Davis v. City of Cleveland et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Arthur Davis,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
City of Cleveland, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1: 25 cv 2176
JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Background
Pro se Plaintiff Arthur Davis has filed a civil rights complaint in this case against the City of
Cleveland, the Cleveland Police Department, John and Jane Doe Officers, Jane Doe Public Defender,
John and Jane Doe Judges and Prosecutors, the State of Ohio, and the Ohio Bar Association. (Doc.
No. 1.) He states his complaint “relat[es] to two separate but related incidents involving the same
officers.” (Id. at 2, ¶ 5.)
First, he complains that in the fall of 2024, he was arrested on a job site on false allegations
made by a complainant of kidnapping and robbery. (Id. at ¶ 6.) He complains “Cleveland police”
placed him in custody, handcuffed and transported him to the station, forced him to post bond under
duress and intimidation, and that property (including $400) was taken from him. He complains he
“told every judge he appeared before that due process had not been followed,” but the “[j]udges and
prosecutors ignored these objections.” 	(Id. at 3, ¶ 9.) 	He states the charges against him were
dismissed after the complainant failed to appear in court, but he complains that he never got his seized
money or an accounting of what was taken from him and that his reputation was publicly harmed.
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(Id. at ¶ 11.) He also alleges he was “assigned a public defender (Jane Doe)” who misrepresented the
law and refused to challenge due process violations or provide him with case files, transcripts, and
evidence after dismissal of his case. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Second, he complains of an incident that occurred in the winter of 2024, when he was detained
and ticketed after being pulled over for sliding into the back of another vehicle during a heavy
snowstorm. (Id. at ¶ 12.) He complains that “Officers demanded [his] identification, searched his
vehicle without a warrant or probable cause, handcuffed [him], and issued [him] false traffic citations
alleging [he] was on the ‘wrong side of the road.’”1 (Id. at ¶ 13.)
Asserting constitutional claims under § 1983 for “false arrest/false imprisonment,” “unlawful
search and seizure/conversion of property,” “denial of due process,” “deprivation of right to travel,”
and conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection and civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), in
addition to state-law torts, he seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (See id. at “Causes
of Action,” ¶¶ 18-25.)
Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee in the case, but instead, filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) That motion is granted.
Standard of Review and Discussion
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to initial screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute expressly requires district courts to screen all in forma
pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the
1 He does not indicate the results of this traffic citation.
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court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	See id.
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege a plausible claim under
either § 1983 or § 1985 and warrants dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Most of the Defendants are not persons subject to suit, or are immune from suit on claims,
under § 1983.2 The Cleveland Police Department is not sui juris and, therefore, is not subject to suit.
See Lawson v. City of Youngstown, 912 F. Supp. 2d 527, 531 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (collecting cases and
holding that Ohio courts and police departments are not sui juris for purposes of suit under § 1983);
see also Tysinger v. Police Dep't of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We note at the
outset that the named defendant in this action, the Police Department of the City of Zanesville, is not
a juridical entity subject to suit under Ohio law.”) Plaintiff’s public defender is not subject to suit as
court-appointed (and retained) attorneys performing traditional functions as defense counsel do not
act “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 325
(1981); Elrod v. Michigan Supreme Ct., 104 F. App'x 506, 508 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Cicchini v.
Blackwell, 127 F. App'x 187, 190 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Lawyers are not, merely by virtue of being officers
of the court, state actors for § 1983 purposes.”). Likewise, § 1983 does not apply to the conduct of
private entities or persons, such as bar associations and members of bar associations. See, e.g., Hu v.
American Bar Ass'n, 568 F.Supp.2d 959, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (federal and “state bar associations do
not engage in state action by formulating and enforcing disciplinary rules”); Jordan v. Kentucky, No.
2 To state civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a constitutional
right by a “person” acting under color of state law. 	Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir.
2002).
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3: 09-cv-424, 2009 WL 2163113, at *4 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2009) (Kentucky Bar Association and its
President not state actors for purposes of § 1983).
The State of Ohio is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 	See
Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 1992) (the State of Ohio has not waived its immunity
to suit in § 1983 cases). Judges and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity on claims arising
out of the performance of their official judicial and prosecutorial functions, see Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 430-31 (1976), and nothing in Plaintiff’s
complaint suggests that any judge or prosecutor he sues took any action falling outside of the scope
of his or her absolute immunity.
Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint even liberally construed fails to set forth
allegations sufficient to state a plausible § 1983 claim against the City of Cleveland or police officers.
To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 	See Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard set forth in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for
determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed allegations are not required, a complaint must set
forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. While some latitude must be extended to pro se plaintiffs with respect to their pleadings,
courts are not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims on their behalf. See Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008); Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Here, Plaintiff contends police officers arrested and detained him in connection with two
separate incidents without probable cause and in violation of his rights. (See Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 18, 19,
21.) 	But other than his own generalized and conclusory assertions in that regard, Plaintiff has not
provided factual content or context from which a plausible inference could be drawn that he was
arrested and detained, in either instance, without probable cause. 	Plaintiff’s own conclusions and
non-specific allegations are insufficient to state a valid claim. 	See, e.g, Bey v. Trumbull Cnty. Health
Department, No. 4: 18-cv-1166, 2019 WL 950078, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2019) (dismissing
complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and stating that “Plaintiff's allegation that he was held without bond
in violation of his right to due process and in retaliation for defending his constitutional rights are
simply legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient to state a claim for
relief).
His complaint also fails to state an actionable § 1983 claim to the extent he contends police
officers mishandled and seized his money and property. 	The Supreme Court has held that where
adequate remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or intentional loss of personal property
does not state a claim cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 	Thus, a plaintiff “does not state a due
process claim merely by alleging the deprivation of property.” Darling v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
No. 1:12-cv-194, 2012 WL 1902602, at *17 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2012) (citing River City Capital,
L.P. v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs, Clermont Cnty., Ohio, 491 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff
must also plead “that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Perdue v. Ohio Dep't
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of Corr., No. 1:13-cv-878, 2014 WL 661707, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2014) (quoting Vicory v.
Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983) and citing Hudson, 468 U.S. 517 and Parratt, 451 U.S.
527). 	Plaintiff has not alleged, suggested, or demonstrated that state post-deprivation remedies
available to him in Ohio are inadequate or unavailable to redress his claims concerning the
deprivation of his property.
Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983 against the City of
Cleveland. A local government may be liable under § 1983, but only when its own “policy or custom”
causes a constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[T]o satisfy
the Monell requirements a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and
show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.’” Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d
170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating, and does not even assert, that
the City of Cleveland had a policy or custom that caused a violation of his rights.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege an actionable
claim, against any Defendant, under § 1983.
Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to state a plausible claim for “conspiracy” under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive persons of equal protection of law. To
succeed on a claim, “a plaintiff must prove (1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons (2) for
the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4) which causes injury to a person or property,
or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” 	Moniz v. Cox, 512
Fed.Appx. 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege these elements. He merely
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alleges that “Defendants conspired to deprive [him] of equal protection and civil rights, by
coordinating false accusations, arrests, and prosecutions.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff’s allegations
of conspiracy are purely conclusory, unsupported by specific alleged facts, and his conspiracy claim
warrants sua sponte dismissal. See, e,g,. Ellis v. DeWine, No. 4: 18-cv-1597, 2019 WL 3500923, at
*7 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2019) (dismissing pro se § 1985(3) conspiracy claim based on conclusory and
unsupported allegations).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state an actionable federal claim and
is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	In light dismissal of the federal claims in the
case at this early stage, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state-law tort claims, which are dismissed without prejudice. The Court further certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: 	February 6, 2026 	U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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