Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY M. SMITH, 	)
)
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1085-MJH
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
JUDGE MICHAEL J. HENDERSHOT
vs. 	)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
James E. Grimes recommending that the Court affirm the decision of Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of Plaintiff Kimberly M.
Smith for supplemental security income. [R.13]. Smith timely filed objections to the
Report, [R.14], and the Commissioner responded, [R.15].
For the reasons below, the Court overrules Smith’s objections, accepts and
adopts the Report, and affirms the Commissioner’s final decision.
I. 	FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the medical and opinion evidence is not
repeated here. 	For the purposes of this opinion, the Court discusses only evidence
necessary to resolve Smith’s objections. 	Record citations are to the electronically
stamped CM/ECF document and the PageID number rather than any internal
pagination.
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A. Smith’s applications to the Social Security Administration
In October 2022, Smith filed an application for supplemental security income,
alleging a disability onset date of August 27, 2021. 	[R.7 at 45]. 	In her application,
Smith claimed disability due to autism spectrum, depression, and anxiety. 	[Id. 	at
336]. 	In December 2022, a psychological consultant, Dr. David Dietz, assessed
Smith’s residual functional capacity and found that she could perform “simple,
routine, repetitive tasks, undertaken in a setting free of production-rate pace,”
requiring “no interaction [with] the public and only occasional interaction [with]
coworkers and supervisors,” and that “contemplates few changes in workplace tasks
and duties.” 	[Id. at 173]. 	The Social Security Administration denied Smith’s
application. [Id. at 167].
In January 2023, Smith moved for reconsideration, a second psychological
consultant, Dr. Nicole Sampson, reached the same conclusion as Dr. Dietz, and the
Social Security Administration denied Smith’s application again. 	[Id. at 176, 182].
Smith then requested, and received, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge,
at which she was represented by counsel. [Id. at 202].
B. Relevant evidence and hearing testimony
Before the Administrative Law Judge, Smith submitted records from her
counselor, Ms. Victoria Gutbrod (“Gutbrod”). [Id. at 544–642]. Gutbrod opined that
Smith’s mental impairments or treatment would cause her to be absent from work
10–15 hours a week, if she worked full time. [Id. at 612]. These counseling records
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reflect over three dozen appointments between Smith and Gutbrod over 21 months.
[Id. at 544–609, 614–42].
Also at the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge posed a hypothetical to an
impartial vocational expert Deborah Lee about whether an individual with Smith’s
age, education, and work experience could perform work if that individual had the
same limitations as those set forth in Smith’s functional-capacity evaluation. [Id. at
75–76]. Lee testified that an individual with those limitations could perform work as
a commercial cleaner, kitchen helper, or laundry laborer. 	[Id. at 76]. 	Lee further
testified that the training period to learn each of these positions would be about two
weeks and that, during this training period, interaction with other employees or
supervisors would be less frequent than “occasional.” [Id. at 77–79]. Lee also testified
that she would include tardiness—arriving late or leaving early—in her definition of
absenteeism and that, on average, a worker could be absent “no more than one day
per month.” [Id. at 79–80].
After the hearing, Smith objected to Lee’s testimony and submitted her own
supplemental vocational expert report from C. Kimball Heartsill. 	[Id. at 405].
Heartsill’s report cited statistics for workers in various job categories regarding the
need for employees to speak on the job, interact with the public, and complete a
training period. 	[Id. at 407]. 	With respect to employee training periods, Heartsill
opined that “[a]ny individual experiencing difficulty interacting personally during
these time periods may find it difficult to get through training successfully.” [Id. at
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408]. 	In his report, Heartsill also opined that “absenteeism should not exceed once
per month.” [Id.].
C. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision
After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found Smith not disabled.
[Id. at 45–57]. 	The Administrative Law Judge found that Smith had the following
severe impairments: depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, dysthymic disorder, mood
disorder, and autism/Asperger’s disorder. [Id. at 48]. The Administrative Law Judge
then concluded that these impairments, or combination of impairments, did not meet
or equal the severity necessary for a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P.
[Id.] The Administrative Law Judge, citing to Smith’s functional-capacity evaluation,
reasoned that Smith could perform “simple, routine tasks, conducted in a work
setting free of fast-paced production requirements or strict production quotas,” that
“contemplates few changes in workplace tasks or duties” and “occasional interaction
with co-workers and supervisors, but no contact with the public.” 	[Id. at 50]. 	The
Administrative Law Judge further explained that the national economy includes
many jobs that Smith could perform. 	[Id. at 55]. 	In reaching this decision, the
Administrative Law Judge rejected Heartsill’s report, overruled Smith’s objection,
and adopted Lee’s testimony. [Id. at 54–56].
The 	Administrative Law Judge’s 	decision 	became final when 	the 	Social
Security Appeals Council declined further review. 	[Id. at 29–31]; see 20 C.F.R. §
404.981.
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D. The Report and Recommendation
Smith then filed this action. 	[R.1]. 	Her merits brief lists two legal issues for
review:
1. 	Did the ALJ err by creating an RFC [residual functional-capacity
evaluation] that is not supported by substantial evidence and thereafter
finding plaintiff not disabled?
2. 	Did the ALJ err by overruling Smith’s objections to Lee, failing to
properly review Heartsill’s opinion, and failing to resolve all vocational
conflicts?
[R.9]. 	The Magistrate Judge issued a thorough Report and Recommendation,
recommending that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. 	[R.13]. 	Smith
timely filed objections, and the Commissioner responded that same day. [R.14, 15].
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Review of objections to a Magistrate Judge’s Report
This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report
challenged through objections. 	After this fresh look, this Court may “accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d
1499 (Table), 1994 WL 532926, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994); Orr v. Kelly, No. 1:14-
cv-2302, 2015 WL 5316216, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2015) (citing Powell, 1994 WL
532926, at *1). General objections to the Report do not trigger review. See, e.g., Miller
v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). A general objection that “merely restates
the arguments previously presented” does not “alert the court to alleged errors on the
part of the magistrate judge.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich.
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2004). Put another way, “[t]he objections must be clear enough to enable the district
court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller, 50 F.3d at
380 (citing Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508–09 (6th
Cir.1991)). 	“‘[B]are disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Magistrate
Judge, without any effort to identify any specific errors in the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis that, if corrected, might warrant a different outcome, is tantamount to an
outright failure to lodge objections.’” Arroyo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-14358,
2016 WL 424939, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2016) (quoting Depweg v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 14-11705, 2015 WL 5014361, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2015)) (citing
Howard, 932 F.2d at 509). 	Alongside this specificity requirement, parties cannot
“raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented” to
the Administrative Law Judge and the Magistrate Judge. Murr v. United States, 200
F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Swain v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App’x
512, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2010).
B. Review of social security decisions
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). 	The impairment must prevent the claimant from performing his or
her previous work and any other work available in significant numbers in the region
where the individual lives or in several regions of the country. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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In making a disability determination, the Administrative Law Judge performs
a five-step sequential evaluation:
1. 	If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, he is not
disabled.
2. 	If the claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity, his
impairment must be severe before he can be found to be disabled.
To 	be 	severe, 	the 	claimant 	must 	have 	a 	severe 	medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, or a combination of
impairments, that must have lasted or be expected to last for at
least 12 months, unless it is expected to result in death.
3. 	If the claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity and is
suffering from a severe impairment that has lasted or is expected
to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and his
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to
Subpart P of Part 404, then the claimant is presumed disabled
without further inquiry.
4. 	If the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the
ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity and
use it to determine if the claimant’s impairment prevents him
from doing past relevant work. If the claimant’s impairment does
not prevent him from doing his past relevant work, he is not
disabled.
5. 	If the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, he is not
disabled if, based on his vocational factors and residual functional
capacity, he is capable of performing other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Quisenberry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 757 F.
App’x 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525,
529 (6th Cir. 1997)). 	The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through
four, while the “burden shifts to the Commissioner only at Step Five.” 	Walter, 127
F.3d at 529.
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Federal courts limit review of the Commissioner’s decision only to whether it
applied the correct legal standard and “substantial evidence” supports the decision.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2010).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla; it refers
to relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)). 	If substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding that the claimant is not disabled, it
“must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently . . .
even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Smith raises five objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. 	Smith’s first
three objections relate to the Administrative Law Judge’s exclusion of an absenteeism
limitation from Smith’s residual functional capacity. 	Specifically, Smith contends
that the Administrative Law Judge’s functional-capacity evaluation should have
included a limitation based on the frequency of her medical appointments and that,
consequently, the Administrative Law Judge should have had the burden to show
that many jobs exist despite that limitation. 	On that basis, Smith objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s findings (1) that Smith did not preserve the issue of absenteeism
on appeal; (2) that Smith improperly raised a new argument in her reply brief
regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s burden of proof at step five of the disability
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evaluation; 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge’s 	functional-capacity
evaluation was supported by substantial evidence. In her fourth and fifth objections,
Smith challenges that Magistrate Judge’s findings (4) that the Administrative Law
Judge properly overruled Smith’s objection to Lee’s testimony; and (5) that the
Administrative Law Judge properly rejected Heartsill’s vocational expert opinion.
The Court considers each objection in turn.
A. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Smith
did not preserve the issue of absenteeism on appeal
In her first objection, Smith argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when he
concluded 	that 	Smith 	“did 	not 	preserve 	the 	issue 	of 	absenteeism 	during 	the
Administrative process.” [R.14 at 702]. In not only her first, but also her second and
third objections, Smith argues that the frequency of her appointments with Gutbrod
will cause her to miss work. 	To Smith, then, the Administrative Law Judge should
have included an absenteeism limitation in her functional-capacity evaluation. 	In
the Report, the Magistrate Judge determined that “at no time at either hearing did
Smith’s attorney . . . raise this medical-appointment absenteeism issue with the ALJ.”
[R.13 at 692]. Smith responds, first, that the Magistrate Judge should not have acted
“sua sponte,” [R.14 at 702], and, second, that she did, in fact, preserve the issue, [id.
at 703]. The Court rejects both arguments.
1. 	The Magistrate Judge did not raise issue preservation
sua sponte
First, the Magistrate Judge did not raise this issue sua sponte. 	Rather, the
Commissioner’s merits brief in this Court flagged Smith’s waiver:
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[N]either of the state agency reviewing psychologists found
Plaintiff had any absenteeism-related limitations. The ALJ
determined these findings were persuasive and Plaintiff
did not argue otherwise, thereby forfeiting any such
argument.
[R.11 at 667 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted)]. 	Smith is mistaken to
ascribe any error to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion finding the absenteeism issue
waived.
2. 	Smith did not preserve the absenteeism issue
Second, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Smith
did not raise the issue of absenteeism previously. 	Smith does not dispute the
Magistrate Judge’s finding that she did not mention absenteeism in her pre-hearing
brief, [R.7 at 400–01], but points to (i) her counsel’s questions to Lee at the hearing,
[id. at 79–80], (ii) vocational evidence submitted with her post-hearing brief, [id. at
405–08], and (iii) her appeal to the Appeals Council, [id. at 413–14], to show that the
Commissioner had notice about her absenteeism argument. [R.14 at 703]. The record
reveals otherwise.
i. 	The Lee testimony
At the hearing, Smith’s counsel posed two questions about absenteeism to Lee,
but neither involved the critical question of whether Smith’s potential need to be
absent from work because of her medical appointments limited her functional
capacity and, in turn, the possible jobs she could perform. [R.7 at 79–80]. On its face,
the first question—“And for absenteeism, is tardiness and stuff like that, is that also
included in absenteeism?”—elicited only general information about absenteeism and
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did not relate to any absenteeism caused by Smith’s medical appointments. 	[Id. at
79 (“When I look at the literature, it [tardiness] wasn’t included, but I tend to include
it.”)]. The second question, again, did not refer to medical-appointment absenteeism,
asking only what level of absenteeism “was typically allowed in the workforce.” [Id.
at 80]. Neither question Smith’s counsel posed to Lee preserved the issue of Smith’s
need to be absent.
ii. 	Post-hearing vocational evidence
In her post-hearing objection, Smith submitted Heartsill’s vocational report,
[id. at 405–08], which she claims as evidence related to “the issue of absenteeism,”
[R.14 at 703]. But Smith’s counsel wrote that he was “not objecting to [Lee’s] opinions
as it relates to being . . . absent . . . as these were based upon her experience and were
also agreed upon as accurate by Mr. Heartsill.” [R.7 at 405]. As such, Smith’s post-
hearing brief did not preserve the issue of Smith’s specific needs to be absent.
iii. 	Assignments of error on appeal
Last, Smith argues that her appeal to the Appeals Council preserved the
absenteeism issue. [Id. at 413–14]. Smith quotes her second and third assignments
of error that “[t]he ALJ did not include all relevant limitations in the final [residual
functional-capacity evaluation]” and “erred in finding occupations existed in the
national economy that the claimant could perform.” 	[Id. at 413]. 	Nowhere in her
brief in support of her appeal, however, does Smith mention absenteeism. 	On the
second assignment of error, Smith discusses the Administrative Law Judge’s decision
to overrule her objection to Lee’s testimony. [Id. at 414]. On the third assignment of
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error, Smith discusses Heartsill’s opinion on frequency of interaction with coworkers
and supervisors during a training period. [Id.]. Neither assignment of error develops
the medical-absenteeism argument Smith now advances. 	“It is not sufficient for a
party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to .
. . put flesh on its bones.” 	Frost v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1407, 2026 WL
607568, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2026) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989,
995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). Smith’s appeal did not preserve the issue of absenteeism.
The Magistrate Judge did not err; Smith’s first objection is overruled.
B. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Smith improperly
raised new arguments in her reply brief
Smith’s second objection relates to whether the issue of her absenteeism should
be slotted into step four or step five of the Administrative Law Judge’s five-step
disability evaluation. Recall that step four considers a claimant’s residual functional
capacity and past relevant work, while step five assesses jobs available in the
economy. 	Smith contests the Magistrate Judge’s statement that her “reply brief
directly contradicts her arguments in her opening brief, in which she characterized
the absenteeism issue as a ‘step four (4)’” issue. 	[R.13 at 692–93; R.14 at 703–04].
But Smith did change her tune. And despite this contradiction, the Magistrate Judge
took on the new argument and concluded “it would fail because Smith hasn’t shown
that [absenteeism] is a step-five issue.” 	[R.13 at 693]. 	As a result, Smith’s second
objection fails to “identify any specific errors in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis that,
if corrected, might warrant a different outcome.” Arroyo, 2016 WL 424939, at *3.
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Smith’s merits brief characterized absenteeism arising from her medical
appointments as solely a step-four issue, [R.9 at 652–54], while her reply brief
assigned the burden of proof on absenteeism to the Commissioner at step five, [R.12
at 673]. 	That is, now Smith argues that the Commissioner must prove that the
economy 	contains 	significant 	jobs 	that 	would 	accommodate 	Smith’s 	supposed
absenteeism limitation. 	Though Smith notes that she “is permitted to respond to
Defendant[’]s arguments” on reply, [R.14 at 704], the Court sees nothing in the
Commissioner’s merits brief that would provoke Smith’s change of position. 	[See
R.11]. Still, as discussed below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that as
Smith’s functional-capacity evaluation did not include an absenteeism limitation,
Smith’s step-five argument fails. [R.7 at 50, 75–76].
As a coda, Smith’s second objection raises yet another new argument—that
absenteeism “is truly both step four (4) and five (5).” [R.14 at 704 (emphasis added)].
That argument, too, is waived. See Murr, 200 F.3d at 902 n.1.
The Magistrate Judge did not err in his conclusion that Smith improperly
raised a new argument on reply or that, in the alternative, Smith’s new argument
fails regardless. Smith’s second objection is overruled.
C. The Magistrate Judge rightly concluded the Administrative Law
Judge’s decision to exclude an absenteeism limitation from the
functional-capacity evaluation rested on substantial evidence
In her third objection, Smith argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by
“ignor[ing]” that, in Smith’s estimation, the Administrative Law Judge did not
properly consider absenteeism when evaluating her residual functional capacity.
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[R.14 at 704]. Smith points to Gutbrod’s counseling records to support the claim that
her frequent therapy appointments raises the “question of whether jobs could be
performed with the rate of treatment” she undertook in the past. [Id. at 705]. Taken
together, Smith argues (i) that the Administrative Law Judge should have included
an absenteeism limitation in her functional-capacity assessment; and (ii) that the
Administrative Law Judge did not meet her burden at step five of showing that jobs
exist in significant numbers with such an absenteeism limitation. 	[Id.]. 	Although
the Magistrate Judge concluded correctly that Smith failed to preserve the issue of
absenteeism on appeal, for the sake of completeness, the Court will dispose of Smith’s
third objection.
1. 	The Administrative Law Judge properly
considered evidence about absenteeism
The 	Magistrate 	Judge 	correctly 	rejected 	Smith’s 	arguments 	that 	the
Administrative Law Judge did not properly consider absenteeism in her functional-
capacity evaluation. 	[R.13 at 688–94]. 	As an initial matter, “there is no legal
requirement for an ALJ to explain each limitation or restriction he adopts or,
conversely, does not adopt[.]” 	Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-cv-2104, 2013
WL 1150133, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2013). 	But here, the Administrative Law
Judge did address absenteeism in finding Gutbrod’s medical opinion only “partially
persuasive,” 	noting 	that 	the 	limitations 	that 	Gutbrod 	identified, 	including
absenteeism for full-time work, were “entirely speculative.” [R.7 at 54]. Smith says
that this finding “is independent to the issue raised here” because the “reasoning
provides no direct explanation as to why absenteeism was excluded.” 	[R.14 at 705,
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n.1]. Yet Smith does not appreciate that “substantial evidence supports the omission
of such a limitation,” where no evidence supports such a limitation apart from a
rejected medical opinion and Smith’s own statements. Alvarado v. Colvin, No. 3:15-
cv-102, 2016 WL 825654, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2016).
Furthermore, by listing her therapy appointments with Gutbrod, Smith “asks
this Court to simply assume that she needed the number of appointments” that she
attended. 	Beck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:19-cv-2320, 2020 WL 5417536, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2020) (emphasis in original). Based on that raw number, Smith
then assumes that the frequency of her appointments “exceed[s] the [absenteeism]
threshold discussed by the vocational expert,” that is, one day each month. [R.14 at
704]. “But in case after case in the Social Security context, it is standard operating
procedure to require evidence to support subjective opinions and information.” Beck,
2020 WL 5417536, at *3 (emphasis in original). Here, Smith has essentially declared
that the number of her medical appointments speaks for itself without offering
evidence that the necessity and frequency of those appointments affected her ability
to perform full-time work. As the Magistrate Judge explained, nothing requires the
Administrative Law Judge “to sua sponte connect medical appointments in the record
and compare them with general vocational expert testimony.” [R.13 at 691].
2. 	The Administrative Law Judge was not obliged to
consider absenteeism at step five where Smith did
not carry her own burden at step four
As the Court has mentioned in Part III.B., the Administrative Law Judge need
not prove at step five that the economy contains jobs compatible with Smith’s medical
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appointments 	because 	Smith’s 	functional-capacity 	evaluation 	lacked 	any
absenteeism limitation. 	As the regulation notes, in relevant part, “At the fifth and
last step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and
your age, education, and work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to
other work.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v) (emphasis added). 	Said another way, “an
ALJ . . . is required to incorporate only those limitations accepted as credible by the
finder of fact.” Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir.
1993). 	Here, the fact-finder did not find Smith’s functional capacity limited by her
medical 	appointments. 	Again, 	Smith’s effort 	to 	shift 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	on
absenteeism to the Administrative Law Judge fails.
The 	Court 	also 	rejects 	Smith’s 	argument 	that 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s
evaluation of the Administrative Law Judge’s determination represents a “post hoc”
justification. [R.14 at 705]. “The Sixth Circuit has instructed that if a district court
finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it need not consider a
post-hoc rationalization objection.” 	Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-cv-979,
2024 WL 3197570, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2024) (citing Pasco v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 137 F. App’x 828, 847 (6th Cir. 2005)). Nor does a Magistrate Judge “engage in
a post-hoc rationalization by simply identifying other evidence in the record that
supports the ALJ’s analysis.” 	Id. at *4; see also Pasco, 137 F. App’x at 847; Poe v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 159 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Oslavic
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:25-cv-39, 2026 WL 776124, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19,
2026) (citation omitted).
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In his Report, the Magistrate Judge explained why Smith’s unsupported
statement that her “medical appointment would occur during the work hour”
“doom[ed] . . . Smith’s argument from the start.” 	[R.13 at 690]. 	To be sure, the
Administrative Law Judge may not have explicitly stated that Smith failed to connect
the frequency of her appointments with vocational expert testimony on absenteeism,
but the decision still built a “logical bridge between the evidence and the result.”
Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 	No “principle of
administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect
opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different
result.” 	Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotations and
citations omitted). As the Court can reasonably discern why the Administrative Law
Judge’s functional-capacity evaluation excluded absenteeism, the Court may uphold
the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.
The 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge’s 	functional-capacity 	evaluation 	rests 	on
substantial record evidence, and the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning contains no post-
hoc justification. Smith’s third objection is overruled.
D. The Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that the
Administrative Law Judge properly overruled Smith’s
objections to Lee’s hearing testimony
In her fourth objection, Smith argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when
he found that the Administrative Law Judge properly overruled Smith’s objections to
Lee’s testimony. [R.14 at 705]. According to Smith, Lee’s hearing testimony lacked
statistical data to support her opinions on the frequency of interaction with coworkers
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and/or supervisors during an occupation’s training period. 	[Id. at 705–06]. 	This
fourth objection largely “state[s] a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested
resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before,” and the Court
need not revisit these points. Aldrich, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 747. Smith also contends
that the Magistrate Judge erred when he overlooked the case law cited in Smith’s
merits brief. The Court rejects these arguments.
1. 	The Report’s treatment of the Administrative Law
Judge’s decision was not error
First, 	Smith 	takes 	issue 	with 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	conclusion 	that
“[r]egardless of what language the ALJ used to characterize Smith’s objection to Lee’s
testimony, it is clear that the ALJ rejected Smith’s objections to it.” 	[R.14 at 706
(citing R.13 at 697)]. Smith argues that the Administrative Law Judge must provide
a “logical response to the objection, and that did not occur here.” 	[Id. (emphasis in
original)]. But as the Magistrate Judge writes, Smith “hasn’t articulated what about
her objections she believes the [Administrative Law Judge] misconstrued” and simply
disagrees with the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. [R.13 at 697].
In addition, Smith challenges the Magistrate Judge’s characterization of the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles as “a reliable source of information.” [R.14 at 706].
While Smith argues that the Dictionary “does not speak to how much contact” with
other coworkers or supervisors a job may require, [id.], the Magistrate Judge made
no such claim otherwise. Rather, in response to the contention in Smith’s merits brief
that Lee’s testimony “is absent of statistical data,” [R.9 at 656], the Magistrate Judge
wrote only that Lee relied on the Dictionary and that the Dictionary “remains ‘a
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reliable source of information at step five.’” [R.13 at 697 (quoting O’Neal v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 799 F. App’x 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2020))]. 	Based on that single sentence,
Smith attributes a litany of errors to the Magistrate Judge that are unsupported. As
this objection depends on Smith’s misreading of the Report, the Magistrate Judge’s
“validation of the ALJ decision” was not in error.
2. 	The Magistrate Judge did not go astray in rejecting
Smith’s cited cases
Second, Smith argues that “the Magistrate completely ignored Plaintiff’s
citations . . . showing that more than occasional contact during training does
eliminate all work.” 	[R.14 at 708 (emphasis in original).] 	Of course, “[t]here is no
requirement 	that 	an 	opinion 	quote 	from, 	analyze, 	or 	address 	every 	case 	cite
mentioned by the parties.” 	Armengau v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., No. 2:19-cv-
01146, 2022 WL 17484358, at *28 n.21 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2022). This principle applies
to Social Security cases as much as any other. See Wood v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-323,
2023 WL 2664738, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Wood v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 23-5494, 2024 WL 400232 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024). 	That the
Magistrate Judge did not expressly address certain cases cited by Smith in her merits
brief does not entitle her to remand.
Even so, Smith’s cases are neither as persuasive as she believes nor as
factually “identical” as she claims. 	[R.14 at 709]. 	In both Matthew H. and McAfee,
the 	Court 	“addressed 	the 	effect 	of 	an 	RFC 	that 	precludes 	over-the-shoulder
supervision during the probationary period,” not Smith’s own limitation to occasional
interaction. Matthew H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-cv-0241, 2022 WL 2255376,
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at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 2022); McAfee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-cv-125, 2020
WL 5810004, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2020). As such, Smith’s general proposition
that “occasional contact during training does eliminate all work” lacks support in her
own citations. 	[R.14 at 708 (emphasis in original)]. 	By comparison, the cases cited
in the Report considered the question of “whether an interaction level during a
probationary training period that briefly exceeds occasional undermines a plaintiff’s”
residual functional capacity. Rebecca L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 256,
273 (D.N.J. 2022); see also Cody H. v. Bisignano, No. 24-cv-3056, 2025 WL 1788474,
at *16 (D. Minn. June 11, 2025). Moreover, unlike Smith’s cases, which depended on
unequivocal testimony from vocational experts that the claimants would be unable to
withstand a probationary period, the cases cited in the Report involved qualified
vocational testimony akin to Heartsill’s opinion that Smith “may find it difficult” to
complete a probationary period. 	Compare McLaughlin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
3:17-cv-424, 2019 WL 125761, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2019) and McAfee, 2020 WL
5810004, at *4, with Rebecca L., 617 F. Supp. 3d at 273, and Cody H., 2025 WL
1788474, at *16. 	In her objection, Smith cites to additional cases “to [c]ounter the
cases brought up by the Magistrate,” but as the objection relates to the Magistrate
Judge’s treatment of the cases cited in her opening brief, the Court disregards these
new cases.
The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s decision to discount certain
case law or to refer to analogous out-of-circuit decisions.
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3. 	The Magistrate Judge did not misanalyze Sczepanski
Last, Smith argues that the Report “does not properly apply” the decision in
Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2020). 	[R.14 at 709]. 	At step five of her
decision, the Administrative Law Judge rejected Smith’s objection to “the jobs
described as available, based on greater social requirements during the training
phase of the job.” 	[R.7 at 56]. 	Based on both Lee and Heartsill’s opinions, the
Administrative Law Judge concluded that “the training phase is necessarily brief and
truncated” and “little reflective of the overall work setting.” 	[Id.]. 	Smith contrasts
this with the Second Circuit’s holding in Sczepanski that a claimant’s ability to
complete a probationary period was relevant to her disability status. 	[R.14 at 709
(citing Sczepanski, 946 F.3d at 158–59)].
First, as the Magistrate Judge wrote, “Sczepanski is not binding on this Court.”
[R.13 at 700.] Even if Sczepanski applied, therefore, the Magistrate Judge would not
need to follow it. 	Second, as the Magistrate Judge points out, when overruling an
objection along these lines, the Administrative Law Judge noted that Heartsill’s
report stated only that Smith “may find it difficult” to complete a probationary period.
[R.7 at 56]. That is, unlike Sczepanski, where the Administrative Law Judge “did not
mention probationary periods in its written decision,” 946 F.3d at 156, here, the
Administrative Law Judge addressed, then rejected, Heartsill’s opinion about Smith’s
ability to complete a training period. [R.7 at 56]. That rejection finds support in this
Circuit’s precedent affirming that if a vocational expert is “unable to testify without
qualification about the jobs a claimant can perform, the ALJ may not rely on his
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opinion.” 	Sias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 861 F.2d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citing Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988)). Smith also scores no points
when she accuses the Magistrate Judge of “sua sponte” finding that Heartsill’s
opinion on a probationary period “is vague and therefore his opinion is irrelevant.”
[R.14 at 709]. 	Smith’s ventriloquy misses the mark. 	The Report never asserts that
the “vagueness” of Heartsill’s opinion bears on the Administrative Law Judge’s
decision to overrule Smith’s objection. [R.13 at 699–700].
Smith’s fourth objection is overruled.
E. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the Administrative
Law Judge properly rejected Smith’s vocational expert’s opinion
In her fifth and final objection, Smith objects that the Magistrate Judge did
not 	consider 	whether 	the 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	“properly 	address[ed]”
Heartsill’s opinion. 	[R.14 at 710]. 	As Smith sees it, the Administrative Law Judge
wrongly treated Heartsill’s report as a “medical opinion.” 	[Id.] 	Similarly, Smith
claims that the Administrative Law Judge improperly “rejected” Heartsill’s opinion
because she thought it was about the amount of “speech” required in each job, rather
than the frequency of interaction with coworkers and supervisors. 	[Id.] 	Both
arguments are contradicted by the record.
First, the Court does not know why Smith suggests that the Administrative
Law Judge treated Heartsill’s opinion as a “medical opinion.” 	[Id.]. 	The decision,
which Smith cites in her objection, explains that Heartsill “offered a vocational
opinion” and that the opinion was “not received of an acceptable medical source.” [R.7
at 54]. Smith furnishes no additional support for this claim.
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Second, in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, she writes that because
no limitations “on speech” were included in Smith’s functional-capacity evaluation,
“much of” Heartsill’s analysis is “moot.” [Id.]. Even so, the Administrative Law Judge
then considered Heartsill’s job figures “[f]or the sake of argument.” [Id.] In response,
Smith argues that “[n]othing in [Heartsill’s] opinion was about ‘speech’ as the ALJ
claimed.” 	[R.14 at 710]. 	Instead, Smith suggests Heartsill’s opinion related only to
“length of training” and the amount of interaction required with coworkers and
supervisors during a training period. [Id.] Smith is off base. In his report, Heartsill
cites statistical data regarding “speech” or “speaking” required of workers in each job
that he considered. 	[R.7 at 407]. 	Furthermore, contrary to Smith’s objection, the
Administrative Law Judge did not “reject[] him on ‘speech’” alone and, in fact, did
consider Heartsill’s opinion on the number of available jobs. 	[R.14 at 710]. 	As the
Magistrate Judge determined, the Administrative Law Judge rejected Heartsill’s
opinion because he “did not link” his cited data about speech and training periods “to
his opinion regarding the frequency of interaction during the training period.” [R.13
at 701].
Smith’s fifth objection is overruled.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Smith’s 	objections 	to 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation 	are 	OVERRULED, 	the 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	is
ACCEPTED 	and 	ADOPTED, 	and 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the 	Commissioner 	is
AFFIRMED. This case is DISMISSED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2026 	s/ Michael J. Hendershot
HON. MICHAEL J. HENDERSHOT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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