Williams v. U. S. Bancorp et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In Re: Teresa Lynn Williams,
Debtor(s).
Teresa Lynn Williams,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated, et al.,
Defendant(s).
) 	Case No. 09-37471
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) 	Chapter 13
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) 	Adv. Pro. No. 10-3207
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) 	Hon. Mary Ann Whipple
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ORDER
This case is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to Reply to Defendant State
Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 47]. In a scheduling order entered on March 15, 2011,
the court set forth the schedule for filing summary judgment motions that had been orally set at a
The court incorporates by reference in this paragraph and adopts as the findings
and orders of this court the document set forth below. This document has been
entered electronically in the record of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.
Dated: May 18 2011
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pretrial conference held on March 8, 2011. The schedule required any summary judgment motion by
any party to be filed by April 8, 2011, with opposition briefs due by May 9 and replies due by May
16. [Doc. # 37].
Each of remaining Defendants U.S. Bancorp and State Farm Fire and Casualty filed a motion
for summary judgment on April 8. Plaintiff did not file her own motion for summary judgment. On
May 9 Plaintiff timely filed her opposition to U.S. Bancorp ’s motion but did not file any opposition
to State Farm’s motion.
On May 16 Plaintiff filed two documents. One is called “Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant
State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. # 46] and the other is called “Plaintiff’s Motion
to Extend Time to Reply to Defendant State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. #47].
Defendant State Farm opposed the motion to extend time on May 17. [Doc. #48]. It also asked for
leave to oppose or reply to the filing if the extension is granted..
Rule 9006 governs extending time. The standard for extending time after expiration of a
deadline set in a court order is that “the failure to act was a result of excusable neglect.” Rule
9006(b)(1). The Supreme Court interpreted this standard in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick,
507 U.S. 380 (1993), where it stated that:
...[T]he determination [as to what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable"] is at bottom
an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission. These include, as the Court of Appeals found, 	the danger of prejudice to the
...[other party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant,
and whether the movant acted in good faith.
507 U.S. at 395.
There is no basis for finding that the opposition filing deadline was missed due to bad faith.
That factor supports the requested nunc pro tunc extension. However, the other factors compel denial
of the requested extension. In reviewing the proposed opposition document, it reads more like a
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motion for summary judgment itself and seeks entry of judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. That deadline,
however, passed on April 8 and Plaintiff did not herself file a motion for summary judgment. Thus,
authorizing the late filing now will necessitate another entire round of oppositions and replies, when
the briefing schedule should have been completed on May 16. But cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(allowing
the court to grant summary judgment to a nonmovant after reasonable notice to respond). The
requested extension is thus not just seeking to extend a deadline that passed one week ago, but one
that passed more than a month ago. The court finds that both Defendants will be prejudiced by the
further delay necessitated by allowing the late filing, as it can be construed as one to which U.S.
Bancorp would also have to respond. Lastly, no reason for the delay has been offered, so the court
infers that it was within the reasonable control of Plaintiff. Nor is this action complex from either a
legal or factual standpoint such that the necessary evidence and legal arguments could not have been
timely marshalled in opposition to the State Farm motion or in support of an affirmative motion for
summary judgment.
Based on the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time will be denied
and the opposition document stricken from the record. The court nevertheless notes that, whether
opposed or not, the standards of Rule 56 must still be independently met before either Defendant is
entitled to have its motion granted. A determination of whether either or both pending motions should
be granted must thus await the further order of the court.
Based on the foregoing reasons,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to Reply to
Defendant State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 47] is denied; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant State Farm’s Motion
for Summary Judgment” [Doc. # 46] is hereby treated as stricken from the record; and
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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty ‘s motion for
leave to reply [Doc. #48] is denied as moot.
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