Patterson v. Swagelok Co. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LAURA L. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SWAGELOK COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:20-cv-566
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
Jonathan D. Greenberg
ERIC L. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:21-cv-470
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
OPINION AND ORDER
On January 9, 2026, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 	(Laura Patterson ECF No. 72; Eric
Patterson ECF No. 91.) 	The Court determined that Eric Patterson could proceed
against Optum and the United Healthcare Defendants under Section 1132(a)(3) for
claimed prohibited transactions and breaches of fiduciary duty on behalf of himself
and that Laura Patterson stated claims under State law for malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, and tortious interference. (Id.)
Case: 1:20-cv-00566-JPC Doc #: 78 Filed: 02/11/26 1 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

2
On February 6, 2026, Plaintiffs timely filed a motion under Rule 54(b) and Rule
59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. (Laura Patterson ECF No. 76; Eric Patterson
ECF No. 95.) 	Under Section 9.M of its Civil Standing Order (available here on the
Court’s website), the Court limits any motion for reconsideration to two pages and
will request briefing if it needs further explanation of the basis for the motion.
Plaintiffs did not comply with this requirement. 	The Court does so to minimize the
burden 	associated with 	re-litigating 	matters, 	particularly 	in light of 	the 	high
standard for reconsideration. 	Plaintiffs’ motion does not comply with the Court’s
Standing Order. That failure suffices to deny the motion.
In any event, the motion fails on its merits. 	A court may alter or amend the
judgment where there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an
intervening change in controlling law or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp, Inc.
v. American Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Such relief constitutes an extraordinary remedy reserved for exceptional cases. Hines
v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1081 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (citations
omitted). 	It is not an opportunity to re-argue matters or “to raise arguments which
could, and should, have been made before judgment issued.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)). 	Under this
standard, Plaintiffs’ motion fails for three reasons.
First, Laura Patterson lacks Article III standing to pursue her ERISA claims
for the reasons explained in the Court’s ruling. 	Plaintiffs’ arguments that the
Case: 1:20-cv-00566-JPC Doc #: 78 Filed: 02/11/26 2 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

3
monetary harm—attorneys’ fees and costs, court fees and costs, and loss of use of
settlement funds—that Mrs. Patterson suffered establish standing for ERISA in
addition to her State-law claims miss the mark. The monetary harms Mrs. Patterson
suffered do not turn on aspects of the ERISA Plan or its application, but on the
primary conduct of Defendants in pursuing recovery—that is, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, and tortious interference. These claims arise from Defendants’ non-
fiduciary conduct. Indeed, she does not seek recovery of a benefit under the Plan and
has not paid any money to Defendants in response to their reimbursement efforts.
Instead, she requests relief for Defendants’ actions following the entry of a valid State
court judgment. 	Therefore, the monetary harms that established standing for
Mrs. Patterson’s State law claims do not also establish standing for an ERISA claim.
Second, to the extent that Plaintiffs rely on CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S.
421, 438–44 (2011), to argue that it was Defendants’ wrongful ERISA conduct that
resulted 	in 	monetary 	harm 	to 	Mrs. 	Patterson, 	such 	reliance 	is 	misplaced.
Mrs. Patterson’s monetary harm does not result from Defendants’ wrongful ERISA
conduct. 	Indeed, the claims are not claims about Mrs. Patterson’s entitlement to
benefits that “originate[] with the ‘terms and conditions’ of the Plan. 	Patterson v.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 161 F.4th 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2025).
Third, when it comes to Mrs. Patterson’s standing to seek relief on behalf of
the Plan, she suffers from the same flaw as Mr. Patterson. 	Previously, the Sixth
Circuit determined that Mr. Patterson lacks standing to seek relief on behalf of the
Plan. 	Patterson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 76 F.4th 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2023). 	It
Case: 1:20-cv-00566-JPC Doc #: 78 Filed: 02/11/26 3 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

4
did so because the “claims lack[ed] necessary ‘factual meat’ on their bones” and it
could have been that the “costs defendants incurred when seeking reimbursement
[we]re assessed against plan assets on a direct basis” or that “defendants pursued
those claims through fixed fees.” 	Id. 	Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
Mr. Patterson’s statements were “conclusory” and “raise[d] at most a ‘conceivable’
claim of plan injury.” Id. In other words, the Sixth Circuit made clear that, without
more, Mr. Patterson’s claims for harm to the plan were at most conceivable and did
not meet the requirements of Rule 8.
With respect to Mrs. Patterson’s claims, Plaintiffs claim that paragraphs 30,
52, 56–57, 61, 67, 69, and 81 of the amended complaint make her claims about harm
to the plan “no-longer merely ‘conceivable.’” (Laura Patterson ECF No. 76-1, PageID
#1881–82; Eric Patterson ECF No. 95-1, PageID #2491–92.) 	With two exceptions,
however, these paragraphs detail Plaintiff’s general complaints about Defendants’
actions and conduct in relation to the alleged “S/R scheme.” Such allegations are of
a type with the merely “conceivable” claims the Sixth Circuit already passed on. As
for the two exceptions, they do not work either. 	First, Plaintiff requests that the
Court take judicial notice of previous State court cases (the Medina County case and
Summit County case). But it is not clear from the motion or the amended complaint
what specifically Plaintiffs request the Court to notice or whether the Court even has
access to that information. Second, paragraph 81 of the amended complaint does not
add the necessary “factual meat” to make Mrs. Patterson’s claims more than
conceivable. 	Indeed, the current state of the record and the amended complaint
Case: 1:20-cv-00566-JPC Doc #: 78 Filed: 02/11/26 4 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

5
suffers from the same flaws recognized by the Sixth Circuit decision with respect to
Mr. 	Patterson’s 	claims 	on 	behalf 	of 	the 	plan. 	Therefore, 	without 	more,
reconsideration of Mrs. Patterson’s standing for her ERISA claims is not appropriate.
For these reasons, the Court sees no clear error of law in its dismissal of Laura
Patterson’s ERISA claims. There has been no intervening change in the law or newly
discovered 	evidence. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	for
reconsideration (Laura Patterson ECF No. 76; Eric Patterson ECF No. 95).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 11, 2026
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
Case: 1:20-cv-00566-JPC Doc #: 78 Filed: 02/11/26 5 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>