Thomas v. Beachwood City School District Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIFFANY THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEACHWOOD CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2167
DISTRICT JUDGE
DONALD C. NUGENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
In a contemporaneously issued report and recommendation, the Court
recommends granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Defendant Beachwood City School District Board of Education. In this order,
the Court adjudicates the motion to file a second amended complaint filed by
Plaintiff Tiffany Thomas.
The deadline to amend pleadings was January 27, 2026. See Doc. 13, at
1. As noted in the report and recommendation, after the Court held a show
cause hearing on January 28, 2026, the Board filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, Doc. 42, and Thomas moved for leave to file a second amended
complaint. Doc. 47. This motion mooted Thomas’s previously filed motion to
file a first amended complaint. Doc. 48.
The Board opposed Thomas’s motion to file a second amended complaint,
Doc. 49, and Thomas filed a reply, Doc. 50, and a document styled as a motion
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to file a second amended complaint and to treat the earlier motion for leave as
her response to the Board’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 52.
Discussion
One might think that the decision whether to grant leave to file an
amended complaint would be controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(2), which commits the decision to the Court’s discretion but provides that
a court should “freely give leave when justice so requires.” The Court, however,
set January 27, 2026, as the deadline to amend, Doc. 29, at 1, and Thomas filed
her motion over five weeks later on March 4, 2026, Doc. 47.
A motion to amend, such as Thomas’s, that is filed after the deadline to
amend is subject the “good cause” standard found in Rule 16(b)(4). See Shane
v. Bunzl Distrib. USA, Inc., 275 F. App’x 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2008). This good
cause “threshold … requires late-moving litigants to show that ‘despite their
diligence they could not meet the original deadline.” Id. (quoting Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 907 (6th Cir. 2003)). Indeed, “a court choosing to
modify the schedule upon a showing of good cause, may do so only ‘if it cannot
reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’”
Leary, 349 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 1983
advisory committee’s notes); see Korn v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 382 F. App’x
443, 450 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To satisfy the Leary standard, Korn must … explain
why he failed to move for the amendment at a time that would not have
required a modification of the scheduling order.”). In other words, a district
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court abuses its discretion if grants leave under Rule 16(b)(4) absent a showing
by the movant “that ‘despite [her] diligence [she] could not meet the original
deadline.” In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 843–46 (6th Cir.
2020) (granting mandamus because a district court granted leave to amend
without a showing of diligence).
Prejudice to the nonmoving party is also a factor. See Leary, 349 F.3d at
908. Courts, however, will “consider the extent of prejudice to the nonmoving
party only if the movant proceeded diligently, and then only to ascertain
whether there exist ‘additional reasons to deny a motion.’” Smith v. Holston
Med. Grp., P.C., 595 F. App’x 474, 479 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added)
(quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.
1992)).
Out of the gate, the problem for Thomas is that her motion doesn’t
mention Rule 16 or the good cause standard. Instead, she cites Rule 15(a)(2).
See Doc. 47. Indeed, even after the Board in its opposition noted that Thomas
was required under Rule 16 to show good cause, Doc. 49, at 2–3, she continued
in her later second motion to file a second amended complaint to rely on the
standard in Rule 15(a)(2), Doc. 52, at 1.
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Thomas’s only reference to good cause under Rule 16 comes in a
document 	styled 	as 	her 	“reply 	(out 	of 	time) 	and 	clarification 	regarding
amended complaint.”1 Doc. 50. There, she says that:
Good cause exists because [her] amendment was
made in direct response to the Court’s January 28
conference and was undertaken in good faith to
confirm pleadings to the Court’s discussion.
The amendment narrows and clarifies the cause
rather than expanding it and eliminates claims that
could otherwise raise exhaustion issues.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). It turns out that virtually none of what Thomas
asserts in this passage is accurate.
Start 	with 	the 	emphasized 	language. 	Thomas 	has 	made 	similar
statements in other filings where she has claimed that the Court gave her
guidance during a show cause hearing in January 2026 that led her to
“under[stand] that she was permitted to amend her complaint to address
deficiencies identified by the Court.” Doc. 52, at 1; see also Doc. 47, at 1.
Whether these references represent a calculated pretext or genuine confusion,
the Court has already clarified that, beyond telling Thomas during the show
cause hearing that she cannot appear on behalf of C.A., “the Court did not tell
Thomas how to prosecute any claim, did not tell her how to structure her
complaint, and did not give her guidance about how or in what venue to pursue
1 	This document appears to be a reply to the Board’s opposition to
Thomas’s motion to file a second amended complaint. Since Thomas filed it
only five days after the Board filed its opposition, it is not “out of time.”
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her claims.” Doc. 51, at 2. So the show cause hearing does not help Thomas to
show good cause. Indeed, the Board pointed out nearly three months before, on
November 5, 2025, that Thomas could not represent C.A.’s interests. See Doc.
8, at 13. The Court during the show cause hearing, therefore, didn’t tell
Thomas anything that would have been new to her.
Further, even if any discussion during the show cause hearing were
relevant to whether Thomas has shown good cause, Thomas didn’t file her
motion until five weeks after the hearing. Had Thomas attempted to show that
she acted with diligence in moving to file her motion, this five-week delay
would belie the attempt.
And contrary to what Thomas says, her proposed “amendment [does not]
narrow[] and clarify[y]” anything. Instead, her proposed amendment would
expand a four-page, four-count complaint against one defendant, to a 41-page,
five count complaint against seven defendants.2
2 	Notably, “[a]llowing a plaintiff to amend h[er] complaint may unduly
prejudice a defendant if amendment would … ‘expand[ ] the allegations beyond
the scope of the initial complaint.’” Lover v. D.C., 248 F.R.D. 319, 322 (D.D.C.
2008) (quoting Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1999)). “Prejudice
may [also] be found in cases where ... the amendment brings entirely new and
separate claims, adds new parties, or at least entails more than an alternative
claim or a change in the allegations of the complaint.” Videojet Sys. Int’l, Inc.
v. Inkjet, Inc., No. 95-7016, 1997 WL 124259, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1997); see
Black & Decker, Inc. v. Greenfield Indus., Inc., No. 90-3272, 1991 WL 239121,
at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 1991) (“If the amendment is ‘an assertion of a separate
and distinct claim, based on a totally different set of operative facts,’ then
amendment is not properly granted.”).
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So Thomas’s only attempt to show good cause is baseless.3
Even putting this fact aside, it’s Thomas obligation in the first instance
to “explain why [she] failed to move for the amendment at a time that would
not have required a modification of the scheduling order.” Korn, 382 F. App’x
at 450. But the quoted passage from Thomas’s reply says nothing about
Thomas’s failure to move earlier.
Worse, even if Thomas had attempted to show that she acted with
diligence, which she hasn’t, the record shows that she was not diligent. A
plaintiff will not be able to satisfy the diligence inquiry if “she was aware of
the facts underlying the proposed amendment to her pleading but failed,
without explanation, to move to amend the complaint before the deadline.”
Ross v. Am. Red Cross, 567 F. App’x 296, 306 (6th Cir. 2014).
Review of the proposed second amended complaint reveals that with one
exception, all of the events described in it allegedly occurred well before the
deadline to amend the Complaint. See Doc. 47-1, at 5–9; 11–12, 18, 21, 24–28,
34. The only exception is that Thomas allegedly received a written response on
February 11, 2026, that the district would only respond in writing “when
3 	New Local Rule 3.16, which limits pro se pleadings to 30 pages, does not
apply to Thomas’s proposed second amended complaint because the new rule
went into effect after Thomas filed her motion. But the new rule references
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10, which Thomas’s proposed second amended
complaint violates in two ways. First, the proposed second amended complaint
does not list all of the proposed defendants in the caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(a). Second, the proposed second amended complaint’s allegations are not
listed in numbered paragraphs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
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feasible” and would otherwise respond with meetings.4 Id. at 13, 19. But
Thomas does not allege that she needed to wait months after all the other
events alleged in her proposed second amended complaint before seeking to
amend. On the face of the proposed second amended complaint, therefore,
Thomas did not act with diligence. Her motion to amend must, as a result, be
denied. See Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d at 843–46.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Thomas has failed to show good cause to allow a
late amendment to her Complaint. Her motion, Doc. 47, is thus denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 19, 2026
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
4 	In the proposed second amended complaint, Thomas alleges that she
“renewed” in January and February 2026 previously made “request[s] for
written communication accommodations.” Doc. 47-1, at 11. As the proposed
second amended complaint alleges, however, these renewals followed requests
in October and December, which were well before the deadline to amend.
Thomas 	also 	alleges 	that 	an 	investigation 	into 	some 	of 	Thomas’s
complaints concluded in January 2026. Doc. 47-1 at 28. But she doesn’t allege
that the conclusion of the investigation forms a basis for her claims. And, in
any event, if the investigation concluded in January, Thomas offers no basis to
conclude that the investigation or its conclusion was a reason that she didn’t
move until March to file her motion to file a second amended complaint.
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