Complaint alleges that the Defendants were
directors, officers, managers, and fiduciaries with broad oversight of BLMIS as a whole, and that
their responsibilities included developing and implementing a supervisory system to prevent and
report any fraudulent activity occurring within BLMIS. 	Specifically, according to BLMIS’s
purported compliance policies, the Defendants were required to “respond to red flags,” closely
scrutinize “any aberrational activity,” and “monitor . . . the activities of BLMIS personnel to
ensure that the policies and procedures . . . [were] being followed.” Compl. ¶ 33. 	The Trustee
alleges the Defendants failed to implement and comply with these policies, thereby directly
enabling Madoff’s Ponzi scheme to continue undetected to the detriment of BLMIS.
Before reaching the merits of the Common Law Claims, the Court must first determine
whether the Trustee has standing to assert them, and second, if he does, whether New York
General Business Law §§ 352 et. seq., commonly referred to as the Martin Act, otherwise
preempts him from bringing them. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. §§ 352 et. seq. (McKinney 2010). As
set forth below in greater detail, this Court finds the Trustee has standing to assert Common Law
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Claims on behalf of the BLMIS estate, and the Martin Act does not preempt him from pursuing
them against the Defendants.
A. 	The Trustee Possesses Standing to Pursue the Common Law Claims on behalf
of the BLMIS Estate
Given the “hybrid” nature of a SIPA liquidation, In re BLMIS II, 2011 WL 3568936, at
*12 n. 10, a SIPA trustee has at least as many powers and responsibilities as an ordinary
bankruptcy trustee under Title 11. 	See also 15 U.S.C. § 78fff–1(a) (“A trustee shall be vested
with the same powers and title with respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor,
including the same rights to avoid preferences, as a trustee in a case under Title 11.”). 	An
ordinary bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to Second Circuit precedent, has standing to assert claims
against corporate insiders alleging injury to the debtor. In re The Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822,
826-27 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We agree that a bankruptcy trustee, suing on behalf of the debtor under
New York law, may pursue an action for breach of fiduciary duty against the debtor’s
fiduciaries.”); 	St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 702 n. 3 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding that “causes of action that could be asserted by the debtor are property of the
estate and should be asserted by the trustee. . . .”); In re Keene Corp., 164 B.R. 844, 853 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Section 720 of New York’s Business Corporation law expressly authorizes a
corporation or bankruptcy trustee to sue the corporation’s officers and directors for breach of
fiduciary duty, including misappropriation or diversion of assets. . . .”). The rationale for this is
plain: section 541(a)(1) of the Code defines property of the estate as “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor . . . as of the commencement of the case” including the estate’s causes of
action. In re Smart World Techs., LLC, 423 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n. 9 (1983)). 	It follows, therefore, that the Trustee has
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standing to assert the Common Law Claims, to the extent these Claims belong to the BLMIS
estate.24
In HSBC, the Trustee, as successor in interest to Madoff and BLMIS, lacked standing
under the Wagoner rule25 to bring common law fraud claims against the defendants (the “HSBC
Defendants”). 2011 WL 3200298, at *2. The allegations presented here do not compel the same
conclusion. 	Indeed, the HSBC Defendants were undisputedly third parties and Wagoner
provides, “a claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation accrues to creditors, not to
the guilty corporation.” 944 F.2d at 114 (emphasis added); see also In re Verestar, Inc., 343 B.R.
444, 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff acting on behalf of a debtor cannot sue an
outside professional or other third party for damages for which the corporation itself can be held
responsible.”) (emphasis added). 	By contrast, the Defendants in the instant proceeding are
alleged to be fiduciaries and insiders of BLMIS, and it is well established that the Wagoner and
in pari delicto rules do “not apply to actions of fiduciaries who are insiders in the sense that they
either are on the board or in management, or in some other way control the corporation.” In re
Optimal U.S. Litg., No. 10 Civ. 4095, 2011 WL 3809909, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2011)
(internal quotations omitted)(emphasis in the original); 	Winnick, 2006 WL 2212776, at *15
24 The district court in Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC held that the Trustee lacks standing—both directly and under
theories of bailment, subrogation, assignment or contribution—to assert common law claims against third parties on
behalf of BLMIS customers. Nos. 11 Civ.763, 11 Civ. 836, 2011 WL 3200298, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011).
Here, although Common Law Claims appear to have been asserted on behalf of customers and the BLMIS estate,
see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 182, 184 (alleging breach of fiduciary duty owed to, and damages caused to, “BLMIS and its
customers”), the Trustee has since insisted that he “is not suing [the Defendants] on behalf of the firm’s customers
but on behalf of the firm itself for [the Defendants’] failures to carry out faithfully their duties to BLMIS.” Trustee’s
Supplemental Letter at 2. In light of this supplemental submission, and in accordance with the holding in HSBC,
this Court need only address the plausibility of the Trustee’s Common Law Claims to the extent they are asserted on
behalf of the BLMIS estate.
25 The Wagoner rule “deprive[s] a trustee from even having standing to bring in federal court a common law claim
that is clearly defeated by the doctrine of in pari delicto.” 	2011 WL 3200298, at *2 (citing Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991)). 	Under New York law, the doctrine of in pari delicto
operates as an affirmative defense whereby a wrongdoer, or a plaintiff asserting a claim on behalf of a wrongdoer, is
generally barred from recovering against a commensurate wrongdoer. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941,
958–59 (N.Y. 2010).
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(“Courts have held that the Wagoner and “in pari delicto” rules do not apply to claims against
corporate insiders for breach of their fiduciary duties.”) (citing In re the Mediators, Inc., 105
F.3d at 826-27); In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 329 B.R. 411, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“[T]he Wagoner Rule does not bar claims against corporate fiduciaries . . . .”); Tese-Milner v.
Beeler (In re Hampton Hotel Investors, L.P.), 289 B.R. 563, 577 n.23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“The Wagoner Rule only deals with claims against third parties. 	It does not proscribe actions
against insiders for breach of fiduciary duty, which are properly claims of the trustee.”); 	KDI
Specialty Foods v. Austin Fin. Serv., Inc. (In re KDI Holdings, Inc.), 277 B.R. 493, 518 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[T]he in pari delicto doctrine is inapplicable where a cause of action is brought
against an insider.”).26 Consequently, to the extent that the Trustee has established the
Defendants’ positions at BLMIS rendered them insiders and fiduciaries, he is not barred by
Wagoner or in pari delicto from asserting claims against them on behalf of BLMIS.
General partners, sole shareholders, and sole decision makers are “insiders” or fiduciaries
in the context of the in pari delicto doctrine under New York common law. 	In re Adelphia
Communs. Corp., 322 B.R. 509, 529 n. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding general partner was
insider who could not use in pari delicto defense); 	Granite Partners, L.P., v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding sole voting shareholders and sole
general partners are insiders whose wrongdoing is imputed to plaintiff). “No reported authority
26 The rationale for the insider exception to the in pari delicto doctrine stems from the agency principles upon which
the doctrine is premised; a corporate insider, whose wrongdoing is typically imputed to the corporation, should not
be permitted to use that wrongdoing as a shield to prevent the corporation from recovering against him. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro (In re Walnut Leasing Co.), No. 99–526, 1999 WL 729267, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 8, 1999) (“Vis-à-vis their corporations, insiders cannot avoid the consequences of their own handiwork.”).
Indeed, a corporation “is represented by its officers and agents,” and “all [of their] corporate acts—including
fraudulent ones—are subject to the presumption of imputation” to the corporation. 	Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at
951(internal quotations omitted); see also In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 356 Fed. Appx. 622, 627 n.4 (3rd Cir.
2009) (“The exception derives from the fact that corporations act through their directors, officers, and controlling
stockholders.”); Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. (In re Granite Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318,
332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In pari delicto. . .does not apply to corporate insiders or partners. 	Otherwise, a
trustee could never sue the debtor’s insiders on account of their own wrongdoing.”).
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suggests an officer or director can assert the defense of in pari delicto” to escape liability to the
corporation on whose behalf he or she acted. In re Walnut Leasing Co., 1999 WL 729267, at *5,
n. 12 (emphasis added). 	Even a third-party professional, typically the quintessential outsider,
may surrender an in pari delicto defense where it exerts sufficient domination and control over
the guilty corporation to render itself an insider. See, e.g., In re KDI Holdings, Inc., 277 B.R. at
518 (“[T]he Committee has alleged sufficient facts with regard to Austin’s and Schneider’s
insider status through domination and control to render the in pari delicto defense inapplicable in
this case”); 	see also In re IDI Constr. Co., Inc., 345 B.R. 60, 67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(holding that in pari delicto did not bar a claim against a consultant involved in the fraud).
The 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	the 	Defendants 	were 	senior 	officers, 	directors, 	and
compliance managers of BLMIS. 	Comp. ¶¶ 28-36. 	Peter, an experienced and licensed
investment and legal professional, held the title of Senior Managing Director and Chief
Compliance Officer of BLMIS and was designated principal responsible for supervising BLMIS
personnel in the absence of Madoff himself. 	Comp. ¶¶ 37-42. 	Mark and Andrew, also
investment professionals, held titles of Co-Directors of Trading at BLMIS, and were designated
as personally responsible for carrying out the Firm’s policy in Madoff’s absence. Comp. ¶¶ 47-
51. Shana was in-house Counsel and Compliance Director of BLMIS and the sole custodian for
most 	BLMIS 	compliance 	documents 	and 	regulatory 	materials; 	she 	was 	responsible 	for
overseeing compliance with firm policy as well as investigating and correcting reported
aberrational activity. 	Comp. ¶¶ 43-46. 	These and other similar allegations set forth in
Complaint suffice to establish, for relevant purposes, that the Defendants were fiduciaries and
insiders of BLMIS. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 951.
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Accordingly, the Wagoner rule and the in pari delicto doctrine do not bar the Trustee
from asserting Common Law Claims on behalf of BLMIS against the Defendants.
B. 	The Trustee’s Common Law Claims are Not Preempted by New York’s Martin
Act
For the better part of a century, the Martin Act has empowered the New York State
Attorney General to take action against fraudulent practices involving securities. 	See Anwar,
728 F. Supp. 2d at 359. When originally enacted in 1921, the Martin Act granted the Attorney
General the power “to bring actions to enjoin imminent frauds” but “failed to address fraudulent
activities that had been already completed.” Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd., v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgt.
Inc., 915 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 	This changed, however, in 1955 with the
enactment of section 352-c, which authorizes the Attorney General to institute criminal and civil
proceedings, predicated “on mere conduct, absent any proof of scienter or criminal intent.” 	Id.
As the Martin Act currently stands, these statutory powers remain available under section 352-c,
provided, however that the Attorney General limits all Martin Act prosecutions to:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or
pretended purchase or sale;
(b) Any 	promise 	or 	representation 	as 	to 	the 	future 	which 	is 	beyond 	reasonable
expectation or unwarranted by existing circumstances;
(c) Any representation or statement which is false, where the person who made such
representation or statement: 	(i) knew the truth; 	or (ii) with reasonable effort could
have known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the truth; or (iv)
did not have knowledge concerning the representations or statements made.
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. § 352-c (McKinney 2010).
The Common Law Claims arise from the Defendants’ alleged derelictions of internal
management duties and misuses of company funds unrelated to any specific investment accounts
under management or any particular investment advice or decision. 	See Compl. ¶¶ 28-36, 42,
46, 49, 52-58. Thus, absent allegations of one of the types of conduct prohibited by the Martin
Act—fraud, deception, unreasonable future promise, or false representation related to the sale of
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security—these Claims do not implicate its plain language. 	See Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd., 915
N.Y.S.2d at 12 (“The plain language of the Martin Act does not explicitly preempt all common-
law claims.”).
The Defendants nevertheless contend that if the Common Law Claims were permitted to
go 	forward, 	the 	policy 	underlying 	the 	Martin 	Act 	would 	be 	undermined 	or 	otherwise
compromised. 	They explain that the Martin Act grants the New York Attorney General
exclusive power over all claims arising out of securities fraud, and thus “[t]o allow private
plaintiffs to bring common law claims related to the Martin Act would detract from the New
York State Attorney’s exclusive enforcement power over the Act.” 	Mark and Andrew Mot. at
12. 	To support their position, the Defendants rely on decisions issued by federal courts in the
Southern District of New York that have held that the Martin Act precludes a private right of
action for any non-fraud tort claim that arises in the securities context and lacks a scienter
element. 	See, e.g., In re Beacon Assoc’s. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 386, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Abbey v. 3f Therapeutics, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 409, 2009 WL 4333819, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
2009); 	Pro Bono Invs., Inc. v. Gerry, No. 03 Civ. 4347, 2005 WL 2429787, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2005); Sedona Corp. v. Landenbury Thalman & Co., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3120, 2005 WL
1902780, at *21-23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). These decisions, however, represent only one side
of an ongoing debate among federal and state courts in New York over the Martin Act’s
preemptive effect. 	The other side of the debate, which the New York Attorney General has
joined,27 holds that neither the plain language of the Martin Act nor its legislative intent supports
27 In at least two separate amicus curiae briefs filed in New York courts, the Attorney General has taken the position
that the Martin Act does not preempt any private right of action in the investment securities context. Brief for the
Attorney General of the State of New York as Amicus Curiae, CMMF, LLC v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgt. Inc., 915
N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (No. 601924/09); Brief for the Attorney General of the State of New York as
Amicus Curiae, Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgt. Inc., 915 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div.2010)(No.
603755/08).
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preemption of all non-fraud common law claims. 	See, e.g., Anwar, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 365;
Assured Guar. (U.K.) Ltd., 915 N.Y.S.2d at 15; CMMF, LLC v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgt. Inc., 915
N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., 862 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538–
39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
Here, because “the Attorney General has, by operation of statute, no enforcement power,”
it is “difficult to see how permitting a common law claim to go forward would interfere with the
state’s legislature’s enforcement mechanism.” 	Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Southridge Capital
Mgmt. LLC, No. 02 Civ. 0767, 2003 WL 22052894, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2003) see also
Hecht v. Andover Assocs. Mgmt. Corp., 910 N.Y.S. 2d 405, *9 (N.Y. Sup. 2010) (finding that
fiduciary duty and other common law claims arising from Madoff-related matters were not based
on the type of misconduct that the Attorney General prosecutes as Martin Act violations, and
thus were not preempted by the Martin Act). Indeed, the Common Law Claims are not based on
fraud, deception, unreasonable future promise, or false representation, but instead on allegations
that the Defendants failed to carry out their compliance and supervisory responsibilities and
improperly used company funds for personal use. 	Similar circumstances arose in Lourous v.
Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), which involved various common law
claims against an investment advisor who had discretionary authority over the investments of his
client. 	There, the court determined that the claims for breach of fiduciary duty were based on
“failures to manage Lourous’s account properly and to keep him informed” and “do[] not come
within the purview of the Martin Act.” 	Id. 	Specifically, in sustaining the breach of fiduciary
duty claim, the court reasoned the “reach of the [Martin] Act” cannot be “unlimited” and thus
“[a] claim of breach of duty that involves securities but does not allege any kind of dishonesty or
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deception implicates neither the plain language of the statute nor its policies.” 	Id.; 	see also
Hecht, 910 N.Y.S. 2d 405, *9 (same).
The Motions to Dismiss on Martin Act preemption grounds are therefore denied.
* * *
Having determined that the Martin Act and the Wagoner Rule do not affect the Trustee’s
ability to assert the Common Law Claims, this Court now turns to whether these Claims survive
Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. 	The Trustee’s Common Law Claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and accounting in Counts Thirteen, Sixteen,
Fifteen, Seventeen, and Eighteen of the Complaint, respectively, survive Rule 12(b) scrutiny.
The Trustee’s claim for conversion in Count Fourteen of the Complaint, however, is dismissed
with leave to amend within forty five days.
C. 	The Trustee’s Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Negligence are
Adequately Pled
Under New York law, “[t]he elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach
of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the
defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant’s misconduct.” Rut v. Young Adult
Inst., Inc., 901 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). Similarly, the elements of a claim for
negligence under New York law are: 	“(i) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendants; 	(ii)
breach of that duty; and (iii) injury substantially caused by that breach.” Lombard v. Booz-Allen
& Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2002).
The Complaint alleges that each Defendant’s relationship with BLMIS was fiduciary in
nature since it was “characterized by trust and reliance” as well as an “assumption of control and
responsibility for the affairs of [the firm].” TP Grp., Inc. v. Wilson, No. 89 Civ. 2227, 1990 WL
52131, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1990). Peter was BLMIS’s CCO, responsible for ensuring that
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the IA Business had compliance procedures in place to detect any potential fraud. Compl. ¶¶ 37-
42. Mark and Andrew were senior managers and supervisors of the firm and its Co-Directors of
Trading. 	Compl. ¶¶ 47-49. 	Shana was BLMIS’s Compliance Director, as well as compliance
counsel and in-house counsel. 	Compl. ¶¶ 43-46; see also Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts,
Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “the attorney-
client relationship entails one of the highest fiduciary duties imposed by law” and includes the
duty of “operating competently”). 	At this stage of the proceedings, the allegations set forth in
Complaint are sufficient to establish that a fiduciary relationship existed between the Defendants
and BLMIS. 28
Just as the Trustee has sufficiently alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between the Defendants and BLMIS, so has the Trustee plausibly alleged that the Defendants’
conduct, whether intentional or negligent, constituted a breach of that relationship. 	Indeed, a
plausible inference can be drawn from the facts alleged that the Defendants breached their duties,
expressly set forth in BLMIS compliance manuals and mandated by applicable securities laws
and regulations, to properly supervise BLMIS operations. For example, Peter is alleged to have
regularly failed to perform those duties expressly delegated to him in BLMIS’s internal
compliance manuals including, but not limited to, “verify[ing] compliance with [BLMIS’s
allocation and trade aggregation] policies and procedures” and “conduct[ing] periodic reviews of
allocation records in order to verify that order allocations are being made in accordance with
28 The precise nature and scope of the fiduciary relationship that each individual Defendant had with BLMIS need
not be ascertained at this stage. 	Indeed, courts applying New York law have consistently held that such a
determination is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot always be determined on a motion to dismiss. See Am
Int’l Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, 877 N.Y.S.2d 614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that “factual issues concerning the precise nature and scope of the [fiduciary] relationship . . . undoubtedly must be
explored”); see also Nisselson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Monahad Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 41
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that “whether fiduciary duties actually arose between the parties is a question of
fact not properly addressed” at the motion to dismiss stage).
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[BLMIS’s] . . . procedures.” 	Compl. ¶ 42. 	Shana similarly failed to monitor BLMIS’s
compliance with federal securities laws and regulations and corresponding FINRA rules and
regulations, even as she assisted her father, Peter, in drafting the annual review of the IA
Business compliance program. Compl. ¶ 43, 46. While Shana argues that her duties applied to
discreet, legitimate operations of BLMIS, the Complaint provides an email in which she
concedes that “the Compliance Departments’ [sic] monitoring and oversight of compliance
issues extends to all areas of the firm’s business.” 	Compl. ¶ 45. 	The Complaint alleges that
Andrew and Mark, FINRA-registered securities principals, played roles in the IA business at
various times and, upon information and belief, had “direct, investment related contacts and
communications with investors in the IA business.” 	Compl. ¶ 49. 	Peter and Andrew were
licensed options principals and were correspondingly responsible for monitoring and approving
the options and transactions of the firm. 	Compl. ¶¶ 47–49. 	Additionally, in violation of
BLMIS’s Anti-Money Laundering compliance program, the Defendants failed to investigate or
detect suspicious transfers of BLMIS funds to MSIL, even though Mark, Andrew, and Peter
were all directors of MSIL.29
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Gully v. National Credit Union Administration Board
illustrates how the Defendants’ derelictions of their compliance and supervisory duties constitute
breaches notwithstanding Madoff’s confessed masterminding of the fraud. 	341 F.3d 155, 159
(2d Cir. 2003). In Gully, a manager of a credit union was accused of breach of fiduciary duty for
failing to monitor or stop her father, the “dominant figure” at the union, from incurring personal
charges on its credit card. Id. In finding that the manager “in effect, participated in h[er father’s]
scheme,” the Second Circuit determined that her not doing anything to correct or prevent
29 Bernard Madoff and Frank DiPascali, a former BLMIS employee, have pled guilty to money laundering charges
arising from these transactions.
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misconduct and failure to exercise reasonable diligence was “particularly egregious,” given her
conflict of interest and that she was the only one to police her own father. 	Id. at 165–66. 	The
Second Circuit’s reasoning in Gully is in line with longstanding New York precedent holding
fiduciaries to a standard “stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is . . . the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928). 	Fiduciary duties include discharging corporate responsibilities “in
good faith and with conscientious fairness, morality and honesty in purpose” and displaying
“good and prudent management of the corporation.” Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d
557, 569 (1984) (internal quotations omitted).
With that in mind, the Defendants may not escape liability by pointing to Madoff’s
fraudulent undertakings. 	Put another way, Madoff’s fraudulent activities do not constitute a
supervening cause that severs the causal link between the Defendants’ above-mentioned
breaches and the foreseeable resulting harm to BLMIS. 	More to the point, “when the
intervening, intentional act of another is itself the foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed,
the defendant who fails to guard against such conduct will not be relieved of liability when that
act occurs.” 	Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33 (1983); 	see also Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 316 (1980) (“[A]n intervening act may not serve as a
superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act
occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.”). Indeed, of all the possible
parties to uncover or prevent the fraud, the Defendants were those best situated, and in fact
obligated, to do so. 	Yet, on the basis of the facts alleged, the Defendants shirked their
compliance and supervisory duties, engaged in improper personal use of BLMIS funds, and
consequently impoverished BLMIS while permitting its descent towards its eventual demise. As
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such, the Trustee has adequately stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence
against the Defendants.
i. Punitive Damages for Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
For his negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Trustee asserts that the
Defendants’ “conscious, willful, wanton, and malicious conduct entitles [him], on behalf of
BLMIS and its creditors, to an award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined at
trial.” Comp ¶¶ 187, 205. For the following reasons, the Trustee’s pursuit of punitive damages
against the Defendants cannot be dismissed at this early stage of the case.
Under New York law, punitive damages serve the dual purposes of punishing the
offending party while deterring similar conduct by others. See Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., Inc.,
812 N.Y.S.2d 325, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). To be liable for punitive damages in tort causes
of action, a defendant’s actions must “constitute willful or wanton negligence or recklessness.”
Gruber v. Craig, 618 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). Acts
are wanton and reckless when done in a manner “showing heedlessness and an utter disregard for
the rights and safety of others.” 	Id. 	The decision to award punitive damages “reside[s] in the
sound discretion of the original trier of facts.” 	Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 812 N.Y.S.2d at
331(internal quotations omitted).
The Trustee has sufficiently alleged that the acts and omissions of the Defendants were
performed under circumstances showing “heedlessness and an utter disregard” for the rights or
interests of BLMIS and, ultimately, all those who foreseeably relied upon its professed integrity.
As discussed extensively above, the Trustee has been unable to identify any meaningful
supervision of BLMIS by the Defendants. 	See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 47. 	These alleged failures to
adequately 	fulfill 	their 	jobs 	were 	not, 	as 	Mark 	and 	Andrew 	contend, 	mere 	“passive
shortcomings” regarding their compliance duties. 	Mark and Andrew Mot. at 45. 	Rather, the
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Defendants spent every day for over twenty years in the offices of the firm where the Ponzi
scheme occurred, allegedly ignoring numerous red flags and irregularities at BLMIS in order to
enrich themselves and their outside business ventures at the expense of BLMIS. See Compl. ¶¶
58, 62, 74, 84, 85, 94. 	These failures therefore may well be considered wanton and malicious
conduct under the circumstances. 	Thus, it cannot be “conclusively determined at this stage of
the litigation . . . that the wrongful conduct alleged is not sufficiently egregious to warrant the
imposition of punitive damages.” D’Amour v. Ohrenstein & Brown, LLP, No. 601418/06, 2007
WL 4126386, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2007).
D. 	The Trustee Has Adequately Pled Claims for an Accounting of Funds Allegedly
Diverted from BLMIS
The Trustee has sufficiently alleged Count Eighteen of the Complaint, which states that
in order “to compensate BLMIS for the amount of monies the [Defendants] diverted from
BLMIS for their own benefit, it is necessary for the [Defendants] to provide an accounting of any
transfer of funds, assets or property received from BLMIS.” Compl. ¶ 214.
Under New York law, an accounting is a cause of action that seeks “an adjustment of the
accounts of the parties and a rendering of a judgment for the balance ascertained to be due.”
Ditolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations omitted). 	Its purpose is to “help sort out what assets are involved [and] enable the
parties to meaningfully pursue their respective claims concerning their private or business
arrangement.” 	Wesselmann v. Int’l. Images, 687 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding
that where the parties shared a close working relationship, an accounting is appropriate to
determine what assets are involved). It is not necessary to “identify a particular asset or fund of
money in the defendant’s possession.” 	Ditolla, 469 F.3d at 275 (internal quotations omitted).
But it is necessary to establish the “existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship and a
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breach of the duty imposed by that relationship respecting property in which the party seeking
the accounting has an interest.” Palazzo v. Palazzo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986);
see Akkaya v. Prime Time Transp., Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); 1 N.Y.
Jur. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 34 (2011) (finding a fiduciary relationship between the
parties and wrongdoing by the defendant to be “essential elements of an equity complaint where
an accounting is demanded”).
The Complaint states a claim for an accounting because it sufficiently alleges the
Defendants had a fiduciary relationship with BLMIS and they breached their duties imposed by
that relationship regarding the property in which the Trustee has an interest. 	See Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. at 335. As explained above, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to BLMIS and diverted BLMIS assets for their own
benefit. See Comp ¶¶ 28-29, 32, 37-39, 43, 45, 47-49, 51-58, 73, 94, 98, 182. 	One instance
where an accounting is particularly appropriate is with regard to the BLMIS funds allegedly used
to pay the Defendants’ personal expenses. Comp ¶¶ 73, 84, 94, 98. Under these circumstances,
an accounting would “help sort out what assets are involved” and determine the Defendants’
disposition, if any, of BLMIS property, compel them to disgorge improper gains, and obtain
information in aid of recovering their withdrawals of fictitious profits. 	Wesselmann, 687
N.Y.S.2d at 341.30
30 The Defendants contend the Trustee should be limited solely to discovery in order to determine the amount of
money at issue. A bankruptcy trustee is permitted, however, to pursue an accounting action to determine the extent
of self-dealing by a corporation’s senior executives and the value of the assets of the debtor corporation. See In re
Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2783, *18 (Bankr. D.P.R. Apr. 12, 1989) (noting that “one
of the purposes of an accounting is to separate the commingled funds and assets of the defendants from the ones of
the estate,” the court enjoined the defendants “from transferring any personal assets until the [trustee’s] accounting
is performed”).
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E. 	The 	Trustee’s 	Unjust 	Enrichment 	and 	Constructive 	Fraud 	Claims 	Are
Adequately Pled
Count Fifteen of the Complaint states that the Defendants benefited from the receipt of
money from BLMIS at its expense, without adequately compensating or providing value to it,
and that “[e]quity and good conscience require full restitution of the monies received by
[Defendants] from BLMIS.” Compl. ¶¶ 195-96. Count Seventeen further states that “because of
past unjust enrichment of the [Defendants], the Trustee is entitled to the imposition of a
constructive trust with respect to any transfer of funds, assets, or property from BLMIS as well
as any profits received by the [Defendants] in the past or on a going forward basis in connection
with BLMIS.” Compl. ¶ 209. Both Counts Fifteen and Seventeen of the Complaint pass muster
under Rule 12(b) because the Trustee has alleged enough facts in the Complaint to sustain his
claims for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust against the Defendants.
New York courts have long recognized that “a court of equity in decreeing a constructive
trust is bound by no yielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of
relief.” 	Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378 (1919); 	see
also Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362 (same).31 New York courts insist upon “a showing that property
is held under circumstances that render unconscionable and inequitable the continued holding of
that property and that the remedy is essential to prevent unjust enrichment.” 	Counihan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 362 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian
Land Co. of Am., N.V., 931 F.2d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1991). An unjust enrichment claim brought
31 In determining whether to impose a constructive trust under New York law, courts consider four factors: (1) a
confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise, express or implied; (3) a transfer made in reliance on that
promise; and (4) unjust enrichment. Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E. 2d 721, 723(1976). However, “these factors are
merely useful guides and are not talismanic.” Coco v. Coco, 485 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (internal
quotations omitted); see also In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 352 (“Although these factors provide important guideposts,
the constructive trust doctrine is equitable in nature and not to be rigidly limited.”) (internal quotations omitted);
Palazzo, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 383–84 (“[T[he power of equity to employ a constructive trust to reach a just result is not
strictly limited by the conditions set forth in Sharp v. Kosmalski.”).
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under New York law must be predicated on factual allegations that the defendant was enriched at
the plaintiff’s expense, and that “it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the
defendant] to retain what is sought to be recovered.” Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16
N.Y. 3d 173, 182 (2011). 	To prove such a claim, it is necessary to show that “one party has
received money or a benefit at the expense of another.” See Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern, No.
07-11586, 2010 WL 445906, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (internal citations omitted). 	The
transaction must be “unjust.” 	McGrath v. Hilding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 627 (1977). 	But, “whether
there is unjust enrichment may not be determined from a limited inquiry confined to an isolated
transaction. 	It must be a realistic determination based on a broad view of the human setting
involved.” Id.
Here, the Defendants allegedly misappropriated BLMIS’s funds for improper personal
uses such as funding personal business ventures and homes. Compl. ¶¶ 66-99. The Defendants
also allegedly failed to perform legal compliance and supervisory responsibilities they were
legally obligated to perform at BLMIS, but nevertheless received astronomical compensation
from the same. 	Compl. ¶¶ 28, 37, 43, 57, 58, 64. 	These and other similar facts alleged in the
Complaint, when viewed in conjunction with the relevant precedent, sufficiently establish that
the Defendants ended up with BLMIS’s funds that they should not possess, and more to point, in
possessing them, the Defendants unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of BLMIS.
As the Trustee has sufficiently alleged that the Defendants are unjustly enriched by
property rightfully belonging to BLMIS, the Trustee has adequately pled the requisite equitable
basis for the imposition of a constructive trust. Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y. 2d 233, 242 (1978)
(“[T]he purpose of a constructive trust is the prevention of unjust enrichment.”). Contrary to the
Defendants’ arguments that a constructive trust can “wreak havoc” with the Code, see Mark and
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Andrew Mot. p. 21 n.10, this Court’s conclusion squares with Second Circuit precedent that
counsels against freely imposing constructive trusts in bankruptcy proceedings. 	See In re
Flanagan, 503 F.3d 171, 182 (2d. Cir. 2007); Superintendent of Ins. v. Ochs (In re First Central
Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). As the Second Circuit recently explained,
The effect of a constructive trust in bankruptcy is profound. While the bankrupt estate is
defined very broadly under § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to include all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor, any property that the debtor holds in constructive trust
for another is excluded from the estate pursuant to § 541(d) . . . A constructive trust thus
places its beneficiary ahead of other creditors with respect to the trust res.
In re Flanagan, 503 F.3d at 182. Simply put, “the effect of constructive trust in bankruptcy is to
take property out of the debtor’s estate. . . . This type of privileging of one unsecured claim over
another clearly thwarts the principle of ratable distribution underlying the Bankruptcy Code.”
Id.; see also In re First Central, 377 F.3d at 217 (“By creating a separate allocation mechanism
outside the scope of the bankruptcy system . . . the constructive trust doctrine can wreak . . .
havoc with the priority system ordained by the Bankruptcy Code.”). 	It follows, therefore, that
these concerns only apply in cases where the property in question is held by the estate, and is set
to be equitably distributed among general unsecured creditors, which is patently not the case
here. In re Flanagan, 503 F.3d at 182 (“It is . . . not the debtor who generally bears the burden
of a constructive trust in bankruptcy, but the debtor’s general creditors.”). In the pending matter,
where the property in question is not possessed by the Trustee but rather by the Defendants, the
same threat does not exist, and thus imposing the constructive trust to prevent each Defendant’s
unjust enrichment at the expense of BLMIS does not clash with the underlying property
principles of equitable distribution under the Code or under SIPA.
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, the Motions to Dismiss Counts Fifteen and
Seventeen of the Complaint are denied.
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F. 	The Trustee’s Claim for Conversion is Dismissed
Under New York law, “[c]onversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
right of ownership over [property] belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.”
Traffix v. Herold, 262 F. Supp. 2d 223, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Specifically, a conversion action
requires that the plaintiff has legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to the
property he seeks to recover and that the defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over that
property “to the alteration of its condition or to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s rights.” 	Ancile
Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. 08-CV-9492, 2011 WL 813724, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); 	Mia Shoes, Inc. v. Republic Factors Corp., No 96-CIV-7974, 1997
WL 525401, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1997) (same). When money, rather than a chattel,
is the property at issue, it “must be specifically identifiable.” Interior by Mussa, Ltd. v. Town of
Huntington, 664 N.Y.S.2d 970, 972 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). In fact, “if the allegedly converted
money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific chattel . . . it
is not the proper subject of a conversion.” Id.
Because the Complaint does not seek a specific amount of money converted from a
particular account, but rather “an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be
determined at trial” it fails to state a claim for conversion under New York law. Compl. ¶ 192.
The Complaint asserts vague, unsubstantiated allegations that “BLMIS had a possessory right
and interest to its assets, including its customers’ investment funds,” 	Compl. ¶ 189, and “[t]he
Family Defendants converted the investment funds of BLMIS customers when they received
money originating from other BLMIS customer accounts in the form of loans, payments, and
other transfers. 	These actions deprived BLMIS and its creditors of the use of this money,”
Compl. ¶ 190. Such allegations “merely refer[] to unspecified monies and assets” and give “no
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indication of an identifiable fund or otherwise segregated amount, nor. . . any description of the
alleged transfer or transfers from which the Court could infer a specifically identified fund of
money.” Global View Ltd. Venture Capital v. Great Central Basin Exploration, L.L.C., 288 F.
Supp. 2d 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Cal Distrib. Inc. v. Cadbury Schweppes Americas
Beverages, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 0496, 2007 WL 54534 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2007). These allegations
are inadequate to sustain the Trustee’s conversion claim against the Defendants. 	Thus, Count
Fourteen of the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend within forty five days.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motions to Dismiss are denied except with regard to
the Trustee’s: 	(1) Preference claims in Count Two, (2) Actual and Constructive Fraudulent
Transfer claims in Count Three through Nine to the extent stated herein, (3) Subsequent Transfer
claims in Count Ten, and (4) his conversion claim in Count Fourteen, with leave to amend the
Complaint within forty five days consistent with the foregoing determinations.
Thus, to the extent described above, the Motions to Dismiss the Complaint are DENIED
in part and GRANTED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
September 22, 2011
/s/ Burton R. Lifland
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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