AMR Corporation

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 	NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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In re: 	Chapter 11
AMR CORPORATION, et al., 	Case No. 11-15463 (SHL)
Reorganized Debtors. 	(Confirmed)
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is the motion [ECF No. 12637] (the “Motion”) of Stephen C. Davidson
to revisit two decisions previously issued by this Court. The first decision disallowed and
expunged his proof of claim in the above-captioned Chapter 11 cases. The second denied Mr.
Davidson’s request for reconsideration of the Court’s prior decision expunging his claim. For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2012, Mr. Davidson filed Claim No. 7670 in the amount of $16,466,00 for
damages arising from his employment with the debtors (the “Debtors” or “American”). The
primary basis for his claim was three alleged incidents of assault and battery upon Mr. Davidson
by a training instructor at American. (Hr’g Tr. 36:18-43:10, Dec. 4, 2014) [ECF No. 12371].
Mr. Davidson also raised issues related to grievances that he filed with American and the Allied
Pilots Association, as well as disability benefits.
In January 2015, the Court issued a decision disallowing and expunging Mr. Davidson’s
claim. See Memorandum of Decision and Order, dated January 28, 2015 [ECF No. 12421] (the
“Claim Objection Decision”). The Court concluded that his claim was barred by the doctrine of
res judicata given a final judgment issued in a state court litigation in Florida on the merits for
the same causes of action that Mr. Davidson asserted in his claim. See Claim Objection Decision
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at 6-11. The Court also addressed certain issues raised by Mr. Davidson with respect to
grievances that he filed with American and the Allied Pilots Association, as well as disability
benefits. See Claim Objection Decision at 9 n. 16 and 11 n.17. The Court subsequently denied
Mr. Davidson’s request to revisit that decision, holding that Mr. Davidson had not satisfied the
requirements under Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Memorandum of
Decision and Order, dated July 10, 2015 [ECF No. 12585] (the “Reconsideration Decision”).
Among other things, the Reconsideration Decision concluded that none of the information
provided by Mr. Davidson would have affected the Court’s conclusion that his claim was barred
by res judicata and that Mr. Davidson had also failed to articulate any exceptional circumstances
to warrant relief. See id.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Davidson once again fails to satisfy the requirements for relief under both Rules
59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are made applicable in this case
through Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024, respectively.1 The standard for granting a motion to
alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule 59(e) is “strict, and reconsideration will generally
be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked.” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). “Motions for
reconsideration and to amend or alter judgment serve a limited function—to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” In re Pothoven, 84 B.R. 579, 582
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988); see also Cioce v. County of Westchester, 128 F. App’x 181, 185 (2d
1 	Local Bankruptcy Rule 9023-1, which governs motions for reargument, states that “[n]o oral argument
shall be heard unless the Court grants the motion and specifically orders that the matter be re-argued orally.” Local
Bankruptcy Rule 9023-1(a). The Court has decided the Motion based on the papers before it and concludes that oral
argument is neither necessary nor appropriate under the circumstances.
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Cir. 2005); In re Crozier Bros., Inc., 60 B.R. 683, 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). But “a motion
for reconsideration is neither an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an
opportunity for making new arguments that could have been previously advanced.” Associated
Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Reconsideration is “an
extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of
scarce judicial resources.” In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted). The burden rests with the movant. See Crozier, 60 B.R. at
688.
Rule 60(b) provides that the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or
proceeding due to:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion for relief from judgment is generally not favored and is
properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001) 	“The burden of proof is on the party seeking
relief from judgment.” Id. Whether to grant a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is within the
discretion of the court. Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Montco, Inv. v.
Barr (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981)). “In no circumstances
. . . may a party use a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for an appeal it failed to take in a timely
fashion.” Stevens, 676 F.3d at 67 (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 176 (2d
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Cir. 2009); see also Fleming v. New York Univ., 865 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A] Rule
60(b)(3) motion cannot be granted absent clear and convincing evidence of material
misrepresentations and cannot serve as an attempt to relitigate the merits.”).
Mr. Davidson does not satisfy the standard for relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule
60(b). In his current Motion, Mr. Davidson believes the Court has overlooked controlling
factors, documents, information and decisions that would change the outcome of the Claim
Objection Decision and the Reconsideration Decision. See Motion at 1. Mr. Davidson’s Motion
mainly covers his arguments about the grievance and the benefits process at American. But Mr.
Davidson has previously raised issues regarding the grievance and benefits process before this
Court, both in the objection to his claim and his prior request for reconsideration. See, e.g., Hr’g
Tr. 45:6-49:8, Dec. 4, 2014 [ECF No. 12371]; Stephen Davidson’s Request [for] a Emergency
Hearing and/or Clarification for Possible Correction to the Unsigned/not Finalized January 29th
2015 Proposed memorandum Decision and Order [ECF No. 12455]; Claim Objection Decision
at 9 n. 16 and 11 n.17; Reconsideration Decision at 2-3, 5. Indeed, Mr. Davidson specifically
notes in his Motion that “[a]ll documents and [i]nformation has previously been provided to this
Honorable Court and AA Attorney Stephen A. Youngman’s Legal Team.” Motion at 1. Thus,
Mr. Davidson has presented no new evidence that satisfies the requirements of either Rule 59 or
60. To the extent that Mr. Davidson raises new arguments, it is inappropriate for this Court to
consider them in this second motion for reconsideration.2 See Tonga Partners, 684 F.3d at 52
(“‘It is well settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case
under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the
2 	For example, Mr. Davidson now argues for the first time that the lawyer who represented him in the Florida
state court litigation was disbarred and that this prevented him from continuing to pursue his Florida state court
action. But as noted in the Claim Objection Decision, Mr. Davidson’s remedy for any problems in his Florida case
rests with the Florida state courts. See Claim Objection Decision at 10.
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apple.’”) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).3 Similarly, he
has not demonstrated exception circumstances or mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect to satisfy Rule 60(b). See Frankel v. ICD Holdings S.A., 939 F. Supp. 1124, 1127
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Rule 60(b) “is not ‘a substitute for a timely appeal. . . .’”) (quoting Nemaizer v.
Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)); Frankel, 939 F. Supp. at 1127 (“Rule 60(b) may not be
used to ‘relitigate matters settled by the original judgment.’”) (quoting Donovan v. Sovereign
Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1984)).
For the same reasons, the Motion also does not satisfy the requirements of Section 502(j)
of the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Bankruptcy Rule 3008 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 3008-1,
which relate to the reconsideration of claims that were previously disallowed.4 See In re Best
Payphones, Inc., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2555, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008). Under Section
502(j), “[a] claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause.” 11
U.S.C. § 502(j). “Cause” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, but
when deciding a motion under section 502(j) of the Bankruptcy Code -- a motion
for reconsideration of a prior order -- the court should apply the same analysis that
it would to a motion under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P.
59) or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. 60), depending on
whether the movant, as here, sought reconsideration within ten days after the entry
of the order disallowing the claim, or did so only later.
3 	Mr. Davidson’s Motion is also untimely under Rule 59. Bankruptcy Rule 9023, which incorporates Federal
Rule 59, requires that “[a] motion . . . to alter or amend a judgment . . . be filed . . . no later than 14 days after entry
of judgment.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Mr. Davidson’s Motion is dated October 5, 2015, approximately nine months
after the Court entered the Claim Objection Decision expunging the claim and four months after it issued the
Reconsideration Decision.
4 	Like Local Bankruptcy Rule 9023-1, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3008-1 states that “[n]o oral argument shall be
heard on a motion to reconsider an order of allowance or disallowance of a claim unless the Court grants the motion
and specifically orders that the matter be reconsidered upon oral argument. If a motion to reconsider is granted,
notice and a hearing shall be afforded to parties in interest before the previous action taken with respect to the claim
may be vacated or modified.” Local Bankr. R.3008-1. As noted above, the Court decides the Motion based on the
papers before it and concludes that oral argument is not appropriate.
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In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2602, *5-*6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009),
rev’d on other grounds, 673 F.3d 180, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4019 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing In re
Enron Corp., 352 B.R. 363, 367-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (if a motion to reconsider an order
disallowing a claim is filed within ten days after entry of the order, it is analogous to a motion
under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 and should be governed by the same principles as a motion under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; if filed later, it should be considered as if it were a motion under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60); In re Aguilar, 861 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Pt-1 Communs., Inc., 412 B.R. 85,
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2389, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009); In re Best Payphones, 2008
Bankr. LEXIS 2555 at *6-8; In re Wyatt, Inc., 168 B.R. 520, 522 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)).
Reconsideration of a claim lies within the discretion of the court. See id. (quoting Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 3008 advisory committee's note (1983)); see also Colley v. National Bank of Texas (In re
Colley), 814 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.)).
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, the Motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
February 18, 2016
/s/ Sean H. Lane
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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