United States of America v. House

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRJCT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERJCA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:26 CR 60
)
Plaintiff,
V.
)
)
) 	JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
)
ISHMAEL WAHID, et al. , 	)
Defendants.
) 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
) 	ANDORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant, Ishmael Wahid's Motion to Suppress 4
Warrants and Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in the Search Incident to February 18 , 2024
Arrest (ECF #114), and his Motion for a Franks Hearing. (ECF #144). The Government filed an
Opposition to Defendant' s Motion to Suppress. (ECF #142). On September 18, 2026, October 5,
2026, and October 6, 2026 in person hearings were held to allow Mr. Wahid and the other
defendants a chance to argue their motions to suppress, and to present evidence in support of their
requests for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
(ECF #115 , 147, 149).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Wahid challenges the search warrants on multiple grounds, and requests a hearing
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
The following search warrants are at issue:
(1) 5:25MJ1261 for information associated with telephone numbers 234-716-9760, 234-
238-3865, Apple ID JeffreyMourton97@gmail.com DSID No. 22365986166 that is stored
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at premises controlled by Apple Inc. (filed 11/26/25);
(2) 5:26MJ1021 for a red Conex storage box located at 184 Massillon Road, Akron, Ohio
(filed 2/10/26);
(3) 5:26MJ1043 for one green Apple Smartphone (Subject Device 1); and one blue Apple
Smartphone (Device 2) currently located and held by HSI in the forensic room, located at
Brooklyn Height, Ohio (filed 2/26/26); and,
(4) 5:26MJ1044 for a warehouse storage unit displaying "Akron Sales:sign on door, a red
Connex storage box marked Number 4, and a blue Connex storage box mared [sic]
Number I located at 184 Massillon Road, Akron, OH 44312 (filed 3/4/26).
Each of the four challenged warrants was issued by a Magistrate Judge Amanda Knapp,
and was supported by an affidavit submitted by Michael Battaglia, a Special Agent of Homeland
Security Investigations ("HSI"), United States Department of Homeland Security. Agent
Battaglia obtained the information contained in the affidavit through his participation in a drug
trafficking investigation. The affidavit avers that investigators received information from a
confidential informant in April of 2025, that Mr. Wahid was involved in transporting bulk
amounts of narcotics from the southwest border of the United States to Ohio.
On April 4, 2025, HSI arranged a controlled buy from Mr. Wimberly, a co-defendant,
using a confidential informant referred to as CS-1. CS-1 contacted Mr. Wimberly by telephone to
set up the drug transaction and discuss pricing for the narcotics. The sale took place at a
residence believed to be Mr. Wimberly's. Investigators observed from outside. Within fifteen
minutes after the purchase, Mr. Wimberly exited the residence, and traveled to Hamlin Street.
Although investigators did not observe which residence Mr. Wimberly entered, his black Cadillac
was parked in the vicinity of Mr. Wahid's residence at 913 Hamlin Street.
In May of 2025 the FBI met with HSI investigators and provided information from an
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earlier FBI investigation of Mr. Wahid. The information from the earlier investigation was
obtained in 2024-2025. The FBI had multiple human sources who provided information about
Mr. Wahid's involvement in drug trafficking. One of the cooperating sources admitted to
purchasing drugs from Mr. Wahid in the past. CS-I provided information on Mr. Wahid that the
investigators were able to independently verify, therefore, they believed that CS-I was truthful
and reliable. CS-I told the FBI that Mr. Wahid was transporting bulk quantities of drugs from
California to Ohio, using a female courier who transported the drugs on Greyhound or other
charter buses.
On July 24, 2025, Detectives from the Parma Police Deparment used CS-I to conduct a
controlled purchase of cocaine from Mr. Wahid. The interaction was recorded. During that buy,
Mr. Wahid and CS-I talked about setting up another trip to California to purchase and transport
another large shipment of narcotics. 	Investigators continued to conduct surveillance of Mr.
Wimberly and Mr. Wahid through August 2025. During this period, CS-I told the investigators
that Mr. Wahid was no longer using charter buses to transport narcotics, and instead had switched
to using a semi-truck for the transport. CS-I identified Mr. Wahid's telephone number as (657)
478-3906.
On September 24, 2025, a woman in Canton overdosed on unknown narcotics. A phone
seized during the investigation of her death included calls to the (657) 478-3906 number
identified as belonging to Mr. Wahid. Communications on that phone indicated that its owner
was likely with the deceased at or near the time of her death. They also established that it was
likely that the owner of the phone was the drug supplier of the deceased.
On October 4, 2025, while investigating another overdose death, police obtained
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statements from multiple witnesses. The witnesses stated Mr. Wahid had been called by another
person present to bring drugs to the location, and that Mr. Wahid had showed up with cocaine,
Xanax, methamphetamine, marijuana, and fentanyl. 	This information was corroborated by
phone records that provided communications between a person at the overdose and the (657)
478-3906 phone associated with Mr. Wahid.
In June of 2025, investigators obtained a warrant for call logs and text messages from a
TextNow user account for the number (657) 478-3906. The account came back with usemame
Jeffreymourton97, account address: 919 Hamlin Akron, OH, and DSID: 1218432143. This
warrant uncovered texts between Mr. Wahid and known drug traffickers in the Akron area.
Investigators also learned that Mr. Wahid was addressed by the nicknames "Ish" and "Chris" in
text messages. The search also uncovered two other phone numbers associated with the Jeffrey
Mourton account at the same address, and the same DSID number. Those numbers, (234) 716-
9760 and (234) 238-3865, are the subject of the warrant request at issue in Mr. Wahid's current
motion. Based on the above information contained in the probable cause affidavit for
5 :25MJ1261, the Magistrate found probable cause to issue the requested warrant.
The warrant was issued on November 26, 2025.
The second warrant, 5 :26MJ1021 was for a red Connex box at the storage location 184
Massillon Road, Akron, Ohio. The affidavit in support of that warrant included much of the
same background information as set forth above. Specifically, it described information obtained
from confidential sources who had knowledge of Mr. Wahid. These sources told investigators
that Mr. Wahid was involved in the transport of bulk narcotics from California to Ohio, and that
he used semi trailers to transport the drugs.
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The affidavit outlined the controlled buys that occurred on April 4, 2025 and July 24,
2025, and summarized information obtained through the search of the TextNow accounts. The
affidavit ~so summarized information obtained about Mr. Wahid from the FBI during a meeting
in May of 2025.
In addition to the information discussed above, the affidavit in support for 5 :26MJ1021
stated that CS-2 told the FBI that Mr. Wahid was using a storage location in Akron, Ohio to store
bulk quantities of drugs. CS-2 provided an address for the storage location as 184 Massillon
Road, Akron, Ohio. Investigators conducted surveillance of the address provided and observed
that it appeared to be a tractor trailer storage facility with multiple garage doors. An additional
source, CS-3, who was deemed reliable, told investigators that he had purchased large amounts of
drugs from Mr. Wahid. He further stated that Mr. Wahid travels to California and transports
hundreds of pounds of narcotics to Ohio and then distributes the drugs throughout northeast Ohio.
He also stated that Mr. Wahid mainly communicated through encrypted applications such as
"Signal" or "Whatsapp."
In January of 2026, Mr. House, another of Mr. Wahid's co-defendants, was arrested as he
was driving his semi-truck from California to Ohio and was found to have eight kilograms of
cocaine and $144,990 in U.S. Currency concealed inside the truck. The phone number (234) 238-
3865 which had been associated with Mr. Wahid was shown to have contacted a phone associated
with Mr. House and his trucking company six times between October 20, 2025 and November 5,
2025. Mr. House was known to have had a long criminal history of drug trafficking convictions.
Mr. Wahid was seen on pole cameras showing up at the 184 Massillon Road storage
facility on several different occassions. He was also seen accessing the target red Conex box
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located in the parking lot there. On or about February 6, 2026, CS-1 told investigators that Mr.
Wimberly was expecting a drug shipment to arrive in the coming days. On February 9, 2026, Mr.
Wahid was seen at the target unit talcing a large roller suitcase from a ride share vehicle into the
target unit and leaving it inside.
Based on this information, the Magistrate Judge found probable cause to issue a search
warrant for the red Connex box or target unit. The search resulted in the seizure of bulk
quantities of suspected crystal methamphetamine, fentanyl, cocaine, and a firearm. 	On February
12, 2026, HSI conducted a search of Mr. Wimberly's residence, during which they seized bulk
quantities of suspected crystal methamphetamine and fentanyl, currency, and multiple firearms.
Mr. Wimberly was arrested and taken to Mahoning County Jail in Youngstown, Ohio.
On February 17, 2026, HSI listened to a recorded jail call between Mr. Wimberly and a
woman believed to be his sister. The woman stated that "Chris," a known alias of Mr. Wahid,
came by Mr. Wimberly's residence after the search. She told Mr. Wimberly that "Chris's" phone
number was (330) 703-8247.
On February 19, 2026, Mr. Wahid was arrested. During a search of his vehicle,
investigators found suspected illegal drugs, two Apple smartphones, and $84,807 in cash. HSI
called "Chris's" phone number ((330) 703-8247). When this number was called, one of the two
phones seized from Mr. Wahid showed the HSI number as an incoming call. Based on training
and experience, the investigators know that people involved in drug trafficking use multiple
phones to conduct their illegal activity and that their phones often contain evidence of those
illegal activities. Drug traffickers also are known to take measures to hide their ownership or
identity from the phone companies and others. 	Based on this information, the Magistrate Judge
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found probable cause to issue a search warrant for two phones obtained during the search incident
to Mr. Wahid's arrest.
Investigators further found through surveillance and rental documentation that Mr. Wahid
rents a red and a blue Connex storage box , as well as warehouse space at 184 Massillon Road,
Akron, Ohio. A person matching Mr. Wahid's description was seen on camera entering the
I
warehouse via a garage door, as well as accessing red and blue Connex boxes in the parking lot.
A prior search of the red Connex box found bulk quantities of illegal drugs and a firearm.
Investigators were unable to complete the search of the container, including the inside of several
vehicles found inside. Following Mr. Wahid's arrest investigators were talking to the owner of
the warehouse when Michael Austin, a known drug trafficker arrived. Upon seeing the
investigators, he drove across the street and continued to observe them. He appeared nervous and
upset, and eventually left the area. The rental agreements for the boxes and the warehouse space
were entered into by Forest Hilltop Properties. Mr. Wahid is the sole registered statutory agent
for Forest Hilltop Properties.
The same day, on a recorded call from jail, Mr. Wahid had a conversation with his wife.
She told him she was not good and to be "aware the shaitan is listening" and "making moves."
She told him to talk to "brother 'Clothes,"' and that he "might as well forget that... the thing you
were trying to get "Work" to do." He asked, "With my car?" and she replied, "the car, you can't,
that and the other thing...the warehouse." Mr. Wahid asked "what's wrong with that, cleaning up
my warehouse?" His wife replied, "People went to go take care of it.. .and there was some people
already there for it.. .. you heard me ...already therefor it... shaitan is listening... "
Based on the above information, the Magistrate Judge found probable cause to issue a
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search warrant for the warehouse unit and the two Connex boxes.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing, the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend IV. 	"While the Fourth Amendment secures
the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not, in explicit
language, provide any remedy for the violation of this right." WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, §1:5, 2d ed. 2025; see also, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). The Supreme Court eventually adopted the exclusionary rule
contained in the Fifth Amendment as a necessary implication of the Fourth Amendment, thereby
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution in any judicial
proceeding. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 1081(1961).
Although the exclusionary rule has remained, the justification supporting its application
has narrowed over time. When originally established, the exclusionary rule was seen by the
Supreme Court as both a means of deterring improper policing and of maintaining judicial
integrity. RINGEL, § 1.5. However, in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984), the Supreme Court made clear that the
exclusionary rule should not be used to deter potential errors of judgment in judicial decisions.
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Rather, it should be employed to "operate as a 'systemic' deterrent" to prevent police misconduct
and overreach. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17 ("[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police
misconduct, rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." ). In doing so, the Leon
Court also explicitly held that the exclusionary rule is not in and of itself a Constitutional right,
rather it is a judicially imposed remedy designed to promote adherence to the principles protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 906; see also, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348,
414 U.S. 354 (1974). Hence, not every violation of the Fourth Amendment justifies application
of the exclusionary rule.
In order to justify the exclusion of evidence found during the execution of a search
warrant, a defendant must satisfy several criteria. First, they must establish that they have
standing to challenge the search. Second, they must show that the warrant lacked probable cause.
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984). Finally, they must establish that the officers
executing the warrant were not acting in good faith. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. In situations where a
search warrant has been issued, the burden of proving a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
the appropriateness of exclusion, rests with the party seeking to suppress evidence obtained
during a search. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 (1978)(citing Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968).
Probable cause exists when there exists "a 'fair probability' or 'reasonable ground to
believe' that evidence of a crime or contraband will be found in a particular place." Id.
"Probable cause is not a high bar." United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 462 (6 th Cir. 2024).
In order to issue a warrant the affidavits need not include an "actual showing" of criminal activity
at the location to be searched. United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 311-12 (6 th Cir. 2019).
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Rather, a supporting affidavit need only show direct or circwnstantial support to find, beyond a
mere suspicion, that the searched premises contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See e.g.,
United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 739 (6 th Cir. 2000); lllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983);
United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Church, 823 F.3d
351, 355 (6 th Cir. 2016).
When deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, "the district
court 'owes great deference' to 'the issuing judge's probable cause determination."' United States
v. Walker, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 29543, *3 (6 th Cir. Sept. 25, 2026)(citing United States v.
Sanders, 106 F.4th 455,461 (6 th Cir. 2024)). A judicial determination of probable cause, once
made, must not reversed in the absence of clear error." United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d
1129, 1132 (6 th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted); see also, e.g, United States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d
434,439 (6 th Cir. 2002). "Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a
particular affidavit establishes probable cause," therefore, ''the preference for warrants is most
appropriately effectuated by according 'great deference' to a magistrate's determination." Leon,
468 U.S. at 914 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,419 (1969)). 	"[T]he task of the
reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but only to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the 0udicial officer's]
decision to issue the warrant." Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6 th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
The government does not challenge the defendant's standing to challenge the search
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warrants.
A. Jurisdiction
Mr. Wahid challenges the Magistrate Judges' jurisdiction to hear and issue the challenged
search warrants. He contends that the affiant did not identify a district in which to search for the
property at issue and, therefore, the Magistrate did not have the legal authority to review the
warrant requests. 	Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) establishes that a United States
Magistrate has the authority to sign a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located
within the district, at the request of a federal law enforcement officer. The warrants issued on
February 10, 2026 and February 27, 2026 included the location of the search. The location, 184
Massillon Road in Akron, Ohio is within the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
Magistrate Judge Knapp has full authority to issue warrants within this district.
The warrant issued on February 26, 2026 allowed investigators to access information
stored on two phones that were in their possession in Brooklyn Heights, Ohio. Brooklyn Heights
Ohio is within the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Magistrate Judge Knapp has full
authority to issue warrants within this district.
The warrant issued on November 26, 2025 sought electronic communications and records
information held by Apple, Inc.. Under the Stored Communications Act, any court of competent
jurisdiction may issue an order for disclosure if there are specific and articulable facts showing
that the information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C.
§2703(d). A court of competent jurisdiction includes any district court (including a Magistrate
Judge of such court) that has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated. 18 U.S.C.
§2711 (3)(A)(I). 	The Northern District of Ohio has jurisdiction over the offense being
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investigated. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Knapp had full authority to issue the warrant.
B. Probable Cause
In order to justify the exclusion of evidence a defendant must first establish that the
warrant lacked probable cause. A warrant is based on probable cause if it is supported by an
affidavit that establishes a fair probability, or likelihood that the specific place to be searched will
contain the specific things that law enforcement is looking for. 	United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d
441,447 (6 th Cir. 2021). A review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of a
search warrant is limited to the information contained in the four comers of the supporting
affidavit. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 338 (6 th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Brooks, 594 F.3d 492 (6 th Cir. 2010). The affidavit must be judged based on a totality of the
circumstances, using commonsense, and taking into consideration that they are "normally drafted
by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of an on-going criminal investigation. United States v.
Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 926 (6 th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 877 (6 th Cir.
1986); United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488,490 (6 th Cir. 2010).
Reliance on hearsay is entirely proper. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472,479 (6 th
Cir. 2009). 	Further, probable cause may be based upon information received from informants, as
well as information within the affiant's own knowledge. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. When
information is obtained from informants, the affidavit must provide "some of the underlying
circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was ... 'credible' or his
information 'reliable."' Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
When considered as a whole, each of the warrant affidavits challenged by Mr. Wahid
easily meet the probable cause requirement. The affidavits included information, from sources
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deemed reliable, that directly tied Mr. Wahid, his telephones, and the storage unit and boxes to
drug trafficking activity. The information provided by the outside sources was corroborated by
Agents through surveillance, pole cameras, and records research.
There was evidence, both direct and circumstantial that indicated Mr. Wahid was storing
drugs in the locations subject to the search warrants, and that he used multiple telephones to
conduct drug trafficking business. The affiant also established that based on his training and
experience the phones were likely to contain evidence of drug trafficking, and the conversation
between Mr. Wahid and his wife indicated that he had attempted to clear contraband out of the
storage unit and boxes. A "practical common sense evaluation of all of the circumstances" leaves
no question that the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the property searched and the
alleged crimes, and was substantially likely to uncover evidence related to those crimes. See
United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683,686 (6 th Cir. 2008); see also Walker, 2026 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29543, at *7.
There was no error, let alone clear error, in the Magistrate's determination of probable
cause. The affidavits supporting the search warrants provide substantial evidence to support a
finding of probable cause and the issuance of the warrants. The information provided establishes
more than a fair probability, or likelihood that the authorized searches would contain the specific
items sought by law enforcement. The warrant was supported by probable cause and its issuance
and execution did not violate Mr. Wah.id's Fourth Amendment rights. There is no basis upon
which to exclude any evidence obtained during the search of this property.
C. Good Faith Execution
Even if the warrant affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause, the evidence
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obtained should not be suppressed. The exclusionary rule does not apply when officers
reasonably rely on a search warrant, even one that is unsupported by probable cause, or is
technically deficient on its face. Leon, 468 U.S. 897; Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981. 	Except in
extraordinary circumstances, the existence of a search warrant issued by a magistrate suffices to
show that the executing officer acted in good faith in conducting the search. United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n. 32 (1982); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 	"[W]here officers rely in an
objectively reasonable fashion on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is
subsequently found to be invalid, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require
suppression of the fruits of the search." United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926,931 (6 th Cir.
1990).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized four grounds for finding extraordinary
circumstances that could override the good faith presumption:
(1) if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was misled by information in an
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for
his reckless disregard of the truth, Franks v Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978);
(2) if the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role, to the degree that the
warrant was open-ended and left to be completed after the seizure was already
carried out;" Leon at 923 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979);
(3) if the warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," Brown v. lllinois, 22 U.S. 263-64
(White J., concurring in judgment); or
(4) if the warrant is "so facially deficient - i.e. in failing to particularize the place
to be searched or the things to be seized - that the executing officers cannot
reasonably be presumed to be valid." Leon at 923; Cf Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 988-991.
"In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, 'excluding the evidence will not
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further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for ... the officer is acting as a
reasonable officer would and should act under the circumstances. Excluding the evidence [under
such circumstances] can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing
to do his duty."' Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976). Mr.
Wahid brings challenges to the good faith execution of the warrants under exceptions one (1) and
four (4).
1. Veracity of Affidavit
In order to prove the first exception, it is necessary to determine whether the officer(s)
providing the affidavits for the search request included information that they knew was false or
would have known was false but for their reckless disregard for the truth. "When 'the Fourth
Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to compromise 'probable cause,' the obvious
assumption will be a truthful showing.' This does not mean 'truthful' in the sense that every fact
recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct ... [b]ut surely it is to be 'truthful' in the
sense that the information put forward is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as
true." Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165 (quoting United States v. Halsey, 257 F.Supp. 1002, 1005
(SDNY 1969)(emphasis in original).
A defendant who challenges the veracity of the affidavit may be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, in order to meet his burden of proof. In
order to be permitted a hearing under Franks, however, the defendant must first present
"allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations
must be accompanied by an offer of proof." Franks at 171. The allegations must be more than
conclusory, and the proffer must specifically identify the claimed falsities, and include a
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statement of supporting reasons, along with supporting affidavits or other reliable statements or
an explanationjustifying their absence. United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931,934 (6 th Cir.
1990). 	"Only after the defendant makes this showing may the court consider the veracity of the
statements in the affidavit or the potential effect of any omitted information." United States v.
Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 558-59 (6 th Cir. 2012).
Identifying allegedly false statements provided by informants is insufficient, as are
allegations of negligence or mistake. Franks at 171-172. "It is not enough for defendants to
show that the affidavit contains false information; in order to obtain a Franks hearing, defendants
must make a 'substantial preliminary showing' that the false statements originated with the
government affiant." United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 477 (6 th Cir. 1988). Further, it is
insufficient "for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the
court to ... put flesh on its bones." United States v. Truett, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4764, *9 (6 th
Cir. Feb. 27, 2025)(quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6 th Cir. 1997)). Even if
a defendant meets the requirements for a Franks hearing, as outlined above, he must also
establish that "absent the challenged statements, the affidavit would fail to support a finding of
probable cause." Bennett, 905 F.2d at 934. In this case, Mr. Wahid does not satisfy the
requirements for obtaining a Franks hearing.
The only allegation of falsity in Mr. Wahid's motion is his purported belief that one
statement in support of the search warrant for the red Connex box was "an obviously false
statement." The statement at issue is that "CS-2 told the FBI that Wahid utilizes a storage
location to store bulk drugs." He did not make a sworn declaration in support of this allegation
and offered no attempt at an offer of proof. The only argument he offers for his claim is that
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Special Agent Battaglia did not include this information in his Report of Investigation dated
February 23, 2026. However, the agent clearly states that his affidavit is based on information
beyond what he gathered in his own personal investigation, and this information was purportedly
provided to the FBI, not to the HSI team that Special Agent Battaglia was a part of. Further, Mr.
Wahid insinuates that this information could not be true because there was insufficient
corroboration for it in the evidence set forth in the affidavit. When making a probable cause
determination, a court is limited to the four comers of the affidavit. United States v. Rose, 714
F.3d 362, 366 (6 th Cir. 2013). An affidavit is judged based on the adequacy of what it contains,
not on what is lacking, or what more could or should have been included. United States v. Allen,
211 F.3d 970, 975 (6 th Cir. 2000).
Mr. Wahid does not proffer any evidence that would disprove the statement. Nor does he
allege that the agent making the affidavit created the false statement or knew that the information
was false. 	Without some showing that the government official involved was or should have been
aware of the falsity of the information, this bald allegation is insufficient to show bad faith.
In his motion for a Franks hearing, Mr. Wahid also argues that Mr. Battaglia's Report of
Investigation does not state that CS-2 met Mr. Wahid at the red Connex box, or that he purchased
drugs or saw drugs stored at the red Connex box. This does not point to a falsity in the affidavit,
as the affidavit does not claim that these things occurred. Further, the fact that such statements
are not in the affidavit, or the report, does not affect the probable cause determination. Things
that are missing from the affidavit do not affect the adequacy of the affidavit. 1 See Allen, 211
Mr. Wahid also argues that the affidavit did not adequately disclose the consideration
expected by the confidential informants. This is an issue that may be appropriately
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F.3d at 975.
Mr. Wahid also argues in his Motion for Franks hearing that "Steven Davis was not a
SOI 2 or CS-I as alleged by Agent Battaglia in his affidavit for 5:26MJI021." However, Mr.
Wahid has not provided any affidavit in 5 :26MJI 021 that attempts to name any of the
confidential sources or informants. None of the affidavits on docket in the 5:26MJI021 mention
an SO I or 2,or provides the identify CS-I or any other confidential source. Therefore, Mr.
Wahid has failed to identify any false statement within the affidavit. The statement Mr. Wahid
argues is false was not in the affidavit and was, therefore, not relied on for, or necessary to the
issuance of the warrant. 2
Even if an informant were misnamed in an affidavit, a mere mistake is insufficient to
create a right to a Franks hearing. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-165. Further, despite his
assertion that there is an operational plan that allegedly documents the alleged misidentification
of the CS for the April 4, 2025 buy, Mr. Wahid has not provided that document to the Court. He
had the opportunity to present the evidence as part of his brief, as an attachment to his affidavit,
as an exhibit to his Reply brief. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court also held hearings to
allow each defendant to supplement their arguments and provide the Court with any offers of
addressed when assessing credibility of a witness at trial, but has no bearing on the validity
of the search warrant.
2
The April 4, 2025 controlled buy is referenced in the affidavit without identifying
information. It was not, however, necessary to the establishment of probable cause for that
warrant. The information obtained from other sources about the existence, purpose, and
address of the storage location, along with the information obtained from surveillance of
the storage location was more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause for the
search.
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proof they may have in support of their motions. These hearings were held on September 18,
October 5, and October 6, 2026. Despite these multiple opportunities to provide evidence
addressing the sufficiency and veracity of the warrant affidavit, Mr. Wahid failed to produce any
evidence and instead made arguments based on unsupported inferences. He has provided no
evidence or other offer of proof that could reasonably support the conclusion that Mr. Batteglia
knowingly lied about the identity of his source, or any other information contained in the
affidavits.
Mr. Wahid failed to meet his burden of providing a "substantial preliminary showing'
that any false statements were made by the government affiant, let alone that such statements
were knowing or reckless. Having failed to make the required showing, he is not entitled to a
Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of the warrant affidavit.
2. Judicial Misconduct
Mr. Wahid does not allege any judicial misconduct in the issuance of the warrants. There
is no allegation that the magistrate abandoned her judicial role, or otherwise acted in a way that
would invalidate the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319 (1979).
3. Indicia of Probable Cause
Defendant does not specifically contend that the search warrants had no indicia of
probable cause and, therefore, could not reasonably have been relied on by the officers executing
the warrants. 	Further, there would be no basis for such a claim. As set forth above, based on the
evidence and information contained in the affidavit, an officer executing the warrant would have
no objective reason to doubt its validity. This Court has determined that the affidavit provided a
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substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. However, even if the Court of Appeals
disagreed, the good faith exception would still apply. In order to find that an executing officer
cannot rely on a judicially approved warrant, the officer would have to be aware that the
supporting affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable." United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6 th Cir. 2004).
In this case, even if the affidavit did not provide a sufficiently substantial basis upon
which the judge could have found probable cause, it was not so deficient that a reasonable officer
would have reason to believe that the issuance of the warrant was "entirely unreasonable." The
affidavits for the challenged warrants are a far cry from the "bare bones" affidavits that a
reasonable officer would be expected to recognize as defective despite its having been reviewed
and approved by a judicial officer. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 106 F.4th 568,572 (6 th Cir.
2024); United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441,445 (6 th Cir. 2021). Therefore, the officers had the
right to rely on the judicial determination that a search was warranted. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798,823 n. 32 (1982); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
(4) Facial Validity
Mr. Wahid argues that the warrants at issue in his motion were facially invalid because
they did not include a proper description of the person or property to be seized, and did not
incorporate an affidavit providing probable cause. He does admit that the warrants reference
attachments that list the items to be seized. (ECF #114, PagelD 3345). 	Further, Mr. Wahid does
not contend that the search resulted in the seizure of items not included in the scope of the items
contained in the attachment.
The Sixth Circuit has consistently found that a search warrant is facially valid when it
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incorporates other supporting documents if those documents are identified by name. See United
States v. Evans Landscaping, 850 Fed.Appx. 942 (6 th Cir. 2021). Documents are sufficiently
identified if they are labeled as an attachment, such as Attachment A or Attachment B. See, e.g.,
Id.; United States v. Pritchett, 40 F.App'x 901,906 (6 th Cir. 2002). In each of the challenged
search warrants, the warrant specifically incorporates labeled attachments in satisfaction of the
requirement. Even one of the cases cited by Mr. Wahid, Groh v. Ramirez, 50 U.S. 551 (2004),
noted that attachments appended to the warrant may be considered to be part of the warrant itself,
if "the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation" by reference and the attachments
accompany the warrant." Id at 558. All four warrants in Mr. Wahid's case use adequate
language incorporating by reference the attachments that define the location and items to be
searched and/or seized.
Mr. Wahid does not allege that the attachments were not included with or were
unavailable to the executing officers at the time the warrant was executed. He does argue that the
warrants nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment because do they do not adequately
incorporate the affidavit establishing probable cause. This, however, is not a constitutional
requirement. The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The warrants all include a statement
by the Magistrate Judge that she found "the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish
probable cause to search and seize the person or property described ...." This affirms that the
Magistrate has performed her Constitutional mandate, making an independent determination that
the affidavit and/or testimony presented by the requesting agent is sufficient to establish probable
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cause for the described search and seizure. Thus, the warrant was issued upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation. The only content requirement for the warrant itself is that it
particularly describes the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. As set forth
above, the descriptions incorporated through identifiable attachments to the warrant or to the
warrant application are sufficient to satisfy this requirement. See United States v. Evans
Landscaping Inc., 850 Fed. Appx. 942,948 (6 th Cir. 2021)(citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
557 (2004); United States v. Pritchett, 40 F. App'x 901,906 (6 th Cir. 2002).
The Magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the warrants, and the application affidavit
provided sufficient probable cause for the searches. Further, there is no showing of bad faith, and
the warrants were facially valid. Therefore, the court cannot suppress the evidence obtained
during execution of the search warrants. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United
States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926,931 (6 th Cir. 1990).
D. Vehicle/Person Search
Defendant also argues the search of his person and his vehicle following his arrest was
unconstitutional. Searches incident to a lawful arrest are an exception to the warrant requirement.
Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). Police may conduct a warrantless search incident to
a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may
be found on the person or in the vehicle. United States v. Hoffpowier, No. 25-5327 (6 th Cir.
2026). Searches of a person incident to a lawful arrest require no additional justification beyond
the probable cause necessary to effectuate the arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973).
Mr. Wahid was arrested pursuant to a valid active federal warrant for charges of
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possessing with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing narcotics. The police were
within their rights to search his person and his vehicle for any evidence relating to these charges.
As to the argument that the search of car was delayed beyond the time necessary for the arrest,
that argwnent has no substance. The duration of the stop depends on what happens during the
stop and the attendant circwnstances. United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919,923 (6 th cir. 2020).
The interaction between the officer and Mr. Wahid was not unnecessarily prolonged. The
undisputed testimony at the October 6, 2026 hearing showed that the canine arrived within ten
minutes to conduct a free air sniff, for which no probable cause or warrant is required. Mr.
Wahid was already detained, and had requested that a family member pick up the car. The car
was in the parking lot running at the time Mr. Wahid was arrested and there is no evidence that a
family member could arrived sooner than ten minutes in order to take possession of the car.
Further, the officer had a right and an obligation to address potential safety concerns with
regard to the vehicle. The vehicle was unlocked and running at the time of the arrest, and no one
was on site to take possession of the vehicle. The officer also had the right to investigate the car
attendant to Mr. Wahid's arrest. Mr. Wahid was being arrested for a drug trafficking offense and
prior to his arrest, the officer saw Mr. Wahid reach into the rear passenger side door and access a
bag before leaving the vehicle. The officer had probable cause to believe the car may contain
evidence relevant to the charges against Mr. Wahid based on the nature of the arrest warrant and
the observed behavior. Further, following the canine's alert, he had probable cause to extend the
search to the interior of the vehicle. 	Mr. Wahid has not demonstrated a Fourth Amendment
violation in the search of his person or his vehicle attendant to his arrest. There is no basis upon
which to exclude any evidence obtained during those searches.
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E. Delayed Notice
At the October 6, 2026 hearing, Mr. Wahid raised a new challenge to the search warrant
for the red Connex box in 5:25MJ1021. The Patriot Act, 18 U.S.C. §3103a(b), permits warrants
to be executed without notice if a court finds that immediate notification may have an adverse
result, and if the delay in notification is for a reasonable amount of time. The warrant in this case
did not check the box indicating that there had been a finding under 18 U.S.C. §3103a(b) that
immediate notification would have an adverse effect, but it did authorize a 30 day delay in
notification. The warrant application provided sufficient support for a fmding that immediate
notification would have an adverse effect because it would have clued the target into the
existence of existing surveillance and would jeopardize the investigation.
Regardless of whether the face of the warrant communicated the findings required by the
Patriot Act, the exclusionary rule is not an available remedy for the alleged deficiency. "[T]here is
no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations." United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d
547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006). "The availability of the suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed
to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially
fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights." United
States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 667 (4th Cir. 201 l)(quoting United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413, 432 n.22 (1977)). "The exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction for a statutory violation
only where the statute specifically provides for suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation
implicates underlying consitutional rights." Abdi, 463 F.3d at 556. To the extent that
communication of the fmdings supporting delayed notice may have fallen short, it would have
been a statutory violation and did not affect the constitutionality of the warrant.
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In this case, there is no constitutional violation because the executed warrant was issued
on probable cause and described the search and items to be seized with particularity. The Fourth
Amendment does not "necessarily require that government agents serve a warrant or an
attachment thereto, prior to initiating a search or seizing property." United States v. Pritchett, 40
Fed. Appx. 901 , 907 (6 th Cir. 2002). "'[A] search conducted in accordance with a valid warrant
does not become warrantless . .. due to the manner in which the officers conducted the search"
because the specificity requirement does not extend to the means by which the warrant is
executed." United States v. Whitsell, 2010 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 56358, *6 (quoting Baranski v.
Fifteen Unknown Agents, 452 F.3d 433 , 441 (6 th Cir. 2006)). As it was in Hudson v. Michigan ,
547 U. S. 586 (2006), the interests protected by the delayed notice requirements are different from
those protected by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. When, as in, the interests
violated by the failure have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable. Id . at Syllabus, ~ (b ).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendant' s Motion to Suppress and Motion for
Franks Hearing are DENIED. (ECF #114, 144). IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States Distri
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