Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

NORMANM.,1
-vs-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Plaintiff, 	DECISION AND ORDER
1:24-CV-00564-MAV
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 2024, Norman M. ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of the
United 	States 	Social 	Security 	Administration's 	("Commissioner") 	denial 	of his
application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIE") and Social Security Income
("SSI"). 2 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule
12(c), ECF No. 7, and the Commissioner cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings,
ECF No. 13.
For 	the 	reasons 	set forth 	below, 	Plaintiffs 	motion 	for 	judgment on the
pleadings [ECF No. 7] is denied, and the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the
1 The Court's Standing Order issued on November 18, 2020, directs that, "in opinions filed pursuant
to .. . 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, any
non-government party will be identified and referenced solely by first name and last initial. "
2 The regulations governing the evaluation of a claimant's eligibility for DIE under Title II of the Social
Security Act are found in Part 404 of Title 20 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations. The
regulations governing the evaluation of a claimant's eligibility for SSI payments are found in Part 416.
Because the relevant regulations in both Parts are practically identical, citations in this Decision and
Order to regulations in Part 404 should be read to also reference the regulations applicable to SSI
benefits in Part 416 unless otherwise indicated.
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pleadings [ECF No. 13] is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the facts and procedural
history in this case, and therefore addresses only those facts and issues which bear
directly on the resolution of the motions presently before the Court.
I. Plaintiff's Application
Plaintiff filed 	his 	application 	for 	DIB 	and 	SSI 	on 	November 	29, 	2018.
Administrative Record ("AR") at 428-437. 3 He alleged a disability onset date of
October 18, 2018. AR at 178. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied his
claims on February 27, 2019, and denied on reconsideration on May 31, 2019. AR at
115-116, 143-144.
II. Plaintiff's Hearing Before the ALJ
After the 	Commissioner denied his application at the initial level and on
reconsideration, Plaintiff appeared with counsel via telephone on November 21, 2022,
for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). AR at 38-62.
During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he was looking for a job and had
been working by shoveling snow. AR at 41-42. He had a driver's license, but it was
suspended for failing to pay for insurance. AR at 42. Plaintiff had a difficult time
hearing, especially with a lot of background noise. AR at 43, 45-46 . His attorney said
that he had an IEP while in school, a "major deficit when he was younger," and was
3 The page references from the transcripts are to the bates numbers inserted by the Commissioner ,
not the pagination assigned by the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system .
2
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on a second-grade level in reading, math, reasoning, and spelling. AR at 43. Plaintiff
said that he could read "[a] little bit. Not really." AR at 44. He had jobs in the past
where he had some conflicts with coworkers, and he would struggle to remember, so
he had to ask questions. AR at 48-49. He struggled to work at a fast pace. AR at 51.
He graduated from high school with an IEP diploma. AR at 50.
A vocational expert ("VE"), Tim Andenmatten, also testified and said that a
person with an RFC identical to that which the ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff to have
could perform Plaintiffs past relevant work as a kitchen helper, and could perform
jobs of a marker, photo copy machine operator, and cafeteria attendant. AR at 54-56.
A hypothetical person with the same RFC but limited to a reasoning level one and a
light job could perform jobs of a paper pattern folder and a casing splitter. AR at 58-
60.
III. The ALJ's Decision
On March 8, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled, and therefore did not qualify for DIB or SSL AR at 17-37 .
At the outset, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
for DIB 4 through December 31, 2023. AR at 19. Plaintiff had engaged in gainful
activity since the alleged onset date, but it was not substantial. AR at 19-20. Then,
at step two of the Commissioner's "five-step, sequential evaluation process," 5 the ALJ
4 Claimants must meet the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act to be eligible for
DIB. See 42 U .S. C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130.
5 The Social Security Administration has outlined a "five-step, sequential evaluation process" that an
ALJ must follow to determine whether a claimant has a "disability" under the law:
3
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determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: status post left ankle
fracture, status post open reduction and internal fixation in the left ankle, hearing
loss in both ears, learning disorder, and intellectual disorder. AR at 20.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 20.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity 6 ("RFC") to perform medium work as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), except he was limited to "simple work-related
tasks" and to a "minimal degree of oral communications." AR at 24.
At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no
past relevant work, was a younger individual, and had a high school diploma. AR at
28. The ALJ found that considering Plaintiffs age, education, and RFC, there were
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3)
whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in
the Listing of Impairments ; (4) based on a "residual functional capacity" assessment ,
whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the
impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numb e rs of jobs in the national
economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional
capacity, age, education , and work experience.
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014); citing , inter alia, 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1520(a)(4)(i)-
(v) , § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v)). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps of the process .
42 U .S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1999). At step five, th e burden shifts
to the Commissioner to demonstrate that there is other work in the national economy that the claimant
can perform. Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009).
6 "Residual functional capacity" ("RFC ") means the most that the claimant can still do in a work
setting despite the limitations caused by the claimant's impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
4
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perform, 	including 	a 	marker, 	kitchen 	helper, 	photocopying 	machine 	operator,
cafeteria attendant, paper pattern folder, and casing splitter. AR at 29. Therefore,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, 	and not entitled to DIB or SSI
payments. AR at 30.
On April 16, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request to review the
ALJ's decision. AR at 1-6. The ALJ's decision thus became the "final decision" of the
Commissioner. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.981) ("[I]f the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ's decision becomes the
[Commissioner]'s final decision.") .
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), a claimant is disabled and entitled to DIB if he or
she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 7 	See also 42 U.S.C. 	§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) 	(adopting the 	same definition of
"disabled" for SSI eligibility).
Where an individual's application for DIB has been denied, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
defines the process and scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.
7 Claimants must also meet the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act to be eligible
for DIB. See 42 U.S . C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130.
Whereas the relevant time period for a DIB application runs from the alleged onset date to the date of
application, "[t]he relevant time period for an SSI benefits application is 'the date the SSI application
was filed, to ... the date of the ALJ's decision."' See Williams v. Colvin, 98 F. Supp. 3d 614, 631-32
(W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Frye ex rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App'x 484, 488 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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The fourth sentence of§ 405(g) authorizes the reviewing court to enter "a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . . with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing." The sixth sentence authorizes the
reviewing court to "order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner ..
. upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good
cause 	for 	the 	failure 	to 	incorporate 	such 	evidence 	into 	the 	record 	in 	a 	prior
proceeding." Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing§ 405(g)).
"The entire thrust of judicial review under the disability benefits law is to
ensure a just and rational result between the government and a claimant, without
substituting a court's judgment for that of the [Commissioner], and to reverse an
administrative 	determination only when it 	does 	not 	rest 	on adequate 	findings
sustained by evidence having rational probative force." Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, it
is not the reviewing court's function to determine de nova whether the claimant is
disabled. Brault v. 	Soc. 	Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012).
Rather, the reviewing court must first determine "whether the Commissioner applied
the correct legal standard[s]." Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999).
Provided the 	correct legal standards 	are 	applied, 	the 	district 	court's 	review is
deferential: 	a finding by the 	Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by
"substantial evidence ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
"Whatever the meaning of'substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such
evidentiary sufficiency is not high." Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)
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(noting that the phrase "substantial evidence" is a term of art used in reviewing
administrative agency decisions to signify evidence that amounts to "more than a
mere scintilla"). Thus, once an ALJ finds facts, a reviewing court can reject those facts
"only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault, 683 F.3d
at 448. Yet, although "the evidentiary threshold for the substantial evidence standard
is not high, ... [it] is also not merely hortatory: [i]t requires relevant evidence which
would lead a reasonable mind to concur in the ALJ's factual determinations ." Colgan
v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two issues in his motion for judgment on the pleadings. First,
he argues that the ALJ erred by not ordering updated intelligence testing. ECF No.
7-1 at 6-8. Second, he argues that the ALJ's step five determination conflicted with
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") and is not supported by substantial
evidence. ECF No. 7-1 at 10-13.
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to obtain
updated intelligence testing and that the ALJ's RFC and step five findings were
supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 13-1 at 6-21.
For the following reasons , the Court agrees with the Commissioner .
I. 	The ALJ did not need to order intelligence testing.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 	develop 	the 	record regarding his
learning disorder and intellectual disability because he was last tested in high school.
ECF No. 7-1 at 6-8. Plaintiff specifically contends that the ALJ should have ordered
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updated intelligence testing. ECF No. 7-1 at 7.
The 	Commissioner 	responds 	that 	the 	RFC 	is 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence. ECF No. 13-1 at 7-10. The Commissioner further contends that updated
cognitive testing was not required because the record contained adequate evidence ofI
Plaintiffs cognitive and intellectual disorders in the form of his testing in 1994, the
consultative examination conducted by Christine Ransom, Ph.D., and his activities of
daily living. ECF No. 13-1 at 10-16.
In light of the non-adversarial nature of the administrative proceedings, an
ALJ has "an obligation to develop the record ... regardless of whether the claimant
is represented by counsel." Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) "Thus,
when the evidence of record is inadequate to determine whether a claimant is
disabled, 'the ALJ has an obligation to seek additional information to supplement the
record.'" Arneatha S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-CV-06187-FPG, 2026 WL 820253,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026) (quoting Jennifer M. v. O'Malley, No. 23-CV-494, 2024
WL 5378976, at *4 (N.D .N.Y. July 23, 2024)). When the evidence on the record is
inadequate to determine whether a claimant is disabled, "the ALJ has an obligation
to seek additional information to supplement the record.'' Mantovani v. Astrue, No.
09-CV-3957, 2011 WL 1304148, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011).
Here, the ALJ was not obligated to supplement the record with updated
intelligence testing. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments at step two
including a learning disorder and an intellectual disorder. AR at 20. 	The ALJ
concluded that those impairments, and Plaintiffs hearing loss, equated to limitations
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to simple work and minimal oral communications. AR at 25. Substantial evidence
supported that determination. The ALJ relied on the evidence showing that Plaintiffs
intellectual function measured in the "deficient to borderline" level and that Plaintiff
had an IEP and received special education services while in school. AR at 25 (citing
AR at 621-622). The ALJ also considered Dr. Ransom's examination, which showed
Plaintiff to be in the low average range in intellectual functioning. AR at 25 (citing
AR at 642-644). Finally, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs activities of daily living, which
included handling personal care, chores, and shopping, as well as driving, playing
games 	and 	sports, 	and 	working 	by 	shoveling 	snow. 	AR 	at 	26. 	This 	evidence
substantially supported the RFC finding, without the need for additional testing. See
Helwig v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-0859 (WBC), 2018 WL 6330242, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018) ("Additional testing was not required because there were no
inconsistencies in the record and the evidence in the record was sufficient to make a
determination.").
Moreover, the additional testing Plaintiff requests for the first time on appeal
would not alter the ALJ's determinations. The ALJ already found Plaintiffs learning
and intellectual disorders to be serious impairments at step two. AR at 20; cf
Katherine B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-1898MWP, 2023 WL 2071475, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2023) (remanding for a consultative intelligence evaluation where
the 	ALJ 	determined 	at 	step 	two 	that 	the 	plaintiff did 	not 	have 	a 	medically
determinable learning disability).
At 	step 	three, 	learning and intelligence 	disorders 	could potentially meet
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Listings 12.02 and 12.05. Yet the ALJ already considered those listings and found
they did not apply because, regardless of Plaintiffs IQ score, he did not have an
extreme limitation in one, or a marked limitation in two areas of mental functioning
listed in Paragraph B. See AR at 20-23; 20 C.F.R. Pt . 404, Subpt . P, App'x 1, Part A,
§§ 12.02, 12.05. The ALJ's Paragraph B determination was supported by substantial
evidence of Plaintiffs activities of daily living as reported during the hearing and as
reported and observed by medical providers and the consultative examiner. See AR
at 21-22. Additional intellectual testing would have no impact on the applicability of
the listings, because the record is sufficient to support the ALJ's finding.
Moreover, 	at step four, 	Plaintiffs functioning 	as a 	result of his learning
disability, and not a raw IQ score, informed his RFC. The ALJ had sufficient evidence
of Plaintiffs functioning through Plaintiffs testimony, job history, medical records ,
and the consultative examiner's report . A number score resulting from additional
testing would not alter what Plaintiff is capable of, and Plaintiffs abilities are already
reflected in the evidence considered by the ALJ . See, e.g., Lawler v. Astrue, 512 F.
App'x 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2013) ("While it is true that the ALJ did not calculate a new
IQ score for [the claimant], [ ]he was not required to do so").
In sum, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion of functional
limitations resulting from Plaintiffs learning and intellectual disorders.
II. 	Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's step five determination.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination at step five is not supported by
substantial evidence because the DOT descriptions of the jobs the ALJ determined
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Plaintiff could perform conflict with the RFC regarding communicating. ECF No. 7-1
at 10-12. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because he did not ask the VE to
address the apparent conflict. ECF No. 7-1 at 12. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that
Plaintiff could not perform the jobs found at step five because he had a second-grade
reading level, and the jobs were classified as language level one. ECF No. 7-1 at 12-
13.
The Commissioner responds that there is no conflict between the RFC and the
jobs identified at step five because the DOT lists the "People" function for each job as
"not significant." ECF No. 13-1 at 16-18. The Commissioner further contends that
the 	ability 	to 	take 	instructions 	does 	not 	mean 	that 	more 	than 	minimal 	oral
communication is required. ECF No. 13-1 at 18. Regarding Plaintiffs reading level,
the Commissioner argues that the record establishes that Plaintiff can read, so he
can perform unskilled work with language levels of one, consistent with the VE's
testimony. ECF No. 13-1 at 19-21.
Under a 2000 Social Security Administration Policy Interpretation Ruling
("SSR") governing the use of vocational expert and vocational specialist evidence, and
other 	reliable 	occupational 	information 	in 	disability 	decisions, 	"[o]ccupational
evidence provided by a VE ... generally should be consistent with the occupational
information supplied by the DOT." SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2 (S .S.A. Dec.
4, 2000). "When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE ... evidence
and the DOT, the [ALJ] must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before
relying on the VE ... evidence to support a determination or decision about whether
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the claimant is disabled." Id.; see also Lockwood v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 914
F . 3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2019).
'"[Vocational] expert testimony and the DOT conflict where they disagree in
categorizing or describing the requirements of a job as it is performed in the national
economy."' Patricia K. 	v. 	Comm'r of Soc. 	Sec., 	No. 	5:20-CV-37 (ATB), 	2020 WL
7490323, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2020) (quoting Schmitt v. Astrue, No. 5:ll-CV-
0796 (LEK/ATB), 2012 WL 4853067, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2012)).
Here, Plaintiffs argument that the jobs the ALJ identified at step five require
more communication than the RFC permits is belied by the DOT definitions for those
jobs. Plaintiff argues that the identified "jobs all have oral communication inherent
in the job" because they have a "People" function of 8, which requires '"[t]aking
[i]nstructions"' and "'[a]ttending to the work assignment instructions or orders of
supervisors."' ECF No. 7-1 at 10-11 (quoting Appendix B - 	Explanation of Data,
People, and Things, 1991 WL 688701). The RFC limits Plaintiff to "a minimal degree
of oral communications ." AR at 24. The "People: 8" requirement that Plaintiff follow
instructions for the step five jobs does not conflict with the RFC's limitations.
In particular, jobs at the "People: 8" level, like those identified by the ALJ,
allow for minimal communications under the definition provided. 8 See Ridley G. v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. l:20-CV-773 (CFH), 2021 WL 4307507, at *13 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 	22, 	2021) 	("Positions 	categorized 	as 	involving level 	8 	interaction can be
8 The full definition for "People: 8" jobs is "8 Taking Instructions-Helping: Attending to the work
assignment instructions or orders of supervisor. (No immediate response required unless clarification
of instructions or orders is needed .) Helping applies to ' non-learning' helpers." 1991 WL 688701.
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performed by individuals who require limited interaction.").
Further, the DOT does not specify that the "instructions" required for "People:
8" jobs must be oral. See 1991 WL 688701. Plaintiffs RFC only contains a limitation
in oral communications, so there is no apparent conflict. Nor is this a situation where
the ALJ should have clarified that point. Plaintiffs current argument revolves around
his limitation in "listening tasks ." ECF No. 7-1 at 11. Yet as the Commissioner points
out , four of the six jobs identified do not require hearing at all-the DOT says,
"Hearing: Not Present - Activity or condition does not exist." See Marker (DOT
209.587-034), Photocopy Machine Operator (DOT 207.685-014), Paper Pattern Folder
(DOT 794.687-034) ; Casing Splitter (DOT 525.687-014) . As such, the jobs identified
at step five do not conflict with Plaintiffs RFC, and the ALJ was not required to
account for any conflict through the VE 's testimony.
Finally , Plaintiff argues that his reading level conflicts with the step five
findings of jobs characterized as language level one, which require reading and
"[r]ecogniz[ing] meaning of 2,500 (two- or three-syllable) words. Read at rate of 95-
120 words per minute." ECF No. 7-1 at 12-13; Appendix C: 	Components of the
Definition Trailer, 	1991 WL 688702 (defining language level one requirements).
Plaintiffs RFC limits him to "simple work-related tasks," and does not include a
limitation in reading. AR at 24. The jobs identified at step five are consistent with
the limitation to simple tasks, as they all have a Specific Vocational Preparation
(SVP) level of 1 or 2, which corresponds to "unskilled work." See SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL
1898704 at *3 ("unskilled work corresponds to an SVP of 1-2"); 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a)
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("unskilled work" is "work which needs little or no judgment to do" and involves
"simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time ... [A] person
can usually learn to do the job in 30 days, and little specific vocational preparation
and judgment are needed."). 9
Plaintiff does 	not 	argue 	that 	the 	RFC 	should have 	contained 	a 	specific
limitation in reading. Even if he had, the ALJ 's RFC was supported by substantial
evidence, and the ALJ was not required to also include a reading limitation. See Teena
H. olblo N.I.K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 521 F. Supp. 3d 287, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)
("Absent a legal error, the Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court might have ruled differently had
it considered the matter in the first instance.") (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Norman M.'s motion for judgment on the
pleadings [ECF No. 7] is DENIED, and the Commissioner's motion for judgment on
the pleadings [ECF No. 13] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment on behalf of the Commissioner and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	October 	8' 	, 2026
Rochester, New York
~ 	l f%£fcAUnited States District Judge
9 Marker (DOT 209.587-034), Kitchen Helper (DOT 318.687°010), Photocopy Machine Operator (DOT
207.685-014), and Cafeteria Attendant (DOT 311.677-010), have an SVP of 2, while Paper Pattern
Folder (DOT 794.687-034) and Casing Splitter (DOT 525.687-014) have an SVP of 1.
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