McCoy v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DELANEY A. MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:25-CV-0988
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
ORDER & OPINION
On May 14, 2025, Plaintiff Delaney A. McCoy filed a complaint against the Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
denying their applications for child’s insurance benefits and supplemental security income (“SSI”).
ECF 1. The Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge James E. Grimes Jr. for preparation of a
report and recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Local Rule 72.2(b).
Magistrate Judge Armstrong recommends the Court affirm the decision of the Commissioner. ECF
12.
McCoy filed an objection on February 6, 2026, alleging that the Magistrate Judge erred in
affirming the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) conclusions on residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). The Court has reviewed the record, the briefings, the R&R, and McCoy’s objection. The
Commissioner’s decision to deny child’s insurance benefits and SSI is supported by substantial
evidence, so the Court overrules McCoy’s objection and adopts Magistrate Judge Grimes’ R&R.
Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision and DISMISSES the case, with prejudice.
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I. 	Background
McCoy filed their child’s insurance benefits1 and SSI applications on October 10, 2022,
alleging a disability onset date of November 20, 2003. Tr. at 10. 2 Their application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration. They then requested a hearing before an ALJ in October 2023.
Tr. at 142. The ALJ held a hearing on April 11, 2024. Id. at 10, 45. Later that same month, the
ALJ issued a written decision, which found that McCoy was not entitled to benefits. Id. at 10. On
June 17, 2024, McCoy appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Counsel. Id. at 189-90. On
March 20, 2025, the Appeals Counsel denied McCoy’s appeal, Tr. at 1, making the ALJ’s April
2024 decision the final decision of the Commissioner, Tr. at 10–32; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
In their opinion, the ALJ found that McCoy
has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work
at 	all 	exertional 	levels 	but 	with 	the 	following 	nonexertional
limitations: they can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; they
must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous moving
machinery, 	and 	commercial 	driving; 	and 	they 	can 	adapt 	to
occasional and superficial interactions with the public (where
superficial means no arbitration, mediation, negotiation, or being
responsible for the safety or supervision of others).
Tr. at 21. In coming to this determination, the ALJ reviewed the extensive medical and educational
records submitted. The ALJ further provided an extremely detailed and thorough analysis detailing
their evaluation of whether McCoy’s allegations were supported by these records. See id. at 21-
28. This was followed by additional extremely detailed and through discussion of opinion evidence
from seven doctors and clinicians and whether they were consistent with and supported by the
record. See id. at 28-30; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5) (noting that
1 Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has promulgated
regulations that provide for the payment of disabled child’s insurance benefits if the claimant is eighteen years old or
older and has a disability that began before attaining age twenty-two. 20 CFR 404.350(a)(5).
2 The transcript of proceedings before the SSA is at ECF 7. All page references to the transcript refer to the SSA’s
numbering in the lower-right corner, and not the ECF PageID number added to the header upon filing with this Court.
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supportability and consistency are the most important factors when considering medical opinion
evidence).
II. 	Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
which requires a de novo decision as to those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.
“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested
resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term
is used in this context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to[]”); Local Rule 72.3(b) (any objecting party
shall file “written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections[]”).
Judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record as a whole to support the
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2010).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla; it refers to relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gentry v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)).
A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide questions
of credibility. DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014); Bass v.
McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Nor need the reviewing court necessarily agree with
the Commissioner’s determination in order to affirm it. “Even if [the] Court might have reached a
contrary conclusion of fact, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed so long as it is
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supported by substantial evidence.” Kyle, 609 F.3d at 854-55. This is true even if substantial
evidence also supports the claimant’s position. See McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d
830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The findings of
the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial
evidence to support a different conclusion.”).
III. 	Law and Analysis
In their objection, McCoy argues that the Magistrate Judge was wrong to find that “the
ALJ did not err in accounting for Plaintiff’s psychogenic non-epileptic seizure disorder by limiting
Plaintiff to no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, heights, dangerous moving machinery, and commercial
driving.” ECF 13 at 1. McCoy contends “[t]he problem with both the ALJ’s and Magistrate’s
conclusion is that RFC limitations that simply aim to minimize the consequences of seizures in the
workplace, as we have here, do not actually account for the seizures’ effects themselves.” Id.
Rather, McCoy asserts that “ALJs must account for the ‘total limiting effects’ of a Plaintiff’s
impairments,” which here would be “the [alleged] impairment Plaintiff experiences in non-
hazardous, more ordinary jobs where stress in the workplace causes her seizures, which, for
starters, would take her off her work tasks.” Id. at 2.
For starters, it is important to make clear that merely because the “RFC limitations say
nothing” about a specific impairment does not mean that the ALJ did not consider and account for
the “all of the medical and nonmedical evidence.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 415.945(e). As previously
mentioned, the ALJ was extremely detailed in his decision, “dedicating over five pages to
analyzing McCoy’s allegations and the opinion evidence of record.” ECF 12 at 18; see also Tr.
21-30. Further, as the Commissioner points out, see ECF 14 at 1, McCoy already made this exact
argument in their brief on the merits before the Magistrate Judge. Compare ECF 13 (McCoy’s
Objection), with ECF 8 (McCoy’s Brief on the Merits).
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In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Grimes appropriately noted that “it is clear that McCoy’s
argument amounts to a dispute over the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence.” ECF 12 at 17. And just
as the R&R points out, “absent evidence to the contrary, the ALJ’s statement that he considered
the entire record, see Tr. 21, is presumed true.” ECF 12 at 17 (citing NLRB v. Newark Elec. Corp.,
14 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)
(“The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official
duties.”); and cf. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 864 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Appeals
Council “state[d] that it ‘considered the entire record which was before the administrative law
judge, including the testimony at the hearing’”)). McCoy’s objection contains no citations to the
record where the ALJ allegedly improperly considered or failed to consider certain limitations or
effects; nor does McCoy’s objection cite any case law supporting their position.
In sum, McCoy’s objection must fail, as it amounts to nothing more than a disagreement
with the ALJ on the weighing of evidence on the administrative record. In any event, this Court
has reviewed the administrative record and finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. A reviewing court cannot overturn the Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial
evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336
F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
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IV. 	Conclusion
After considering the arguments raised and the underlying record, the Court hereby
OVERRULES McCoy’s objection. Magistrate Judge Grimes’ R&R is ADOPTED and this case is
DISMISSED, with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 12, 2026
s/Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge
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