United States of America v. Washington, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 1:19-cr-184-5
)
)
Plaintiff, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
FREDDIE SANCHEZ, )
)
)
Defendant. )
Now before the Court is the motion of defendant Freddie Sanchez (“Sanchez”) for
compassionate release. (Doc. No. 628 (Motion).)1 Plaintiff United States of America (the
“government”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 630 (Response).) For the reasons that follow, the
motion for compassionate release is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 28, 2020, Sanchez was sentenced to a custody term of 37 months, and six years
of supervised release, following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
and three counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 422 (Judgment); Minutes of Proceedings [non-
document], 5/28/2020; see Minutes of Change of Plea [non-document], 11/22/2019; Doc. No. 264
(Plea Agreement).)
1 Unless specifically noted, all record cites are to the present case.
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Within a month of his release to supervision, Sanchez violated his supervised release. (Doc.
No. 552 (Violation Report).) Specifically, Sanchez was indicted on one count each of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances. (N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:22-cr-609, Doc. No. 21 (Superseding Indictment).)
The new indictment was assigned to U.S. District Judge Benita Y. Pearson, and this Court referred
the related supervised release violation in the present case to Judge Pearson. (Doc. No. 599 (Order
Regarding Supervised Violation Report).) After a trial on the charges in the superseding indictment
in Case No. 1:22-cr-609, a jury convicted Sanchez of both charges. (N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:22-cr-
609, Doc. No. 96 (Verdict Forms).) On July 9, 2025, Judge Pearson sentenced Sanchez to a custody
term of 177 months on the charges in N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:22-cr-609 and 36 months on the
supervised release violation in the present case, the sentences were imposed to run consecutively.
(Doc. No. 602 (Order on Supervised Release Violation); N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:22-cr-609, Doc.
No. 105 (Judgment).) Sanchez is currently serving his sentences at Hazelton FCI and has an
anticipated release date of May 26, 2038.2
On January 5, 2026, Sanchez filed the present motion for compassionate release. In his pro
se motion, Sanchez represents that he should receive a sentence reduction because he was
imprisoned for much of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. No. 628, at 2–5.) Citing unreported
decisions discussing the difficulties faced by inmates during the pandemic, Sanchez suggests that
he “should be allowed a sentence reduction of a day and a half to two days for each day he was
incarcerated during the Pandemic from March 11, 2020 to May 5, 2023 when the Pandemic
ended.” (Id. (collecting unreported decisions).)
2 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/, last visited 2/6/2026.
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The government believes that the motion should be denied because Sanchez has failed to
establish the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons under the governing statute and
because the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 do not weigh in favor of early release. (Doc.
No. 630, at 5.) The Court agrees with the government as to both arguments.
II. MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A. Governing Law
The sentencing court has no inherent authority to reconsider and/or modify an otherwise
valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, the
authority of the Court to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston,
529 F.3d 743, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2001)); see United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Generally speaking,
once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that
sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.”) Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a court
may only modify a term of imprisonment under the following circumstances: (1) upon a motion
of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or defendant for compassionate release; (2) as
expressly permitted by statute or by Fed. R. Crim. P. 35; or (3) where a defendant has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission. § 3582(c)(1)–(2).
Sanchez does not seek relief under Rule 35, nor does he claim that he was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered. Instead, he
claims that he is entitled to a compassionate release. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may
grant a sentence reduction “only if it finds that the defendant satisfies three requirements: (1)
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‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; (2) the ‘reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’; and (3) the relevant §
3553(a) factors support the reduction.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021)); see United
States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020). Additionally, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a mandatory claims-processing rule that must be satisfied before a defendant may seek
compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
The policy statement applicable to compassionate release motions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, was
amended effective November 1, 2023, and describes six categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons that individually, or in combination, may support a request for compassionate
release. These categories are: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the
defendant; (3) a defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by the
defendant while in custody involving a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other reasons”
similar in gravity as those articulated in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(b).
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Sanchez does not suggest—and there is no evidence by which the Court may find—that he
has exhausted his administrative remedies. As the party seeking a compassionate release, it is
Sanchez’s burden to show that he is entitled to relief, including that he has properly exhausted his
administrative remedies. See United States v. Williams, 458 F. Supp. 3d 939, 943 (W.D. Tenn.
2020) (“The defendant bears the burden of showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies
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and is entitled to compassionate release.” (citations omitted)).
But even if the Court were to conclude that Sanchez had properly exhausted, he would still
have to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under the compassionate release statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)) and the relevant BOP policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). The Court, therefore,
turns to a consideration of whether defendant has demonstrated the existence of extraordinary and
compelling reasons identified in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and discussed in detail in § 1B1.13(b), as
amended.
Sanchez appears to invoke U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)—Medical Circumstances of the
Defendant—as the basis for compassionate release. Pertinent to the present motion, §
1B1.13(b)(1)(D) provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons support early release if the
defendant presents the following circumstances:
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at imminent risk of
being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing
public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local
authority;
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the defendant is at increased
risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure to
the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health emergency
described in clause (i); and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.
Sanchez has not demonstrated that he meets any of the requirements of U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(b)(1)(D). In particular, he has not shown that he is housed in a facility affected by an
ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or that his facility is affected by an ongoing public health
emergency. There is no current outbreak of infectious disease at Hazelton FCI, and BOP’s statistics
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indicate that there are currently zero open cases of COVID-19 at Hazelton FCI.3 And, as the
government correctly notes, the COVID-19 national emergency was terminated by President
Joseph Biden on April 10, 2023. Pub. L. No. 118-3. Moreover, Sanchez has not suggested, let
alone demonstrated with medical documentation, that he suffers from one or more medical
conditions that would place him at a higher risk of suffering severe complications or death in the
event his facility was experiencing an infectious disease outbreak or a public health emergency.
Rather, he argues that he is entitled to early release by virtue of having served part of his
sentence during the COVID-19 pandemic, due to the more restrictive, and, at times, harsher
conditions resulting from measures taken by the BOP to slow the spread of the virus. Sanchez’s
complaints about the conditions he previously endured during the pandemic do not constitute
compelling reasons for release. See United States v. Traylor, 16 F.4th 485, 486–87 (6th Cir. 2021)
(A defendant’s mere incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic does not establish
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release (quoting United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747,
751 (6th Cir. 2021) (“a defendant’s incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic—when the
defendant has access to the COVID-19 vaccine—does not present an ‘extraordinary and
compelling reason’ warranting a sentence reduction” (further citation omitted))); see also United
States v. Farmer, No. 19-cr-427, 2022 WL 47517, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2022) (“[G]eneralized
statements about the conditions of confinement do not constitute compelling reasons for release.”
(citations omitted)). Because all inmates at his facility were subjected to the same hardships and
restrictions during the pandemic, “conditions at the prison do not constitute a reason why
[Sanchez] should be released.” United States v. Orozco, 5:15-cr-101, 2023 WL 1452053, at *3
3 See https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_covid19.jsp, lasted visited 2/6/2026.
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(E.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2023) (citing United States v. Peterson, No. 1:17-cv-20243, 2021 WL 2682819,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2021) (finding that defendant’s claims regarding conditions of
confinement did not warrant compassionate release because “many if not all of [the defendant’s]
fellow inmates must endure similar hardships”)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Sanchez has
failed to demonstrate the existence of an extraordinary and compelling reason to justify early
release.
To the extent that Sanchez is offering the novel argument that his time spent in custody
during the pandemic should be subject to a multiplier and his anticipated release date be re-
calculated accordingly, this Court is without authority to entertain it. The BOP, and not the
sentencing court, is responsible for the execution of a sentence, and it is the prerogative of the BOP
to determine whether a prisoner is entitled to any sentencing credits. United States v. Wilson, 503
U.S. 329, 334–37, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 117 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992); see United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d
640, 645 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover, judicial claims challenging the BOP’s execution of a
prisoner’s sentence are not directed to the sentencing court, but are brought as a habeas action
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the judicial district in which the prisoner is confined, after proper
exhaustion of administrative remedies. See United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir.
2001); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Little v. Hopkins, 638 F.2d 953,
954 (6th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases).
C. Sentencing Factors
But even if Sanchez had cleared the initial hurdle of demonstrating the existence of
extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Court would still have denied his motion because the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not favor release. The nature and circumstances of
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Sanchez’s supervised release violation—conspiracy with intent to distribute controlled substances
and distribution of controlled substances—are serious. See United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939,
947 n.6 (6th Cir 2010) (“To be sure, drug trafficking is a serious offense, that, in itself, poses a
danger to the community.” (citations omitted)). Additionally, the supervised release violation was
not Sanchez’s first drug-related offense. As noted, the underlying convictions in this case were for
the same dangerous activities. Sanchez was one of 15 individuals charged in a large-scale drug
trafficking organization, wherein Sanchez and his co-defendants obtained substantial quantities of
heroin and fentanyl from co-conspirators to redistribute throughout the Lorain, Ohio area. (Doc.
No. 421 (Presentence Investigation Report), at 7–8 ¶¶ 15–22.)
Indeed, Sanchez’s criminal history—which began when he was only 15 years of age and
spans more than 20 years—is replete with drug trafficking convictions. (Id. at 13–14, 16–17 ¶¶ 49,
51, 55, 57.) His criminal record also includes convictions for other dangerous crimes, including
aggravated rioting (and aggravated rioting with gang specification) and felonious assault. (Id. at
12, 18 ¶¶ 46, 58.) In one such instance of aggravated rioting, Sanchez and several others were
involved in an incident in which two individuals were stabbed in a bar in Elyria, Ohio: one victim
sustained serious injuries and the other victim died. (Id. at 12 ¶ 46.) Similarly, his felonious assault
conviction, which included a gang specification, involved serious physical harm to another or to
their unborn child. (Id. at 18 ¶ 58.)
Prior custody sentences for drug trafficking and other violent crimes have failed to
discourage Sanchez from returning to dangerous and destructive behavior like drug trafficking. In
fact, as set forth above, the present supervised release violation occurred within a month of his
release from prison. And even in prison, Sanchez has demonstrated that he is unable or unwilling
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to conform his behavior. In 2013, while serving a custody sentence for felonious assault, Sanchez
was convicted of conveying drugs of abuse within the state penitentiary. (Id. at 19 ¶ 59.) The Court
has grave doubts that, if released early, Sanchez would be able to abide by any condition of release
the Court might set, including the condition that he refrain from engaging in illegal behavior.4
After considering all of the § 3353(a) factors, the Court finds that a reduction in sentence
would undermine the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offenses,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offenses, afford adequate deterrence,
and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Based on these same facts, the Court
also finds that defendant continues to pose a danger to the community.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant’s motion for a compassionate
release.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 6, 2026
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 Of course, even if the Court agreed to reduce Sanchez’s sentence on his supervised release violation, Sanchez would
still be required to continue to serve his sentence in N.D. Ohio Case No. 1:22-cr-609.
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